South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Darkening Shades of Grey
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
 

In its Plenary held on February 22, 24, 25, 2021, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)  decided to retain Pakistan in its listing of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – the ‘grey list’ – along with 18 other countries. Pakistan has been on the ‘grey list’ since June 2018. 

In its release, FATF noted,

In June 2018, Pakistan had made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and the Asia Pacific Group (APG) to strengthen its Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/ Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies. It had submitted a 27-point action plan. Though the 27-point action plan is not openly available to officially determine what actions Pakistan has taken so far, in its release after the February 2021 Plenary, FATF urged Pakistan to work on implementing the "three remaining items in its action plan to address its strategically important deficiencies," namely by.

Interestingly, in its previous Plenary held on October 21-23, 2020, FATF had asked Pakistan to address the same issues, along with "demonstrating enforcement against TFS violations, including in relation to NPOs [Non-Profit Organisations], of administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases." It had urged Pakistan that "as all action plan deadlines have expired, the FATF strongly urges Pakistan to swiftly complete its full action plan by February 2021".

In its Plenary held on February 19-21, 2020, the FATF had asked Pakistan to resolve eight "strategic deficiencies" including the three "remaining items" mentioned above. It had even warned,

As expected, through 2020, Pakistan continued with efforts to deceive the world community, taking some cosmetic measures  against terrorists and terrorist entities operating out of its soil and listed under Resolutions 1267 and 1373, to come out of the 'grey list'. Most recently, in January 2021 Pakistan initiated the following measures:

The reality that these actions were hurriedly taken just days before the February 2021 Plenary, and that their impact was no more than notional, with little real restraint placed on the 'arrested' and 'convicted' individuals, is abundantly clear, but has largely been ignored by the FATF. Indeed, Pakistan has failed to take effective measures against any of the prominent terror leaders/entities operating out of its soil. The founder and chief of the LeT/Jammat-ud-Dawa (JuD) Hafeez Saeed and the JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar, continue to enjoy the support of the Establishment in Pakistan. According to reports, though Saeed is officially stated to be serving time in jail , in fact he continues to reside at his Johar Town house in Lahore, Punjab, from where he continues to run his terrorist complex. Azhar was reportedly shifted from his Bahawalpur 'headquarters' in Punjab, to Rawalpindi, the garrison town, for his 'personal safety' by the deep state.

Moreover, several reports confirming the sustained and close ties of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence with the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda, continued to emerge through 2020. The acquittal of Omar Saeed Sheikh, the main accused in the 2002 beheading of American journalist Daniel Pearl, by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in January 2021, further exposes Islamabad's lackadaisical approach to terrorism. Regrettably, the people at the helm continue to justify terrorism in the name of religion. Instead of criticizing the beheading on October 16, 2020, of the French teacher, who had used cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in a class to illustrate a lesson on freedom of speech and expression, Prime Minister Imran Khan posted a letter on October 28, 2020, on Twitter, "My letter to leaders of Muslim states to act collectively to counter the growing Islamophobia in non-Muslim states esp Western states causing increasing concern amongst Muslims the world over." In the letter, among other things, Khan asserted,

Meanwhile, the security situation in Pakistan deteriorated in 2020, as compared to 2019. The country accounted for 506 fatalities (169 civilians, 178 Security Force, SF, personnel, 159 terrorists) in 2020, as against 365 fatalities (142 civilians, 137 SF personnel, 86 terrorists) in 2019, an increase of 38.63 per cent in overall fatalities. The county has already recorded 114 fatalities (39 civilians, 38 SF personnel, 37 terrorists), in the current year, so far (data till February 27).  

The SF: terrorist kill ratio continued to favor the terrorists in 2020 as in 2019. The ratio worked out at 1:1.11 in 2020 and 1:1.59 in 2019, demonstrating the stronger position of the terrorists on the ground. Not surprisingly, the impact on civilian security has been palpable, with fatalities in this category increasing by 19.01 per cent. Ahamadiyas and tribal elders  faced increased violence.

Other parameters of violence also indicated a deterioration in the security situation. Overall-terrorism linked incidents increased from 284 in 2019 to 319 in 2020. Killing incidents in particular increased from 136 to 193. Though the number of major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) increased by one, from 52 to 53, the resultant fatalities in such incidents increased from 254 to 317.

Though Balochistan remained the epicenter of violence, there were ample signs of a resurgence of violence, after a relative peace, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Minorities continued to bear the brunt of terrorism in Punjab, while separatism was on the rise in Sindh.

Moreover, State’s secret operations against its own people continued in Gilgit-Baltistan, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. According to Pakistan’s Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances latest monthly progress report, as on January 31, 2021, since the formation of the Commission in March 2011, at least 6,921 cases of Enforced Disappearances had been received, including 415 in 2020, as well as 23 in January 2021. The report claimed that at least 2,122 of these 6,921 cases remained unresolved as of January 31, 2021.

