South Asia Terrorism Portal

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
[SAIR]

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

Meaningless Overtures
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 19, 2018, Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani stated

As we approach Eid-ul-Adha [festival of sacrifice]… we announce a ceasefire that would take effect from tomorrow, Monday [August 20, 2018], the day of Arafa, till the day of the birth of the prophet (PBUH) i.e., Milad-un-Nabi [November 30, 2018], provided that the Taliban reciprocate. We call on the leadership of the Taliban to welcome the wishes of Afghans for a long lasting and real peace, and we urge them to get ready for peace-talks based on Islamic values and principles…

On August 20, 2018, two unnamed Taliban ‘commanders’ responded with the statement that their supreme leader Sheikh-ul-Hadith Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada had rejected the offer on the grounds that it too would only help the American-led mission. One of the ‘commanders’ added, “Our leadership feels that they [US] will prolong their stay in Afghanistan if we announced a ceasefire now.” They also asserted that the outfit would persist with their attacks.

On the same day (August 20), the Taliban abducted and held hostage over 180 passengers – including at least 160 civilians and over 20 Security Force (SF) personnel – aboard three buses, when they were traveling through the Kunduz Province from the Takhar Province on the way to Kabul. Zabihullah Mujahid, a ‘spokesman’ for the Taliban, stated, “We decided to seize the buses after our intelligence inputs revealed that many men working with Afghan Security forces were traveling to Kabul… We are now identifying members of the security forces.” All civilians were released later. Ghulam Rabani Rabani, a provincial council member in Kunduz Province disclosed on August 21, “More than 160 civilians have reached home safely but at least 20 soldiers and policemen have been taken to an undisclosed location by the Taliban.” The Taliban confirmed the release of civilians claiming that they had no intention of harming them. The SFs were shifted to a Taliban ‘secret jail’. “Most probably we would exchange them for our prisoners later,” an unnamed Taliban ‘commander’ stated. Referring to the incident, he added, "We wanted to convey a powerful message to the Government that we can launch many attacks and defeat them at every level."

Apart from this, the Taliban have also claimed at least 57 incidents in which 78 SF personnel were killed between August 20 and August 26. On the other hand, SFs continued with their operations in Ghazni Province, where fighting between the Taliban and Government Forces intensified. Most recently, on August 24, 2018, at least 18 Taliban militants were killed during an air operation in Muqar District. Two ‘top members’ (identity not known) of the Taliban were among the dead.

Clearly, the purported cease-fire has 'ceased to exist'.

Earlier, President Ghani had announced a unilateral ceasefire with the Taliban from June 12, 2018, to June 19, 2018, during Eid al-Fitr [celebrated by Muslims worldwide to mark the end of Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting]. Ghani had then tweeted on June 7, 2018,

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan announces ceasefire from the 27th of Ramadan [June 12, 2018] until the fifth day of Eid-ul-Fitr [June 19, 2018] following the historic ruling [Fatwa] of the Afghan Ulema… This ceasefire is an opportunity for Taliban to introspect that their violent campaign is not wining them hearts and minds but further alienating them.

In response, the Taliban declared, in a June 9, 2018, release

…All Mujahideen are directed to cease all offensive operations against the domestic opposition forces during the first, second and third day of Eid [June 15, 16, 17] however if Mujahideen are attacked, they must defend with their utmost capability…

The ceasefire, in this case, held till the Taliban declared its end stating , in a release dated June 17, 2018,

In order that our countrymen may celebrate their Eid festivities in ease and comfort, the Islamic Emirate announced and successfully implemented a three day ceasefire. This ceasefire was not in response to the ceasefire of the Kabul regime but was announced for the wellbeing of the nation and has to end tonight. Mujahideen throughout the country are ordered to continue their operations against the foreign invaders and their internal puppets as before.

This was despite the Ghani Government's announcement, on June 16, 2018, of a 10-day extension of the ceasefire, i.e. till June 29. On June 30, 2018, Ghani declared,

The ceasefire has ended and our security and defence forces are allowed to continue operations. Now, it is up to the Taliban's decision, whether they want to join the peace process or keep on killing in the country.

Though Ghani claimed that the second ceasefire (June 12 – 29) had been “98 per cent successful”, Taliban-linked violence remained unabated. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there were at least 227 Taliban-linked fatalities (25 civilians, 79 SF personnel, 123 militants) during this period. Some of the major incidents (each resulting in three or more fatalities) during this period included:  

June 27: 16 Afghanistan Border Police (ABP) personnel were killed and four went missing after an attack by Taliban militants at an outpost in the Yatimi Tapa area of Chah Ab District in Takhar Province.

15 Taliban militants were killed and another eight injured in five air-strikes conducted by Afghan Forces in Khwaja Sabs Posh District of Faryab Province.

June 24: At least 10 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers were killed in a Taliban ambush in Badghis Province (area not specified).

