Year 2002 began with the Assam government announcing a month-long safe passage offer to the terrorists of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). The ULFA on its part, through its mouthpiece, Freedom of January 1, 2002, asserted that the ‘centrifugal character of the Constitution’ precludes the possibility of a non-military solution to the problem. These two events essentially summed up the developments in the year 2001, when a ‘more than willing state government’ continued with its futile efforts for a peace process with the terrorist outfits.
December 2001 had raised the anticipation of a solution to the problem of insurgency in Assam to a peak. At least three prominent outfits, the ULFA, the NDFB and the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) had defined conditions to open negotiations for a settlement of their grievances. These, however, turned out to be effective non-offers as they were based on requirements would compromise India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in the Northeast – conditionalities that are rejected by the government.
Assam continued to be the most violence stricken state of the Indian Northeast, though trends in fatalities are showing a significant decline. There were 606 fatalities in 2001 as against 758 in the previous year.
January
February
March
April
May
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July
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September
October
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The year had started with the fratricidal killing of a prominent surrendered ULFA (SULFA) leader, Abinash Bordoloi, on January 2, 2001. There has been no instance of any internecine violence after this attack till March 2002, which suggests that the series of killings and counter-killings that had marred the last two months of the year 2000 had ended with the January 2, 2001 attack.
The year 2001 brought in a new State Cabinet formed by the Congress party after elections in May 2001. The electioneering process was a bloody affair, with a number of candidates and their sympathisers attacked by the terrorist groups, led by the ULFA. On May 1, 2001, Jayanta Dutta, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) candidate from the Dibrugarh constituency was killed in an attack by suspected ULFA terrorists.
The new Congress regime belied hopes of ushering in peace in the State. Even as it made several announcements signifying an intention to initiate a peace process, the nature of these announcements did not hold out concrete prospects for a settlement. Immediately after swearing in, the Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi called for a peace dialogue with the ULFA, only to be met with a rebuff from the group. The ULFA, in its newsletter, Freedom of May 15, 2001, warned the party, ‘not to repeat its history of betrayal and fratricide'. The Chief Minister’s gesture appeared to be a move towards scoring political points over its political rival, Asom Gana Parishad, the party which controlled the outgoing government.
The year-end impasse started with the statement of Arabinda Rajkhowa, the ULFA Chairman, on the occasion of the outfit’s ‘Martyr’s Day’ on November 27, 2001. In an announcement which that echoed the group’s recurrent position, Rajkhowa talked of a ‘political solution to the Indo-Asom problem’. In response, the State administration began looking for a suitable mediator. In its enthusiasm to find a possible solution, the State government made effort to mobilise the otherwise dormant civil society, largely dominated by sympathisers of the terrorist outfit. However, the subsequent clarification by ULFA’s publicity secretary, Mithinga Daimary reiterating what can be interpreted as extremely prohibitive pre-conditions led to a continuation of the stalemate. Notwithstanding the vague promise published in Freedom to ‘waive’ the outfit’s condition regarding the presence of the United Nations (UN) during peace talks, the attempt remained a non-starter. The Union government, on its part, was in no mood to agree to a round of talks to decide about Assam’s sovereignty under the UN banner.
The ULFA had, on two occasions in 2001, talked about a ‘political solution’ to the problem of insurgency in the State. On July 27, the ULFA Chairman had called for a referendum in the State to decide the issue of sovereignty, for which the outfit is fighting. He also added that his organisation wants a ‘political solution’ to the 'Indo-Asom conflict.’ Previously, on January 3, 2001, Paresh Baruah, the Commander-in-Chief of the outfit, had talked about a ‘scientific dialogue’ with the Government of India. However, these two statements failed to meet with the enthusiastic response from the State government which the November 2001 statement received.
It appears that the ULFA has used the so called ‘peace proposals’ to secure a much-needed breather. The corresponding ‘go slow’ approach adopted by an over enthusiastic administration has been exploited by the outfit to replenish its reserves. This is particularly significant at a time when the outfit is being pressurised by the Bhutanese government to close down some of its camps in that country. The group is reported to be looking for sites to relocate camps dismantled in Bhutan.
