South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Balochistan: An eye for an eye
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On September 30, 2022, three Military Intelligence (MI) and two Frontier Corps (FC) personnel were killed while several others were injured in an explosion at a sweet shop in the main market of Kohlu town (Kohlu District) in Balochistan. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), through social media, claimed responsibility for the incident, claiming that it had targeted a ‘secret agency hideout’. 

On September 25, 2022, six Pakistan Army officials, including two majors, were killed after a helicopter ‘crashed’ during a rescue mission near Khost in the Harnai District of Balochistan. BLA ‘spokesperson’ ‘Jeehand Baloch’ claimed responsibility, asserting that the helicopter had been shot down by rocket launchers, and that two ‘enemy personnel’, identified as Naib Subaidaar Kaleem Ullah of FC 114 Wing Loralai Scouts and personnel of secretive agency Mohammad Faisal r/o Qasoor Punjab, had been ‘arrested’.

On September 12, 2022, five Army soldiers were killed when Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) cadres attacked an Army convoy with Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) at Hamzai Koh in Mand tehsil (revenue unit) of Kech District. BLF ‘spokesman’ ‘Major’ Gwahram Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack. In a press release issued to the media, ‘Major’ Gwahram Baloch asserted that BLF cadres targeted the convoy at Hamzai Koh when it arrived at Goldsmiths Line to fence the border.

On September 9, 2022, three Special Service Group (SSG) Commandos were killed while one was injured by the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), during an operation in the Mazanband area of Mand town in Kech District. BLF ‘spokesman’ Gwahram Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack, adding, "Our attacks will continue with intensity until the independence of occupied Balochistan".

During 10 months and Nine days of the current year, Balochistan has recorded a surge in violence against SF personnel, taking fatalities to the double of the previous year. While there have been 142 SF fatalities in 2022, the corresponding period of 2021 recorded 71 SF fatalities. Through 2021, there was a total of 107 SF fatalities. In 2022, with 142 SF Fatalities out of a total of 272 throughout country, Balochistan leads in SF killings among all the provinces. With the ongoing trend, by the end of 2022, SF fatalities could be the highest in a single year, in the history of Baloch resistance movement.  

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on conflicts in Pakistan, Balochistan has accounted for a total of 1,832 SF fatalities. A maximum of 178 fatalities were registered in 2012.

Balochistan North-South SF Fatalities Breakup

A North-South breakup of SF fatalities over the last 22 years indicates that SF fatalities in North Balochistan are consistently higher than South Balochistan. Since, March 6, 2000, out of the total of 1,830 SF fatalities in the province, 1,237 were recorded in the North, while 593 were in the South. However, in 2022, the previous trend is being reversed. Out of the 140 SF personnel killed in the province so far (data till October 9, 2022), 104 were killed in South Balochistan, and 36 in North Balochistan. This reversal demonstrated the growing strength of the Baloch insurgent groups in the South, which is the traditional stronghold of Baloch nationalist insurgency. The North is dominated by Sunni jihadi formations, most prominently the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The major Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). Since January 2022, different Baloch groups have carried out at least 64 attacks out of a total 85 on SFs, in which 118 SF personnel were killed. The strengthening of the Baloch insurgent groups can be marked by the February 2, 2022, simultaneous attacks by BLA cadres on the Panjgur and Nuskhi Army camps in Balochistan, which resulted in 19 fatalities (15 terrorists and four SF personnel). Indeed, though Pakistan Government sources claimed only four SF fatalities, Radio Zrumbesh, quoting BLA ‘spokesman’ Jeehand Baloch, claimrd that 45 SF personnel were killed in the attack, when a ‘martyred’ fidayeen (suicide attacker) rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the main gate of the Frontier Corps headquarters at Nushki, clearing the way for other fidayeen to enter.

After the February 2 attacks, Federal Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid, citing intelligence reports, told the media on February 3,

The TTP-Baloch militant alliance speculation became clearer when TTP ‘spokesperson’ Mohammad Khurasani congratulated the Baloch insurgent groups for their attacks in Nuskhi and Panjgur. He stated, “The Pakistani Army is carrying out the massacre in Balochistan. We are against the massacre of Balochistan as well as in Waziristan by the Pakistani Army. Our enemy is common."

