South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Balochistan: Cycles of Repression and Reaction
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On February 10, 2023, two Army personnel were killed in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) explosion in the Kohlu area (Kohlu District) of Balochistan. Based on credible intelligence, a sanitisation operation was initiated by Security Forces (SFs) when an IED explosion resulted in the death of two soldiers.

On February 5, 2023, six Army personnel were killed and an unspecified number of others sustained injuries, when Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) cadres attacked Brigadier Shahid Nadeem's convey with an IED, on the Quetta-Sibi National Highway in the Sirajabad area of the Bolan District. BLF ‘spokesman’ Gwahram Baloch claimed responsibility.

On February 5, 2023, one SF trooper, identified as Tanveer, was killed and another eight were injured in a suicide blast in the Gulistan Road area of Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack.

On February 3, 2023, four Pakistan Coast Guard (PCG) personnel were killed and another five were injured when Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) cadres attacked a patrolling team with a remote-controlled bomb and firing with automatic weapons, in the Jeemuri area of Gwadar District. BLA ‘spokesman’ Azad Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Balochistan has recorded 36 Security Force (SF) personnel fatalities in 22 terrorism-related incidents so far, in the current year (data till February 19, 2023). During the corresponding period of 2022, the province had recorded 33 SF fatalities in 14 terrorism-related incidents. Through 2022, 202 SF fatalities were recorded in the province, a rise of 92.38 per cent over year 2021, at 105 SF fatalities. In terms of SF fatalities, the 2022 tally was the highest, at 202, since the SATP database started documenting fatalities in Pakistan. The preceding high in the province was 177 in 2012, at a time when terrorism was rampaging across Pakistan.

The overall fatalities in Balochistan in 2022 totalled 406 (88 civilians, 202 SF personnel and 116 terrorists) in 160 incidents of killing, as against 308 such fatalities (111 civilians, 107 SF personnel, and 90 terrorists) in 111 such incidents in 2021, registering an increase of 31.82 per cent.

Incidents of killing increased from 111 in 2021 to 160 in 2022. Incidents of killing had dropped from 148 in 2016 to 82 in 2017, 69 in 2018, 48 in 2019 and 76 in 2020. Similarly, major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) increased from 40 in 2021 to 52 in 2022, and the resultant fatalities from 200 to 271. The number of explosions and resultant fatalities increased from 66 and 92, respectively, in 2021, to 94 and 100, respectively, in 2022. The number of suicide attacks remained the same, two each in 2021 and 2022.The two suicide attacks in 2022 were:

November 30: A Policeman and a child were killed, while 24 others, including 20 Policemen, were injured in a suicide blast targeting a Police truck in the Baleli area of Quetta. The blast targeted a Police team preparing to escort polio vaccinators. TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

March 8: A suicide bomb explosion at the Jail Road of Sibbi town (Sibbi District) killed seven SF personnel and wounded another 28. The explosion occurred as President Arif Alvi was in the city, which was holding the Sibbi Mella (Fair), a well-known annual festival. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack.

Even as all parameters of violence indicate that the overall security situation in Balochistan has deteriorated significantly in 2022, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killing of ethnic Baloch by the security apparatus have been rampant. The annual report released on January 12, 2023, by Paank, the human rights organization of the Baloch National Movement (BNM), recorded that the Pakistan Army forcibly disappeared 629 persons, extra-judicially killed 195, and tortured 187. The report declared that year 2022 was full of human tragedy in Balochistan, with mass punishment, forced disappearances, murders, massacres and violence.