Following a June 2001 agreement with the Royal Bhutanese government, the ULFA promised to close down four of its camps and reduce cadre strength in the rest. Conflicting media reports towards the end of the year suggested that the group is in the process of closing down three of its camps in Bhutan. The Bhutanese King, in his national day speech on December 17, 2001, talked of possible army action in case the group chooses to dishonour the agreement. What became apparent at the end of the deadline, however, was that the outfit had merely relocated the four camps inside Bhutan. The ULFA is clearly asserting a new position, transcending the barriers of being an Assam-centric terrorist group. In spite of three major mass surrenders in the first two months of 2001 that threatened to deplete the outfit’s strength, its activities are now significantly visible in parts of Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and North Bengal. Even at places where the outfit is not directly active, collusive linkages with other terrorist outfits such as United National Liberation Front (UNLF) of Manipur, National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) of Nagaland, National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) are proving to be a real threat for security forces. Contrary to reports of the outfit’s falling popular support, the outfit is now reportedly active in most Upper and Lower Assam districts. Even in the capital, Dispur as well its twin city Guwahati, periodic encounters and arrests involving the outfit’s cadres underline the group’s resurgence. Taking on a new mantle as the ‘spokesman of the north-eastern population’, ULFA’s Paresh Baruah, on December 13, 2001, repeatedly talked of a peace process between the Indian State and the Northeast (instead of Assam), in his clarification to the peace proposal by the group.
Along with its expansion within the country, the ULFA’s growing presence in neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Thailand is an additional reason of concern. With a new regime in Bangladesh under the leadership of Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP), the possibility of a resurgence of insurgent outfits such as the ULFA and the NDFB has increased. The BNP regime, in its previous tenure, described the north-eastern terrorist groups as ‘freedom fighters’. The top leadership of the ULFA also enjoys protection on Bangladesh territory. In addition to using this safe haven to chalk out plans for its campaigns on Indian soil, the group has established a number of economically rewarding activities in Bangladesh, including transport agencies, tanneries, garment factories, departmental stores, travel agencies and schools.
ULFA is currently engaged in a massive recruitment and extortion drive in Assam’s Darrang, Nalbari and Barpeta districts. The extortion drive reportedly resulted in a collection of over Rs. One billion in 2001. The group also succeeded in recruiting a number of unemployed youth into its cadre, nullifying the successes achieved in counter-insurgency operations in terms of surrenders, arrests and killings of ULFA members.
The major Bodo terrorist group, the NDFB, has also been active in 2001, perpetrating several acts of sabotage, including an explosion in the Northeast Express on September 25. More than 120 persons were injured in the explosion. Due to the threat against railway trains, all important trains in the region run only during the daytime. On October 19, 2001, 10 terrorists and three police personnel were killed and twenty others injured as NDFB terrorists attacked a police station at Labdabguri in Barpeta district with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). Areas of lower Assam remained virtual strongholds of the outfit. On February 27, 2001, the group imposed a ban on the Bodo newspaper Bodossa, published from Kokrajhar. A number of tribal woodcutters, who depend on the forest for their livelihood, were killed by NDFB cadres, including ten in a single attack at the Lungsung forests in Kokrajhar district on June 3, 2001. The NDFB’s internecine conflict with its Bodo counterpart, Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) also added to the violence in the region. On January 16, 2001, the group, through a press release, announced its plan for selective killings targeting rival Bodo organisations such as the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU), the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS), Bodo People’s Action Committee (BPAC) and the All Bodo Women’s Welfare Federation (ABWWF). Within three days of the announcement, three BLT cadres were killed by suspected NDFB terrorists at Bijni.
The NDFB, over the years, has shown little inclination for a political solution to what it perceives as ‘injustice suffered by Bodos’. Towards the latter part of the year, the group emulated the ULFA by laying down similar conditions for a round of peace talk with the government. These comprised:
· The talks must be held in a foreign country.
· Talks must be held under the supervision of the United Nations (UN).
· The talks must discuss the issue of Assam’s sovereignty.
In an interview to a regional daily, the NDFB publicity secretary B. Irakdao said, “The Centre must honour all our pre-conditions before talks.” However, the prospect of a round of peace talks with the NDFB generates less enthusiasm in comparison to the ULFA.
The cease-fire between the government and the BLTF was extended twice in 2001, in March and September. The cease-fire was in operation legally until January 21, 2002. The two parties, while continuing talks on contentious issues have not agreed to a formal extension of the treaty though a de-facto cease-fire continues to operate between them. In the meantime, talks continued between the State and Union Government and the BLT for the formation of a proposed Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). The Union government has asked the State government to adopt a resolution granting Sixth Schedule Status to the proposed BTC, which is a constitutional necessity for the creation of such a Council. Earlier, in a much delayed decision, in September 2001, the government negotiators in the Bodo peace talks decided to invite non-Bodo groups, such as the Adivasis, Koch-Rajbongshis and other minorities, for an interface, before the creation of the BTC. Only after the Bodo groups threatened to pull out of the peace talks, pointing to the futility of inviting groups with ‘no presence’ in the proposed BTC area, did the Central government backtrack on this point. By then, however, this move had already created a sense of insecurity among the non-Bodos in the BTC area who, curiously, are a majority compared to the ethnic Bodos. On October 28, 2001, fourteen non-Bodo organisations set November 10 as the deadline for the Centre to drop the proposal for the creation of a territorial council. This was ignored.
