In spite of the continuing cease-fire between the Government and the militant outfits, Nagaland continues to witness factional violence, which is an indication of the deepened factional schism between militant outfits and the intransigent nature of the insurgency in the State.
Unabated factional clashes between the two warring factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) indicate that the cease-fire agreements signed between the Union Government separately with the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN in 1997, and the Khaplang faction of the NSCN-K in 2001 are being violated at will. Worse, efforts to end the abiding and violent confrontation have had no visible impact on the warring factions.
The May 19, 2006-killing of the NSCN-K ‘Education Kilonser’ (minister), Ngampan Konyak, by the rival NSCN-IM at Mon provoked the NSCN-K to launch a violent campaign codenamed, “Operation Blueland”, under which it had stepped up violent attacks against the IM group. On the other side, the IM faction also alerted its armed cadres to reinforce their dominance in different parts of the State. As rebel factions, both claiming to represent the wishes and aspirations of the Nagas, build up their manpower and resources for future mutual carnage, the common people in remote and interior locales, are increasingly worried.
Although the ceasefires with the Union Government still hold formally, escalating factional violence, large-scale extortion and intimidation put a question mark on the very arrangement that supposedly prohibits the movement of armed cadres, armed violence, intimidation and disturbance to peace that are, in fact, endemic. According to the cease-fire agreements, the cadres of each faction are to remain confined to their respective designated camps, but the rule is flouted more often than it is followed. Indeed, the truce has been exploited by militant groups to consolidate and expand. Since the NSCN-IM entered into a formal cease-fire in 1997, it has reportedly raised its cadre strength from 3,000 to 5,000 and nearly doubled its weapon holdings.
The State Government, often described as soft on the militants – especially the NSCN-IM – tends to surrender to their caprice. Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio, while presenting the State Budget in the Legislative Assembly in capital Kohima on March 20, 2006, stated: “It is not possible for any Government to prevent this (extortion) completely.”
2006 has already seen 36 incident of factional clashes, (till August 21) in which at least 35 militants have been killed (19 of the NSCN-IM, 12 of the NSCN-K and two of the Naga National Council (NNC), and two unidentified). There is no available record of the numbers of injured.
Among the major incidents of violence in 2006 are:
January 8: Three militants of the NSCN-IM and the rival NSCN-K are killed in internecine clashes at the Nokyan village in Mon district.
February 9: Two NSCN-K cadres, including the outfit’s Angami region chairman Neisa Angami alias AKD and his bodyguard, are killed by rival NSCN-IM militants at Rusoma village near Kohima.
April 6: Two cadres, one each of the NSCN-IM and NNC, are killed in an internecine clash at Porba village in the Phek district.
April 15: In a factional clash, two NSCN-IM cadres and one from the NSCN-K are killed at Hongphoi village in the Mon district.
May 6: Two NSCN-K militants are killed while three others sustained injuries in a pre-dawn attack by the NSCN-IM at Old Phek village in the Phek district.
May 16: Two NSCN-IM cadres are killed while an unspecified number of NSCN-K cadres are wounded in a factional clash at Athibung in the Peren district.
May 19: NSCN-IM killed the NSCN-K ‘Education Kilonser’ (minister), Ngampan Konyak, at Mon.
May 27: NSCN-K killed two rival NSCN-IM cadres and injured two others in an encounter at a place near Longleng in the Tuensang district.
The eight year-old cease-fire, beginning August 1997, has led to a significant reduction in insurgency-related fatalities in Nagaland. Between 1992 and 1997, 1,338 persons had been killed in the conflict, averaging 223 per year. Between 1998 and 2004, a further 595 persons have been killed, bringing the average down to 85 per year, still a disturbing number in view of the ‘cease fire’ that is now in place. During 2005, 40 fatalities were reported from the State. The fatalities in the post-cease fire period have overwhelming been the result of turf wars between the NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K. However, the reduced fatalities fail to reflect the ground-level violence which persists across the State, and which affects the widest possible spectrum of the population.
In 2001, altogether 103 lost their lives, of which 25 (24.27 per cent) were civilians, two (1.94 per cent) were security force (SF) personnel and 76 (73.78 per cent) were militants. It is significant that, between 2002 and 2005 – a period during which both factions of the NSCN were party to a cease-fire - 171 persons have been killed in militancy-related violence in the State, of which 113 (66.08 per cent) were militants, 52 (30.40 per cent) were civilians and the rest 6 (3.50 per cent) were SF personnel. With rare exception, most militant deaths have been the result of factional clashes. 2004 saw at least 17 factional clashes, while 2005 witnessed 14.
Of the 40 people killed in militancy-related incidents in 2005, there were 31 (77.5 per cent) militants and the rest 9 (22.5 per cent) constituted civilians. In one of the major incidents of the year, at least 10 militants were killed and several others sustained injuries during clashes between the two rival NSCN factions in the Surohuto village of Zunheboto district on March 2005.
The free run of the militants does impact upon the lives of the civilians. On November 8, 2005, Hesso Mao, former Director General of Police of Nagaland, was shot dead by suspected NSCN-K militants at his residence in the capital Kohima. Mao reportedly was served with an extortion demand, which he refused to comply with.
