South Asia Terrorism Portal
Renewed Commitment S. Binodkumar Singh Research Associate; Institute for Conflict Management
On February 15, 2018, 20 Islamic State (IS, formerly, Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, also Daesh) terrorisms were killed in air and ground attacks conducted by the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in Pacheragam, Kot, Heska Mina and Rawodat Districts of Nangarhar Province.
On February 13, 2018, 43 Taliban terrorists were killed and another 20 were injured in clashes with ANDSF in the Nish District of Kandahar Province.
On February 12, 2018, 20 IS terrorists were killed in air and ground attacks conducted by ANDSF in Rodat, Hasaka Mina and Achin Districts of Nangarhar Province.
On February 11, 2018, 11 Taliban terrorists, including a ‘local commander’ identified as Mawlavi Mir Wali, were killed and another five were injured during the Pamir-18 Operations conducted by ANDSF in Darqad District of Takhar Province.
On February 7, 2018, 10 IS terrorists were killed in air-strikes conducted by B-52 Bombers of the United States (US) in the Sar Dara area of Darzab District in Jowzjan Province.
On February 6, 2018, 28 IS terrorists were killed in an air-strike conducted by the US Forces in the Sarud area of Darzab District in Faryab Province.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 1,562 terrorists have already been killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2018 (data till February 18, 2018). 10,798 terrorists were killed in 2017 and 11,469 in 2016.
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which began systematically documenting civilian casualties on January 1, 2009, in its Annual Report released on February 15, 2018, documented a total of 10,453 civilian casualties (3,438 deaths and 7,015 injured) in 2017 as against 11,418 civilian casualties (3,498 civilians deaths and 7,920 injured) in 2016. Although the figure represents a decrease of nine per cent compared with 2016, the report highlights the high number of casualties caused by suicide bombings and other attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The combined use of suicide bombings and non-suicide IEDs caused 4,151 civilian casualties (1,229 deaths and 2,922 injured) comprising 40 per cent of all civilian casualties in 2017.
According to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)’s 36th Quarterly Report released on July 30, 2017, between January 1, 2017 and May 8, 2017, there were 2,531 ANDSF service members killed in action and an additional 4,238 wounded in action. However, the Quarterly Reports of SIGAR subsequently released on October 30, 2017, and January 30, 2018, did not provide ANDSF casualty figures, and so there is no data available for the rest of 2017. The US Department of Defense (DoD) instructed SIGAR not to publish data on "fundamental metrics of ANDSF performance as casualties, attrition, and most capability assessments" in its reports. It similarly "instructed SIGAR not to release to the public data on the number of Districts, and the population living in them, controlled or influenced by the Afghan government or by the insurgents, or contested by both." SIGAR had consistently reported ANDSF casualties since January 2015, when ANDSF took over operational control. According to SIGAR, 6,785 ANDSF members were killed between January 1 and November 12, 2016 as against 5,000 ANDSF fatalities recorded during the same period in 2015 (no data is available for the remaining period of 2015 and 2016).
Disturbingly, on November 19, 2017, lawmakers raised concerns over the reluctance of young people to join ANDSF and asserted that this was rooted in Government’s failure to address the problems facing soldiers. According to lawmakers, not paying salaries on time, no days off, the lack of equipment, and threats by insurgents against families of soldiers, were some of the reasons preventing youth from joining ANDSF. Taliban pressure is taking a serious toll, with officials in some Provinces reporting recruitment down by as much as 50 per cent. Admitting a partial drop in recruitment, General Mohammed Ibrahim, the Commander of the Afghan Army’s National Recruitment Center in Kabul, stated on November 18, 2017, “In the first six months of this year (2017), we recruited 13,000 personnel, but we are planning to recruit 25,000 in the second six months. We do face challenges in recruiting enough personnel, I cannot hide that.” The Force had recruited 37,000 men in 2016 and 42,000 in 2015. Taliban pressure includes fines on families of soldiers, physical punishment of soldiers who return home, and even confiscation of land and homes.
More distressingly, insurgent control of Afghanistan has slowly increased. SIGAR in its 38th Quarterly Report released on January 30, 2018, revealed that, as of October 2017, 57 per cent of the country’s 407 Districts were under Afghan Government control or influence, 30 per cent remain contested, and 13 per cent were under insurgent control or influence. In November 2015, 72 per cent were under Afghan Government control or influence, 21 per cent remain contested, and only seven per cent were under insurgent control or influence. Meanwhile, the Global Terrorism Index 2017 which was released on November 15, 2017, ranked Afghanistan the second worst country, out of 163, in terms of terrorism in the world. The Index put Iraq at number one and Afghanistan at number two, followed by Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan and Yemen – in that order.
Another profoundly alarming trend in Afghanistan was the revelation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on November 15, 2017, in its Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017, that the cultivation and production of opium in Afghanistan had increased by 87 per cent compared to 2016. According to the latest figures released by UNODC, in addition to an 87 per cent jump to a record level of 9,000 metric tonnes in 2017, the area under opium poppy cultivation also increased to a record 328,000 hectares in 2017, up 63 per cent compared to 201,000 hectares in 2016. The number of Provinces affected by cultivation also increased accordingly from 21 to 24. The record 2017 levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates are likely to further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. According to Afghan and Western officials, the drug trade profits the Taliban, constituting at least 60 per cent of their income.
Afghanistan’s principal problem, however, remains Pakistan. Exposing Islamabad’s role, on December 17, 2017, the US Department of Defense, in its report to the US Congress, observed,
Similarly, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) Chief Mohammad Masoum Stanikzai noted, on January 28, 2018, that Afghanistan’s war was complicated and that insurgent groups were backed by foreign countries, especially Pakistan. Further, President Ashraf Ghani, in an address to the nation on February 2, 2018, declared, “Pakistan is the center of the Taliban. We are waiting for movement. Word and process are the words on paper; the Afghan nation wants clear practical action.”