June 22, 2018: At least 15 pro-Government militia men were killed by Taliban militants in Badghis Province (area not specified).

June 20: 11 armed Taliban militants were killed in clashes with SFs in Trenkot city, the provincial capital of Urozgan Province.

June 18:  About 17 ANA personnel were killed when Taliban militants attacked a security shell in the Shakh Walwal region of Jorm District in Badakhshan Province.

At least 10 Taliban militants were killed and another seven wounded after they carried out an attack on Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) checkpoints in the Pusht Roaud District of Farah Province.

At least 13 Taliban militants were killed during clashes with SFs at unspecified places in Helmand Province.

June 12: 10 Taliban militants and five Policemen were killed and another 26 injured in a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) attack using a Humvee military vehicle in the Muqur District of Ghazni Province.

Taliban killed 18 ANA soldiers and captured their post during an overnight attack in northeastern Badakhshan Province.

These incidents clearly suggest that the ceasefire was meaningless as there was no respite from terror during its entire duration, including the three days of the overlapping ceasefire – June 15, 16, and 17.

The first overlapping ceasefire between the Government Forces and Taliban were observed, according to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) latest quarterly report (July 30, 2018), in 2008, when the Afghan Government, international military forces and the Taliban, each announced a ceasefire coinciding with the International Peace Day (September 21). Again, in 2009, the Afghan Government, international military forces, and the Taliban announced new ceasefires coinciding with the International Peace Day. Bothe these ceasefires lasted for just the one day.

These ceasefires and ongoing efforts to include Taliban in peace-process  have all proven futile, as the Taliban has clearly stated its goal to continue jihad till it achieves its goal of ousting foreign forces and forming a Government of its 'own'. Taliban chief Sheikh-ul-Hadith Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, thus stated on August 18, 2018,

…it is incumbent upon us to show our appreciation of Divine Help and Jihadi victories with further Jihadic efforts and services and with further rectification of our intentions and deeds in order to become even more deserving of Allah Almighty's help and assistance because righteous actions produce firmness and steadfastness in Jihad. …We pray to Allah that He (SwT) free Afghanistan from the American occupation, end the long tragedy of the valiant Afghan people through His Bounty, safeguard the Muslim Afghan nation from all enemy plots through their unity and bless them with an Islamic government on their own soil, of their own choice and choosing…

The war in Afghanistan continues.

INDIA	MYANMAR

       

NSCN-K: Coup!  
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The Myanmar-based Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-Khaplang) in a 'party emergency meeting' held on August 17, 2018, at its 'council headquarters' in Myanmar's Sagaing region, 'elected' Yung Aung, a Myanmarese national, as the new 'acting chairman' of the outfit. The NSCN-K in a release announced,

The National Socialist Council unanimously elected Mr. Yung Aung as the new Acting Chairman of the party by a majority vote on this day of 17th August 2018... effective from today he shall exercise his powers, functions….

Yung Aung replaced the incumbent 'chairman' 'lieutenant general' Khango Konyak (an Indian national) who was 'impeached' during the 'emergency meeting', in absentia. A NSCN-K statement reportedly released to the media read,

He was found guilty of absolute control of powers and functions without collective leadership, non-distribution of powers and functions exposing a one-man government policy, incompatible traits...

The statement termed his impeachment a necessity to "save" the ‘party’ from further "breakdown and confusion".

The statement reportedly added the outfit would reserve its respect for Khango as the senior-most party member and in recognition for his long service towards the cause of the ‘nation’, "he shall be unharmed and will be allowed a safe passage".

On June 20, 2017, Khango Konyak had replaced the founding ‘chairman’ of NSCN-K, Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang, following the latter’s death on June 9, 2017, after a prolonged illness in a hospital at Taga in the Sagaing Division of Myanmar. Khango Konyak at that time was the ‘vice-chairman’ of the outfit. The new ‘acting chairman’ Aung is the nephew of Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang and was the ‘defence kilonser (minister)’ of the outfit prior to his elevation.

Though the NSCN-K release accused Khango Konyak of violating ‘party discipline’ and cited some reasons which led to his ‘impeachment’, this was, in all likelihood done with an aim to bring back a Myanmarese national to the helm of the outfit once again. If reports are to be believed, after the death of Khaplang, NSCN-K had appointed ‘commander-in-chief’ Khumchok Pangmi, a Myanmarese national, as ‘acting chairman’. This was resisted by Naga members from the Indian side on the ground that, being the ‘vice-chairman’, Khango Konyak was the rightful claimant to the supreme position. Though Konyak then became the ‘chairman’, the divide between Myanmarese and Indian Naga members in the group rose to surface.  Konyak had been a Khaplang loyalist since 1988, when NSCN split into the NSCN-K and NSCN- Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) factions, and with his ‘impeachment’ the group has virtually no Naga from India in a position of power. Prior to Nagaland’s Assembly election in February, Union Minister of State (MoS) for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju emphasized that NSCN-K was “an insurgent group from Myanmar", when asked if the Government foresaw a threat from the outfit during the polls.

