South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Establishment losing Authority
Ajit Kumar Singh
Senior Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

At the time of writing, Pakistan’s political landscape is full of chaos. The General Election 2024 results have not only thrown up a hung National Assembly, but have done so after a pre-election scenario ‘fixed’ to produce a ‘selected’ and not elected, government, and an electoral process riddled with irregularities. The meme currently doing the rounds in Pakistan is that the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) got more votes on February 9, than it did on February 8. Widespread protests and violent repression have already been witnessed in multiple locations across Pakistan, and it is widely believed that the political future of the country can only be extremely tumultuous.

The provisional results, bitterly contested and challenged, declared on February 11, 2024, indicate that the Independent Candidates have won the maximum number of seats, 101, of which 93 were backed-by the jailed former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan-led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). This was followed by the Nawaz Sharif-led PML-N, 75; Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 54; Muttahida Qomi Movement Pakistan, 17; Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan, four; Pakistan Muslim League, three; Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party, Balochistan National Party, two each; Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League-Z, Pashtoonkhwa National Awami Party Pakistan, Balochistan Awami Party, National Party, Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, one each. The result of one seat has been withheld.

The General Elections for 265 out of 266 National Assembly seats were held on February 8, 2024. Polling on one seat was postponed after the death of a candidate. The National Assembly comprises 336 seats, with 266 determined through direct voting, and 70 reserved seats (60 for women and 10 for minorities) allocated based on each party's strength in the house.

In the simultaneous elections held for Provincial Assemblies of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Punjab and Sindh, while PTI supported independents have emerged leaders with 136 seats out of a total of 297 direct voting seats in Punjab and 89 out of 115 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; PPP has won a maximum of 88 out of 130 in Sindh, and 11 out of total 51 in Balochistan.      

These results are a dramatic setback for the ‘all powerful’ Military Establishment in Pakistan, which had done everything possible to bring back its protégé-turned-foe-turned-protégé Nawaz Sharif to power again. To this end, the Establishment first helped the then-combined opposition under the banner of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) sustain an orchestrated street mobilisation and protests against the then Prime Minister Imran Khan – another protégé turned foe – leading to the build-up of a political situation which help the Establishment topple Imran’s government in April 2022. Subsequently, a PDM Government was installed under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Nawaz’s brother, which later handed over power to an Interim Government led by caretaker Prime Minister Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar, in the run-up to the elections.

In the interim, Imran Khan was sent to jail, convicted on multiple ‘corruption’ charges, his party was banned from participating in elections, and its election symbol was withdrawn by a pliant Election Commission of Pakistan. It is significant that Nawaz Sharif had been forced into exile in 2019 by a slew of corruption case, and had been banned from participating in elections ‘for life’. The ban was abruptly lifted by the Supreme Court on January 8, 2024, paving the way for his engineered return to power.

With just 75 seats in the National Assembly, Nawaz Sharif has declared himself the victor and staked his party’s claim to form the Government. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari of the PPP, with 54 seats, has announced that his party would join a PML-N led government, to “bring political stability” to Pakistan. Significantly, the combined total of the two parties, at 129, is still below the minimum of 133 required to secure a majority, and reports indicate that a process of poaching on the Independents has begun.

With the Establishment backing them, there is little doubt that a PML-N – PPP combine, with support from some other parties as well a few independents, can form a ‘unity government’, as had happened after the ouster of Imran Khan in April 2022.

Nevertheless, with widespread and credible allegations of election rigging, the Establishment is facing unprecedented ignominy and a rising challenge to its authority. It is significant that the PTI-backed Independents have performed well across the country – including Punjab, the Establishment heartland and Nawaz Sharif’s home Province. A crisis of legitimacy is inevitable, and will hobble any government that is formed in contravention of the popular mandate. The possibility of a situation arising where the Establishment may ‘be forced’ to take ‘full control’ of governance, citing critical disorders, is growing.

The political fragility can only be worsened by the economy, which has been in tatters for long, with little hope of imminent revival. Pakistan’s budget deficit reached PKR 2.4 trillion or 2.3 percent of the GDP in the first half of fiscal year 2024, up from PKR 1.7 trillion or 2 percent of GDP in the same period last year. As on February 11, the USD to PKR interbank exchange rate was PKR 278.5 according to Pakistan Interbank. The prices of essential commodities are soaring, with as inflation at 28.3 per cent.

