South Asia Terrorism Portal

NEPAL

NEPAL: Politically Volatile
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
 

Almost 31 months after the merger, the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) suffered a vertical split on December 22, 2020, with the rival factions of the party led by the two Co-Chairmen claiming their faction to be the authentic NCP in two separate Central Committee meetings held in the capital, Kathmandu. The faction led by Co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal removed K.P. Sharma Oli from the post of party Co-chair and unanimously nominated senior party leader Madhav Kumar Nepal as the new party Co-chair. On the other hand, Oli told his faction leaders that his faction was the authentic NCP and Dahal faction had no authority to call party meetings.

In a historic development, on May 17, 2018, two major national Left political parties – the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) led by Oli and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-Maoist Centre) led by Dahal – at a joint meeting held at Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s residence in Baluwatar, Kathmandu, had announced their merger and the formation of the NCP. Prior to that, on February 19, 2018, CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist Centre signed a seven-point agreement on the modalities of unification. However, the division of responsibilities between Oli and Dahal remained an issue of contention since then. The internal rift within the NCP, however, reached a climax after Prime Minister Oli unilaterally decided, on April 20, 2020, to introduce an ordinance to bring amendments in the existing provisions in the Political Party Act that, according to observers, made it easy to split the party. The party did come to the verge of split, but several efforts of rapprochement delayed the inevitable. Expectedly, however, the inevitable eventually came to pass. 

On December 20, 2020, just two days before the official split, President Bidya Devi Bhandari dissolved the House of Representatives (HoR) endorsing the Oli Government’s recommendation for the dissolution of the HoR. The President also approved the Cabinet’s recommendation for holding general elections on April 30 and May 10, 2021.

Unsurprisingly, on December 21, 2020, 12 writ petitions were filed in the Supreme Court challenging the dissolution of the HoR. Separately, three lawyers filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court on December 28, 2020, demanding that the reshuffle of the Oli Cabinet be scrapped, because Oli had been reduced to a caretaker Prime Minister by the dissolution of the HoR. Another writ petition was filed on December 29, 2020, demanding a court order to bar the newly-appointed Ministers from carrying out their day-to-day responsibilities. Significantly, on December 25, Oli appointed eight new Cabinet Ministers and one Minister of State, following the resignation of seven Ministers said to be close to the NCP chair, Dahal, and senior leader Madhav Kumar Nepal, on December 20. These Ministers had resigned in condemnation of Prime Minister Oli’s move dissolve the HoR.

Moreover, political parties are out on the streets, protesting against the move. Rival factions of NCP, close to Dahal and Nepal, organized a ‘whistle rally’ in Kathmandu city on December 27. Marching along the Maitighar-Babarmahal Road section, the protesters blew whistles demanding reinstatement of the lower House. On December 28, 2020, the main opposition party, the Nepali Congress (NC), organised demonstrations in all 165 electoral constituencies across the country in protest against the dissolution of the HoR. Separately, on December 27, 2020, the Janata Samajbadi Party staged a mass demonstration in Kathmandu city. Further, thousands of students close to Dahal and Nepal marched through the streets of Kathmandu on December 29, 2020, urging Oli to reverse his decision. Police officials overseeing security disclosed that at least 10,000 people were on the streets to participate in this march, one of the most intense protests the country has witnessed since Oli dissolved Parliament.

Thus while 2020 was indeed a story of instability in Nepal, the political volatility did not have an adverse impact on the overall security situation in the country.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the country recorded just one insurgency linked fatality (a civilian) in 2020 as against 13 fatalities recorded in 2019 (three civilians, two Security Force personnel, and eight extremists). Violence had peaked in 2019 after a lull of almost six years between 2013 and 2018, during which Nepal recorded just two fatalities (both civilians, in 2013). All the 13 fatalities in 2019 were linked to the Netra Bikram Chand aka Biblab-led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Chand). The lone 2020 fatality was also linked to this outfit. CPN-Maoist-Chand was formed on December 1, 2014, after splitting from the Communist Party of Nepal (Revolutionary Maoist) headed by Mohan Baidya.

