Sri Lanka: Assessment- 2006

The cease-fire agreement (CFA) still holds, at least on paper. Neither the Government nor the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has yet given the 14-day notice prior to an announcement of withdrawal from the peace process. Despite the truce that is still nominally in place, at least 2187 people have died since January this year (till August 23, 2006). It is clear that Sri Lanka is descending rapidly into war. The European Union ban and the subsequent announcement of the withdrawal of Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) peace monitors from Finland, Denmark and Sweden have further endangered peace in the country. The continued fighting in the Trincomalee district at Mavil Aru in the Kallar region following LTTE’s closure of the irrigational channel, affecting some 15,000 families, and clashes in Jaffna have the potential to blow up in a full-fledged war.

The island nation has seen some major incidents of violence in the last eight months of 2006. These include:

• August 20: Suspected LTTE cadres shot dead former Tamil Parliamentarian of the TULF, Sinnathamby Sivamaharajah, at his temporary residence in Tellippalai in the Jaffna district.

• August 16: Troops kill at least 98 LTTE cadres in retaliation when the latter attacked the FDL in Kilaly area of Jaffna district. The Sri Lanka Army (SLA) informed that three soldiers also died and 15 others sustained injuries in the incident.

• August 15: The Sri Lankan Military said that at least 250 LTTE cadres were killed and another 300 injured in continued fighting in the Jaffna peninsula during the past 72 hours.

• August 14: At least seven persons, including four soldiers of the SLA, are killed and 17 others sustain injuries in a suicide attack carried out by the LTTE targeting Pakistan High Commissioner Bashir Wali Mohammad in the capital Colombo. The envoy, returning from the Pakistan Independence day function at the mission, escapes unhurt though his vehicle suffered minor damage.

• August 12: Kethesh Logananathan, Deputy Secretary-General of the Government's SCOPP and former EPRLF member, is shot dead by unidentified gunmen near Vandervet place in Dehiwela Colombo.

• August 11: At least 128 people, including 28 army and navy personnel, are killed in the battle between the SLA and the LTTE in the east and north. Clashes occur when the LTTE attempted to overrun the army's Forward Defence Line (FDL) in the Jaffna peninsula.

• August 4: The LTTE massacres over hundred civilians in the Trincomalee district who were fleeing fighting from the Muttur town. Troops foil a major LTTE attack on a strategic jetty in the Muttur area of Trincomalee district, killing 152 cadres of the outfit.

• July 31: In fierce fighting between the LTTE and SLA close to the disputed Mavil Aru sluice gates in the Kallar area of Trincomalee district, 40 LTTE cadres and seven SLA personnel are killed.

• June 26: A LTTE suicide bomber kills the SLA Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Parami Kulathunge, the third highest appointment in the SLA, and three others at Pannipitiya, a suburb of capital Colombo. Eight persons are wounded in the explosion.

• June 17: At least 30 Sea Tigers, six sailors and six civilians are killed in the Talaimannar islet of Mannar district as heavy fighting broke out between security forces and the LTTE.

• June 15: At least 64 civilians, including 15 children, are killed and 86 others are injured when a state-run passenger bus carrying 150 passengers was destroyed in a twin side-charger claymore mine explosion in the Anuradhapura district. Government spokesperson, Keheliya Rambukwella, blames the LTTE for the attack saying, "There is no iota of doubt that it is the LTTE." The outfit, however, denied involvement and blamed the Government for the attack.

• May 11: At least 17 Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) sailors and 50 LTTE cadres are killed as the SLN successfully repulsed an attempt by a cluster of the outfit's suicide boats to destroy a heavy troop-carrying vessel - the 'Pearl Cruiser' - with 710 troops on board off the coast of Vettilaikerni. In the firefight, Navy ensured the safety of the passenger craft and suffered the loss of one Dvora (P 418) with two officers and 15 sailors onboard. The Navy in a retaliatory attack with the assistance of the Air Force destroyed five LTTE boats completely and disabled four others, killing 50 'Sea Tigers' and forcing the fleet to withdraw.

