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South Asia Terrorism Portal

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
[SAIR]

Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 17, No. 49, June 3, 2019
Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

ASSESSMENT

  • AFGHANISTAN-USA: Slow Surrender - Joy Mitra
  • NEPAL: Dangerous Slide - S. Binodkumar Singh

AFGHANISTAN
USA

       Print

Slow Surrender
Joy Mitra
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

The latest round of talks held in the second week of May 2019 between the United States (US) and Taliban left US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad expressing frustration about the “slow progress” of the peace talks, even as dead bodies continued to pile up high. This was the sixth such meeting between the two sides since the process commenced in October 2018, and there have also been secret meetings before the engagement turned overt and high-level. The six rounds of peace talks have yielded a tentative “draft agreement” on two issues: first, Taliban’s primary concern with withdrawal of “Foreign Forces”; and second, on assurances that Afghan territory will not become a base for use by international terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), to hurt the US or any other country.

In theory, a conflict is ripe for resolution if a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ prevails, at which stage the conflict is essentially deadlocked, and no actor can unilaterally “escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or way out.” The important condition here is not the existence of an objective mutually hurting stalemate, but rather that both sides perceive it as such, regardless of what the objective state of the conflict is.

The evidence from the conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates that the current peace process does not satisfy the criteria for the existence of a mutually hurting stalemate. This is because the conflict is not militarily in a static state, and because the stalemate is not perceived to be mutually hurting by Taliban. Indeed, the Taliban not only view the current state of conflict as a stage from where they can escalate to a position of strength, but also as one where the stalemate is not necessarily damaging to their position in the battlefield or on the negotiating table.

Crucially, the Taliban’s assurances belie facts on the ground. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project, during the first four months of 2019, the Taliban military offensive increased in the month of March, even as offensive operations by the state decreased. This was followed by the official announcement of the spring offensive by the Taliban on April 12, 2019, after which Taliban-led attacks spiked sharply. This is corroborated further by SIGAR’s April Quarterly Report, which says that the average monthly enemy-initiated attacks have risen by 19% from November 2018 to January 2019.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the Taliban initiated at least 53 attacks in Afghanistan in 2019 (data until May 31) in which 50 civilians perished, as against 54 such attacks between January and May 2018 in which 66 civilians were killed.  There has certainly been no diminution in military activity by the Taliban.

The SATP database indicates that, through 2018, 5,455 militants have been killed in 717 incidents involving the Taliban, while 2,037 were injured. The numbers for 2019 already stand at 2,982 militants killed and 652 injured in 432 incidents (data until May 31). Despite suffering comparable losses over years, there has been no degradation in Taliban’s operational capacity to carry out offensive military action and large scale assaults, indicating that the fighting manpower available to the outfit is much larger than the estimated 50,000 permanent and temporary fighters.

Clearly, the military stalemate is either not a stalemate or not damaging enough to them in their own estimation. This is also borne out by United States Forces own assessment that the Taliban are preparing to attack more provincial centers in 2019.Crucially, District level Stability assessments by Resolute Support (RS) which include district, population and territorial control data, last produced in October 22, 2018, indicated that Districts under Afghan Government control or had already fallen to 219, 7 per cent down from the previous quarter. Taliban controlled or influenced districts had increased marginally to 50, while the number of contested districts went up from 132 to 138 Districts over the same period.  Since October 2018, this data has not been released publicly, in line with the earlier discontinuation of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) casualty data since October 2017, suggesting that both these metrics could be out of tune with the narrative of the stalemate in the Afghan conflict.

The sixth round suggests that the negotiation process has in fact essentially boiled down to the timeline for withdrawal of Western Forces – the Taliban’s core demand – that could be hammered out by the two sides. The Taliban has focused its attention on this key deliverable, after which it purportedly intends to begin intra-Afghan negotiations for a comprehensive ceasefire. On the other hand, US frustration with the pace of the talks is highlighted in the six statements made by the US after these rounds, as no concrete outcome was achieved beyond the draft agreement, until the fifth round. Even this draft doesn’t seem to be nearing completion anytime soon. But the presence of foreign troops is a necessity that arises out of the absence of a ceasefire. The withdrawal of foreign forces prior to such a ceasefire would eliminate all pressure on or motivation for the Taliban to push for a negotiated settlement with a progressively weakening Kabul, or with any other marginal adversaries.

