South Asia Terrorism Portal
Hitting Hard Deepak Kumar Nayak Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On April 6, 2024, three Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres were killed during an exchange of fire with Security Forces (SFs) in the Karriguta Forests of Pujari Kanker in the Bijapur District of Chhattisgarh. SFs recovered one AK47 rifle, one Light Machine Gun (LMG) and explosives from the encounter spot. The identities of the slain Maoists are yet to be ascertained.
On April 5, 2024, one CPI-Maoist cadre was gunned down by SFs in the forest area near Kirandul in the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh. During the search, SFs recovered the dead body of the Maoist, his weapon and explosives from the encounter site.
On April 2, 2024, 13 CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with security personnel in a forest near Lendra village under the Gangaloor Police Station limits of the Bijapur District of Chhattisgarh. The identity of the dead Maoists was yet to be ascertained, but prima facie, it appeared that they belonged to the Maoist’s PLGA (People's Liberation Guerrilla Army) Company No. 2, a senior Police official disclosed. Police recovered weapons, including a Light Machine Gun (LMG), a .303 rifle, and a 12-bore gun, along with a substantial quantity of barrel grenade launchers, shells, and other arms and ammunition, from the site.
On April 1, 2024, two CPI-Maoist cadres were killed in an encounter with security personnel in the Kerajhari Forest of the Balaghat District in Madhya Pradesh. The Police recovered the bodies of 38-year-old Maoist ‘divisional committee member (DCM)’ Sajanti aka Kranti and ‘area committee member (ACM)’ Raghu aka Sher Singh (54), both were wanted in multiple cases of murder, kidnapping, and arson, with bounty announcements by the Police in three states: Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Chhattisgarh.
Elsewhere on the same day, one CPI-Maoist cadre was killed in an encounter with SFs in the forest area near Tetemadgu village under Kistaram Police Station limits in the Sukma District of Chhattisgarh. The dead body of the Maoist and his weapons were recovered from the encounter site. The identity of the slain Maoist is yet to be ascertained.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 58 Naxalites [Left Wing Extremists, LWEs] have been killed by the SFs during the current year, 2024 (data till April 7). During the corresponding period of 2023, SFs had eliminated nine Naxalites. Through 2023, SFs killed 58 Naxalites, in addition to 67 killed in 2022.
According to the SATP database, SFs arrested 401 Naxalites in 2023 as against 395 arrests in 2022. In 2024, as on April 7, the number of arrests stood at 92. Since March 6, 2000, according to SATP data, 16,364 Naxalites have been arrested (data till April 7, 2024).
Through 2023, SFs recovered weapons and ammunition from the Maoists in 223 incidents, in addition to 193 such incidents of recovery in 2022. During the current year, as on April 7, 2024, the number of such incidents was 58. Since March 6, 2000, a total of 4,917 incidents of arms recovery are on record.
Mounting pressure on the Naxalites has resulted in a large number of surrenders over the past few years. According to SATP data, at least 254 Naxalites surrender through 2023, in addition to 2,855 surrenders in 2022. During the current year, as on April 7, 2024, 42 surrenders have been recorded. Since March 6, 2000, 16,780 Naxalites have surrendered (data till April 7, 2024).
Continuing SF successes on the ground further improved the overall security situation through 2023. The trend of declining overall fatalities, on year-on-year basis, in Left Wing Extremism-related violence, has been established since 2018, though a marginal reversal occurred in 2023 at around 11.11 per cent (from 135 in 2022 to 150 in 2023). According to SATP data, a total of 150 people (61 civilians, 31 SF personnel and 58 Naxalites) were killed in such violence through 2023, as against 135 fatalities (53 civilians, 15 SF personnel and 67 Naxalites) recorded in 2022. During the current year, as on April 7, 2024, the total number of such fatalities stood at 93 (22 civilians, 13 SF personnel and 58 Naxalites), as against 37 such fatalities (19 civilians, nine SF personnel and nine Naxalites) reported during the corresponding period of 2023.