• April 30: The LTTE raids camps belonging to 'Colonel' Karuna faction in the Welikanda area of Polannaruwa district, killing 20 of its cadres.

• April 25: Army Commander Lt. General Sarath Fonseka is critically injured while at least eight persons are killed when a female suicide cadre of the LTTE, disguised as a pregnant woman, blew herself up in front of the military hospital inside the Colombo Army headquarters.

The District and Province wise break up of the fatalities gives a clear picture of the areas affected in the year 2006.

In retrospect, year 2005 was a prelude to what is happening in the year 2006. A fresh wave of attacks commenced on December 4, 2005, a week after LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran warned, in his annual Heroes’ Day speech, that the Tigers would ‘have no option’ but to return to hostilities if President Mahinda Rajapakse failed to come up with a viable power devolution proposal. The LTTE imparted basic military training to civilians in areas under their rule before the attacks commenced. Violence has escalated steadily since.

For most ordinary people, the first Tsunami on December 26, 2004 not only brought in death and devastation, but also created conditions apparently ideal for national unity. Many believed that real peace was now possible, since the Tsunami had weakened the LTTE's ability to resume the war, and an apparently over-confident then President Chandrika Kumaratunga declared that she could say for certain that there would not be another war. The LTTE also indicated, initially, that it was ready to co-operate with the Government on relief and rehabilitation, and Prabhakaran sent a message of condolence to the people of the South, even as the Government-LTTE 'peace secretariats' sought to streamline aid flows to the North-East. However, LTTE Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham, who was airlifted to the Tiger-territory by a Government helicopter after he arrived in Colombo from London, made it abundantly clear in a press conference that, "the Tsunami has not swept away the aspirations of the Tamil people in their freedom fight," and accused the Government of attempting to portray the disaster as an end to the struggle of the Tamil people. He added, "Until such time that the Tamil people realize their goal, we will continue with our freedom struggle."

After the Tsunami, one of the main irritants for the LTTE was the Government's refusal to allow United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan to visit the Tiger-held areas devastated by the natural disaster. Another irritant was the centralisation of the relief and rehabilitation effort. The LTTE alleged that the Government discriminates against the North-East areas in distributing relief aid, and proposed the formation of an apex body, which was rejected by the Government. Again, after days of negotiation, the LTTE came up with a formula according to which relief and rehabilitation in the North East would be handled by an 11-member apex body (six Tamils, three Muslims and two Sinhalese). But the LTTE proposal was again shot down by the President who was unwilling to relax her hold on the multi-billion dollar aid flow. A third irritant was the declaration of a state of emergency by the President, ostensibly to deal with the post-Tsunami law and order situation. But the LTTE, as well as civic rights groups, saw the new emergency regulations as sweeping measures that erode civil liberties and tend towards a presidential dictatorship. These emergency provisions also enabled the President to appoint military officers as coordinators in the relief and rehabilitation work. The LTTE was incensed with the imposition of the state of emergency not only because it included Tiger areas, but also because it strengthened the role of the military in Tamil areas. The presence of Government forces in refugee camps added to the tension.

A further irritant was a defence deal the Government entered into with Iran in the aftermath of the Tsunami. The LTTE alleged that the defence purchases from Iran, through a 150 million dollar credit line offered to Sri Lanka by the Islamic Republic, have tilted the military balance in violation of the February 2001 CFA. On January 22, 2005, the LTTE voiced its concern over the possibility of Tsunami relief aid being diverted to defence purchases. Worried about the impact of such allegations on the flow of aid, the Government denied the LTTE charges the next day. These apprehensions, however, were mutual. The Government also feared that channeling aid to the LTTE and its front organisations, like the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), would only help the rebels build up their fighting force, which, according to military intelligence estimates, lost as many as 2,000 cadres in the Tsunami. Adding to these irritants was the presence of more than a thousand US marines in Sri Lanka.

