South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN	AFGHANISTAN

IMAM: TTP's Deception?
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 8, 2022, four soldiers were killed in a suicide blast targeting a military convoy in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Two days later, on August 10, Ittehad Musallah Islami Mujahideen (IMAM)’s spokesperson Abu Basheer Waziristani claimed responsibility for the attack.

On August 3, 2022, two policemen were killed and another two were injured when a hand grenade exploded at the Karachi Police Headquarters in Karachi, Sindh. Though IMAM has not directly claimed the attack,  social media accounts sympathetic to IMAM have claimed that it was carried out by the outfit.

On July 22, 2022, suspected IMAM militants opened fire on a police patrol van, leaving two persons injured, including a policeman, at Khwar Bazaar in the Akora Khattak area of Nowshera District in KP.

On July 16, 2022, IMAM militants killed District Police Officer (DPO) Gul Rehman near his residence in the Lakki Machan Khel area of Lakki Marwat District in Sindh.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since the start of ceasefire between the government and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on May 1, 2022, IMAM has claimed four attacks across Pakistan, which resulted in seven fatalities, all Security Force (SF) personnel (data till August 14, 2022).   

It is believed that IMAM is a reincarnation of Ansar-ul-Mujahideen, led by Mufti Shafiq, a leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan – Gandapur group (TTP-Gandapur group), which came into existence in March 2013. The militant formation had two stated organizational goals: to avenge the death of each and every drone strike victim; and to target the Shia community. However, on March 1, 2014, when TTP declared a one-month long ceasefire with the government, the Ansar-ul Mujahideen opposed it and continued its violent activities.

Some of the prominent attacks owned by Ansar-ul-Mujahideen over the years include:

These incidents demonstrated the strength and brutality of the group over these years.  

However, the outfit lost its relevance gradually, as it suffered major losses during Operation Zarb-e-Azb (Sword of the Prophet), which was launched by the Army on June 15, 2014, targeting TTP, forcing the group to relocate to Afghanistan.

At a time when TTP is engaged in talks with the government, the Ansar-ul-Mujahideen has now found opportunities to reassert itself in Pakistan.

Significantly, another outfit, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HBG) has also escalated violence since the talks began. According to the SATP database, since the beginning of the ceasefire (May 1,2022), at least 32 HGB-linked fatalities (six SF personnel and 26 militants) have been recorded in Pakistan (data till August 14, 2022).  33 targeted civilian killings that took place in North Waziristan District between January 2022 and July 2022 were also attributed by the local administration to the Ariana and Ghazi Force. The Ghazi Force was formed after the Lal Masjid Operation in 2007 and it later joined TTP. Most of its members are now reportedly part of HBG.

While many believe that these two groups are reasserting themselves to put pressure on Islamabad  for greater concessions, Farhan Jeffery, a longtime observer of Jihadi groups active in the Afghan-Pakistan region, claims that IMAM has been reactivated by TTP to maintain ‘deniability’ on its role in the ongoing violence. Jeffery claims that HGB, like Ansar-ul-Mujahideen, is TTP’s ‘B team.’

Whether they are working on their own or as TTP’s ‘B team’, violence in the region will put added pressure on Islamabad to make some concessions. A ‘breakthrough’ has already been achieved, and an indefinite ceasefire was announced following these concessions by the Pakistan Government, which was struggling to contain political and economic instability.

The Pakistani state may, understandably, also have started to assert itself to secure some leverage vis-à-vis TTP. The suspicious assassinations of four top TTP ‘commanders’ in Afghanistan could be a case in point. While no group has claimed responsibility for the incidents, the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI’s) role is suspected, as those who were eliminated were reportedly hardcore TTP elements not ready to reconcile with the government. The four TTP leaders killed included:

In a statement released in Urdu on August 9, 2022, the TTP eulogized the deceased 'commanders' and warned,

Indeed, TTP and its affiliates have also carried out some attacks since then, including:

Meanwhile, on August 8,2022, the 11^th Corps commander of Peshawar, Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, who was leading the talks with TTP, was replaced by Lieutenant General Hassan Azhar Hayat. Lieutenant General Hameed was transferred to the Bahawalpur-based 31st Corps. Notably, Lieutenant General Hayat was reportedly part of the Doha talks and had served as General Officer Commanding in Miran Shah, besides also being the Brigade commander in the same area. This was described by some as a surprise move, essentially implying that the Army's role might be more focused on operations, rather than on talks.

The TTP-Government negotiations will now be determined by the outcomes of the shadow games playing out in the tribal areas across the Durand line. Whether or not the negotiations progress, an imminent escalation of violence appears likely. In the worst case, this could spread from the frontier into the urban areas, particularly given the fragile political and economic situation in the country.

PAKISTAN

Balochistan: Targeting Oil and Gas
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 3, 2022, Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) cadres blew up the gas pipeline in the Chashma Aab area of Mach in the Kachhi District of Balochistan. BLA ‘spokesman’ Azad Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack and warned, "Our such attacks will continue till the independence of occupied Balochistan." 