According to the report, in January 2022, 92 forced disappearances, 15 murders were recorded, and one person was tortured by the Army in Balochistan.  95 enforced disappearances, 42 murders and 5 cases of torture were reported in February. In March, 62 people were forcibly ‘disappeared’, 19 were killed and six were tortured. 50 enforced disappearances, 39 murders and 18 cases of torture were reported in April. 61 enforced disappearances, five murders and 22 cases of torture were reported in May. In June, 26 people forcibly disappeared, and 11 people were murdered. In July, 46 people forcibly disappeared, 16 were killed, and 28 were tortured. 55 forced disappearances, five murders and 37 cases of torture were reported in August. In September, 30 forced disappearances, two murders were recorded, and 19 people were tortured. In October, 38 people were forcibly ‘disappeared’, 15 were killed, and 18 were tortured. In November, 36 people were forcibly ‘disappeared’, 23 were killed, and 14 were tortured. 38 enforced disappearances and two murders were recorded, and 19 people were tortured, in December 2022.

On January 30, 2023, under the Universal Periodic Review process at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, member states called on Pakistan to stop enforced disappearances and other human rights abuses, and demanded protection for the people.

The escalating attacks on SFs in Balochistan are substantially a consequence of the continuing frustration among Baloch nationalist groups over the systematic extermination of ethnic Baloch through enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings by Pakistani security agencies, in addition to the persistent neglect of the basic needs of the population.

The systematic campaign of extermination by Pakistani security agencies is being countered by the Baloch insurgent groups through the escalating attacks on SFs. Reprisal attacks by the major Baloch insurgent groups such as the Baloch National Army (BNA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA) resulted in the escalating casualties among SF personnel in 2022.

A strengthening of the Baloch insurgent groups is indicated by the February 2, 2022, simultaneous attacks by BLA cadres on the Panjgur and Nuskhi Army camps in Balochistan, which resulted in 19 fatalities (15 terrorists and four SF personnel). Indeed, while Pakistan Government sources claimed only four SF fatalities, Radio Zrumbesh, quoting BLA ‘spokesman’ Jeehand Baloch, claimed that 45 SF personnel were killed in the attack, when a ‘martyred’ fidayeen (suicide attacker) rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the main gate of the Frontier Corps headquarters at Nushki, clearing the way for other fidayeen to enter.

After the February 2 attacks, the then Federal Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid, citing intelligence reports, told the media on February 3,

The speculation on a TTP-Baloch militant alliance appeared to receive some confirmation when TTP 'spokesperson' Mohammad Khurasani congratulated the Baloch insurgent groups for their attacks in Nuskhi and Panjgur. He stated, "The Pakistani Army is carrying out the massacre in Balochistan. We are against the massacre of Balochistan as well as in Waziristan by the Pakistani Army. Our enemy is common."

Since the February 2, 2022, twin attacks, emboldened Baloch groups have mounted repeated strikes on SFs, including some high-profile operations:

August 1, 2022: Six Army personnel, including Lieutenant General Sarfraz Ali, Corps Commander, XII Corps, were killed in an Army helicopter crash. The helicopter went missing in the Lasbela District of Balochistan in the night of August 1, and the wreckage was found near the Moosa Goth area on August 2. Baloch Raji Ajoi Sanger (BRAS) ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan, in a statement to the media, claimed the helicopter had been shot down.

July 15, 2022: BLA cadres shot dead the head of the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), Eid Muhammad Hassani aka Eido, near Naurozabad Road in Kharan town (Kharan District). BLA ‘spokesman’ Azad Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack, declaring that Eid Muhammad had worked as Station House Officer (SHO) in the Kharan Police Department for many years before joining CTD, and was being used as a pawn by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). At the behest of the ISI, he used to monitor the movement of Baloch cadres and to barricade the area. Apart from this, he had extra-judicially handed over Baloch youth to secret agencies on fabricated charges or without any grounds.

July 13: Army Lieutenant Colonel Laiq Baig Mirza, who was abducted along with his cousin Umer Javed by BLA cadres near the Warchoom area of Ziarat District, was killed, while five BLA cadres were later killed during an exchange of fire near the Mangi Dam area of same District. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeehand Baloch claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that Lieutenant Colonel Mirza was ‘arrested’ in an intelligence-based operation by BLA’s special force, the Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS). Mirza was a prime target and he was being tracked for days by BLA’s intelligence units. Mirza was ‘arrested’ as an officer of the ‘occupying forces’, and for his direct involvement in the Baloch genocide and grave human rights violations, including enforced disappearances of women and children, among other crimes.