Indeed, SFs have succeeded in substantially countering the threat from this group. Eight CPN-Maoist-Chand cadres have been killed since its formation, while another 378, including 90 in 2020, have been arrested. Prominent CPN-Maoist-Chand leaders arrested include ‘treasurer’ Arjun Katwal (arrested on February 4, 2020), ‘provincial leader’ Indal Prasad Sah (February 12, 2020), ‘politburo member’ Anil Sharma aka Birahi (May 5, 2020), ‘central member’ Om Prakash Pun (July 15, 2020), ‘chairman of Finance Department’ Prem Darnal (November 20, 2020) and ‘Lamjung District in-charge’ Jang Bahadur Bhandari aka Akrosh (November 23, 2020).

There are, however, apprehensions that the deepening political instability in the country may provide the Chand group an opportunity to widen its reach. Expressing serious concern over the dissolution of the HoR, on December 29, 2020, CPN-Maoist-Chand announced that it would forge a common strategic front with three other fringe left parties – the Nepal Communist Party-led by Rishi Ram Kattel, the Communist Party of Nepal (Revolutionary Maoist)-led by Mohan Baidya and the Scientific Socialist Communist Party-led by Aahuti. Issuing a joint statement, the four fringe leftist parties said that this was their attempt to fight back the ‘counter-revolutionary’ measures adopted by Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli. They announced their intention to publicize the concept, structure and forward-looking programs of the Front at the earliest possible date.

The deepening political crisis has once again provided an opportunity to China to meddle in Nepal’s internal affairs. From the beginning of this evolving crisis, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, Hou Yanqi, has openly engaged with leaders cutting across party lines. More recently, on December 27, Beijing dispatched Guo Yezhou, a Vice Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, to Kathmandu as the head of a four-member team. Guo’s team held talks with Nepali President Bidya Devi Bhandari, Prime Minister Oli, and NCP leaders Dahal and Nepal. According to Dahal’s secretariat, in addition to the current situation in Nepal, the visiting Chinese team discussed the possibility of reuniting the NCP. Guo played a major role in bringing together the Oli-led CPN-UML and the Dahal-led CPN-Maoist Centre in 2018 to form the NCP. Guo also negotiated with the leaders of Nepal’s two main communist parties to get them to contest the 2017 election on a common plank.

Moreover, the deepening political crisis is being exploited by China to make further territorial inroads in Nepal.  In August, the Humla District authorities reported a Chinese incursion near the Limi-Lepcha area of the Namkha Village Municipality. Protests erupted across the country. On September 22, the Government refuted the reports, but local residents of the area, including their elected representatives – Chhakka Bahadur Lama from ruling Nepal Communist Party, Rangmati Shahi and Jeevan Bahadur Shahi of the Nepali Congress, and representatives of local bodies – rejected the Government’s stance. The issue came into limelight again in October, when a Nepali Congress lawmaker of Karnali Province, Jeevan Bahadur Shahi, after returning from an 11-day visit to the Nepal-China border in Humla District, accused China of encroaching on Nepal’s territory in the District. The Government has not responded and there is widespread resentment again the Government’s stance. 

Meanwhile, urging the Government to undertake immediate steps to reinvigorate the Transitional Justice process, in a joint statement on August 30, 2020, the Accountability Watch Committee, Advocacy Forum-Nepal, Amnesty International-Nepal and Conflict Victims' Common Platform (CVCP) observed,

On January 27, 2020, unconvinced by the Government's approach to the Transitional Justice process, the conflict victims threatened to invite the international community, including the United Nations, to intervene in the 'botched' justice process. Bhagiram Chaudhary, Chairperson of the Conflict Victims' Common Platform (CVCP), an umbrella body of 13 organizations advocating justice for war-era victims, noted,

Significantly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has barely completed preliminary investigations into some 2,800 among the 63,000 cases filed, and is yet to complete a detailed probe into a single case. The Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), which received some 3,000 complaints, has completed preliminary investigation into just about 500, but has also failed to launch a single detailed investigation.