The futility of the current process and the divergence between the perceptions of the two sides are evident in the juxtaposition of statements emanating from the six stages of the negotiation process:

No.

Talk Round

Statement/Outcome

Reporting Source

1

12 October 2018

“They talked about the end of occupation and a peaceful resolution for the Afghan issue,”
“Both sides agreed to continue their meetings in the future.”                

-Zabiullah Mujahid

“The United States shares the aspirations of all Afghans for a peaceful Afghanistan where all Afghans see themselves included”

-Zalmay Khalizad

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/us-talks-taliban-afghanistan.html

2

16-18 November 2018

"We're watching every diplomatic move of the U.S. officials. We'll continue our fight until the U.S. accepts our demands" "These were preliminary talks and no agreement was reached on any issue"

-Zabiullah Mujahid

"The second round of talks went on for three days. This clearly proves that both sides are exercising patience and caution during their diplomatic engagement"

- U.S. Official (Anonymous)

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-taliban/u-s-peace-envoy-seeks-to-reassure-kabul-it-wont-be-blocked-from-talks-idUSKCN1NL1JJ

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-taliban/taliban-say-no-pact-struck-with-u-s-on-deadline-to-end-afghan-war-idUSKCN1NO0SD

3

17-19 December 2018

“Future negotiation meetings shall continue after deliberations and consultations by both sides with their respective leaderships.”

-Zabiullah Mujahid

“…(held) productive” meetings with Afghan and international partners in Abu Dhabi “to promote intra-Afghan dialogue towards ending the conflict in Afghanistan.”

-Zalmay Khalizad

https://www.voanews.com/a/afghan-us-taliban-talks/4707000.html

4

21-26 January 2019

"…the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and other vital issues saw progress."
"The policy of the Islamic Emirate during talks was very clear: Until the issue of withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan is agreed upon, progress in other issues is impossible".
"Reports by some media outlets about agreement on a ceasefire and talks with the Kabul administration are not true"

-Zabiullah Mujahid

“a number of issues left to work out” and that there could be no overall agreement without a cease-fire period that includes dialogue among Afghans. “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”

-Zalmay Khalizad

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/us-taliban-talks-appear-closer-to-pact-after-marathon-talks-in-qatar/2019/01/26/685e638e-20f5-11e9-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html?utm_term=.27138912cde3


https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/progress-taliban-talks-qatar-190126131202251.html

5

25 February-12 March 2019

“This round of talks saw extensive and detailed discussions taking place regarding two issues that were agreed upon during January talks”

“Those two issues were the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and preventing anyone from harming others from Afghan soil.”

-Zabiullah Mujahid

“a withdrawal timeline and effective counterterrorism measures is finalized, the Taliban and other Afghans, including the government, will begin intra-Afghan negotiations on a political settlement and comprehensive cease-fire.” “We will meet again soon, and there is no final agreement until everything is agreed”

-Zalmay Khalizad

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/12/world/asia/afghanistan-us-taliban-talks.html

6

1-5, 7-9May 2019

"some progress" on a draft agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops

-Taliban Spokesperson

"We made steady but slow progress on aspects of the framework for ending the Afghan war. We are getting into the nitty gritty. The devil is always in the details". "However, the current pace of talks isn't sufficient when so much conflict rages and innocent people die. We need more and faster progress. Our proposal for all sides to reduce violence also remains on the table."

-Zalmay Khalizad

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/taliban-talks-peace-afghanistan-190510062940394.html

 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-talks/sixth-round-of-taliban-u-s-peace-talks-end-idUSKCN1SF1PR

 

 

Table 2.Actor Stance on Negotiations: 

US Stance

Taliban Stance

  1. Comprehensive Ceasefire
  2. Counter-terrorism assurances
  3. Bar International terror outfits like Islamic State and Al Qaeda from operating in Afghanistan
  1. No direct talks with the Afghan Government
  2. Complete Withdrawal of Foreign Forces

If the nature of talks is indicative of anything, it is that ‘time’ is a greater consideration for the US than it is for the Taliban. Contrary to the received wisdom that the US would deploy military power to “coerce Taliban to the negotiating table” and “bargain from a position of strength”, the reality is, the US stance is progressively weakening. The Taliban is very much in the process of simultaneous bargaining, signaling its intent to sustain negotiations, and to engage in violence. As the negotiations stretch out, the Taliban is strengthening its military position on the ground, and its appetite for relentless attacks does not seem to diminish.