Frustration among Baloch insurgent groups over the enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings by Pakistan security agencies in Balochistan resounded in other Provinces as well:

On February 16, 2023, a blast inside the Quetta-bound Jaffar Express train killed two passengers and injured six others when the train was passing from Chichawatni railway station in Sahiwal District of Punjab. Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA), through its media cell Baask Media, claimed responsibility for the attack.

April 26, 2022: Five persons including three Chinese nationals, their Pakistani driver and a security guard, were killed when a women suicide bomber blew herself up near a van transporting Chinese nationals from a Karachi University (KU) hostel to the Confucius institute in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. BLA claimed responsibility for the attack. The female suicide bomber, Shaari Baloch aka Bramsh, belongs to BLA’s Majeed Brigade, a suicide bomber squad. She was the first Baloch woman suicide bomber. 

January 20, 2022: Three persons were killed and over 33 were injured in a bomb explosion near Pan Mandi in the New Anarkali Bazar area of Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab. Baloch Nationalist Army (BNA) claimed responsibility for the attack.

State atrocities on Baloch people and the Government’s skewed developmental priorities, focused on exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources without significant benefits for the local population, have also provoked attacks on non-locals in Balochistan. Baloch insurgents targeted ‘outsiders’, especially Punjabis, as they were considered either as agents of the security forces, or were engaged in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects to exploit their natural resources of the province. According to partial data compiled by SATP, a total of 243 ‘outsiders’ have been killed in Balochistan since August 26, 2006, (data till December 31, 2022). Of these, 187 were Punjabis. Other ‘outsiders’ were also part of the ethnic ‘collateral damage’. Out of 56 non-Punjabi ‘outsiders’, 37 were Sindhis, while the ethnic identity of the remaining 19 remains unconfirmed. The most recent attack was on January 18, 2023, when BLA cadres killed a non-Baloch person on the charges of being an Army agent at Absar in Turbat, the administrative centre of Kech District. BLA ‘spokesman’ Jeehand Baloch claimed responsibility for the killing, disclosing that the intelligence wing of BLA had gathered information that the non-resident, Babo Khan aka Allah Rakhia, was working as an informant for the Pakistani military in Turbat and adjoining areas.

Though there have been no major attacks on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, a series of protests have started against Chinese interests in the province under the banner of the Haq Do Tehreek (Give our Rights Movement) led by Maulana Hidayat ur Rehman, who is also the general secretary of Jamaat-e-Islami in Balochistan. The protesters started a sit-in in Gwadar on October 27, 2022, demanded an end to illegal trawling, a major issue for the people of the port city, for whom fishing is one of the very few sources of income. The Government had licensed Chinese trawlers to fish in the waters off the coast, and locals, with their small boats, were unable to compete with their better equipped Chinese competitors.

As the sit-in continues, tens of thousands of protesters, including women and children, blocked an expressway leading to the Gwadar Port, as the Government failed to meet their deadline to act on their demands. On December 10, thousands of women rallied in Gwadar in support of Rehman and the Haq do Tehreek. As tension continued to build, Rehman issued a warning to Chinese nationals working in Gwadar Port to leave, vowing to completely stop work on all CPEC projects in Gwadar. Things turned violent on December 27, a day after negotiations between the Government and movement leaders failed. The Police clashed with protesters in which one Policeman killed while hundreds of protester and many Policemen injured. A number of protesters were taken into custody. After evading the Police for about two weeks, Haq Do Tehreek leader Maulana Hidayat ur Rehman was arrested on January 13, 2023, from the court where he had arrived to surrender, along with two other activists, Nasibullah Nusherwani and Hassan Murad.

On February 12, 2023, instead of addressing the legitimate grievances of the protesters, the Federal Minister of Interior Rana Sanaullah announced that ‘fool proof security’ would be provided to Chinese nationals in Gwadar Port. Sanaullah visited Gwadar, reviewed security arrangements for the Chinese, and declared: “All locals and foreign nationals would be provided fool proof security.”