On October 2, SF personnel belonging to the Assam Rifles seized a huge cache of explosives, including 800 detonators, 710 gelatine sticks and six bundles of cordex, each 10 metres long, from Dimapur railway station and arrested one person in this connection. While, on the other hand, on March 19, 2005, the Chief Minister, Neiphiu Rio, told the State Legislative Assembly that three Nagaland Police deserters have joined the NSCN-IM at the outfit’s headquarter along with arms and ammunition.
Following is a sampling of the major incidents of militant violence in 2005:
February 25: Two NSCN-IM cadres are killed in an attack by the rival NSCN-K faction at one of the outfit’s camps in the Athibung area of Peren district.
March 24: At least 10 militants are killed and several others sustain injuries during clashes between the two rival NSCN factions in the Surohuto village of Zunheboto district.
March 27: The NSCN-IM attacks a camp of the rival Khaplang faction in the Zunheboto district. Two militants, one each belonging to both the outfits, are reported to have died in the clash.
March 29: The NSCN-IM kills four cadres of the NSCN-K during an internecine clash at Yakor village in the Tuensang district.
September 10: Two NSCN-IM cadres are killed in an internecine clash with the rival NSCN-K at Athibung town in the Peren district.
October 5: Two NSCN-IM militants are killed in a gun-battle with cadres of the rival NSCN-K at Lapha Lampongbasti in the Mon district.
On September 21, 2001 emerging from negotiations in Amsterdam, the Government of India’s chief interlocutor, K. Padmanabhaiah, and NSCN-IM General Secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah, declared a two-year time frame for the ‘solution’ of the Naga imbroglio. Very few actually believed such an assertion, although it raised some hopes in Nagaland and outside, of an end to the long-standing insurgency. About five years after that declaration, and after numerous rounds of subsequent parleys between both the sides in India and abroad, Nagaland still stands at the crossroads, waiting for peace.
Difficulties became apparent on July 31, 2005, with the NSCN-IM’s demand that the cease-fire extension be limited to six months, rather than the usual one-year period. Then, on November 5, IM leader R.H. Raising declared: "There is no point in operating a cease-fire and holding talks without any solution in sight." This statement came less than a month after the October 11, 2005, negotiations in Bangkok, where Muivah had stated, "We are very happy to have the talks with the Indian representatives because both sides are now more serious about all the issues." On November 7, other sympathetic organizations, including the Naga Hoho, the Naga Mothers Association and the Naga Students’ Federation put their weight behind the NSCN-IM’s position that the talks served no purpose unless they were seen to be leading up to a peaceful solution, creating some consternation in the concerned circles. Finally, on December 19, Muivah issued a veiled threat of the resumption of a bush war in case a tangible solution was not found by January 31, 2006.
The ‘threat’ to withdraw from the peace process needs to be seen in the context of the failure of the NSCN-IM leadership to make any sort of progress towards its final goal, the integration of the Naga-inhabited areas. On December 15, Muivah, in fact summed up his frustration in the following words. "We Nagas have extended our hand of friendship and India is putting conditions before accepting it. Is this wise? Can we keep coming back again and again, demanding friendship from India? Do Nagas have no honour?" Muivah claimed further that there has been no progress ‘from the Indian side’ over the last six months of the cease-fire.
There is a pattern to these threats, issued periodically by the NSCN-IM since 1997. These have been used either to keep its arch rival, the Khaplang faction, out of the negotiation process in spite of several demands to broad-base the process; or to wriggle out of difficult positions after the Government has indicated the possibility of a solution short of the IM demand of an integrated Naga territory. Threats have also been used to keep its support base intact, to ensure that the Nagas do not come to view the group as a weak organization, susceptible to the Government’s pressure.
The fact remains that, in spite of Muivah’s six-month stay in India between January and July 2005 and the three rounds of dialogue [July 29-30, October 10-11 and December 16-17] that followed, very little has been achieved beyond the usual rhetorical assertions. States like Manipur and Assam remain opposed to any dismemberment of their territory to please the NSCN-IM. Union Minister and mediator Oscar Fernandes’ October 18 assertion that the NSCN-IM was ready for an interim solution was rebuffed by the outfit.
It would be simplistic to conclude that the Naga peace process, as it stands now, is in the reverse gear. However, the forward movement that was expected is absent. New Delhi has reason to be happy that the NSCN-IM has not really pushed its key demand: that of a sovereign Naga homeland. But, the Government negotiators could not get the NSCN-IM to budge from the next best option that the group thinks is actually feasible - the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast with the existing State of Nagaland to constitute a single politico-administrative unit. It is the logjam over integration demand that stalled the forward movement of the negotiation process.
The Government remains caught in a bind and shied away from telling the NSCN-IM leadership that their demand for integration of the Naga-inhabited areas in the region could not be conceded. New Delhi is aware of the mood of both the State Governments and the people in the States of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh - they have made it clear they will not part with any stretch of their territory to appease the Nagas. Obviously, the Government of India cannot attempt to resolve one nagging problem only to open up several new fronts in the already turbulent Northeast.