Socio-political and economic turmoil have deepened further, as the Establishments entrenched policy of using terrorism as a strategic tool boomerangs. After a peak in 2009, at 11,317, terrorism-linked fatalities declined steadily, to bottom out at 365 in 2019. A sustained rising trend has since been established, with 1,502 killed in 2023 – including 532 Security Force (SF) personnel. 244 terrorism/insurgency linked fatalities have already been recorded in 2024 (data till February 11), including 75 SF personnel. While positive, the SF:Terrorist kill ratio is not very reassuring, at 1:1.098 in 2023; and 1:1.04 in 2024, indicating severe pressure on the SFs. These trends are unlikely to improve, with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State (IS) operating across the border from Afghanistan, the former with tacit support from the Taliban. It is useful to recall, here, that Imran Khan had often expressed sympathy with TTP, which has its strongest operational base in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Khan’s home Province. In the recent past, Khan has repeatedly reminded the Establishment that a refusal to accept an electoral mandate had led to the breaking away of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and another such outcome was conceivable if the people’s will was ignored again. The degree to which such sentiments can coalesce with the TTP’s agenda and activities, with Pakhtun identity politics, and with the Taliban’s ambitions, in the restive Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region remains to be seen.

Domestic terrorism continues to thrive in Pakistan within a broader environment that the Establishment has created to facilitate the operations of foreign oriented terrorist formations, both directed against neighbours as well as wider global formations, and sectarian (anti-Shia) terrorist groups, as well as armed proxies – hit squads – that are deployed against dissident and rebel elements, particularly in Balochistan. Significantly, the mobilizing ideology of all these groups is Islamist (Sunni) extremism, and overlaps, crossovers and operational coordination are not uncommon. Indeed, groups that receive strong state support – including, for instance, the Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish e Mohammad (JeM)– have had long and close links with the TTP as well as with the Afghan Taliban. A change in the political environment or ground situation in Pakistan can provide a dramatic fillip to domestically oriented terrorist formations, particularly the TTP.

Crucially, the Durand Line has re-emerged as a contentious issue between Islamabad and Kabul. There have been repeated and direct confrontations between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani border forces. Moreover, despite urgent exhortations and pressure from Islamabad, the Afghan Taliban has taken little meaningful action against the TTP cadres/leaders who have been sheltering on Afghan soil. The increased volatility of the Af-Pak border has helped the TTP infiltrate most of its cadres into Pakistan, and the group has made deep inroads across Pakistan, far beyond its traditional strongholds in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Pakistan’s historical malfeasance has, moreover, left it with no friends in the immediate neighbourhood, with the exception of China. The fractious history with India, and Rawalpindi’s enduring proxy war on Indian soil do not bear repetition here. Friction with Iran also has a long history, and, most recently, on January 16, 2024, Iran's Revolutionary Guards launched "precision missile and drone strikes" on two alleged strongholds of the Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice, formerly Jundallah) an anti-Iran Baloch separatist formation, located in the Pakistani Balochistan, which borders the Sistan & Baluchistan Province of Iran. According to reports, two children were killed in the Iranian attack, which was a response to an attack by Jaish al-Adl at a police station in the city of Rask, in the Sistan & Baluchestan, in which 11 policemen were killed on December 13, 2023. The Jaish al-Adl, re-christened in 2012 from its original Jundallah after a US ban on the latter, and blacklisted by Iran as a terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the Rask attack. Pakistan retaliated to missile and drone strikes with an air attack in Sistan & Baluchestan Province on January 18, targeting alleged hideouts of the Balochistan Liberation Front and Balochistan Liberation Army. At least nine persons were killed in the attack. Though the tension has deescalated, both sides continued to blame each other for harbouring ‘terrorist groups’.