Balochistan’s long history of discontent due to a denial of basic rights and services, economic exploitation and brutal repression implies that the security situation in the province will remain volatile in the foreseeable future.

INDIA

Nagaland: Stalemate continues
Mutum Kenedy Singh
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 21, 2023, the National People’s Government of Nagaland/Non Accordist faction of the Naga National Council (NPGN/NNC-NA) President, T. Ovung, in a press statement, declared that there will be “bloodshed and war” if the Naga political solution was not based on the “August 3, 2015-Framework Agreement”, as some Nagas would be excluded. T. Ovung reaffirmed that the Framework Agreement was for “Nagalim”, which included all Nagas of Nagaland, Nagas of Manipur, Nagas of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagas of Assam, and “no Nagas should be excluded.”

On January 18, 2023, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) reaffirmed the Naga National Decision of May 31, 2022, “to uphold and protect Naga’s unique history and Naga national principle at any cost.” The NSCN-IM further added that an “honorable and acceptable political solution between India and the Nagas should be based on the Framework Agreement of August 3, 2015, wherein the sovereignty of the Nagas is acknowledged, in conjunction with the Naga National Flag and the Constitution… The Nagas do not acknowledge any agreements signed under the Indian Constitution.”

The NSCN-IM leadership also accused the Government of India (GoI) of “desperately trying to push through a new edited version of 16-Point Agreement (16-PA) at the cost of betraying the Framework Agreement (FA)” signed with the group on August 3, 2015. In a statement, NSCN-IM asserted that “the state of affairs on the ongoing Indo-Naga political talks is a matter of regret as rogue elements are pushing around with the blessing of the GOI targeting the destruction of the Framework Agreement.” The outfit further claimed “the elements of perfidy, deceit, duplicity, double dealings and treachery had been planted by Government of India’s intelligence agencies in the same manner when the State of Nagaland was created under the 16-Point Agreement.”

Earlier, on September 12, 2022, Union Minister of Home Affairs (UMHA) Amit Shah met a delegation of the Nagaland Government in New Delhi, to discuss the Naga political issue. UMHA Amit Shah asked the delegation to convince the NSCN-IM to soften their stance on separate flag and Yehzabo (constitution) so that the issue could be resolved.

To further the peace talks, the Government of India and Working Committee (WC) comprising of six Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), had signed an agreement on November 17, 2017, which recognized the political and historical rights of the Nagas to self-determine their future, in consonance with their distinct identity. The NNPG is led primarily by Nagaland Nagas, who want to resolve the Naga issue within the boundaries of the Nagaland state.

The Government of India has been holding separate dialogues with the NSCN-IM and the Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) since 1997 and 2017, respectively, because of the divergent objectives of the two stakeholders. The NSCN-IM is led by the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur, who want a solution to the Naga issue for all Nagas, including those beyond the state boundaries of Nagaland. The NNPGs, on the other hand, are primarily interested in finalizing a solution for the Nagas of Nagaland.

Although the NSCN-IM has often claimed to be the sole party representing the Naga political cause, it has recently acknowledged the importance of the NNPGs. On January 14, 2023, the NSCN-IM and Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) jointly declared their unconditional commitment to collaborate for the resolution of the Naga political issue. This declaration came after four months of signing the “September Joint Accordant”, inked on September 14, 2022, in which NSCN-IM and NNPGs agreed to form the “Council of Naga Relationships and Cooperation”, led by the convener of the NNPGs and the chairman of NSCN-IM, to explore, at the earliest, realistic ways for Nagas to move forward on the basis of Naga historical and political rights.

Despite the assurances of the Government of India, and the rhetoric and posturing of the NSCN-IM and the NNPGs, the peace talks are in a deadlock, and a final settlement looks unlikely within the present scenario.