The New York Times reported that the withdrawal timeline that is being negotiated between the two sides ranges from six months put forth by Taliban to three years put forth by the US. If the past is any precedent, the Taliban will have an interest in prolonging the process until the withdrawal approaches a stage where a reversal of the process is difficult, if not completely impossible.

Worse, fissures within the Afghan polity are already visible. President Ashraf Ghani’s call for a Consultative Jirga (Congregation of Elders, Tribals, ethnic groups) in the month of April 2019, which had some normative value for the Afghans, was boycotted by the High Council of Jihadi and National Parties encompassing many important political formations. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Afghanistan and stakeholder in the National Unity Government (NUG) Abdullah Abdullah, himself boycotted the Jirga – perhaps the most visible proof of the lack of unity and consensus within the Afghan leadership. Further, on May 27, CEO Abdullah confirmed that he was not in the loop when President Ashraf Ghani appointed three new acting ministers. Abdullah noted, “Any change in ministers recently is only considered a political decision, not another move… It is unfortunate that when the changes happen, the people of Afghanistan, including the relevant ministers are informed through social media… As the chief executive, I was personally embarrassed when I was asked about one of the ministers, who was dismissed, and I replied that I was not aware of that. I was not informed”. To complicate the issue the NUG’s constitutionally mandated term ended on May 22, further eroding its legitimacy and credibility.

Consequently, even if the intra-Afghan talks begin, the Taliban could well exploit the political fissures to prolong the process. Earlier, in February 2019 and again in May 2019, the Taliban further tried to widen this wedge by engaging with Afghan politicians outside the NUG in the talks held in Moscow, even as it steadfastly refused direct engagement with the Afghan Government. In the six rounds of talks held with the US, the Taliban has refused to talk directly to the Afghan Government, and Kabul has been excluded from the process. However, President Ghani’s political opponents, including former President Hamid Karzai, continue to attend the Moscow rounds, eroding the legitimacy of the Ghani-led administration.

The Taliban has cleared benefited from its intransigence in these talks. The US and Afghan Government positions have been considerably diluted, as a war of attrition drained resources and resolve. As time passes, these resources - in men, materials and morale – have been delivering diminishing returns. From throwing the Afghanistan constitution under the bus, to directly engaging with the Taliban to the exclusion of Kabul, concessions have been rolled out, without any reciprocity from the Taliban in terms of a cessation or even diminution of hostilities on the ground.

Significantly, Taliban’s assurances in the negotiations inspire little confidence. According to The Long War Journal, contrary to the Taliban’s counter-terrorism assurances, al Qaeda continues to operate across Afghanistan and has done so over the past two decades. Indeed, Zalmay Khalizad, in his own testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in July 2016, noted that the Taliban had enduring ties with al Qaeda and the two were unlikely to part ways. Further, US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Forces Commander General Scott Miller confirmed, on May 22, 2019, that Al Qaeda had been seen operating across different parts of Afghan territory.

Clearly, though the negotiation process is on, the conflict is not in a mutually hurting stalemate from Taliban’s perspective. Taliban continue to initiate attacks across Afghanistan and has sought to use the peace process to consolidate their position militarily as well as politically. In the meantime the military component of the US strategy has contracted to an exclusive reliance on its air campaign, which has had questionable deterrent value. As the US calculus of its interests in the Indo-Pacific region compel it to pull out resources from Afghanistan, the so called ‘peace talks’ look increasingly akin to a slow surrender, both on the table and on the ground.

 


NEPAL

      Print

Dangerous Slide
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On May 26, 2019, four persons were killed and another seven were injured in three accidental bomb blasts in the capital, Kathmandu. According to the Police, all the persons who were killed were cadres of the Netra Bikram Chand-led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Chand), who were making time bombs to detonate at public places during the nationwide bandh (shutdown) called by the group on May 27. CPN-Maoist-Chand had enforced the shutdown to protest the death of its cadre, Tirthraj Ghimire, in Police firing on May 22 in the Bhojpur District.