Another source of concern for the Establishment in Pakistan is the recent spate of targeted killings of the leaders/cadres of India-directed terrorist proxies – both Islamist and Khalistani – by unidentified assailants inside Pakistan. Between 2020 and January 2024, at least 20 such terrorists have been killed. These killings are most likely the result of increasing differences within these terrorist groups or their rivals operating from Pakistan, though there are unsubstantiated allegations regarding the involvement of ‘Indian agencies’ in some of these. Since Pakistan refuses to acknowledge the presence of most of the deceased terrorists on its soil, transparent investigations and a definitive identification of the victims and the perpetrators remains unlikely. Within the current context of a deteriorating security situation, there is a strong likelihood of a surge in such killings as well, as the Establishment’s control of its proxies weakens.

Pakistan is at a crossroads. Though the country has survived deep crises in the past, it is useful to recall that it has emerged weaker from each. Crucially, the manifest loss of credibility and faith in the Military Establishment has unhinged the nation from the anchor on which it has long relied with dogged fidelity, despite the Establishment’s dubious role through Pakistan’s fractious history. Absent a political leadership which has the sagacity and vision to lead the country out of its present morass, the loss of the Establishment’s authority can only deepen the enveloping instability.

INDIA

Odisha: Enduring challenges
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On February 3, 2024, a ‘divisional committee member (DCM)’ of the ‘Kandhamal-Kalahandi-Boudh-Nayagarh (KKBN) division’ of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist), identified as Dasru, carrying a cash award of INR 500,000 on his head, was killed by the Police during an exchange of fire at the Kakerkupa area in the Kandhamal District of Odisha. One Policeman also suffered injuries during the encounter. Dasru, who was from Chhattisgarh, was wanted in more than 20 cases in the Kandhamal and Boudh districts of Odisha.

This is the lone fatality recorded in the state in Naxalite [Left Wing Extremism (LWE)]-linked violence in the state in the current year, thus far (data till February 11, 2024).

According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Odisha recorded nine fatalities, including three civilians and six Naxalites (Left Wing Extremists), in LWE-related violence in 2023. In 2022, there was a total of 17 fatalities, including seven civilians, three Security Force (SF) personnel and seven Maoists. The data thus reflected a decline of 47.05 per cent in overall fatalities in LWE-linked violence in the state in 2023, as compared to 2022.

It is worth noting here that the trend of declining fatalities on a year-on-year basis in LWE-linked violence in the state has been established since 2016, with the exception of 2020 and 2022, and has continued through 2023.

The number of total LWE-linked incidents came down from 53 in 2022 to 48 in 2023. Six incidents have been recorded in the current year: one killing incident (mentioned above), two incidents of exchange of fire, two incidents of surrender (resulting in two surrenders in one incident and one surrender in the second), and one explosion.

Killing incidents fell from 12 in 2022 to five in 2023, the lowest recorded in a year since 2010, when a maximum of 62 such incidents were recorded, resulting in 112 killed, including 62 civilians, 18 SF personnel, 30 Maoists and two fatalities in the ‘not specified’ category.  

Civilian fatalities registered a decline of 57.14 per cent in 2023, in comparison to 2022, from seven to three. This was the second lowest number of civilian fatalities recorded in a year since March 6, 2000, when SATP started documenting data on LWE-linked violence across the country. The same number of three fatalities was also recorded in 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2021.A low of two civilian fatalities was recorded in 2000, and 2003. A high of 62 civilian fatalities in the State was recorded in 2010.

Significantly, SFs did not lose any troopers through 2023, as against three fatalities recorded in 2022. On the other hand, SFs neutralised six Maoists in 2023 in addition to seven in 2022. The overall kill ratio since March 6, 2000, favours the SFs at 1:1.45.

Meanwhile, SFs arrested five Maoists in 2023, in addition to the five in 2022. Further, mounting SF pressure resulted in the surrender of five Maoists in 2023. 2,498 Maoists, including ‘militia’ [people’s army members carrying rudimentary weapons and providing logistics support to the core group of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)] members surrendered in 2022.

Giving a major jolt to the Maoists, the SFs unearthed several weapons’ dumps and recovered a huge cache of arms and explosives, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), muzzle-loading guns, homemade grenades, gelatin sticks, detonators, cordex wire bundles, on 31 occasions in 2023, in addition to 27 such occasions in 2022. The total number of such recoveries since March 6, 2000, was 620. In the current year, two such incidents of arms recovery have already been recorded so far (data till February 11, 2024).