Since the February 2 twin attacks, emboldened Baloch groups have mounted repeated attacks on SFs, including some high-profile operations:

August 1: Six Army personnel, including Lieutenant General Sarfraz Ali, Corps Commander, XII Corps, were killed in an Army helicopter crash. The helicopter went missing in the Lasbela District of Balochistan in the night of August 1, and the wreckage was found near the Moosa Goth area on August 2. Baloch Raji Ajoi Sanger (BRAS) ‘spokesperson’ Baloch Khan, in a statement to the media, claimed the helicopter had been shot down. In addition to Lieutenant General Ali, the dead included Major General Amjad, Director General Coast Guard; Brigadier Khalid; the pilot Major Saeed; co-pilot Talha; and crew chief Naik Muddasir.

July 15: BLA cadres shot dead the head of the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD), Eid Muhammad Hassani aka Eido, near the Naurozabad Road in Kharan town (Kharan District). BLA ‘spokesman’ Azad Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack, declaring that Eid Muhammad had worked as Station House Officer (SHO) in the Kharan Police Department for many years before joining CTD, and was being used as a pawn by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). At the behest of the ISI, he used to monitor the movement of Baloch cadres and to barricade the area. Apart from this, he had extra-judicially handed over Baloch youth to secret agencies on fabricated charges or without any grounds.

July 13: Army Lieutenant Colonel Laiq Baig Mirza, who was abducted along with his cousin Umer Javed by BLA cadres near the Warchoom area of Ziarat District, was killed, while five BLA cadres were later killed during an exchange of fire near the Mangi Dam area of same District. Lieutenant Colonel Laiq Baig Mirza and his cousin Umer Javed were returning after a paying a visit to the Quaid-e-Azam Residency. BLA ‘spokesperson’ Jeehand Baloch claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that Lieutenant Colonel Mirza was arrested in an intelligence-based operation by BLA’s special force, the Special Tactical Operations Squad (STOS). Mirza was a primary target and he was being tracked for days by BLA’s intelligence units. Mirza was ‘arrested’ as an officer of the ‘occupying forces’, and for his direct involvement in the Baloch genocide and grave human rights violations, including enforced disappearances of women and children, among other crimes. Mirza was killed by the BLA cadres when an Army Quick Reaction Forces team tried to rescue him.

The escalated attacks on Security Forces in Balochistan are substantially a consequence of the continuing frustration among Baloch nationalist groups over the systematic extermination of ethnic Baloch through enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings by Pakistan security agencies. The Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) held a press conference at the Quetta Press Club on February 11, 2022, where VBMP General Secretary Sammi Deen Baloch addressed journalists and the public, speaking of recent and alarming developments in the province. Sammi Baloch asserted that, after the Panjgur and Nushki attacks, “enforced disappearances” and “kill-and-dumps” had seen an dramatic spike in the province.

In its annual report, the Human Rights Council of Balochistan (HRCB), a Balochistan-based human rights group, underscored the dire human rights situation in Balochistan in 2021. According to the report, the year witnessed a drastic deterioration, as students remained the main target of the military and its shadow organizations, both in Balochistan as well as in other provinces of Pakistan. A large number of Baloch students were forcibly disappeared in 2021. HRCB received reports of enforced disappearance of 442 people, of whom 170 were tortured and later released, while the whereabouts of 272 people remained unknown. A total of 366 people has been confirmed killed.

Baloch enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings have been deliberately ignored by the Pakistani State. However, the Judiciary has repeatedly reprimanded the Government and reminded it about its responsibility in this regard. In the latest instance, on September 9, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) summoned Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif over the issue of the missing persons, observing that making people disappear was the “biggest form of torture” and that the chief executive of Pakistan would be held responsible in case of enforced disappearance. Prime Minister Sharif assured the Court, “I cannot say that all of the missing persons will be recovered, but we will leave no stone unturned. I will not give any lame excuse.”

Such assurances give cold comfort, against the backdrop of repeated Court interventions and assurances by the State in the past. The Government’s seriousness on the issue can be assessed by the fact that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 2021, which was passed by the National Assembly (NA) on November 8, 2021, to amend the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and Code of Criminal Procedure, making ‘enforced disappearances’ a criminal offence had itself ‘disappeared’. A meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights was informed on June 29, 2022, that the Bill could not be found and remained ‘missing’. Earlier, on January 3, former Human Rights Minister Shireen Mazari had revealed that the Bill had gone missing after it was sent to the Senate, having been passed by the relevant standing committee and the NA.