The Tsunami came as a blessing in disguise, with billions in foreign aid being promised and Western nations offering sweeping trade concessions on sympathetic grounds. Armed with these advantages, the former President publicly said that there would be no elections in the country for the next five years, and her stance suggested that she would not mind if the peace process was pushed to the backburner. She had, of course, discussed, among other matters, issues relating to the peace process during her meeting with the visiting Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jan Peterson, on January 21, 2005 and spoke of a constitutional package which could address some concerns of the LTTE. Earlier in the week, however, a visibly upset LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Tamilselvan, told European envoys that the Government's mishandling of the relief and rehabilitation efforts only bolstered the LTTE's case for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). The then President, however, was in no mood to discuss the ISGA, claiming that her Government's priority is to rebuild the devastated country.

With the Tsunami, the LTTE front Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), known as its fundraising outfit and banned in a number of countries, including the USA, UK and Malaysia, came to the forefront in the areas temporarily controlled by the LTTE. Riding on a sympathy wave around the world, the TRO organized fundraising campaigns even in countries like the UK where they are proscribed. Even though there are many LTTE front organizations, including, for instance, the White Pigeon, operating after the Tsunami, the TRO has taken the lead role, and it is evident that the LTTE is keen to give legitimacy. It is difficult to determine the exact quantum of funds being handled by the TRO after the Tsunami, but, independent analysts believe it to be in the billions of rupees. A TRO document conceded that the organization had received a sum of nearly USD 500 million during December 26, 2004 to January 26, 2005, including USD 500,000 from Norway. It stated further that local institutions and private donations had added SLR 52.4 million, postal orders SLR 3.8 million, and another SLR 20.7 million from NGOs. Apprehensive of the consequences, on July 7, 2005 the Sri Lankan Parliament adopted the Draft Bill to give effect to the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing by a majority vote.

The Government feared that the LTTE has grown from strength to strength during the cease-fire and especially after Tsunami. According to defence officials, it has not only accrued air power, but also swelled its ranks with child soldiers. On February 10, 2005 the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, in the world body’s report on "Children and Armed Conflict" said that since 2001, the LTTE has recruited more than 4700 children. The UNICEF Sri Lankan representative, Ted Chaiban, stated that it had received reports that the LTTE were recruiting children displaced by the Tsunami and warned the rebels to leave under-age survivors alone. "Recruitment... was an issue before the tsunami. It's an issue that continues to be of concern. We know of three cases of reported under-age recruitment that took place in the east," said Chaiban. The Government also said the LTTE was covertly building up its military machine even as the country grappled with the Tsunami disaster. It alleged that the Tigers obtained military hardware under the cover of Tsunami relief. According to a February 2005 report, Tsunami aid cargoes destined for the LTTE and detected at the airport have included two helicopters, ammunition and a consignment of body armour.

A series of public events were held in the Tamil-dominated areas, including Batticaloa, under the banner of the Tamil National Resurgence Convention. The LTTE have been loath to advertise that they continue to impart basic military training to civilians. Even during the cease-fire, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces have charged that the LTTE were training civilians. In early August 2005, there was a large training session in northern Pallai under Tiger rule and on August 30, 2005, a similar event, including a ‘passing out ceremony’, was held inside LTTE-held areas in Trincomalee. Trincomalee ‘military commander’ Sornam, who attended the ‘passing out ceremony’ as chief guest, acknowledged that the outfit relied on civilian support during major military operations. He said that the LTTE was able to thwart Government efforts to wrest control of the main A9 highway that links the Jaffna Peninsula as a result of help from civilians, who were involved in light military work. Analysts believe that, when the main units are forced into action, the LTTE use civilians for back-up duties and logistics. Sornam also said that the outfit’s military strength was one of its prime strengths at the negotiating table and should be reinforced further.