The Assam State Cabinet sub-committee on the Bodo issue, after a meeting with the BLTF leaders at Dispur on February 10, 2002, decided to recommend to the State Cabinet, the formation of the Council under the provisions of an amendment to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Following the submission of the sub-committee’s report, the State Cabinet, on February 13, 2002, formally approved the formation of Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) under a suitably modified Sixth Schedule, with specific safeguards for the rights of the non-Bodos. Health Minister Bhumidhar Barman said that the government would soon forward its recommendations to the Centre for necessary action in this context. Reacting to the Cabinet’s decision, the Sanmilita Janagosthiya Sangram Samiti (SJSS), a co-ordinating body of eighteen different non-Bodo organisations opposed to the BTC formation, threatened, on February 13, 2002, to launch a stir. The SJSS convenor, Phani Medhi, said that SJSS and its constituents feared marginalisation in the newly created Council, which would lead to ethnic violence between Bodos and non-Bodos. Meanwhile, the State government in a move to appease the BLT and other Bodo organisations agreed, on December 3, 2001, to cancel local body elections in the proposed BTC area.
In the North Cachar Hills district, the Dima Halom Daoga (DHD), suffered a setback on April 24, 2001, when its 'Home Minister' Kanta Langthasa, was arrested at Guwahati. However, the outfit continued with its insurgent activities in spite of newspaper reports, suggesting it’s readiness to engage in a negotiation process. The group’s Commander-in-Chief, Pranab Nunisa, in early October 2001, was reported to have said, “The Government of India has to acknowledge that the Dimasa problem is a political one and we also realise that the problem cannot be solved militarily.” However, on October 30, 2001, four persons including two police personnel were killed in an attack by DHD cadres in Karbi Anglong district. Subsequently, on November 3, 2001, two police personnel, including a sub-Inspector of the Assam police, were killed in an ambush by the DHD activists in Diphu sub-division of the Karbi-Anglong district. On September 3, 2001, DHD cadres abducted two officials of the Northeast Frontier Railway (NFR) from Mandaradisha station in NC Hills district. The army conducted a massive operation targeting the DHD in the month of September 2001 in the Diyungmukh, Umrangso, Garampani, Kalachand, Maibong, Mahur, Haflong and Laisong areas of the NC Hills district.
The United People’s Democratic solidarity (UPDS), a group active in Karbi Anglong and parts of Golaghat district, has also defined its conditions for talks with the government. Once on October 23, 2001 and again on December 21, 2001 the outfit’s chairman P Dilli said that the pre-conditions, among others, included:
Either the Amnesty International or any other international fact-finding Agency should probe the “killing of indigenous people.”
The government must be prepared to look for solutions outside the framework of the Indian Constitution and not restrict its efforts to find a solution within provisions of the Constitution’s Sixth Schedule or grant of maximum autonomy.
The Government should initiate political measures to incorporate the right of self-determination of the Karbi and Dimasa people in the Constitution.
military action against the group must be stopped.
The UPDS remained engaged in insurgent activities throughout the year 2001. It even announced a ‘shoot at sight’ order on any body defying its boycott of the Independence Day celebrations on August 15. It also indulged in rampant extortion activities targeting businessmen and government officials in the area. Official sources said that UPDS collected 3 to 4 per cent tax on the salaries of the State government’s employees and Rs. 10,000 to Rs.12,000 from the each businessman in the area. The group’s interference in the State Local Government Body (Panchayat) elections in the Karbi Anglong district was intense. In the pre-election period, the outfit had issued press notes asking political parties not to utilise the services of the group’s defecting members. In another move to reiterate its supremacy in the area, the UPDS announced an economic blockade in the Karbi Anglong district beginning December 20, 2001 in protest against the ‘massive destruction of the green cover in the district by alien people’. It also threatened to ‘shoot anyone transporting, importing or exporting agro and forest products’ during the period. However, the most shocking of its acts came towards the end of the year: on December 3, 2001, eight persons, including six government officials on election duty, were killed in an IED explosion by suspected UPDS terrorists at Lamelangso in Karbi Anglong district.
The year 2001 witnessed the termination of two peripheral insurgencies in the State. On September 19, the Adivasi Cobra Militant Force (ACMF) declared a unilateral ceasefire and urged the government to initiate dialogue with it. Subsequently, a delegation of the ACMF led by Xabrias Khakha and Kandu Murmu called on the Chief Minister in Guwahati on October 4, 2001. Earlier on January 8, 2001, Bhabatosh Dutta, commander-in-Chief of the Bengali Tiger Force, surrendered at Nalbari. Even though these two were only recently formed and were low on intent, their decision to relinquish violence did create examples for other fence sitting groups.
