Prospects for peace in Sri Lanka are apparently at their brightest turn since the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) launched its bloody war against the government 18 years ago. The LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe signed the Norwegian-brokered Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities, on February 22, 2002. Ahead of signing the MoU, the LTTE announced in December 2001, that it would observe a month-long cease-fire beginning December 24, 2001; the government subsequently reciprocated the gesture. Teams comprising representatives from Scandinavian countries, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE will monitor the implementation of the February 22 truce, even as preparations would be made for formal talks, the date and venue of which are yet to be determined.
The peace process received a fresh impetus after the December 5, 2001, elections brought the United National Party (UNP)-led United National Front (UNF) to power and Ranil Wickremasinghe was sworn in as the Prime Minister. A peculiar political situation now exists in the island country, with the Prime Minister and the President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, representing two rival political formations. The President is the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Mutual accommodation, thus, becomes crucial for any peace and/or political initiative to fructify. Differences between the President and the Prime Minister have not yet reached a state of acrimony. However, the President expressed displeasure at being kept in the dark, till the eleventh hour, regarding the contents of the cease-fire agreement, and had threatened to render it ineffective, but has not carried out her threat.
During 2001, the peace process failed to take-off largely because both the SLFP-led government and the LTTE perceived, at different points in time during the year, the other side to be on a ‘weak footing’, when each had called for a resumption of talks to resolve the ethnic conflict. The LTTE continued to extend the cease-fire, initially declared in December 2000 for a month, by one month at a time, first on January 23, 2001, second on February 22 and for the third and last time on March 21. The LTTE’s unilateral cease-fire, thus, came to an end in April 2001.
Chandrika Kumaratunga adopted a tough posture at the beginning of the year 2001 in her January 8-address to the nation, when she stated categorically that the government would observe a cease-fire only if it was mutually agreed upon through negotiations, and called upon the LTTE to seek a negotiated solution. This was followed by the launch of a fresh military offensive, on January 16, 2001, and the re-capture of the strategically important areas of Ponnar and Avarkadu, southeast of Kilali and Eluthumadduva. Over 100 persons were killed and another 300 injured on both sides, in these battles.
Later, on April 25, 2001, the Army launched an operation code-named Agni Khiela, to expand its control over the Jaffna peninsula. The Operation was launched following four months of preparations and planning, but faced several reversals and was quickly abandoned four days after its initiation. There are conflicting claims on the casualties suffered by the LTTE and the Army during the abortive Agni Khiela. The Army claimed to have killed 200 LTTE cadres and injured another 400, while admitting to the loss of 187 men and another 867 wounded. The LTTE, however, maintained that it had wounded 2,400 troops, while 400 more were killed during the clashes. The LTTE placed its own casualties at 75 cadres killed.
Government troops, in 2001, had also initiated some measures to demoralise the LTTE. For instance, the Army laid an ambush on a vehicle carrying LTTE leaders who were returning from Madhu after meeting a peace delegation, on February 20, 2001. There were, however no casualties. The LTTE’s political-wing leader Tamil Chelvan’s convoy was attacked in the Vanni region while he was proceeding for a meeting with Norwegian peace envoy Eric Solheim, on March 16, 2001. In another incident, the LTTE’s Deputy Political Leader Karikalan was wounded in a claymore mine blast near Batticaloa, on October 18, 2001. Yet another political-wing leader, Nizam, the in-charge of Batticaloa and Ampara districts, was killed in a claymore mine blast on June 13, 2001, near Batticaloa. Another significant loss for the LTTE has been the death, in a landmine explosion, of Sea Tigers deputy chief Kanagiamaran alias Anthony Johnson, on June 29, 2001, at Nachchikuda, near Mannar. Yet another significant loss was the killing a senior leader, Shankar, a self-styled ‘colonel’, by a deep penetration unit of the Sri Lankan Army, in a claymore mine explosion, near Oddusudan, on September 26, 2001. In what could, perhaps, be described as retaliation to these methods adopted by the Army, an LTTE suicide squad killed three Army intelligence personnel at the high security zone in Batticaloa on November 15, 2001.
Though there is no reliable information on the degree of success, the Sri Lankan Air Force also carried out raids on LTTE training camps, barracks, logistics and communication centres. Bases of the Sea Tiger, the LTTE’s naval wing – in Muhamalai, Mullathivu and Poomeryn – were bombarded several times during 2001. The raids on Pooneryn were reportedly meant to weaken the LTTE, and undermine prospects of an LTTE attack on Jaffna.
In another attempt to weaken the LTTE, the Navy and the Air Force launched a joint operation code-named Varuna Kirana, in late July 2001, to enforce a blockade off the waters of Mullathivu and to prevent ingress and egress by the Sea Tigers. The blockade was not a complete success as the Black Sea Tigers, the suicide cadres of the naval wing, launched counter-attacks. In one such instance on September 16, 2001, rebels sneaked through a blockade and penetrated up to Point Pedro, where they ambushed a Naval vessel MV Pride of South, carrying troops. 23 naval personnel were killed in the attack and another 62 naval and army personnel were wounded. In another incident, also during the same month, several dozen LTTE boats reportedly shipped a huge consignment of arms evading the blockade. By the time the Sea Tigers were detected, most of the arms had reached the shore. Nevertheless, four Sea Tigers boats were struck, killing 20 Black Sea Tigers cadre and another 22 Sea Tigers.