Earlier, marking the third anniversary of the CFA, on February 22, 2005 the Sri Lankan Government announced that was ready to reopen direct negotiations with the LTTE on the establishment of an interim authority. The Government Information Department said the goal of the proposed interim authority would be "to meet the urgent humanitarian and development needs of the people of the North and East and to proceed thereafter to negotiating a final settlement of the ethnic conflict." The remarks drew an angry response from the coalition partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which threatened to walk out of the Government if the talks on the interim authority took place before a final solution to the ethnic conflict was found. Kumaratunga, apparently regretting her alliance with the JVP, addressing a public gathering, fired salvos at the JVP, accusing it of being an obstacle to peace and asking it to leave the Government if it did not agree with her policies. The main opposition United National Party (UNP), however, welcomed the Government's statement and offered its unstinted support.

On May 16, 2005, Chandrika Kumaratunga informed the international donors that she will enter into an Tsunami aid-sharing deal with the LTTE despite threats to her life from "within and outside" her Government. Speaking at a two-day aid meeting attended by more than 125 participants including the World Bank, Japan and the United States, she said, "In the decisions we are called upon to take, the lives of some of us are in extreme danger… Our commitment to this cause will be steadfast despite various objections from extremists, from various groups." A day later, the Sri Lanka Development Forum ended in Kandy with the international donor community making commitments and pledges exceeding US $ 3 billion in the form of grants and moratorium on debts for the Tsunami reconstruction process and other development programmes initiated by the Government. Such promises of assistance for 'reconstruction' are, of course, not unprecedented. In December 2002, a 'Sri Lanka Peace Process Support Conference' at Oslo pledged US$ 70 million for rebuilding the war-ravaged areas of the north-east. In Tokyo, six months later, a much larger international forum pledged a stunning US$ 4.5 billion, conditional on the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE resuming the stalled peace process. Since the LTTE continued its boycott of direct negotiations, the pledge remained frozen.

Finance Minister Dr. Sarath Amunugama later announced that: "Ninety five per cent of the assistance committed at the Forum comprises outright grants. There are no loans and there is no repayment also… There are absolutely no conditions for the disbursement of these funds to the Government." Later on June 3, 2006 an India-Sri Lanka Joint Statement issued in New Delhi, during the visit of the then President Chandrika Kumaratunga, noted that she apprised Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of her efforts to establish a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) in the Tsunami-affected areas and that the "Prime Minister expressed understanding of and support for these ongoing efforts."

The JVP pulled out of the coalition on June 15, 2005 when Kumaratunga refused to rescind her willingness to sign the Joint Mechanism (JM) with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to handle Tsunami-related aid in areas under the latter's control. JVP leader, Somawansha Amarasinghe, said that the JM was an open invitation to the LTTE to eliminate rivals. "By establishing the Tsunami relief structure, the Government of Sri Lanka is attempting to hand over part of the power legally vested in it by the people to a group (the LTTE)," the JVP central command said when it issued an ultimatum to Kumaratunga to reject the mechanism proposals. The breakaway Karuna faction also said that it was not supportive of the JM. Lanka, a pro-JVP Sinhala newspaper, reported, quoting anonymous Karuna faction sources, that the faction welcomed the pullout and said that the JVP stance would be helpful to its operations in the East. In any event, the JM was a big blow to the Karuna faction, since it was for the first time that the Kumaratunga administration would enter into an agreement with the LTTE. Kumaratunga herself said that the JM could be the prelude to the resumption of negotiations.

