South Asia Terrorism Portal

PAKISTAN

Chinese Quicksand
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On March 26, 2024, at least six persons – five Chinese nationals and their Pakistani driver – were killed when their convoy was attacked by a suicide bomber in the Besham area of Shangla District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). A convoy of 12 vehicles, nine of them carrying Chinese nationals and three escorting vehicles of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, were on their way to the Dasu Hydropower Project in Upper Kohistan from Islamabad, when a suicide bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into the convoy, targeting a bus carrying Chinese nationals. While no group has claimed responsibility for the suicide attack, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) released a statement denying involvement in the attack.

Chinese workers engaged in the same Dasu Project were earlier targeted on July 14, 2021, when a vehicle driven by a suicide attacker and laden with explosives rammed a convoy of Chinese workers headed to the Dasu Hydropower project site in the Upper Kohistan District, killing at least 13 persons, including nine Chinese. KP Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) DIG Javed Iqbal, had then said that the attackers were from Afghanistan. While Khalid alias Sheikh was identified as the suicide bomber, Muhammad Tariq Rafiq, a TTP ‘commander’, was identified as the ‘mastermind’ behind the attack.

Notably, the first and also the worst attack targeting Chinese nationals was, recorded on July 19, 2007, when a suicide bomber tried to ram his explosive laden vehicle into a van taking Chinese engineers to Karachi from Hub town, at the Gadani Bus Stop in the industrial town of Hub in Balochistan. The attacker missed the target when a Police van blocked its way. At least 30 people, including seven Policemen, were killed and 28 were injured. However, all seven Chinese engineers, including a woman, remained unhurt. This was also the first attack directly targeting Chinese nationals.

According to partial data compiled by SATP, since July 19, 2007, at least 16 attacks directly targeting Chinese nationals have been recorded in Pakistan (12 in Balochistan, two in Sindh and two in KP), resulting in 84 deaths (data till March 31, 2024). The dead included 16 Chinese nationals, 13 Pakistani SF personnel, 42 Pakistani civilians and 13 attackers. Another, 53 persons, including six Chinese nationals, were injured in these attacks.

Some of the other prominent targeted incidents in which Chinese nationals were killed include:

Meanwhile, there have been several attacks which were not directly targeting Chinese nationals, but intended to hurt Chinese economic interests in Pakistan.

Most recently, the attack in the night of March 25 on the Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) Siddique Naval Airbase in the Turbat city of Kech District in Balochistan, in which seven persons (six BLA militants and one Frontier Corps soldier) were killed, was not particularly directed against Chinese interest, but the BLA 'spokesperson' Jeeyand Baloch, while claiming responsibility for the attack, warned China about its involvement in the region, threatening severe attacks on Chinese nationals and projects in Balochistan unless China ceases exploitative activities and support for the Pakistani military.

In a major attack, not directly targeting Chinese nationals, but intended to hurt Chinese economic interests in Pakistan, at least 11 persons were killed when four terrorists attacked the Pakistan Stock Exchange on Chundrigar Road, Karachi, on June 29, 2020. Those killed included four private security guards, one Policeman, two bystanders and all the four attackers. All the persons killed were Pakistani nationals. Significantly, after this attack BLA 'spokesperson' Jeeyand Baloch declared,

Significantly, the BLA and other Baloch groups are increasingly targeting Chinese nationals and projects after the inception of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)-related projects in 2013. Baloch groups target Chinese nationals engaged in economic activities, as they believe that China, in connivance with Islamabad, is exploiting the resources of the province, while denying any benefits to the Baloch people. They believe that CPEC is part of a 'strategic design' by China to loot resources and eliminate Pakistani, particularly Baloch, culture and identity. The USD 65 billion CPEC is a massive series of projects that includes a network of highways, railways and energy infrastructure, spanning the entire country. CPEC is a flagship project in China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Out of 16 attacks directly targeting Chinese nationals, 14 were orchestrated by Baloch groups (12 in Balochistan, two in Sindh). Two attacks were reported from KP out of which one attack was claimed by TTP. One attack on Chinese national in Karachi involved the Sindhi nationalist group, the Sindh Revolutionary Army (SRA).  

These attacks continue despite Pakistan’s best efforts and assurances to China that all such attacks would be thwarted. The News reported on March 5, 2018, that by March 2018, Pakistan had deployed an estimated 37,000 security personnel to guard Chinese workers engaged in some 22 projects directly associated with CPEC and another 214 related small and mega projects in Pakistan. These included 15,780 military personnel trained under the Special Security Division (SSD) and the Maritime Security Force (MSF). Current force deployment are believed to be considerably higher, however, estimates are not publicly available.