The TRC and the CIEDP were constituted on February 10, 2015, to probe instances of serious violations of human rights and to determine the status of those who disappeared during the course of the armed conflict between the State and the then Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-Maoist), between February 13, 1996, and November 21, 2006, the day of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2006 .

With rising political instability in the country, there is a lurking danger of escalation of violence by opportunistic formations such as the Chand group.

INDIA

Chhattisgarh: Red Erosion
Indrajit Sharma
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On December 29, 2020, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres killed a civilian near Tumdikasa village under Manpur Police Station limits in Rajnandgaon District. The Maoists left a pamphlet near his body, which accused the victim of being a ‘Police informer’.

On December 28, 2020, two women Maoists carrying a cumulative cash reward of INR 700,000 on their heads, were killed in an exchange of fire with the Security Forces (SFs) in a forest between Kalepal and Kakari villages under Kuakonda Police Station limits in Dantewada District. The slain Maoists were identified as Ayte Mandavi, the Maoists’ Malangir Area Committee’ member and ‘military intelligence head’ of the area, who carried a reward of INR 500,000 on her head; and Vijje Markam, a ‘military intelligence member’ in the ‘Malangir Area Committee’ who carried a reward of INR 200,000 on her head. A pistol and a muzzle-loading rifle were recovered from the encounter site.

On December 16, 2020, an unidentified Maoist was killed in an exchange of fire with the SFs in a forest near Miliampalli-Rajpenta villages under Jagargunda Police Station limits in Sukma District. The incident occurred when a joint team of SFs was out on an anti-Naxal [Left Wing Extremist] operation. SFs recovered a locally fabricated UBGL (under-barrel grenade launcher) and two muzzle-loading rifles from the encounter spot.

According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Chhattisgarh recorded at least 70 incidents of killing, resulting in 135 fatalities (28 civilians, 37 SF personnel, and 70 Maoists), in Left Wing Extremism (LWE)-linked violence in 2020. In 2019, 72 incidents of killing, resulting in 122 fatalities (30 civilians, 19 SF personnel and 73 Maoists) were recorded. The data thus reflected a marginal spike of 10.65 per cent in overall fatalities in LWE-linked violence in the State.

Alarmingly, fatalities in the SF category, almost doubled from 19 in 2019 to 37 in 2020. The surge is particularly worrying, as fatalities in this category in 2019 were the lowest recorded since 2012, at 30.

Moreover, while the SF : Maoist kill ratio remained in favor of the SFs, it deteriorated in comparison to 2019. In 2019, the ratio was 1:3.84, the best recorded in a year since 2000 [SATP started compiling data on LWE violence from March 6, 2000]. The ratio fell considerably to 1:1.89 in 2020. The overall kill ratio since March 6, 2000, is in favor of SFs, at 1:1.15.

Meanwhile, at least 99 Maoists were arrested in 2020, in addition to 134 such arrests in 2019. 238 Maoists surrendered in 2020, in addition to 231 such surrenders in 2019.

Civilian fatalities remained nearly the same, 28 in 2020 as against 30 in 2019. Fatalities in this category have declined continuously since 2018, when there were 59. 

Chhattisgarh has a total of 28 Districts and fatalities were reported from eight of these in 2020: Sukma (62); Bijapur (40); Dantewada (11); Kanker (six); Rajnandgaon (six); Narayanpur (five); Bastar (three); and Dhamtari (two). Six of these eight Districts (barring Rajnandgaon and Dhamtari) fall in the Bastar Division. 

In 2019, fatalities were reported from nine Districts: Sukma (33); Dantewada (23); Bijapur (20); Kanker (15); Bastar (nine); Rajnandgaon (eight); Narayanpur (seven); Dhamtari (six); and Kabirdham (one).  Six of these nine Districts (barring Rajnandgaon, Dhamtari and Kabirdham) fall in Bastar Division. 