On July 29, 2022, Baloch Republican Guards (BRG) cadres blew up the gas pipeline in the Sui area of Dera Bugti District. BRG ‘spokesperson’ Dostin Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack and cautioned all oil and gas exploration companies in Dera Bugti to withdraw from “all exploitation projects of the occupiers, otherwise they would be responsible for their losses.”

On July 26, 2022, BLA cadres targeted a vehicle of an oil and gas exploration company in Bolan District. BLA ‘spokesman’ Jeehand Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack. "BLA warns all exploration companies to refrain from being involved in exploitation projects or they will be targeted", Jeehand Baloch stated.

On July 18, 2022, BLA cadres destroyed a gas plant in the Sheekhri area of Kalat District. Jeehand Baloch stated that the gas well was destroyed and the security guards at the site were taken into ‘custody’. As the guards were locals, they were released later with warnings. Their weapons were, however, confiscated. BLA warned locals to refrain from being accessories of enemy forces and its exploitation projects, or they would be targeted.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), militants have carried out at least six attacks targeting Gas/Oil installations and tankers in Balochistan in 2022 (data till August 14, 2022). Two Security Force (SF) personnel have died in these attacks. There was not a single such attack in 2021. A total of 248 such attacks have been recorded since August 16, 2004, when the first such attack was recorded. These 248 attacks have resulted in 41 fatalities and 45 persons injured. Five paramilitary troops have been killed and another 12 sustained injuries in two attacks near the Sui gas fields of Dera Bugti District.

Attacks targeting Gas/Oil Installations and Tankers: 2004*-2022**

Pakistan's economy is highly natural gas dependent, with this resource accounting for about 50 per cent of the country's total energy consumption. Attacks targeting this source of energy have significant detrimental impact on the country's economy, a reality the Baloch insurgents are well aware of, and seek to exploit. This also explains the disproportionate number of incidents and causalities, as the main objective of Baloch insurgents is to inflict economic damage on the Pakistani establishment, and not to kill people. Indeed, after the June 29, 2020, Pakistan Stock Exchange attack, which resulted in 15 deaths, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) 'spokesperson', Jeehand Baloch had declared,

Natural gas was discovered at Sui in Balochistan as far back as in 1952. The commercial production of gas commenced in 1955. Ironically, more than 60 to 70 per cent of the population of the district does not have a ‘Sui gas’ facility even after 67 years. The Balochistan Minister for Education, Abdul Rahim Khan Ziaratwal, informed the Balochistan Assembly on August 28, 2017, that, of the 33 Districts in the Province, 23 had no supplies of natural gas. Later, on December 9, 2019, the then convener of the Subcommittee of the Senate Standing Committee on Planning Development and Reforms, Mir Kabeer, disclosed that 93 per cent of the people of Balochistan lacked gas supply, while 88 per cent were without electricity. According to a September 24, 2021, report presented to the National Assembly, only 36 per cent of the area of Balochistan had electricity in 2021.

According to the latest Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA)’s State of the Regulated Petroleum Industry Report 2019-20, Sindh’s share in gas supply was 45 per cent of the country’s total, whereas Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan and Punjab supplied 12, 11 and three per cent respectively. However, Province-wise gas consumption showed that Punjab’s share was 56 per cent, Sindh 33 per cent, KP nine per cent and Balochistan two per cent of total gas consumption during 2019-20.

Contrary to its contribution to national coffer, like the previous years, Balochistan has been neglected in budgetary allocation again. In 2022 budget, Punjab got lion’s share of 51.74 per cent in budgetary distribution of resources among the federation and provinces; followed by Sindh, 24.55 per cent; KP, 14.62 per cent and Balochistan, 9.09 per cent.  

On May 20, 2018, Former Balochistan Chief Minister Mir Abdul Quddus Bizenjo alleged that the province’s funds were being spent on the development of Punjab, and that the Federal Government had ignored Balochistan. The Federal Government has failed to fulfil its promise of giving the province its due share under the Public Sector Development Programme.

In an interview on May 7, 2019, Karima Baloch, former chairperson of the Baloch Students Organisation-Azad, had said that Pakistan "doesn't want the Baloch people but wants the resources there. It has been its policy of exploiting the resources." Significantly, BLA 'chief' Basheer Zeb, during a media interview on July 15, 2020, had asserted,

According to a July 29, 2022, report, Balochistan Liberation Front chief Allah Nazar Baloch stated, in a video message, that Baloch national wealth was being exploited: "Baloch is considered as an enemy", he declared, "I, on behalf of the Baloch nation, want to tell China that you should avoid being a partner of our occupier (Pakistan)."

Insurgency in Balochistan has principally been linked to a sense of deprivation and under-development in the region. The indices of Balochistan's underdevelopment of include:

Through these recent attacks on gas and oil installations in the province, the Baloch insurgent groups have once again demonstrated that they will continue to fight against Pakistani state exploitation. With no visible signs of Islamabad making any changes in its extractive policies, such attacks are likely to continue.