The surrendered terrorists of the ULFA (SULFA), who wreaked havoc in the State, especially during the AGP regime, seem to have been contained to an extent. This reticence has been the result of the new Government’s anti-SULFA posture as well as some internal bickering. The group suffered a setback when 13 of its members were killed in a ‘yet to be explained’ incident in Moran on July 21, 2001. Even though the initial fingers were pointed at its bete noire – the ULFA – later investigations revealed deep-rooted divisions within SULFA cadres as being responsible for the mayhem. The Moran massacre ultimately turned out to be a decisive affair that forced the SULFA to lie low for the rest of the year. The State government’s raids on the coal syndicate run by SULFA leaders in the Beltola area of capital Dispur have also led to a significant reduction in activities.
Another important issue that continues to dominate the popular as well as intellectual intercourse in Assam is the problem of illegal migrants. While, there has been unanimity regarding the seriousness of the problem among the people, irrespective of political affiliations, the suggested ways to deal with the problem remain unproductively conflicting. The previous AGP regime of Prafulla Mahanta had filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court for the repeal of the controversial IMDT Act. However, the Congress government, in its own wisdom, seems convinced about the utility of the much-maligned Act, and has filed a counter-affidavit seeking its continuation.
Islamist militancy, which has peripheral linkages with the influx of Bangladesh migrants into the State, appeared to be on the rise in 2001. In the month of March 2001 alone, 11 terrorists of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen surrendered in the State. In the later part of the year, operations resulted in the arrests of a number of Islamic terrorists. On September 23, five terrorists of the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) were arrested along with arms and ammunition in Darrang district. On October 30, two more MULTA activists were arrested at Nayeralgera in Dhubri district along with arms, ammunition and documents. On November 11, two terrorists of the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) were arrested at Balichar in Dhubri district. However, the State government seemed to have paid much less attention to these developments. Its decision to ignore the Home Ministry’s October 2001 directive to put madrassas in the region under observations for Islamic terrorists can at best be interpreted as a policy that typically seeks to maintain a communal vote bank for the Congress regime. While such a move placated certain quarters, it certainly contains seeds of danger for the future of the State.
The other worrying factor that has become typical of all conflict zones in the Northeast, is the nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, media and the terrorists. In the first week of November 2001, Lakshman Brahma alias Nakhra Raja, a NDFB ‘lieutenant’, who was earlier arrested at Vellore in Tamilnadu, revealed that bureaucrats in the Assam government had been providing shelter to NDFB cadres. Earlier, on July 5, army personnel had arrested a hard-core ULFA terrorist of the Nalbari district from the official residence of the Additional SP (Security) of North Lakhimpur district. On December 15, the office premises of the Assamese weekly ‘Saptahik Janasatta’ were sealed in Masarhat in Jorhat district following the arrest of Gautam Neog, a ULFA terrorist. Later the arrested extremist confessed that the ULFA had funded the weekly.
The year 2001 witnessed some rethinking on part of the new State government on counter-terrorism strategy. On July 22, the Chief Minister talked about a two-pronged strategy that aimed at
i. Ensuring that the extremist outfits cannot recruit any more youth to their ranks; and
ii. Employing suitable mediators to persuade the extremist leaders to come over for talks.
Soon after its installation, the Tarun Gogoi government had contemplated the option of assigning to the State police a primacy over the army in counter-insurgency operations. River police patrols and patrols in the Char(riverine) areas have been strengthened. However, in the absence of a well thought out strategy, these announcements have only resulted in reinvigorated demands for the induction of more companies of security forces in the State.
It is noteworthy that civil society in Asaam has started showing some signs of revival in terms of carving out a role for itself in the resolution of the long-standing conflict. In December 2001, the Assam Xatra Mahasabha, a Vaishnavite religious body, offered its services to act as a negotiator between the Government and the ULFA. The State Chief Minister on January 23, 2002, said that the Mahasabha could be entrusted with the task of being an intermediary in peace negotiations with the ULFA, clarifying however, that ultimately the dialogue would have to be between the ULFA and the Union government, given that the demands of the former can only be decided upon by the latter. On the flip side, on April 14, 2001 in the State, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) had identified six Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), including the Manab Adhikar Sangram Samiti (MASS), North East Co-ordination Committee on Human Rights (NECHR) and North East Indigenous Tribal Peoples’ Forum (NEITPF), for maintaining links with the terrorist groups. The State government was directed not to release any funds to the NGOs without proper 'physical verification' of the utilisation of such allocations.
The Union Government provided an indication of its seriousness in bringing peace to the region by creating a separate portfolio for Northeastern Affairs. The utility of this move is still to be demonstrated on the ground.