Reports also indicate that the abrupt decision to ‘impeach’ Konyak was because the Myanmar-origin Nagas were inching closer to signing a peace accord with the Myanmar Government. NSCN-K has formally maintained a ceasefire with the Myanmar Government since April 2012.

The impact of the ‘impeachment’ remains uncertain. Yung Aung reportedly has deep links with China and maintains close ties with the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah and the Manipuri militant leadership. If he chooses to emphasize the operational unity of militant formations across the Northeast – as did Khaplang under the aegis of the United National Liberation Front West South East Asia (UNLFWESA) – this may escalate violence in the region.

NSCN-K had emerged as the most active militant outfit under Khaplang after it walked out of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) in 2015, particularly targeting Security Forces (SFs). NSCN-K violence spanned Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh, with the group linked to a total of at least 79 fatalities (seven civilians, 32 SF personnel, and 40 NSCN-K militants) in the three States between March 27, 2015 and June 10, 2017, before Khango Konyak assumed charge. However, in Konyak's 14 month tenure, violence declined, and NSCN-K 'central committee member' U Kyaw Wan Sein observed on [report of August 20, 2018],

He [Khango] could not do anything that would develop our organization. We were disordered and our work suffered setbacks. There was no guidance to the ministries and no engagement with the public.

According to partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), only five NSCN-K linked fatalities (one civilian, one trooper, and three NSCN-K militants) were recorded across Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur during Konyak's tenure. No fatalities have been recorded in Assam from June 11, 2017, till date. Only one major incident (resulting in three or more fatalities) was attributed to NSCN-K in this period.

Konyak's impeachment may also impact adversely on the India's efforts to bring NSCN-K back to the negotiating table. Founder 'chairman' Khaplang was always under the control of Myanmarese Nagas, who remained extremely hostile to the Indian Government. Konyak's appointment as 'chairman' had raised hopes of an early breakthrough. After Khaplang's death MoS Rijiju had noted, on June 10, 2017,

Khaplang was the main person who was supporting and facilitating insurgency in the Northeast and had a clout. He was a Myanmarese citizen and hence there was a problem. His death will definitely have impact in the region.

With Konyak’s ‘impeachment’ the situation is likely to revert to the earlier status of amplified hostility.

Significantly, NSCN-K is the only Naga outfit which outside the ambit of the Naga talks, which have purportedly been at a ‘final stage’ since the signing of the ‘framework agreement’ with NSCN-IM on August 3, 2015.  

On the other hand, the ‘impeachment’ may lead to the further weakening of the outfit. An unnamed source observed, "The move may lead to defection within the NSCN-K, as the Konyak tribe and the Indian-origin Nagas will certainly be angered by it…" Two earlier instances of splits in NSCN-K include the formation of Khole-Kitovi faction [NSCN-KK, subsequently rechristened as NSCN-Neopao Konyak/Kitovi (NK)] in 2011, and the Reformation faction (NSCN-R) in 2015. Khole Konyak and Kitovi Zhimomi, who formed NSCN-KK, were Indians. Two other Indian NSCN-K leaders, Y. Wangtin Konyak and P. Tikhak, who did not agree to Khaplang’s diktat on abrogation of ceasefire, had formed NSCN-R. The Government signed a ceasefire agreement with NSCN-NK on April 28, 2012; and with NSCN-R on April 27, 2015. 

Further, the ‘impeachment’ is unlikely to weaken the militant conglomerate UNLFWESA, as the relationship between the participating formations remains deeply symbiotic in terms of money, arms and camps. However, with the removal of Indian Nagas, primarily of Konyak origin, the support for NSCN-K may shrink in the Konyak inhibited areas such as the Mon District of Nagaland. UNLFWESA was first headed by Khaplang and, after his death; Khango Konyak became the ‘chief’ of this alliance.

Meanwhile, Konyak is believed to have left the NSCN-K ‘domain’ along with other ‘Indian’ Naga leaders, including ‘lieutenant general’ Niki Sumi, the ‘military supervisor’ of the Indian side, and Isaac Sumi, its ‘publicity secretary’. Reports indicate that Khango Konyak remains undecided about his future and is said to be in touch with both the Isak Muivah and Khole-Neopak factions. According to sources, almost a hundred cadres are believed to be in Konyak’s group, as they return to the Indian side in batches. Reports suggest that Konyak may join the ‘peace talks’. Other reports indicate that NSCN-K’s Sumi tribal faction from Nagaland, led by Nikki Sumi, may soon reach a ceasefire designated camp in the State.

The coup within NSCN-K will certainly have an impact on the Naga insurgency, but the intensity and direction of its consequences remain uncertain.