Indeed, violence has been substantially confined to a few pockets of the Bastar Division, which spans over 40,000 square kilometers, and comprises of seven Districts – Bastar, Bijapur, Dantewada, Kanker, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, and Sukma.

On December 15, 2020, the Chhattisgarh Legislative Affairs Minister, Ravindra Choubey, in a press conference, claimed that the Naxal (LWE) activities had been confined to a few pockets of Bastar Division, and that the State would soon rid itself of the menace:

According to reports, some CPI-Maoist 'Central Committee (CC)' members remain active in the forested areas of Sukma and Bijapur. They are protected by an entity called the 'Central Regional Command (CRC)'. CRC's 'Battalion 1' is led by Maoist leader Madvi Hidma who, according to unconfirmed reports, has been promoted to the 'CC'.

To confront this residual threat, five additional battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) are being deployed in the region. 35 CRPF batalions, including five Commando Battalions for Resolute Action battalions, were deployed earlier. A total of around 60,000 personnel of the State Police and Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) were deployed in the seven Districts of Bastar Division. This included, around 300 'Danteshwari Warriors' (women commandos, comprising local women, surrendered Naxals, and Naxal-affected women), whose deployment in the Bastar Division has not only increased the number of successful operations and surrenders, but also improved Policing and intelligence in the area. The additional deployment is intended to bring around 1,500 square kilometres of the Maoist-stronghold territory under increased scrutiny, by setting up new SF camps at short distances. An unnamed senior Police officer thus stated,

Dantewada Superintendent of Police (SP), Abhishek Pallava added,

It remains to be seen whether the decision to establish new CRPF camps can be exploited by the Maoists to incite opposition from the locals.

Significantly, an October 1, 2020, report indicated that the Chhattisgarh Government's plan to open eight new Police camps by the end of 2020 to strengthen its hold in the Maoist affected areas in Dantewada, Kondagaon, Bijapur and Sukma Districts, faced resistance from local villagers. The camps were part of the 15 Police camps that the Government had planned to set up in 2020. The first seven of these were established before the COVID-19 outbreak. Commenting on the local resistance, Bastar's Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Sundarraj P. observed,

More recently on December 23, 2020, local residents of as many as 103 villages in Kanker District launched an indefinite strike at Koyalibeda in the Pakhanjur Nagar Panchayat (village level local self-Government institution) in the District against the establishment of two new Border Security Force (BSF) camps in the Maoist-affected area, alleging that the BSF camps were built on sacred ancient tribal land — locally called ‘Devasthals’. The two camps were set up on the banks of the Mendaki River in the Tumaraghat and Karkaghat areas of Koyalibeda. The villagers demanded that Police and the local administration pull down the two camps and restore their holy sites.

While the strengthening of the security footprint is a pre-requisite for accelerating pending developmental works, such as the construction of roads and bridges in LWE-affected areas, this has to be balanced with the larger interests of all stakeholders, particularly including the local population, as any misadventure would only validate Maoist propaganda.

Significantly, a report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, on the Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Home Affairs placed in Parliament on December 21, 2020, stated that road construction in LWE-affected areas in Chhattisgarh had been ‘abysymally slow’. The Panel report revealed that out of 2,479 kilometers of sanctioned roads, under Road Connectivity Project in Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas (approved in December 2016), only 319 kilometers has been completed in Chhattisgarh till now. This is further slowing down the inclusion and development processes of these areas and negatively affecting the capability of the CAPFs and State Police in tackling the menace.

The Maoists in Chhattisgarh are determined to retain their strongholds in the State. Despite suffering losses, they continue to demonstrate significant fighting capabilities. The March 21, 2020, attack in which Maoists ambushed an SF group, killing 17 of them and injuring another 15, in a forested area of Elmaguda close to Kasalpad and Minpa villages in the Chintagufa area in Sukma District, is an example of the rebels’ surviving capabilities. SFs need to sustain their focus and exercise extreme caution to thwart Maoist efforts to regain and expand their bases, particularly in erstwhile stronghold areas.