According to SATP data, the number of civilian fatalities (61) recorded through 2023 was the third lowest in this category since 2000. Two other previous lows were recorded at 53 in 2022 and 58 in 2021. A third low of 61 was also recorded in 2020. The maximum number of civilians killed in such violence, 630, was in 2010.
Though the number of fatalities among SFs increased from 15 in 2022 to 31 in 2023, according to SATP data, the number of fatalities in 2023 was the second lowest in this category since 2000. A previous low of 15 was recorded in 2022. The maximum number of SFs killed in such violence, 319, was in 2009.
The SF:Maoist kill ratio remained in favour of the SFs in 2023, at 1:1.87, improving the ratio in favour of the SFs in 2011, when it was at 1:1.53. In 2022, the ratio was at 1:4.46, surpassing the previous best of 1:4.03 in 2016. In 2010, the SF:Maoist kill ratio shifted to 1.01:1, favouring the Maoists. Also, in 2009 the ratio was at 1.01:1. In 2007, the ratio was at 1.2:1 favouring the Maoists. However, since March 6, 2000, the overall kill ratio has been in favour of the SFs (1:1.63). In the current year, the kill ratio remains in favour of the SFs at 1:4.46, so far (data till April 7, 2024).
Other parameters of violence indicate that, despite sustained SF pressure, the Maoists but retain significant operational capabilities across the country. At least eight major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) were recorded in 2023, compared to seven such incidents in 2022. There were 89 incidents of exchange of fire between SFs and Maoist in 2023, compared to 86 such incidents in 2022. Further, the Maoists orchestrated at least 62 incidents of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blasts in 2023, compared to 32 such incidents in 2022.
Moreover, the number of overall LWE-linked incidents of violence increased marginally from 602 in 2022 to 603 in 2023. In particular, incidents in which the Maoists killed civilians and SFs increased from 63 in 2022 to 77 in 2023.
Meanwhile, according to the SATP database, Maoist activities were reported from 12 States in 2023, in comparison to 10 States in 2022. (India has a total of 797 Districts in 29 States and nine Union Territories). The 12 affected States have a total of 83 Districts which recorded a Maoist presence. Of these, seven districts fell in the ‘highly affected’ category; 20 in the ‘moderately affected’ category; and 56 were ‘marginally affected’. By comparison in 2022, of 57 affected districts from 10 states, two districts fell in the ‘highly affected’ category, 28 in the ‘moderately affected’ category, and 27 were ‘marginally affected’.
However, in a written reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian Parliament) on February 7, 2024, Minister of State for Home Affairs Nityanand Rai claimed that the resolute implementation of the “National Policy and Action Plan (NPAP) to address LWE” approved in 2015, resulted in a consistent decline in violence and constriction of the geographical spread of LWE influence. LWE-related violence and resultant deaths (Civilians + Security Forces) declined by 73 per cent from a high in 2010, by 90 per cent in 2022, and by 86 per cent in 2023. Further, Rai stated that the number of Police Stations reporting LWE-related violence had reduced significantly, from 465 Police Stations across 96 districts in 2010 to 176 Police Stations across 45 districts in 2022 and 171 Police Stations across 42 districts in 2023.
Clearly, all major LWE-affected states across the country – see Andhra Pradesh’s Residual Vexations, Bihar’s Halted Menace, Chhattisgarh’s Persisting Disruptions, Jharkhand’s Risks amidst decline, Madhya Pradesh’s Enduring Risks, Maharashtra’s Ineffective ‘Revival’, Odisha’s Enduring challenges, and Telangana’s Sustained Dominance have recorded substantial improvement in the security situation in the regions affected by LWE activity.
Earlier, on January 21, 2024, the union home minister (UHM) Amit Shah, had asserted that the country would be free from the menace of Naxalism in the next three years, and directed states to expedite development activities in remote areas affected by the ultras. UHM Shah also directed the Security Forces (SFs) to financially choke the ultras and instructed officials to prepare a blueprint to end Naxalism. He also stressed the need for expediting development in Naxalite-affected areas, asserting that all welfare schemes of the central and state governments would have to be implemented in these areas with renewed vigour.