The shutdown hit life across country and terrified the population as the outfit planted bombs and torched vehicles at different places on May 27, 2019. Bombs were recovered in the Makawanpur, Kaski, Rautahat, Tanahun, Kailali and Baitadi Districts. Many vehicles were torched during the shutdown in the Ramechhap, Surkhet, Nawalpur, Bara and Makawanpur Districts. Market places and shops pulled down shutters in various Districts, while educational institutions remained closed due to the shutdown.

CPN-Maoist-Chand, formed on December 1, 2014, after splitting from the Communist Party of Nepal (Revolutionary Maoist) headed by Mohan Baidya, was banned on March 12, 2019, following a series of explosions that took place at ‘Ncell’ telecommunication towers and other public places across the country. On February 8, 2019, CPN-Maoist-Chand cadres exploded three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) near the powerhouse of the under-construction Arun III Hydropower project developed by the Indian company, Sutlej Jala Vidhyut Nigam. On February 22, 2019, one person was killed and two others were seriously injured in an explosion carried out by CPN-Maoist-Chand cadres at the entrance of the office of Ncell at Nakkhu in Lalitpur District. On March 8, 2019, two persons were injured in an IED blast carried out by CPN-Maoist-Chand cadres inside the residence of the Chairman of the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies in Basundhara in Kathmandu.

It is not clear whether the CPN-Maoist-Chand has formed its own army, like the one the Maoists had during the days of insurgency, but many believe it has hundreds, if not thousands, of sophisticated weapons in its possession. Confirming this, Nepal Communist Party (NCP) Co-chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, former supreme commander of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA), had told reporters in Biratnagar on March 5, 2019, that some arms and ammunition were stolen from the cantonments and that he had informed the Government at the time about the incident. Similarly, on March 14, 2019, Minister for Agriculture and Livestock Chakrapani Khanal, who was serving as Deputy Commander of the then Maoist PLA, revealed that the Chand-led group had taken away some arms, including some sophisticated ones from the cantonments. According to the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies signed on December 8, 2006, the Maoist PLA stored 2,855 weapons in seven cantonments in addition to 524 for security of the perimeter of cantonments of Maoist combatants and 96 for security of the Maoist leaders. 

Further, proving that CPN-Maoist-Chand cadres possess sophisticated weapons, on February 27, 2019, Police arrested Dev Kumar Limbu, CPN-Maoist-Chand’s in-charge of Morang and Dhankuta Districts, from the Sunsari District, with an M-16 rifle, a light machine gun (LMG), two sets of LMG magazines, and an M-16 magazine. Investigations found that the weapons were part of those the former Maoist rebels had looted from the Rolpa Barracks.

Separately, on March 7, 2019, a joint team of the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force raided Netra Bikram Chand’s house and 15 other houses in his village in Kapilvastu District, and recovered two SMGs, three magazines, 129 bullets used in M-16 rifles, a Chinese pistol, two other pistols, a remote control and around 40 metres of cable.

Earlier, CPN-Maoist-Chand cadres had opposed the new Constitution adopted on September 20, 2015. They also boycotted and tried to disrupt the elections held in 2017 under the new Constitution. Amidst the sudden rise in incidents of violence targeting candidates and election campaigns for the Provincial and Parliamentary Elections, the National Security Council (NSC) in a confidential report submitted on October 23, 2017, noted that CPN-Maoist-Chand was the major security threat to the elections scheduled on November 26 and December 7, 2017. The report stated that the Chand-led group had formed a parallel People’s Government and People’s Court, and had mobilised its National Volunteer Organisation, the youth wing of the party, which decided to boycott elections.

In order to hold talks with the disgruntled armed group, the Government formed a five-member High-Level Political Talks Team on August 25, 2018, led by Nepal Communist Party (NCP) lawmaker Som Prasad Pandey. The team failed to hold formal talks with CPN-Maoist-Chand as Chand refused to meet the team members in person, a pre-condition set by the team. One of the prerequisite set by CPN-Maoist-Chand for talks with the Government was the release of 12 of its central committee members and around 100 cadres, including party Spokesperson Khadga Bahadur Biswokarma. Finally, on December 27, 2018, the High-Level Political Talks Team submitted its report to Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, observing, “It is an extremist political outfit and the government needs to take action against illegal activities of the group.”