Not surprisingly, China is losing confidence, After the April 26, 2022, attack, media sources reported on June 28 that China wanted its own security company to guard its citizens and assets in Pakistan. The Chinese Ministry of State Security asked Pakistan to allow a Chinese security company to operate inside the country. Islamabad, however, denied the request.

Again, on September 25, 2022, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a media statement declaring that Beijing was not satisfied with the security arrangements for the Chinese companies and nationals working on CPEC projects across Pakistan. The Foreign Ministry disclosed that Chinese diplomats met with their Pakistani counterparts on the sidelines of the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) summit at that time, where they asked for tighter security arrangements. According to reports, after not being able to repay the debt owed to power companies and providing additional security to Chinese nationals, the Pakistani Government failed to restore China’s confidence.

Later, the then Federal Minister of Interior in Pakistan Rana Sanaullah, while visiting Gwadar on February 12, 2023, announced that ‘fool proof security’ would be provided to Chinese nationals in Gwadar Port. After visiting Gwadar and reviewed security arrangements for the Chinese nationals, Sanaullah declared, “All locals and foreign nationals would be provided fool proof security.”

Again, on September 6, 2023, KP Police Deputy Inspector General (DIG), Hazara Range, Mohammad Ijaz Khan, stated that security for Chinese nationals working on mega energy projects in Upper Kohistan District had been enhanced. He, however, cautioned, “Though we have beefed up security of Chinese engineers and labourers at the sites of Dasu Hydropower and other projects, you should be extra vigilant.” 

The March 26, 2024, attack again highlights the inherent weakness of the Pakistani security establishment in providing security to the Chinese nationals and interests, as well as the domestic frictions CPEC has sharpened. This created an environment of fear among the Chinses companies and people engaged in work in Pakistan. Indeed, the Chinese company, Gezhouba Group Company, on March 27, 2024, halted construction on two major dam projects – the Dasu Dam in KP and Diamer Bhasha Dam in Gilgit-Baltistan. The Chinese company has demanded that Pakistani authorities come up with new security plans before reopening the sites, where around 1,250 Chinese nationals are working. “Around 750 Chinese engineers are engaged in the Dasu Dam project, while 500 are working on the Diamer Bhasha Dam," an unnamed senior official from the KP interior department disclosed on condition of anonymity. He said the movement of Chinese engineers has been restricted to the compounds where they live, close to the sites.

Pakistan’s security challenges with regard to the CPEC projects and their Chinese workers go far deeper than a question of providing ‘fool proof’ security to the small sub-set of Chinese nationals in the country, and reach well beyond into the much more intractable issues of economic inequalities, ethnic injustice, the rape of resources, and brutal suppression in the less favoured provinces of the country. While these inequities have been repeatedly documented and have been taken note of, particularly by the Supreme Court of Pakistan which has called for urgent redress, Islamabad remains obdurately on the path that has created chaos in the country over the past many decades. The surge in terrorist activities in the country, including targeted attacks against Chinese interests, is unlikely to be permanently contained if it is approached simply as a security threat, even as the fundamentals of the protracted conflict are ignored. 

INDIA

 

   

Madhya Pradesh: Enduring Risks
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On March 11, 2024, responding to concerns raised over the presence of Naxalites (Left Wing Extremists) in certain pockets of the Kanha Tiger Reserve in Madhya Pradesh, State Chief Minister Mohan Yadav placed emphasis on empowering the forest staff to effectively address any threat from the Naxalites. In this regard, discussions were held on many proposals, including installing 4G mobile tower in Supkar village located in the core area of Kanha Tiger Reserve and at Patwa forest village. The Chief Minister was speaking at the 25^th State Wildlife Board meeting.

Meanwhile, reversing the trend of increasing overall fatalities on year on year basis established since 2019, barring 2020, when it remained at the same level as in 2019,  according to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the State recorded five fatalities, including one civilian and four Maoists in 2023 in Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)-linked violence, as compared to a total of eight fatalities, including two civilians, and six Maoists in 2022. There was just one fatality in 2018; four each in 2019 and 2020; and five in 2021. No fatality has been recorded in the current year thus far (data till March 31, 2024). Incidents of killing also decreased from five in 2022 to four in 2023.

The last fatality in the Security Forces (SFs) category was reported on September 22, 2010, when the Maoists killed a trooper of the Hawk Force (special anti-Naxalite force of Madhya Pradesh Police) near Sitapala village in Balaghat District.

