With the exception of a few incidents, Sri Lanka has been free of violence since February 22, 2002, when a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities was signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As part of the ongoing peace process, international donors pledged USD 4.5 billion over the next four years to Sri Lanka at the Tokyo donor conference on June 9-10, 2003. Earlier, on April 21, 2003, the LTTE pulled out of the peace talks in protest against the exclusion of its accredited representatives from the crucial international aid conference in Washington, which was held on April 14, 2003, in preparation for the main donor conference in Japan, and slow reconstruction of war-hit North-East Province (NEP) of the country. The LTTE has, however, been careful in the statement it issued regarding its decision to suspend participation in the peace negotiations, which was qualified by an announcement that it would continue with the peace process and honour the cease-fire agreement. But, there is considerable apprehension that the peace process may break down given the intransigence of the LTTE. On June 25, 2003, the Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga while reportedly warning that the LTTE was preparing for war added that security forces are ill prepared to meet any eventual offensive in the northern peninsula of Jaffna.
Fifty-one leading nations and 21 international organizations participated in the two-day donor conference in Tokyo. Apart from the pledging of a USD 4.5 billion aid package, the declaration called upon the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE to enter into discussions, as early as possible, on a provisional administrative structure (PAS) to manage the reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged NEP. Speaking at the start of the Tokyo conference, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe promised to revive the stalled peace talks with the LTTE, offering to meet their key demand for an interim administration for the island's Tamil-majority NEP. He also declared that his Government would consider calling a referendum to endorse changes to the country's Constitution that could be part of a final solution to the 20-year old ethnic conflict. Meanwhile, on June 11, 2003, the LTTE said that the resolutions adopted by the donor community at Tokyo had no binding obligations on the outfit.
The Government and LTTE have concluded six rounds of talks thus far. In a significant breakthrough during the fifth round of talks at Berlin (February 7-8, 2003), the LTTE agreed that their child soldiers would 'return home'. The agreement stipulated that soldiers under the age of 18 would lay down their arms and would subsequently be trained for civilian jobs. Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator for the LTTE, conceded that earlier pledges to halt the practice had recently been violated in 'some isolated cases of child recruitment to the army.'
The substantive and core issue of a political solution resulting in a power sharing arrangement between the Sinhala-majority Government and the Tamils represented by LTTE, is yet to be discussed. The LTTE has shown displeasure over the Tokyo aid conference declarations. In Kilinochchi on June 11, 2003, the LTTE reiterated that it would resume peace negotiations with the Government only after it puts forward the draft framework of the interim administrative framework for the NEP and rejected the Prime Minister's offer for a provincial administrative structure. It said, "We are disappointed to note that the Prime Minister's statement does not offer anything new. The so-called provincial administrative structure' is the new name given to the Apex Council proposed by him for development and rejected by us as extremely limited and inadequate." It further said, "While our leadership has proposed an Interim Administrative framework, a politico-administrative structure for the NEP with wider participation of the LTTE, the Government has offered a council with a structure and mechanism for the development of the region."
In announcing its withdrawal from the peace negotiations, on April 21, 2003, the LTTE has made it clear that its co-operation is essential if the Government is to attain its aid target. In fact, by boycotting the Tokyo donor conference, the LTTE also made the larger point that everything the country has achieved in the course of the last 16 months of peace is contingent on its co-operation. However, the current international climate is likely to restrain the LTTE from returning to violence in the short-term. Since 9/11, along with several other groups, the international spotlight has been on the LTTE, one of the world's most lethal terrorist groups. The threat of further international isolation, especially, the likelihood of the US and other countries stepping up assistance to the Sri Lankan Government in the event the group returns to violence, is understood by the LTTE. The post-9/11 policy response of the international community to criminalize and prosecute terrorist groups has placed all terrorist front, cover and sympathetic organisations, including the LTTE, under significant pressure worldwide.