Despite several rounds of talks between the incumbent interlocutor for the peace talks, Akshaya Kumar Mishra, the former Intelligence Bureau (IB) Special Director and advisor to MHA (Northeast India) and the leadership of the NSCN-IM, the stalemate has persisted. On April 25, 2022, the Union Government’s interlocutor in the Naga peace talks conveyed to the NSCN-IM that there would be no change in the Government’s stand on the group’s demand for a separate flag and constitution for Nagaland. Meanwhile, the NSCN-IM remain firm on its insistence on a separate flag and constitution as key conditions of the proposed final settlement.

Another challenge to the peace talks is the frequent infighting amongst the NNPGs, who are important stakeholders in the peace talks. The NNPGs are a militant conglomerate that comprises seven Naga groups: NSCN-Kitovi Neopak (NSCN-NK); NSCN-Reformation (NSCN-R); NSCN-Khango Konyak (NSCN-K2); and four factions of the Naga National Council (NNC) – Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), NNC-Parent Body, Non-Accordist faction of NNC/National People's Government of Nagaland (NPGN/NNC-NA), and the Government Democratic Republic of Nagaland/ NNC-NA (GDRN).

Recently, on December 15, 2022, the Akato Chophy-led faction of (NSCN-R), which is one of the groups constituting the Working Committee of the NNPGs, announced that they have joined the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) who are in talks with the Government of India for a solution to the Naga political issue. However, the group’s claims were refuted by both the Working Committee of the NNPGs and the Kilo Kilonser (Home Minister) of the NSCN-R. Such frequent infighting complicates the resolution of the peace process.  

In addition to the peace talks, the Government of India has also extended the ceasefire pacts with various Naga insurgent groups in order to bring lasting peace in the regions affected by Naga Insurgency. The Government extended the ceasefire agreement with the Nikki Sumi-led faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K-NS) for a period of one year, with effect from September 8, 2022, to September 7, 2023. The ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K-NS has been in operation for a year, since September 2021.

The Government also extended the ceasefire agreements for a further period of one year, with effect from April 28, 2022 to April 27, 2023, NSCN-R. The ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K Khango faction has been extended from April 18, 2022, to April 17, 2023. These Agreements were signed on April 19, 2022.

Another issue affecting political stability in the state is the issue of the ‘Frontier Nagaland State’ demand by the Eastern Nagaland People's Organization (ENPO). ENPO which was formed in 1997, after the Eastern Nagas walked out of Naga Hoho, is stewarding the movement for the creation of a separate state, comprising the six districts of Tuensang, Mon, Shamatore, Longleng, Noklak and Kiphire, which are settled by the Konyaks, Sangtams, Changs, Phoms, Khiamniungans, and Yimchungrus tribes. On December 6, 2022, UMHA Amit Shah met with delegates of ENPO in New Delhi to discuss the demand for 'Frontier Nagaland'. Shah highlighted a clear roadmap for an amicable, legislative and sustainable solution for Eastern Nagaland, which will include consultation with the people of Eastern Nagaland and the Nagaland State Government. Subsequently, on December 16, 2022, a three-member committee of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), constituted by the Centre to deal with the matter, arrived in the Tuensang District of Nagaland.

The escalating differences between the backward Eastern Nagas and the more developed Naga tribes are fueled by a sense of neglect of the Eastern Nagaland Districts by successive Governments in Nagaland and a perceived lack of development in the Eastern Naga Districts. The elite Naga tribes in Nagaland, such as the Angami, Sema, Ao and Lotha, oppose the idea of a "Frontier Nagaland State," since this would further fragment the Naga movement, diluting the idea of a ‘Greater Nagalim’. Moreover, ENPO's demand for ‘Frontier Nagaland’ implies Nagaland's bifurcation and would compromise Naga unity and cohesion. Nevertheless, NSCN-IM has maintained an ambivalent position on the issue, since the key stakeholders in the ‘Frontier Nagaland’ issues are the Nagas of Nagaland. These issues among the constituents of the peace process and Naga society might impact adversely on the security situation in the State. 