Meanwhile, the political situation in the country continued to deteriorate through 2020, with the Opposition intensifying its campaign against the 'selected' Prime Minister Imran Khan and 'corrupt government' of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) under his leadership. During the All-Parties Conference on September 20, 2020, the Opposition announced the formation of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of 11-opposition parties. After the first meeting of the PDM on September 29, senior Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) leader and former Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, declared,,

Since then, PDM has held several mass rallies across Pakistan and has attracted huge support.

The PDM has also targeted the deep state, alleging that it has been increasingly involved in Pakistani politics. In the most recent rally held in Hyderabad, Sindh, on February 9, 2021, PDM chief and Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman noted that, when PTI won the 2018 election, the Army had congratulated it by saying "we have defeated the enemy," and asked how it could then be said that the military establishment had no connection with the ruling party? Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan leader Owais Noorani was more forthright when he, referring to the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Maj Gen Babar Iftikhar's statement that politicians should not drag the army into politics, observed,

Noorani demanded that the Army "write it down that you will go back to your barracks".

It is pertinent to recall here that the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) had staged a 21-day sit-in at Islamabad's Faizabad Interchange in 2017, demanding the resignation of the then Law Minister Zahid Hamid for allegedly amending the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat clause in the Election Act, 2017. After several days, the Government had called out the Army to break up the sit-in, but the Army stated that it couldn't use force against 'our own people'. Finally, Hamid resigned, following an agreement between TLP and the Government. The Pakistan Supreme Court later observed,

Meanwhile, PDM has planned a ‘long march’ to Islamabad on March 26, 2021. Before that, elections for the 48 vacant seats of the Senate are slated to be held on March 3, 2021. The durability of the PTI Government, which is hanging on a wafer-thin margin in the National Assembly and is in a minority in the Senate, will depend on the PDM’s success in the Senate elections as well in the ‘long march’. The prospect a of military coup also cannot be ruled out in such a chaotic political scenario.

Pakistan remains a ‘grey area’ and a big security concern for the world community. The threat will become graver if the ISI’s proxies in Afghanistan – the Taliban and the Haqqani Network – succeed in capturing political power in Kabul.

INDIA

Assam: Sticky Negotiations
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On February 23, 2021, a total of 1,040 militants surrendered before Assam Chief Minister (CM) Sarbananda Sonowal. Prominent among these were the ‘chairman’ of the People's Democratic Council of Karbi Longri (PDCK), Ingti Kathar Songbijit; ‘chairman’ of the Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF), P. Dilli; and ‘commander-in-chief’ of the Donri Kramsa-led faction of Karbi People's Liberation Tiger (KPLT), S. J. Ejang.

The surrendered militants belonged to the PDCK, KLNLF, both factions of the KPLT – one led by Donri Kramsa and another led by Ron Rongpi – the United Peoples Liberation Army (UPLA) and the Kuki Liberation Front (KLF). All these groups are based in the Karbi Anglong District, one of the worst insurgency-affected districts of the State. Out of the 33 Districts of the State that have recorded insurgency-linked fatalities between March 6, 2000, and February 25, 2021, the Karbi Anglong District recorded the maximum of 762 fatalities.

The surrendered militants also deposited 338 arms, including 58 AK series rifles, 11 M-16 guns and four Light Machine Guns (LMGs).

However, a peace agreement with these groups that was expected to be signed in the presence of Union Home Minister Amit Shah on February 25 has failed to materialise. KPLT-Donri Kramsa faction 'foreign secretary' John Tandon Bey aka Rex Ting-eh stated,

He further added,

On the other hand, KPLT-Ron Rongpi 'chairman' Ron Rongpi observed,

Meanwhile, commenting on the surrender and its significance, Additional Director General of Police (ADGP-Law and Order) of Assam, G.P. Singh, noted,

The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) has long been promoting proxy groups in the Hill Districts of Assam, mainly the Karbi Anglong District. For instance, NSCN-IM militants Phungting Shimrang (the former 'commander-in-chief' of the Naga army) and 'Brigadier' Chiphemi Shimrang have been involved in promoting Dimasa National Liberation Army (DNLA).

It is pertinent to recall here that in January 2020, at least 2,259 militants had surrendered in the State.

On November 11, 2020, the Security Forces (SFs) secured the surrender of the ‘deputy commander-in-chief’ of ULFA-I, Drishti Rajkhowa aka Monoj Rabha, along with four of his accomplices at Rongra in the South Garo Hills District of Meghalaya. On December 21, 2020, a ceremonial surrender took place where 63 militants, including Drishti Rajkhowa, laid down arms at Srimanta Sankardeva Kalakhetra Auditorium in Guwahati in the presence of Assam Chief Minister Sonowal. The surrendering militant belonged to four outfits, ULFA-I, PDCK, DNLA and United People’s Revolutionary Front (UPRF).

Recent measures to bring ethnic militants back into the mainstream appear to be an effort to prevent these groupings from exploiting the fault lines that have re-emerged in the multi-ethnic State following the polarising discourse on illegal migration in the aftermath of the Citizenship Amendment Bill/ Citizenship Amendment Act (CAB/CAA) and the updating exercise of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), which had engulfed the State between 2016 and 2020. During this phase there was a rising perception amongst the indigenous communities of the State that their political status and interests would diminish once illegal entrants were given legitimacy.