With Pakistan’s State agencies following a policy of targeted extermination against the Baloch people and the refusal of the State to take corrective action, the Baloch groups taken to retaliation against the SFs. The cycle of revenge killings can only escalate, since the Army authorities are responsible for this policy of genocide and, despite the posturing of the Judiciary and the civilian Government, no power within the country can challenge or hold the Pakistan Army to account.

AFGHANISTAN

Suicidal course
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On October 5, 2022, a suicide bomber detonated his device inside a mosque in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Kabul city, killing at least four worshippers and injuring 25. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the incident. Interestingly, this incident coincides with the reported deterioration of relations between Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani Network led by Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, which is mediating talks between TTP and the Pakistani government.

A day earlier, On October 4, 2022, Canada based freelance Afghan Journalist Bilal Sarwary tweeted a voice recording of a senior TTP commander mufti Noor Sayed Mehsud, “the TTP Emir, Mufti Noor Wali [Mehsud] has instructed him for a full-fledged war against Taliban if it does not refrain from transgressions”. The incidents of ‘transgressions’ include the house search of Commander Maulvi Abdullah Bajauri and ‘expulsion’ of 25 TTP families from Nangarhar to a desert in Helmand. Pro-TTP social media accounts, however, maintain that it was a small dispute sorted out through negotiations.

The extent of the rift between a section of TTP and the Islamic Emirate of Taliban’s Haqqani network, for now, remains a matter of speculation. However, Pakistan’s Interior Ministry issued a ‘nationwide alert’ in September 2022, in the midst of stalled talks and factionalism within TTP, warning of the risk of sub-groups affiliated with TTP defecting to the militant Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), and such dissatisfied groups carrying out violent attacks in Kabul to undermine Sirajuddin Haqqani’s writ cannot be ruled out.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan recorded several prominent suicide attacks:

On September 30, 53 persons were killed in a suicide attack at the Kaj Education Institute located in the Hazara dominated Dasht-e-Brachi area under PD-13 in Kabul. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack.

On September 5, 26 persons, including two Russians and four civilians, were killed in a suicide bombing attack in front of the Russian embassy in Kabul. The attack was claimed by IS-KP.

On August 17, 2022, a suicide attack killed at least 21 civilians, including a prominent Sufi cleric Mullah Amir Mohammad Kabuli, and injured at least 27, in the Siddiquiya Mosque located in the Kher Khanna neighborhood in Police District (PD) 17 of Kabul city. No group has claimed responsibility, but the role of IS-KP is strongly suspected.

On August 11, 2022, a prominent pro-Taliban cleric, Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani, was killed, along with two civilians, in a suicide attack inside a madrassa in Kabul. The IS-KP claimed responsibility for the attack.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 641 people (571 civilians, 13 Security Forces, 15 terrorists and 38 NS) have died in 15 suicide attacks across Afghanistan since August 15, 2021 (data till October 9, 2022). There were 244 (85 civilians, 43 Security Forces, 36 terrorists and 80 NS) fatalities in 26 such attacks during the corresponding period of preceding (July 23, 2020-August 15, 2021).

IS-KP is singularly and overwhelmingly responsible for most of the suicide attacks since August 15, 2021. According to SATP data, eight incidents orchestrated by IS-KP led to 478 fatalities (including 415 civilians,13 Security Force personnel,12 terrorists, and 38 not specified. Among the civilian victims, Shias account for a large number of fatalities. During the corresponding period preceding, most of the attacks were unclaimed. However, 51 percent (43 out of total 85) of civilian fatalities were linked to IS-KP claims.

For the unclaimed attacks, noted scholar on the Af-Pak region Abdul Sayed, wrote on his Twitter account on October 7, 2022, that ISKP might be deliberately not claiming several attacks perpetuated by the group, as ISKP’s official media group Al-Azaim recently published a book on jihad, which mentions certain exceptions amongst infidels who cannot be executed. Thus, "Islam forbids the killing of eight infidels; children, women, older people, disabled, insane, monks, and laborers." Many suicide attacks end up killing significant numbers of women and children, especially in incidents targeting educational institutions.