An important and continuing contentious issue in the peace process is truce violations by both the Government and the LTTE. Violations by Government forces have, in the main, been in the form of harassing civilians and restriction of their movement, or detaining LTTE cadres allegedly without sufficient reason. Allegations of violations against the LTTE include abduction, conscription, recruitment of child soldiers and extortion, and on occasion murder. Beginning late February 2002, when the truce came into force, till December 31, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) announced its decision in 556 cases of violation––502 against the LTTE and 54 against Government forces. The LTTE was accused in 89 cases of abducting adults, 313 cases of recruiting child combatants and 41 cases of harassment.
Serious acts of violation by the LTTE have been committed in the seas. The LTTE is accused of transporting weapons surreptitiously, but has steadfastly denied the same. A suspected arms smuggling vessel of the LTTE was allegedly blown up by the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) in international waters, 266 nautical miles off the coast of Mullaitivu, on June 14, 2003, in which, according to the SLMM monitors, 12 'sea tigers' were killed. The LTTE committed the most serious cease-fire violation on July 13, 2002. It alleged that Sri Lankan naval troops fired upon an LTTE vessel in the Iranaitivu seas near Mannar, even after a one-hour search by the SLMM did not reveal anything incriminating on board its vessel. Subsequently, the LTTE cadres took two monitors hostage and fled to safety. The Government was found to have committed violation in 20 cases of harassment, 13 cases of extortion and seven cases of restriction of movement. For instance, in Nanattan village, Mannar, residents alleged that 15 Army personnel entered the village ostensibly to settle a dispute and later assaulted some 20 people. In another incident, a Government soldier was shot dead by the LTTE on July 25, 2002, when he, contrary to orders from his superiors, strayed into LTTE-area crossing the zone of separation, 150mts East of Muhamalai Checkpoint, on the A9 road. This was the first casualty on any of the sides after the truce came into force in February.
During March-April 2003, there were many incidents that could have disrupted the peace process. Some of the most threatening incidents included the sinking of an LTTE cargo vessel, suspected of carrying arms, by the SLN, which resulted in the loss of over a dozen LTTE cadres on March 10. This was followed by the hacking to death of nearly 20 Chinese civilian sailors on board a shipping vessel flying the Sri Lankan flag, on March 20. Further, between April 16 and 21, there were clashes in the multi ethnic eastern region of the country, where there has been widespread violence between Tamils and Muslims, with several hundred Muslims fleeing their homes. The LTTE has also been accused of assassinating leaders of Tamil groups opposed to it and Government intelligence agents. Subathiran, a front ranking leader of a faction of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), was assassinated in the heart of northern Jaffna town on June 14, 2003, by an unidentified sniper, allegedly an LTTE sharpshooter. The LTTE has neither claimed nor denied involvement in the killing.
The facilitator in the peace process, Norway, too, has come under criticism for its role in helping the LTTE set-up an FM radio station. In a letter to the Norwegian Prime Minister on December 30, 2002, President Chandrika Kumaratunga had written that Norway was illegally helping the LTTE to import radio equipment, in violation of Sri Lankan laws, under the guise of brokering peace. She also reportedly questioned Norway's objectivity in facilitating the peace process. In response, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry reaffirmed its commitment to help the Government and LTTE reach a final peace settlement, and its spokesperson Oystein Boe said "We are going to continue to be available for the parties in Sri Lanka."
The LTTE and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe signed the Norwegian-brokered MoU on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities, on February 22, 2002, initiating the peace process. Ahead of signing the MoU, the LTTE announced in December 2001, that it would observe a month-long cease-fire beginning December 24, 2001; the government subsequently reciprocated the gesture. The SLMM, headed by a retired Norwegian General, Trond Furuhovde, is monitoring the implementation of the February 22-truce with the assistance of teams comprising representatives from Scandinavian countries, the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, even as peace talks are being held abroad.