Meanwhile, on January 11, 2024, the Chhattisgarh government invited Maoists to hold unconditional talks, suggesting "video calls if they are reluctant to come for physical meetings". Chhattisgarh deputy chief minister Vijay Sharma, who holds the state's Home portfolio, stating that this would be a step towards restoring peace and stability in the Bastar region, thus observed,
While holding out an olive branch, the Government made it clear that there would be no softening of stance. The Deputy Chief Minister thus warned,
Meanwhile, according to a March 21, 2024, media report, Chhattisgarh's Deputy Chief Minister Vijay Sharma's call for unconditional dialogue with Maoists prompted a response from the CPI-Maoist, with the rebels presenting certain preconditions and emphasizing the necessity of a conducive environment for talks to ensure the welfare and lasting peace of oppressed and exploited segments of society. In a letter, CPI-Maoist Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC) 'spokesman' Vikalp outlined several conditions before any agreement could be reached to engage in dialogue. These conditions included the cessation of atrocities and false encounters on tribals, halting militarization in tribal regions, withdrawing security forces, and annulling agreements with corporate entities. In a two-page letter dated March 15, 2024, Maoist spokesperson Vikalp declared that, if their demands were met, they would be ready to engage in dialogue via mobile phone calls. He noted, further,
Vikalp also insisted on providing loan waivers for farmers, increasing agricultural subsidies, providing free irrigation and electricity, cancelling agreements with international companies, and implementing welfare schemes such as free education, housing, healthcare, and employment.
The Maoists thus gave bandh (general shut down strike) calls on their whims. In their latest call on March 30, 2024, the Maoists called for a bandh in Bijapur and Sukma on April 3, 2024, to protest the killing of six Maoists in an encounter in the Bijapur District of Chhattisgarh on March 27, 2024, which the rebels claimed was a "fake encounter". However, the bandh calls were peaceful.
Rejecting the allegations of fake encounters as "old tactics" of the Maoists, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Bastar range, Sundarraj P., asserted,
Earlier, on March 26, 2024, Mohan, the ‘secretary’ of the CPI-Maoist West Bastar Division Committee, had issued a press note which announced that Bijapur would remain closed on March 30. In the note the Maoist leader accused the Police of killing 15 tribals since January. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Government in Chhattisgarh has been accused of fake encounters, atrocities, and the eviction of tribals from forests and land, and denial of access to water resources. The Maoists warned transporters and businessmen that they would be responsible if they operated on March 30. However, the bandh passed without any disruptive activities.
The Maoists issued nine Bandh calls in 2023 across the country, as against eight such calls in 2022.
The Maoist movement has weakened, as the SFs now increasingly dominate areas long under LWE sway. Nevertheless, the capacities to sustain dominance remain limited. According to Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, the all-India Police-population ratio was 152.80 (as on January 1, 2022), in comparison to 152.51 per 100,000 on January 1, 2021. Some of the Maoists’ affected States have much worse police-population ratios: Bihar, at 75.16; Odisha at 122.59; and Maharashtra at 136.45. Even in States like Jharkhand, where the police-population ratio, at 162.73, exceeds the national average, it remains much lower than the 220/100,000 ratio regarded as desirable for 'peacetime policing'.
Moreover, there were 504 (17.59 per cent) vacancies in the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) in the 12 affected States, considerably weakening executive direction of the Force. Further, huge vacancies persist in the total strength of the State Police forces, which have been increasingly used in the fight against the Naxalites: there were 417,784 vacant posts in the 12 affected States, as on January 1, 2022, against a sanctioned strength of 1,642,759 (actual strength: 1,224,965). Significantly, these constituted 72.3 per cent of the 595,105 vacant posts across India, as on January 1, 2022. Moreover, against a sanctioned strength of 324,654 in the CRPF, the lead counter-insurgency Force in the country, the actual strength stood at 309,544, a vacancy of 15,110 personnel.