On June 24, 2005 the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for establishing P-TOMS, aimed at ensuring equitable distribution of international assistance for the reconstruction of the coastline. A week later, S. P. Tamilselvan, leader of the political wing of the LTTE, stated that the outfit does not accept Sri Lanka's sovereignty by signing the P-TOMS agreement. On July 4, the Sri Lanka Supreme Court passed a stay order to block four key provisions of the P-TOMS agreement between the Government and LTTE. Later, on July 29, the Sri Lankan Government filed a review petition requesting the Supreme Court to reconsider its interim injunction on the P-TOMS agreement. The Government reportedly asked the court that it be permitted to carry on with the operational aspect of the P-TOMS as it was a "delegated power" made by the Government to the LTTE and did not amount to granting the outfit the functions of Government. The Supreme Court on September 13 extended its interim injunction on the implementation of certain clauses of the P-TOMS agreement till November 22, 2005.

Year 2005 also witnessed the keenly contested Presidential election on November 17, in which both the ruling United Front (UF) and opposition United National Party (UNP) made all out efforts to win the election making different pledges to the voters. During the first fortnight of September 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse, the then Prime Minister (PM) and the candidate of the People's Alliance/Sri Lanka Freedom Party (PA/SLFP) for the presidential election, entered into formal electoral agreements with the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU/ lit. 'National Sinhalese Heritage'), the parliamentary representation of which consists entirely of Buddhist monks. The LTTE gave a call to boycott the elections. Voting for the presidential poll was held under heavy police deployment across the country. A low voter turnout was reported from the Northern Province after the LTTE announced that it would not support any Presidential candidate.

Finally, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party won the Presidential poll by defeating Ranil Wickremesinghe of the United National Party.

On November 19, 2005 the newly elected President Mahinda Rajapakse said that he would restart the stalled peace talks soon. He invited the LTTE to participate in a dialogue aimed at durable peace in the country. "I hope the LTTE will consider the peace offer seriously. Both parties can start the peace talks with an agreed timeframe once the LTTE readies for the talks," the President said while addressing the nation. He added that he would take several measures to amend the CFA with the LTTE to ensure no future hostile situations. In his Statement of Government Policy at the opening of the new Parliamentary session in Colombo on November 25, Rajapakse set out the broad parameters of his Government's new and inclusive approach for 'peace with dignity' to end the ethnic conflict. "Our method is discussion instead of war. We are aware that such discussions are not simple and easy. Yet, it is the only way to peace," he said. Rajapakse added that the current CFA would be revised to ensure the protection of human rights, prevent recruitment of children for war, safeguard national security, and prevent terrorist acts. The LTTE issued an ultimatum to the new Government to come up with a ‘reasonable' political settlement soon or risk the outfit setting up a separate state next year. LTTE chief Prabhakaran in his annual ‘Heroes’ Day’ on November 27, 2005 said their patience was wearing thin and he was making a final appeal for a political settlement that would answer their call for a separate state for the Tamils. Later, rejecting the Government’s proposal of holding the peace talks at an Asian venue, the LTTE instead suggested Oslo as the ideal venue on December 17.

The LTTE and breakaway faction of ‘Colonel’ Karuna fought for their supremacy in the trouble-torn eastern region. The Karuna faction, which broke ranks in April 2004, has been successful in eliminating key LTTE figures in the East, including Kaushalyan, the former LTTE eastern political wing leader and the highest ranking LTTE leader to be killed in the internecine violence since the CFA, in February 2005, which unleashed a fresh bout of killings. The Karuna faction has made life very difficult for the LTTE, especially in the East. Most of the cadres supporting the renegade commander hail from the region and are masters of the terrain. They use the border areas between Government-controlled and LTTE-held areas and those between Sinhala/Muslim areas and Tamil areas as staging grounds for attacks and as hideouts. According to a September 2005 report, Karuna claimed that he has the support of 5,000 cadres. But, only several hundred are believed to be actively engaged in taking on their erstwhile brothers-in-arms in the East, since the internal rebellion. However, when he fled the LTTE, Karuna released 2,437 child soldiers and several hundred other cadres from the fighting ranks.