On March 25, 2019, advising the CPN-Maoist-Chand to join the mainstream peaceful politics, Prime Minister Oli stated, “I urge the Chand-led group to sit for talks with the government as early as possible. It’s a good opportunity for the group to renounce all the violent activities and join the peaceful mainstream politics.” Articulating a tougher stance on Mar 27, 2019, Prime Minister Oli warned “The Chand outfit will be brought to mainstream politics – if possible politically, and if not, by putting them behind bars.” Similarly, vowing to bring the outlawed Chand-led group into the mainstream, Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa, speaking in Parliament, on May 27, 2019, declared, "The government will leave no stone unturned to bring to book the perpetrators involved in the recent bomb blasts in the Kathmandu Valley." 

Since the Government declared the CPN-Maoist-Chand a “criminal and destructive” group and banned its activities on March 12, 2019, scores of its leaders, including standing committee members and politburo members, have been arrested. But the party has defended its activities saying their fight is against fascism and the Government. A statement undersigned by Chand read “While our party is gaining ground by taking action against anti-national elements, thugs, human traffickers and labour oppressors as per the public mandate, the government, in order to hide its failure, disrepute and crisis, has displayed a high level of fascism by imposing a ban on the party.”

Hours after the Government banned the Chand outfit, Mohan Bahadur Karki, a politburo member of the CPN-Maoist-Chand on March 12, 2019, warned of retaliation, telling the Kathmandu Post over Phone from an undisclosed location “The government has thrown the country into a conflict.”  A day later, on Mar 13, 2019, in another statement he declared, “We are ready to take the difficult journey for the principles that we believe in. We are ready to retaliate accordingly if the government attempts to suppress us. Demanding donation is our right because we are fighting for the rights and future of the people of the country.” The Government views the demands for ‘donations’ as criminal extortion.

Little is known about CPN-Maoist-Chand’s party structure and organisation. According to party leaders, the party has its networks in most Districts, under four different commands – Eastern, led by Anil Sharma; Central, led by Hemanta Prakash Oli; Mid-western, led by Santosh Budha; and Western, led by Dharmendra Bastola. The party has also formed a People’s Council, led by standing committee member Santosh Budha Magar. The Chand party in recent years is believed to have expanded its base in Kalikot, Rolpa and Kapilvastu, which is Chand’s hometown.

The Government’s intelligence apparatus is being blamed for failing to track CPN-Maoist-Chand activities. However, the National Intelligence Department (NID) had cautioned authorities about increasing threats from the group. “The government was well-informed about the increasing security threat in the capital city,” a senior NID official claimed, requesting anonymity. Meanwhile, some sections of the intelligentsia and the opposition party continue to insist that the Government should try to persuade Chand to come to the negotiating table.

The recent bomb explosions have brought back the tragic and painful memories of the 10-year-long civil war. Chand and his followers are hardliners who view the entire peace process since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2006 as a sell-out of the decade-long ‘People’s War’. At the same time, as Chand rejects any talks leading to the repudiation of his violent ways, the Government cannot evade the responsibility to act strongly and swiftly to punish the perpetrators. If the Government fails to maintain order, the country may slide into another vicious cycle of violence and instability.

 
NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia 
May 27- June 2, 2019

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

 

Jammu and Kashmir

1
0
10
11

INDIA (Left-Wing Extremism)

 

Jharkhand

0
1
0
1

INDIA (Total)

1
1
10
12

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

0
0
1
1

PAKISTAN (Total)

0
0
1
1

Sri Lanka

0
1
0
1
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.
 

AFGHANISTAN

No ceasefire declared during Eid days, states Taliban: Taliban has rejected the reports that they have made a decision on a ceasefire for the upcoming Eid al-Fitr. Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman of the group, said in a tweet that an audio message on social media about ceasefire is from the last year. This comes few hours after Former President Hamid Karzai said in a statement that he welcomes “ceasefire announcement” by the Taliban during three days of the upcoming Eid al-Fitr. Tolo News, May 31, 2019.

Corruption, narcotics and IS are the three biggest challenges, says John F. Sopko: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko said that administrative corruption, narcotics and Islamic State (IS) are the three biggest challenges faced by Afghanistan, reports Tolo News on May 31. Talking to the C-SPAN (Cable-Satellite Public Affairs Network), Sopko said that even if the Afghan government makes a peace deal with the Taliban, it will have to face with the above-mentioned challenges. Tolo News, May 31, 2019.