Stark deficits are visible in some of the worst afflicted States. According to BPR&D data, as on January 1, 2022, there were at least 22 Police Stations in Chhattisgarh, the worst Naxalism-affected State, which did not have a telephone. Similarly, the second worst affected State, Jharkhand, had 211 such Police Stations without telephone connections. The number of Police Stations without a vehicle in Jharkhand was 47, while 31 Police stations in the state hand no wireless/mobile phone.
The Maoists are certainly losing their impact across the country; however, the danger of resurgence remains alive. There is urgent need to build the necessary capacities to sustain, indeed, heighten pressure at this stage, in order to consolidate the gains of recent years.
North-East: Expanding Challenges Afsara Shaheen Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
On April 2, 2024, the Government extended the imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in the whole State of Manipur, except for 19 Police stations, for another six months with effect from April 1, 2024. The areas under the Police Stations excluded from AFSPA are Imphal, Lamphel, City, Singjamei, Sekmai, Lamsang, Patsoi, Wangoi, Porompat, Heingang, Lamlai, Irilbung, Leimakhong, Thoubal, Bishnupur, Nambol, Moirang, Kakching and Jirbam. Thus, there has been no change in areas covered under AFSPA in the notification dated September 27, 2023, though the security situation has worsened in the State in the recent times, primarily due to the abrupt escalation of ethnic violence.
Earlier, on March 27, 2024, the Government extended AFSPA in three Districts of Arunachal Pradesh for another six months. The districts included Tirap, Changlang, and Longding District (TCL Districts). AFSPA was extended in specific areas under the jurisdiction of Namsai, Mahadevpur, and Chowkham Police Stations in Namsai District, as well. The extension is slated for a duration of six months, effective April 1, 2024, unless withdrawn earlier by the authorities. This extension maintains the earlier notifications, as there is no change in the security situation in these areas of Arunachal Pradesh, which continue to pose security challenges as a result of their use as a transit route by insurgents from other states.
On the same day, March 27, 2024, the Government also extended AFSPA in four Districts of Assam for six months from April 1 – Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Charaideo and Sivasagar. In accordance with the earlier notification dated September 27, 2023, the latest notification excludes four Districts – Jorhat, Golaghat, Dima Hasao and Karbi Anglong – from the purview of AFSPA, a s result of improvements in the law-and-order situation in these areas.
Also, on March 27, 2024, the Government issued a notification extending AFSPA in eight Districts, as well as 21 Police Stations across five other Districts of Nagalan,d for a period of six months starting April 1. The districts include Dimapur, Niuland, Chumoukedima, Kiphire, Phek, Mon, Noklak and Peren. The earlier notification issued on September 30, 2022, imposed AFSPA in nine Districts as well as 16 Police Stations in four other Districts. The Zunheboto District has been excluded in the latest notification.
AFSPA was withdrawn from Meghalaya in 2018, from Tripura in 2015, and from Mizoram in the 1980s.
The notifications clearly indicate that security concerns in the region persist, though the overall situation has improved gradually over the period, with the exception of Manipur, which has recorded a sudden and abrupt deterioration since May 2023. From a peak of 1,165 fatalities in 2003, the Northeast region recorded a low of 21 fatalities in 2022. For five consecutive years between, 2018 and 2022, fatalities across the region remained well under a hundred. In 2023, the rest of the region recorded just 17 fatalities, while Manipur alone saw 163 insurgency-linked fatalities. On February 28, 2024, Manipur Governor Anusuiya Uikey disclosed that 219 people had been killed in ethnic violence in Manipur since May 2023. No further details were provided, and it is likely that there would be significant overlap with the SATP category of insurgency-linked fatalities. In 2024 (till April 7), Northeast India recorded a total of 29 fatalities, of which Manipur alone accounted for 27. The remaining two fatalities occurred in Nagaland (both militants).