Several other militant groups, once active in the State, are currently under Suspension of Operation (SoO) agreements. These include the Hmar People’s Council-Democratic (HPC-D), Adivasi Cobra Military of Assam (ACMA), Birsa Commando Force (BCF), Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), United Kukigam Defence Army (UKDA), Kuki Liberation Organization/ Kuki Liberation Army (KLA), Adivasi People’s Army (APA), All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA) and Santhal Tiger Force (STF).

Not surprisingly, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), violence from armed insurrections remained low. Through 2020, the State accounted for a total of eight fatalities (three civilians and five militants). In 2019, there were three fatalities (one civilian and two militants). The State had recorded a high of 783 fatalities (531 civilians, 72 Security Force, SF, personnel and 180 militants) in 1998.

In the current year, two fatalities have been recorded thus far (data till February 28, 2021). On January 27, suspected Dimasa National Liberation Army militants opened fire and killed two civilians in the Dhansiri area in Karbi Anglong District. The deceased include a former militant leader Amit Nunisa and Alta Maibongsa. One person was also injured in the incident.

As of now, the only major active ethnic militant group in the State is ULFA-I. However, the group’s presence is limited to the easternmost Districts of the State that lie along Assam’s interstate boundary with Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland.

However, there are grounds of concern with the reported expansion of Bangladeshi Islamist terrorist groups – the Neo Jammat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB) in Assam. A December 25, 2020, report stated that Neo-JMB was increasing its presence on the northern banks of the Brahmaputra Valley, especially the Char areas inhibited by migrant Muslims. DGP Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta disclosed that “the ingress of Neo-JMB in Assam is a fact. We are getting ready to counter the menace.”

There is indeed a danger that these remaining terrorist groupings could take advantage of several existing contentious issues.

The clarity over the vexed foreigner issue that was expected from the Supreme Court monitored updating of the NRC exercise has failed to emerge. The final list left out 1.9 million applicants and the outcome pleased none of the stakeholders. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic put both the framing of CAA rules and the roll-out of the nationwide NRC in limbo.

Moreover, a plethora of steps, including the assurance of the implementation of Clause 6 of the 1985 Assam Accord, which had been announced to cool down local tempers after the enactment of CAA, have, in fact, created more problems. On July 15, 2019, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) formed a 13-member committee headed by retired High Court judge Biplab Kumar Sarma and asked it to give recommendations on how to implement Clause 6 of the Accord. The Committee submitted its report on February 25, 2020, and recommended, among other things, the definition of Assamese people based on a cut-off date (January 1, 1951), 80-100 percent reservation in Parliament seats, 80-100 percent reservation for Group C and D jobs for Assamese people, and land rights for Assamese people with restrictions on transfer of land to others. The State Government has now declared that the recommendation by the Committee cannot be implemented. On February 17, 2021, State Finance Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, declared,

Clause 6 of the Assam Accord promises, “Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social, linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.”

Meanwhile, on December 12, 2020, the All Assam Student’s Union (AASU) revived its anti-CAA movement that had been grounded following security measures and assurances given by the Government and due to COVID-19 related restrictions. The assurances included the extension of Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to six ethnic groups, namely, the Moran, Muttock, Adivasi, Chutia, Tai-Ahom and Koch-Rajbongshi, and have also not been fulfilled. Adivasi militants have constantly reiterated their demand for ST status. Now that these promises have failed to be redeemed the renewal of the agitation in the State cannot be ruled out.

The increased number of militants surrendering makes it imperative for the security establishment to strictly monitor them. Worryingly, several surrendered NDFB militants have reportedly gone missing. On February 20, 2021, DGP Bhaskar Jyoti Mahanta revealed that several ‘elements’ including NDFB-B. Saoraigwra leader M. Batha, might have returned to the jungles to mount another insurrection. DGP Mahanta further noted, “Not only Batha… there are several others who are mulling a return to the jungles, we have been informed. I cannot divulge all the information at this present moment.”

Earlier, on October 6, 2020, all four NDFB factions – Dhiren Bodo, Gobinda Basumatary, Ranjan Daimary and B. Saoraigwra – that had surrendered on January 30, 2020, demanded omission of the phrase 'comprehensive and final' and 'exclusion of villages from Bodoland Territorial Council', from the agreement, as well as general amnesty for all members of NDFB without the distinction of heinous and non-heinous crime category and inclusion of NDFB members in the constituted Commission for inclusion/ exclusion of villages within Bodo Territorial Region (BTR). There is also the demand of giving ST status to Bodos living in Karbi Anglong District. In such a situation the BTR transition  becomes really tricky.

Separately, the inter-state border disputes between Assam and Mizoram have resulted in several instances of violence in 2020. Tension still prevails with the latest clash reported from Kachurtal in the Hailakandi District of Assam, which left six persons (three from each of the two State) injured on February 9, 2021.

The future of insurgent movements and the consolidation of peace in Assam will depend on how well the political establishment balances several competing ethnic and linguistic interests. Peacefully resolving inter State boundary dispute and the continued support from Myanmar and Bangladesh are also crucial.