While the confusion over ‘Nagalim’ continues, the security situation remained in control over the past year. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Nagaland registered no insurgency-related fatalities in 2022 (though there were some Naga insurgency-linked fatalities outside the state). For the first time, in nearly two decades from 1992 to 2022, this is the first time that not a single insurgency-linked fatality was reported in the State, which saw a peak of 360 fatalities in 1997. The last Security Force (SF) death in the State was reported on May 25, 2019, when two Assam Rifles (AR) personnel were killed and another four sustained injuries, after suspected militants ambushed an AR patrol along the Indo-Myanmar border in Mon District. Though there was no surrender in 2022, there were two incidents of arrest, in which one cadre of NSCN-K2-Issac and two cadres NSCN-U, were arrested from the Dimapur District of Nagaland.  

On April 1, 2022, responding to the improved security scenario in the state, the UMHA removed the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act (AFSPA) from 15 Police Stations in seven Districts of Nagaland. But AFSPA was extended for another six months in Dimapur, Niuland, Chumoukedima, Mon, Kiphire, Noklak, Phek, Peren and Zunheboto Districts of Nagaland.

However, some insurgency-linked incidents did occur in 2022. On August 9, 2022, NSCN-KYA militants, opened fire on the 14th Assam Rifles camp in the Dan village of Noklak District, situated near the Indo-Myanmar border. Again, on August 15, 2022, two Assam Rifles personnel were injured in an encounter with the NSCN-KYA, in the Nyasa area of Mon District.

Moreover, the extortion rackets prevail across Nagaland due to illegal taxation imposed by various Naga insurgent groups. On December 1, the Dimapur Police arrested two persons, Zhehoto Sumi and Kughato Sumi, for extorting money in the name of NSCN-U, from the Dimapur District of Nagaland.

In another incident, close aides of the top NSCN-IM leaders, Rayilung Nsarangbe alias Colonel, the treasurer of NSCN-IM, and his wife Ruth Chawang, were issued notices by a special Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) Court of the District and Sessions Judge of Dimapur District, after the Enforcement Directorate (ED) filed a chargesheet against them on December 19, 2022. The accused were charged with operating a well-organized extortion racket in Nagaland and Manipur, resulting in the diversion of government funds. The ED stated that “in pursuance of their conspiracy for terrorist acts, the terrorist gang of NSCN (IM) had been criminally intimidating construction companies undertaking road construction projects in Manipur and collected huge sums as illegal tax (extortion).”

Further, the activities of Naga insurgents continue to affect the neighbouring state of Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. In Arunachal Pradesh, Changlang and Longding Districts remain the operating ground of Naga militants. The NSCN-KYA the most active groups in Arunachal Pradesh and works in alliance with other militant groups, such as the United Liberation Front of Assam – Independent (ULFA-I).

Some of the inter-State activities of Naga militants include:

On October 9, 2022, suspected NSCN-KYA militants killed a businessman, Atar Singh Sharma (40), in the Longding District of Arunachal Pradesh.  

On May 8, 2022, a Gaon Burah (village headman), Napho Boham of Lauksim village, was kidnapped by suspected militants of the NSCN-KYA, in the Longding District of Arunachal Pradesh.

Meanwhile in Manipur, the NSCN-IM was involved in an ethnic clash with the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF), who signed a peace accord with the Government of India on December 27, 2022. On January 12, 2022, a ZUF militant, Pouluanthai Gangmei, was abducted and later shot dead by militants of the NSCN-IM, between Awangkhul and Warngkhung village, under the Noney Police Station of Noney District, Manipur.  

Despite the improved security scenario in Nagaland, varied challenges remain. The NSCN-IM’s intransigence on the issue of separate flag and Yehzabo (constitution) continues to stall the peace process. Infighting and factionalism within the NNPGs also erode the possibilities of resolution. Further, there is a need to neutralize the capability of splinter NSCN groups to operate in other states of the Northeast region, which creates a domino effect in these states. Bringing all these divergent interest and issues to a pragmatic and inclusive solution is of utmost importance, since the Naga insurgency is the “mother of all insurgencies” in India’s Northeast.