Earlier, in a major attack, the Black Sea Tigers targeted two naval vessels, destroying one and damaging another, on March 21, 2001. 15 persons were killed in the attack. In another attack, LTTE rebels set off a claymore mine in the Thambalagamuwa general area, 40 kilometres away from Trincomalee, killing 10 naval personnel and injuring 17 more, on May 22, 2001.
In the most daring attack during the year past, a team of 21Tiger suicide cadre struck at the Katunayake Airforce base and the Bandaranaike International Airport, on the outskirts of Colombo, on July 24, 2001. Eight military aircraft, including two helicopters, three K8 trainers and three Kfir and MiG fighter aircraft, and six Airbus passenger craft owned by the national carrier, Sri Lankan Air, were either destroyed or damaged during the six-hour attack. One estimate held the total damage at US$ 400 million. The total value of the eight military aircraft destroyed alone was estimated at US$ 19.3 million. Seven security force personnel were killed and 12 others wounded in the attack, while the LTTE lost 14 cadres.
Even while refraining from initiating any major terrorist attack in Sri Lanka after July 24 attack, sporadic incidents of LTTE violence continued through the latter half of 2001. 19 civilians were injured when two parcel bombs, suspected to be of LTTE origin, exploded inside the office of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) at Batticaloa on December 1, 2001. The EPDP, with a base in the Northern region of the country, is a major constituent of the People’s Alliance. Earlier, on October 9, 2001, a group of 150-200 rebels attacked an Air Force base at Velverikulam near Trincomalee. Four Airforce personnel were killed in the attack which was successfully repulsed without any major damage to the base, while casualties among the rebels were not known.
On October 30, 2001, LTTE rebels attacked a police post at Muttur and killed 11 police personnel. In a separate attack on the same day, an oil tanker, docked off Point Pedro near Jaffna, was attacked by the Sea Tigers. The ship was destroyed and four LTTE rebels and three Navy personnel were killed.
Comprehensive data of casualties in Sri Lanka’s ethnic war is not available. Scattered estimates, made at various points of time indicate that the war has been very costly for both the sides. One estimate held that over 64,000 civilians, security force personnel and LTTE cadres were killed in the 18 years since the ethnic war commenced. A Tamil news source estimated that 379 civilians died between 1990 and 1999 in just the Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts. These sources also claimed that 4,879 civilians died in the Mullaithivu district between 1994 and 1999 due to the direct impact of the government’s economic embargo on Vanni, particularly due to the severe restrictions on medical supplies. Official sources indicate that 1,464 security force personnel were killed and more than 9,000 injured in the conflict with the LTTE during 2000. Providing data for the last three months of the year 2000 in the Jaffna peninsula, a defence ministry statement said 777 LTTE rebels and 268 troops have been killed while 246 LTTE rebels were injured.
A significant shift during the year 2001 in the LTTE’s position on a separate country (Eelam) occurred with its chief, V. Prabhakaran, declaring in his Annual Heroes’ Day message that his organisation was neither for separatism nor terrorism. He also indicated that the LTTE would agree to a political solution within an integrated Sri Lanka, but would be forced to opt for secession if the conflict was not solved through peaceful means. The LTTE continues to insist that the government de-proscribe the organisation, and, thus, impart legitimacy to it, which it holds is a prerequisite to participate in the peace talks. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe has stated categorically that he would not, for the present, consider de-proscription; nor would the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) be repealed.
The ongoing peace process has received support from the international community, especially the United States. US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca visited Sri Lanka on 15, 16 March 2002, travelled to Palaly where she met with the Prime Minister Wickremasinghe during her March 2002 three-country tour of South Asia. The visit was meant to convey the United States’ support to the peace process. A jarring note in the visit was that President Kumaratunga cited ‘prior commitments’ as the reason for not granting audience to Rocca.
Even while attesting support to the peace process, the US has unambiguously stated that the LTTE would continue to remain on the US State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organisations. The US Ambassador in Sri Lanka, Ashley Willis said in late January 2002 that a decision on de-listing the LTTE would be taken only after the US made an independent assessment of the case, and would not automatically follow Sri Lanka’s decision to de-proscribe the LTTE if and when its is done.
Some countries among the international community had imposed restrictions on the LTTE after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The US attacks, while unrelated to the LTTE, strengthened the then Sri Lankan government’s campaign for a global ban on the LTTE. Australia, in December 2001, placed the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisation in pursuance of its obligations under UN Resolution 1373 on the suppression of the financing of terror. On November 8, 2001, following a relentless effort by the Sri Lankan government, Canada also named the LTTE as a terrorist outfit and the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada, issued a new list that included, for the first time, the LTTE. The LTTE’s front organisations have a formidable presence in Canada and the Tamil expatriate community there is considered to be a major source of funds for the LTTE. Earlier, on February 28, 2001 the British government had proscribed the LTTE under its new Terrorism Act 2000.