Meanwhile, SFs arrested two Maoists in 2023. No Maoist was arrested in 2022. However, four Maoists were arrested in 2021. A total of 73 Naxalites have been arrested in the State since March 6, 2000, when SATP started compiling data on Naxal [Left Wing Extremism, LWE)-linked violence in the country. Further, at least five incidents of arms recovery were reported in 2023, as against three such incidents in 2022. Since March 6, 2000, at least 31 such incidents have been recorded in the State.

Though no Maoist surrendered in 2023, as well as in 2022, at least 15 Maoists have reportedly surrendered in the State since March 6, 2000 – seven in 2000, seven in 2004 and one in 2013.

On August 22, 2023, the Madhya Pradesh cabinet approved the state's first Maoist Surrender, Rehabilitation-cum-Relief Policy, 2023, to reintegrate voluntarily surrendered Maoists into mainstream society and extend support to families affected by the repercussions of LWE. Under the policy, the surrendered Maoists will get INR 500,000 or the money equivalent of the reward for their arrest, whichever is higher. If they are unmarried, they will be given INR 50,000 each for the wedding. They will also be given INR 150,000 each to build their house. If a Maoist surrenders with a weapon, he or she will be given an additional incentive ranging from INR 10,000 to INR 40,000. They will also be eligible to get INR 150,000 for professional training to start a business. Furthermore, families of surrendered Maoists will have access to benefits under the Ayushman Bharat Yojana and Food Assistance Scheme. A surrendered Maoist who helps in the elimination of another Maoist would be recommended for the post of constable in the Police department.

No incident of arson was reported in 2023, as against one incident in 2022. The State recorded a total of 10 such incidents since March 6, 2000, the last of which was reported on May 22, 2022, when more than 350 bags of tendu (Diospyros Melonoxylon plant) leaves collected by the tribals were set on fire by the cadres of the New Democratic Revolution Zindabad (NDRZ) of the CPI-Maoist at the Dadekasa-Bilal Kasa tendu leaves collection centre under the South Forest Division of the Lanji Tehsil (revenue unit) in Balaghat District. Similarly, no incident of explosion was recorded in 2023. Since March 6, 2000, the Naxalites have triggered just one blast in the State, on December 11, 2001, when cadres of the erstwhile People’s War Group (PWG) blew up the government guest- house at Samnapur in Balaghat District.

Significantly, all the fatalities in 2023 were recorded from just one District, Balaghat. Similarly, the fatality in 2022 was recorded from Balaghat as well. Out of total 37 fatalities recorded in the state since March 6, 2000, 32 occurred in Balaghat (12 civilians, three Security Force, SF, personnel and 17 Naxalites). The remaining five fatalities were reported from Mandla (two Naxalites), Konta (two civilians) and Jagdalpur (one trooper). Fatalities in Konta and Jagdalpur were reported before November 1, 2000, when these two districts became part of the Chhattisgarh. Chhattisgarh was carved out of Madhya Pradesh on November 1, 2000.

In 2023, Maoist activities were reported from two Districts, Balaghat and Sidhi. While, Balaghat fell in the ‘moderately affected’ category, Sidhi was in the ‘marginally affected’ category. In 2022, Maoist activities were reported from the Balaghat District alone, and it fell in the ‘moderately affected’ category.

Though 2023 data indicates that the security situation in the State with regard to Maoist violence improved marginally, as compared to 2022, it is to be noted here that out of total 37 fatalities recorded in the state since March 6, 2000, 27 fatalities have been reported between 2018 and 2023. The level of violence over the past several years, as compared to earlier years is, therefore, disturbing.   

The Madhya Pradesh Police continues to face critical shortages in capacities and deployment. According to the latest Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) data, as on January 1, 2022, Madhya Pradesh had 121.76 Police personnel per 100,000 population, significantly below the inadequate national average of 152.80. The Police/Area Ratio (number of policemen per 100 square kilometres) was just 33.62, as against the national average of 63.70. Both the State and national averages on the Police/Area ratio were well below the sanctioned strength, at 40.65 and 81.80, respectively. The sanctioned strength for the States’ Police was 125,319, while just 103,642 personnel were in position, creating a deficit of 17.29 per cent. In addition, the sanctioned strength of the apex Indian Police Service (IPS) Officers in the State was 305, but just 247 officers were in position, a deficit of 19.01 per cent.

The Maoists’ enduring operational capacities cannot simply be overlooked. The existing lacunae in state capacities and deployment need to be addressed with urgency, and crucial security and developmental efforts must be amplified, to ensure that SF gains are consolidated.