Taliban Wants Peace, states Taliban ‘deputy leader’ Mullah Baradar: A group of Afghan politicians led by former President Hamid Karzai and members of the Taliban led by the ‘deputy leader’ of the group Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on May 28, attended a ceremony in Moscow, Russia on 100 years of Afghanistan-Russia diplomatic relations. Addressing the ceremony, Baradar said “the Islamic Emirate wants peace”, but “the hurdles on the way of peace should be removed”. He added, “The key barrier to peace is the presence of foreign forces,” referring to the Taliban’s long-time stance on the presence of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan who toppled the regime in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. Tolo News, May 29, 2019.

INDIA

New idea of militancy introduced by Zakir Musa ended with his death, says Jammu and Kashmir DGP Dilbag Singh: Terming the killing of militant ‘commander’ Zakir Musa as a success for the Security Forces (SFs), the Jammu and Kashmir Director General of Police (DGP) Dilbag Singh on May 28 said that a new idea of militancy introduced by dreaded militant Zakir Musa has ended with his death. DGP Dilbag Singh said that “No one accepted Musa’s idea within the State and outside”, adding that those who joined Musa’s cadre were eliminated by the Jammu and Kashmir in coordination with other security agencies. Daily Excelsior , May 29, 2019.

Myanmar based UWSA involved in supplying weapons to Indian insurgent groups, states report: The surrender of United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I) militants on March 18 has highlighted Myanmar’s United Wa State Army (UWSA) role in supplying weapons to Indian insurgents. The weapons surrendered by the ULFA-I militants had specific manufacturing marks indicating the weapons were manufactured by UWSA. Northeast Now, May 29, 2019.

ISI targeting veterans under 'Project Harvesting Canada' in its plan to target India: Indian Intelligence agencies have claimed that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been targeting several retired Police officers and Indian Army veterans to instigate terror in Punjab. A report sent to the Union Home Ministry, mentions a deeply classified plan titled 'Project Harvesting Canada' for this purpose. The report further claimed that a Khalistani terrorist living in Canada has been given the responsibility of 'Project Harvesting Canada'. DNA, May 29, 2019.

There will be no let-up in counter insurgency operations, decides Strategy Group of Army Unified Command: The Strategy Group of Army’s Unified Command on May 27 decided that there would be no let-up of the counter-insurgency operations as there is a possibility of militants trying to make their presence felt with acts of violence as they are under tremendous pressure in Myanmar. According to sources, militants are under pressure in Myanmar following operations launched against them by the Myanmar Army, they are desperate to make their presence felt by indulging in acts of violence. Assam Tribune, May 28, 2019.

Insurgency declined in Northeast region in 2018, states UMHA report: According to Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) report, insurgency-related violence declined by 48 per-cent in Meghalaya, 40 per-cent in Arunachal Pradesh, 16 per-cent in Assam and 24 per-cent in Manipur in 2018 compared to 2017. In Assam, insurgency related incidents declined to 28 in 2018 from 402 in 2009. The Sentinel, May 27, 2019.

 
 NEPAL

Conflict victims demand amendment to transitional justice act: A meeting of the Central Executive Committee of Conflict Victims’ Common Platform (CVCP) on May 26 adopted its special resolution on the current issues related to transitional justice demanding amendment to transitional justice act. According to a press statement issued by CVCP, the two commissions – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission on the investigation of Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP) – failed to discharge their duties in accordance with the principles of transitional justice, goals of the Comprehensive Peace Accord and sentiment of the victims. The Himalayan Times, May 28, 2019.

 
SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka is 99% secure, President Maithripala Sirisena assures Diplomats: President Maithripala Sirisena on May 27 described his country as “99%” secure and urged the international community to continue to provide economic assistance and lift the travel advisories issued to tourists. President Sirisena told select Colombo-based diplomats, and urged countries to lift the travel ban imposed following the Easter attacks. “He [Mr. Sirisena] thanked the international community for the cooperation and assistance provided to Sri Lanka at this time of need and urged them to continue to provide economic assistance and lift the travel advisories issued to tourists,” according to a statement issued by his office. The Hindu, May 29, 2019.

For assessments on other South Asian countries and for daily news updates on terrorism visit
South Asia Terrorism Portal 
 

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal

 
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