The important aspects of the MoU are as under:
Importantly, the LTTE chief negotiator and ideologue, Anton Balasingham, assured that the LTTE has no intention of resuming war to win the rights of the Tamil people, during the course of the inaugural round of talks, held in Sattahip, Thailand, between September 16 and 18, 2002. However, the LTTE is firm about not laying down arms until the negotiations conclude to its satisfaction. At Sattahip, Balasingham declared, "The question of decommissioning [weapons] does not arise until a firm decision is arrived at to address the question of the Tamil minority." The Sri Lanka Army’s Jaffna Commander, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, proposed on December 20, 2002, that the LTTE would have to de-commission its arms, if internally displaced persons (IDPs) were to be permitted to be settled in HSZs. In response to the proposal, Balasingham said on January 9, 2003, during the fourth round of talks in Bangkok, "Disarming of our cadres or decommissioning of our weapons at this stage without a permanent settlement is suicidal on our part because military power is the bargaining power of the Tamils." However, the Government and LTTE arrived at a consensus. The Government agreed not to link decommissioning of arms to resettling IDPs in HSZs. They would be re-settled outside the HSZs, in the first phase, and in the second, within the HSZs.
A significant development in the peace process occurred, on December 5, at the third round of peace talks in Oslo. Both the parties agreed to ‘explore’ a federal structure within a ‘united Sri Lanka’, on the principle of ‘internal self-determination’. Commenting on the development, Government chief negotiator and Minister, G.L. Peiris, said, "The breakthrough … was… the explicit identification of a federal structure, which will be the basis on which a political solution will be evolved. Now we have a clear idea of the nature of the political solution the parties are working towards. It is not separatism, it is not confederation." However, any political solution offered to the LTTE needs to find approval with the majority Sinhalese and the consent of President Kumaratunga and her Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP)-led People’s Alliance (PA), of which the nationalist Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) is a member. The President or the PA has not been involved in any substantive measure in the peace process thus far.
The response of the Muslims to the ongoing negotiations and to the intensifying political turbulences in the Eastern Province (in which they constitute slightly more than a third of the population) is yet another problem that has acquired critical significance. The apparent willingness of the United National Front (UNF) leadership to grant the LTTE a position of eminence (if not of sole authority) in the NEP has made the Muslim demand for an autonomous unit of government consisting of the Muslim-majority areas of that part of the country far more vehement than it has ever been in the past. Besides, the interests of the Muslim community need to be accommodated. Notwithstanding the participation of Cabinet Minister and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader Rauf Hakeem as a member of the Government delegation during the talks, Muslims as a community have not been invited to participate in the talks. The chief demand by the Muslims is an arrangement that would facilitate self-government for those inhabiting the main Muslim areas in the East in Sri Lanka. Friction between the two communities has been in existence since a long time. Reports indicate that, by January 1991, an estimated 350,000 Muslims had left their homes in the East, following large-scale LTTE attacks. Further, in October 1990, the LTTE also evicted en masse an estimated 70,000 Muslims from the North. Signs of rapprochement between the two communities appeared when the LTTE admitted, on April 3, 2002 that the ethnic cleansing in 1990 was a mistake. Besides, media reports on April 16, 2002, said that LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran assured Hakeem on April 13 that the LTTE would not extort from Muslims in the East, and has also agreed to the latter’s participation in the peace process. Nevertheless, bitter clashes broke out between the Tamils and Muslims during year 2002, at Muttur in February, Valachennai in June and Akkaraipatu in October.
Internal politics in Sri Lanka is increasingly becoming confrontational, following the signing of the truce agreement. Traditional rivals, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by President Kumaratunga and the United National Party (UNP) led by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, have threatened to dislodge one another from power. The UNP indicated that it would initiate an impeachment motion against the President and the SLFP declared that the President would, under the powers vested in her by the Constitution, dissolve Parliament and, in effect, oust the Wickremesinghe Government. Perhaps the most important contradiction in the on-going peace process is that, although one of the principal negotiators is identified as the Government of Sri Lanka, both in a statutory sense as well as from the viewpoint of political realities, the negotiations with the LTTE are, in fact, being conducted by a section of the Government - the section headed by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. And, President Kumaratunga - head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces - has remained outside the mainstream of the peace process, hardly ever consulted in the formulation of the related strategies.