The improvement in the overall security situation has primarily been due to the actions of the SFs on the ground over a period of time, which has weakened several groups forcing them to surrender and enter into peace talks with the government. Two major peace agreements were signed with two prominent insurgent groups in the North-East in 2023:
Meanwhile, the sudden surge in fatalities in Manipur was linked to the outbreak and persistence of ethnic clashes between the Kuki and Meitei communities in Manipur, which commenced on May 3, 2023, in Churachandpur District, and which spread rapidly across the state and continues till date. Since the outbreak of the ethnic clashes in Manipur on May 3, 2023, at least 186 insurgency-liked fatalities have been reported in the state, including 94 civilians, 19 Security Forces (SF) personnel, 72 insurgents, and one in the Not Specified (NS) category. Of these, 27 have been reported in 2024: 23 civilians, two SF personnel and two insurgents. It is important to note that Manipur recorded just seven fatalities, including five civilians, one trooper and one militant, in 2022, a significant drop from 27 fatalities, including eight civilians, five SF personnel and 14 militants, recorded in 2021. The 2022 tally was an all-time low since 1992, along with 2020, when there was an equal number of fatalities. In 2023, Manipur recorded 163 insurgency-linked fatalities – 72 civilians, 73 terrorists, 17 SF personnel and one in the non-specified category – in 77 incidents.
It has been almost a year since the ethnic violence started in Manipur, and the current scenario in the State is far from satisfactory. Occasional incidents of killing of civilians as well as SF personnel at the hands of insurgents or unidentified miscreants continue to occur from time to time. Though the situation in Manipur has seen some improvement since the initial outbreak of violence, sporadic incidents persist, and the ethnic borders that have been established between the Valley and Hill areas continue to be policed by SFs as well as by armed ethnic militia.
In Assam, eight insurgency-related fatalities were recorded in 2023, as compared to six in 2022. The terrorist groups active in the State and across its borders include the United Liberation Front of Asom – Independent (ULFA-I), Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) and its factions. The state’s security situation has improved significantly and a succession of peace agreements has largely contributed to stabilization. However, ULFA-I remains an enduring challenge.
The troubles in Arunachal Pradesh are an overflow from other states of the region, including Assam, Nagaland and Manipur, which continue to disproportionately affect the TCL Districts of the State –– all lying on the Indo-Myanmar border. Arunachal Pradesh is used as a transit route by various militant groups, whose camps are situated in the Sagaing Region of Myanmar. TCL remains the ‘axis’ of conflict in the state. Five fatalities were recorded in these districts in 2023 (one civilian, one SF and three terrorists). The Yung-Aung faction of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K-YA) remains violently active in the State. On December 16, 2023, NSCN-K-YA cadres killed a former Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) of the State, Yumsem Matey, in Tirap District, along the Indo-Myanmar border. Further the outfit continues to engage in abduction and extortion, mainly in the Longding District.
Nagaland has experienced a marked improvement in the security situation over the past years, with just three insurgency-linked fatalities recorded in 2023 (all terrorists). There were no fatalities in the state in 2022. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) remains active in the State, despite its engagement in peace talks with the Government, and is still adamant on its demand for a separate flag and a separate constitution for the Naga people. The Union Government has insisted that any agreement with the rebel group would be within the purview of the Indian Constitution. On December 9, 2023, NSCN-IM rejected the Government's position, declaring,
The security situation in Meghalaya is peaceful and the State recorded no insurgency-linked fatalities in 2023 and 2022. There were eight fatalities in 2017, seven in 2018, two in 2019, none in 2020 and two in 2021. The Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) is the only active insurgent group in the State and there have been uncertain negotiations between this group and the Meghalaya Government. On April 4, 2024, Meghalaya Deputy Chief Minister (CM) Prestone Tynsong asserted that the door was still open for HNLC to engage in peace talks with the state government and asked the group’s leaders to reconsider their stance and return to the negotiating table. He further stated that, if the HNLC chooses not to pursue dialogue, then the law of the land would prevail. It is to be noted here that, on December 31, 2023, HNLC had decided to withdraw from peace talks with the Central government, citing a complete lack of attention to their demands.
The security scenario in Tripura remains stable and the state recorded just one insurgency linked fatality in 2023. The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) remain active in the state, although their capacity to mobilize and to carry out terrorist operations has declined over the years.