Other parameters of violence also registered some decline. Two incidents of arson carried out against civilian construction companies were recorded in 2023, as against five in 2022. Eight incidents of exchange of fire between SFs and Maoists were recorded in 2023, as against 10 in 2022.

Fatalities in 2023 were recorded in four Districts – Kalahandi and Malkangiri (three each), Nabarangpur (two) and Kandhamal (one). In 2022, six Districts registered fatalities – Kandhamal (six), Nuapada (four), Bolangir, Kalahandi and Koraput (two each), and Malkangiri (one).

According to SATP data for 2023, based on assessments of underground and over-ground activities of the Maoists, four districts – Kalahandi, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur and Kandhamal – remained moderately affected; while, eight districts – Bargarh, Boudh, Ganjam, Koraput, Mayurbhanj, Nuapada, Rayagada, and Sundargarh – were in the marginally affected category. In 2022, six districts – Bolangir, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Koraput, Malkangiri and Nuapada – were moderately affected; while, three districts – Bargarh, Nabarangpur and Rayagada – were marginally affected.

Clearly, SF successes on the ground have led to improvements in the overall security situation in the state, though concerns persist.

A February 10, 2024, report indicated that the Maoists were trying to regain lost ground in Malkangiri District, exerting efforts to strengthen their organisation with regular visits to villages in the Swabhiman Anchal (earlier known as the ‘cutoff area’ of the district), and those bordering Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, to assess the situation.

On December 21, 2023, the CPI-Maoist cadres blew up a railway track at Binuan village, between Manoharpur and Rourkela Railway Station in Sundargarh District. More than 20 trains were stranded at different stations due to the violence by the Maoists.

On December 20, 2023, State Director General of Police (DGP) Sunil Kumar Bansal disclosed that the major focus was now on the Kandhamal-Kalahandi and Boudh axes, which had emerged as the new flash points of Maoist activities.

Earlier, on November 30, 2023, Border Security Force (BSF) Inspector General (IG) Dhaneswar K.R. Sharma stated that the CPI-Maoist menace still prevailed in four districts of Odisha, adding:

Meanwhile, the government is trying to further strengthen intelligence-gathering mechanisms so that anti-LWE operations would be further intensified in the affected areas, with a special focus on Boudh. The establishment of 11 new Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and BSF camps in remote areas is also being discussed in detail. Moreover, Odisha Police has also planned to procure six high-tech drones to carry out surveillance in Naxalite-affected districts such as Malkangiri, Koraput, Kalahandi, Kandhamal, Boudh, Nuapada, and Rayagada. The drones will give security agencies a boost, to keep a close vigil on the movement of Naxals, who may try to carry out demonstrative acts of violence to make their presence felt and boost the morale of the rank and file, especially ahead of the upcoming Parliamentary Elections of 2024. It may be noted that, at present, Odisha Police has mini drones, but they have not proved very effective and cannot be used at night.

Persistent and unaddressed deficits, moreover, also present some difficulties. According to the latest Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as on January 1, 2022, the Odisha Police does face a persistent deficit in terms of capacities and strength. Odisha had 122.59 Police personnel per 100,000 population, significantly below the severely inadequate national average of 152.80. More worryingly, the Police/Area Ratio (number of policemen per 100 square kilometres) was just 36.11, as against the national average of 63.70. Both the State and national averages on the Police/Area ratio were well below the sanctioned strength, at 43.52 and 81.80, respectively. The sanctioned strength for the States’ Police was 67,769, while just 56,227 personnel were in position, creating a deficit of 17.03 per cent against sanctioned strength. In addition, the sanctioned strength of the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State was 195, but just 120 officers were in position, a deficit of 38.46 per cent that considerably weakens the executive supervision of the Force.

In recent years, Maoist activities in Odisha have been contained to a great extent. However, exhaustive and aggressive SF operations in the remaining affected areas are an inevitability to foil necessary to ensure that Maoist plans and efforts to engineer a resurrection don’t succeed.