The first suicide bombing in Afghanistan was recorded on September 9, 2001, under the first Taliban regime (1996-2001), when the principle armed opponent of the Taliban, the Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad Shah Masood was assassinated in the Khwaja Bahauddin District of Takhar Province by two Arab (from Tunisia) al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists from Belgium. This was a prequel to the 9/11 attacks in the United States

Thereafter, the US led operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ launched in October 2001 dislodged the Taliban from power, with top Taliban leaders fleeing to Pakistan’s tribal areas, from where they launched a sustained insurgency. Two instances of suicide attacks targeting International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan forces were recorded in 2003, after which the suicide bombing became a regular pattern of attack. Some of the prominent early attacks included the June 9, 2003, incident, when suspected operative of Al-Qaeda drove a taxi filled with explosives into a bus carrying German ISAF troops, killing four soldiers and one Afghan national. On December 28, 2003, five Afghan Security Force personnel were killed in a suicide bombing near Kabul International Airport.

According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), Afghanistan recorded at least 421 incidents of suicide attack between September 9, 2001, and December 31, 2008, resulting in 1,231 fatalities. Thereafter, between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2021, the United Nations Assistance Mission’s (UNAMA) recorded more than 654* suicide attacks, resulting in 19,973 casualties (4,697 deaths and 15,267 injured).

Clearly, a comparison of the data before and after August 15, 2021, indicates a deterioration in terms of the frequency and impact of suicide attacks after the departure of US forces on August 31, 2021, the result of the rising mayhem inflicted by IS-KP.

The principal actor responsible for the rising trend in suicide attacks is the IS-KP, which wants to replace the Taliban as the main ‘Islamic’ power center in Afghanistan, and to delegitimize the Taliban ideologically and militarily by showcasing the latter’s weakness to the Islamic world, including both its supporters and its detractors. Targeted attacks on pro-Taliban scholars such as Sheikh Rahimullah Haqqani could also send a chilling message to religious clerics not to openly take pro-Taliban and anti-IS-KP positions.

IS-KP is also targeting Russians as well as the Hazara Shia, Sikh and Hindu minorities, possibly to deter regional powerhouses-Russia, Iran and India from collaborating with the Taliban. These elements are borne out by IS-KP propaganda material:

In the 15^th volume of its English mouthpiece, Voice of Khorasan, IS-KP the article ‘Hindutva, RSS and an Islamophobic State’, identifies India as an ‘Islamophobic’ and not a ‘secular’ state. Further, it criticizes the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), arguing that its ‘sole aim is to target and denigrate Muslims and ultimately wipe out Islam’.

In a column titled 'American Project' in the 13th volume of Voice of Khorasan, IS-KP declares, 'After a year, US is still licking its wounds', and argues that the Taliban is a 'nationalist' entity and a mercenary of the US:

The same volume of Voice of Khorasan observes

Earlier, in a column titled 'American Project' in the 8th volume of Voice of Khorasan, IS-KP asserted that the Taliban was an ISI-CIA project,

Also, after the September 5,2022, bombing outside Russian embassy, while claiming responsibility, IS-KP mocked the Taliban’s repeated reassurances to the international community, including Russia, “not to worry about IS-KP threat”.

Given IS-KP’s orientation and ambition to use the Taliban’s earlier and very successful methods against the Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan is expected to deteriorate further, as the Taliban and IS-KP slug it out in a contest for supremacy. Civilians, already suffering from economic shock, poverty and hunger, will clearly bear the brunt of this violent confrontation, as IS-KP employs suicide bombings to get worldwide attention to its cause.

AFGHANISTAN

US officials hold first meeting with IEA delegation in Qatar since late July 2022: On October 8, United States (US) officials met in-person with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's (IEA) officials for the first time since the US claimed it had killed Al Qaeda emir (leader) Ayman al-Zawahiri in late July. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)'s deputy director and the top State Department official responsible for Afghanistan to the Qatari capital of Doha met with an IEA's delegation which included their head of intelligence, Abdul Haq Wasiq. Ariana News, October 10, 2022.

IS-KP has been defeated in Afghanistan that's why it is attacking civilians, says Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi: On October 3, the Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said that Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) and other groups have been defeated therefore they are targeting civilians. Afintl, October 4, 2022.

Fresh hurdles in the way of 22nd Amendment to the Constitution: Fresh hurdles have emerged in the way of the enactment of 22nd Amendment to the Constitution after Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna which commands the majority support in Parliament objected to it in its present form. The bill which is listed for debate in Parliament on October 4 and October 5 was taken up for discussion at the parliamentary group meeting of the government on October 3 evening. It seeks to reduce powers of the president to be vested with Parliament. Daily Mirror, October 5, 2022.