Mizoram has remained free of insurgency-related violence since 2015, but the State continues to be disturbed by rising incidents of weapons and explosives smuggling. Incidents of recoveries of arms and ammunition in Mizoram have increased considerably in recent times. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, four such incidents in the state have already been recorded in 2024 (data April 7), while there were at least 11 such incidents in 2023, and 13 in 2022.
The Northeastern region has been struggling with internal security challenges for several decades. There has been sustained and dramatic improvement over the years. The region has suffered from a range of afflictions, including insurgency, ethnic conflicts, economic marginalization, and cross-border infiltration. The decline in the multiple insurgencies of the region has principally been a consequence of sustained SF pressure over the decades, and cannot be attributed to any extraordinary shift in policy under the present regime. In fact, the current violence in Manipur is the result of the erroneous and polarizing politics pursued by the government, and this crisis has once again raised the spectre of a possible revival of insurgency across the region. It is crucial that the enormous costs of the region’s stabilization, particularly in terms of the sacrifices of the SFs, be recognized, and policies in the region be defined by the imperatives of the situation, and not by self-serving partisan political calculations.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia April 1-7, 2024
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
NS
Total
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Chhattisgarh
Jammu & Kashmir
Madhya Pradesh
INDIA (Total)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
PAKISTAN (Total)
Total (South Asia)
Taliban enforces closure of multiple educational centers in Kabul, says report: On April 1, Taliban imposed blockades at entrances of numerous educational centers within the city of Kabul, citing the presence of female students beyond the sixth grade as their rationale. This measure was initiated by Taliban primarily in 7th and 10th Districts of Kabul. The plan is purportedly slated for extension across the entirety of the city. Hasht e Subh, April 2, 2024.
Meghalaya Deputy CM Prestone Tynsong calls HNLC for peace talks: On April 4, Meghalaya Deputy Chief Minister (CM) Prestone Tynsong asserted that the door is still open for Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) to engage in peace talks with the state government. He asked HNLC to reconsider their stance and return to the negotiating table. He further stated that if the HNLC chooses not to pursue dialogue, then the law of the land will prevail. Northeast Now, April 6, 2024.
AFSPA extended in Manipur for six months: The Manipur Government has extended the imposition of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in the whole State except for 19 Police stations, for another six months with effect from April 1, 2024. The areas under Police stations which do not come under AFSPA are Imphal, Lamphel, City, Singjamei, Sekmai, Lamsang, Patsoi, Wangoi, Porompat, Heingang, Lamlai, Irilbung, Leimakhong, Thoubal, Bishnupur, Nambol, Moirang, Kakching and Jirbam. The Sangai Express, April 3, 2024.
Balochistan and KP dominate violence landscape in first quarter, says CRSS report: Pakistan witnessed a total of 432 violence-related fatalities and 370 injuries during the first quarter of 2024, stemming from 245 incidents of terror attacks and counter-terror operations, the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) report said. The figure includes 281 fatalities among civilians and Security Forces (SFs) personnel. According to the report, the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan bore the brunt of this violence, accounting for over 92 per cent of all fatalities and 86 per cent of attacks during this period. The report underscores significant regional variations in the intensity of violence, with KP and Balochistan emerging as epicenters of conflict.The Express Tribune, April 2, 2024. .
Sindh Rangers seek policing powers for entire Sindh: Pakistan Rangers Director General (DG) has sought special policing powers for the whole of Sindh amid the deteriorating law and order situation in the province. During a meeting at the Sindh High Court regarding the law and order situation, the DG Rangers urged for giving policing powers to the paramilitary force as given in Karachi to fight terrorism in the past. Ary News, April 6, 2024.
Pakistan rules out negotiations with TTP after Afghan Taliban suggested for peace negotiation: A day after a senior Afghan Taliban leader urged the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Pakistan to sit together and negotiate for peace, the Foreign Office (FO) on April 4 ruled out talks with the terrorist outfit. On April 3, Muhammad Nabi Omari, Deputy Interior Minister of the Interim Taliban Government in Afghanistan, made the remarks at an Iftar gathering in the Khost town. Dawn, April 5, 2024. .
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
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