Since its takeover of the East in April 2004, the LTTE has been keen to keep its cadre levels high, leading to persistent allegations, by UN and other agencies, of child recruitment and forcible conscription of adults. The outfit has taken trouble to keep the Eastern situation within control, leading to the tit-for-tat attacks. Truce monitors located in the East likened the situation to being tied to a swinging yo-yo, one day it can be all bonkers, the next day absolutely calm. Two senior military commanders on par with Karuna, Bhanu and Balraj, have been placed in the East on either side of the main town, Batticaloa. The LTTE has inducted specially trained units from the northern theater to confront attacks by the rival faction and to act as buffers. However, the battle has been more a war of attrition than of face to face confrontations. The outfit have been targeted inside Government areas, where they cannot officially operate with arms, or close to the line of control, as in Kirimichchi, making it that much more difficult for them to pursue and engage with their rivals. The LTTE have, consequently, targeted informants and ranking members of the Government intelligence units as a counter attack. Therefore they demanded the Government to allow them to carry their arms while their movement in Government held areas, which after reluctance was accepted by the Government.

Major incidents of violence between the LTTE and its breakaway group in 2005 include:

• February 7: LTTE’s Eastern Political wing leader, Kaushalyan, his deputy Nedimaran and three other LTTE cadres are killed during an ambush at Poonani in the Batticaloa district

• March 26: Five LTTE cadres are killed by cadres of the rival 'Colonel' Karuna faction at Tharavai in the Batticaloa district.

• April 14: Five cadres of a 'paramilitary group' are killed during an attack on their camp by suspected LTTE cadres at Sorivil in the Welikanda area of Polannaruwa district, 80 kilometers northwest of Batticaloa.

• April 21: Citing an intercepted rebel communication, military spokesperson, Brig. Daya Ratnayake, said that five LTTE cadres were killed and seven others wounded in a pre-dawn attack by the 'Colonel' Karuna faction at Kanjikudichcha Aaru in the Amparai district, about 250 kilometers east of the capital Colombo.

• July 10: Four LTTE cadres, including two senior leaders identified as Dikkan and Sinnavan, are killed by the rival 'colonel' Karuna group at the Selvanayagapuram Agriculture Training Institute in Trincomalee district.

• December 5: Four cadres of the ‘Colonel’ Karuna faction, including a senior commander, identified as Iniyabarathy alias Barathy, are killed by the LTTE in the Siyambalanduwa area of Amparai district.

Far more significant in disruptive impact is, of course, the increasing recourse to violence by the LTTE in the form of both innumerable violations of the terms and conditions of the CFA of February 2002 as well as the increasing belligerence that accompanies its demands. As a mass of evidence hitherto unearthed indicates, the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on August 12, 2005, is the latest and the most destabilising episode of this process. The other main incidence of violence during year 2005, which was by and large peaceful in the first half, are:

• March 5: Six civilians are shot dead at Welikanda in the Polonnaruwa district by the LTTE.

• November 18: Six civilians are killed and 21 others, including a child, sustain injuries when LTTE cadres lobbed hand grenades targeting a mosque in the Akkaraipattu area of Amparai district.

• December 4: At least six civilians are killed and two others sustain injuries in clashes between Muslims and Tamils in the Muttur area of Trincomalee since December 3.

• December 6: Six SF personnel are killed and one sustains injuries in a claymore mine explosion in the Irupalai area of Jaffna district.

• December 24: LTTE cadres made an abortive attempt to ambush SFs who were conducting a cordon and search operation in the Fort area of Jaffna district, injuring three SF personnel. In retaliatory action, SFs killed five LTTE cadres, including a female identified as Thamil Etchchi.

• December 27: Eleven soldiers are killed and four others injured when LTTE cadres triggered a remote controlled claymore mine explosion targeting an army truck in the Puloly west area of Jaffna district.

Three years ago, there was enthusiasm all round, with peace talks resuming in the Thai resort town of Satahip. There was an economic boom riding on the expectation that the curse of two decades was finally over. Three years later, there is no peace, and hostilities have resumed. Peace in Sri Lanka, thus, remained a deadly tool of war.