Presently, according to a survey entitled ‘Peace Stalemate and Solutions’ conducted in six Provinces including Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Balkh and Kunduz, by the Center for Strategic and Regional Studies (CSRS), most Afghans see an Afghan-led peace process as the only solution. The survey result released on December 2, 2017, revealed that 90.2 per cent of the respondents believe that an Afghan-lead peace process can bring peace the country. Amid ambiguity in the peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban, on December 25, 2017, the High Peace Council (HPC) opened a two-day conference of religious scholars in Kabul in an effort to pave solid grounds for peace with the insurgents. The HPC invited more than 700 religious scholars from across the country. At the end of the conference, on December 26, 2017, a number of religious scholars suggested that President Ashraf Ghani should consider allowing the Taliban to open a political office in Kabul.
To pave the ground for official talks between the two sides on January 14, 2018, Afghan Government representatives held the third round of unofficial talks with five Taliban members in Turkey. Humayun Jarir, a representative of the Afghan Government in the talks, disclosed that the Taliban members represented the Quetta Shura, Haqqani network and other factions of the Taliban. Meanwhile, Mawlawi Abdul Rauf, the Taliban leader who headed the peace talks delegation in Turkey, told Tolo News on January 15, 2018, “We represent the overall Taliban of the Islamic Emirate except some of individuals who are not willing to opt for intra-Afghan peace talks and who want to talk through Americans. I want to say that we represent the Taliban in this meeting and this is the third peace talks meeting here in Turkey. It is a fundamental meeting.” The first and second rounds of Government-Taliban negotiations were held in Turkey in 2017.
Crucially, following the announcement of US President Donald Trump’s new “South Asia strategy” on August 22, 2017, the number of airstrikes against insurgents has increased significantly. According to the US Air Force figures, 4,300 bombs have been dropped by US troops in Afghanistan in 2017, targeting Taliban and other terrorist groups in various parts of the country. The number of airstrikes in 2017 was twice the cumulative strikes carried out over the preceding two years – 2015 and 2016. Further, as part of the US Administration's broader efforts to disrupt terrorist fundraising, on February 8, 2018, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions against three individuals, Rahman Zeb Faqir Muhammad, Hizb Ullah Astam Khan and Dilawar Khan Nadir Khan, for allegedly having connections with Pakistan-based terror outfits operating in Afghanistan. In 2015, Hizb Ullah Astam Khan was involved in sending shipments of improvised explosive device (IED) chemicals from Pakistan to Afghanistan to terror groups, including Taliban and Jamaat ud Dawa al-Quran. In mid-2014, Rahman Zeb Faqir Muhammad was involved in operations of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Afghanistan. In 2013, Dilawar Khan Nadir Khan provided financial and material support to LeT and the Taliban.
Under pressure from a stepped-up Trump administration military campaign, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid released a 10-page letter in several languages, on February 14, 2018, declaring: “If you want peaceful dialogue with the Afghans specifically, and with the world generally, then make your president and the war-mongering congressmen and Pentagon officials understand this reality and compel them to adopt a rational policy towards Afghanistan.” The new letter by the Taliban group has been issued almost a month after President Trump rejected the possibility of early talks with the Taliban, following a series of deadly attacks in Kabul and other parts of the country.
On January 29, 2018, Trump stated,
Significantly, on January 14, 2018, a 15-member delegation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held talks with the Afghan Government leadership, where they reportedly discussed a wide range of issues, including security and ongoing developments on the political front. Meanwhile, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg observed, on February 13, 2018, “At least twenty-eight allies and partners are increasing their troop contributions to our training mission in Afghanistan. We are aiming to have close to 16,000 Personnel there this year, up from around 13,000 last year.” Further, on February 15, 2018, Stoltenberg asserted that the Taliban had to understand that they will never win on the battlefield and urged them to come to the negotiating table and agree to a political solution.
After the withdrawal of an overwhelming proportion of NATO Forces by end 2014, Afghan Forces have been reeling under escalating Taliban attacks. It is difficult, at this early stage, to assess whether Trump’s Afghan strategy will actually achieve its promised ends. Nevertheless, Washington’s renewed commitment to stay the course, add additional resources, take the fight to the enemy, and end Pakistan’s double game, represent a qualitative shift of potentially great importance. If implemented aggressively, adjusted as necessary and sustained over time, this strategy improves probabilities of an acceptable resolution to Afghanistan’s unending troubles.
M.A. Athul Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
For the second consecutive year, Mizoram did not record a single insurgency-related fatality in 2017. Significantly, the last such fatality in the State was recorded on March 28, 2015, when three Policemen were killed in an ambush by cadres of the Democratic faction of Hmar People’s Convention (HPC-D) near Zokhawthiang in Aizawl District. The last civilian fatality was recorded on October 15, 2014, when the bodies of two non-tribals were found near the Tuikhurhlu area in Aizawl District. The last militant fatality was recorded on February 26, 2008, when a Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) militant was killed in a factional clash in the State capital Aizawl.
The last insurgency-linked incident was reported from the State on April 16, 2017, when three Bru Democratic Front of Mizoram (BDFM) cadres were arrested from Lawngtlai District. These cadres were reportedly trying to enter Mizoram from Bangladesh. Two AK-47 rifles and 39 rounds of ammunition were also recovered from the arrested militants.
Since 1992 (SATP data is available since then), the State has recorded 49 insurgency-related fatalities, including 15 civilians, 25 Security Force (SF) personnel and nine militants (data till February 18, 2018), an average of less than two fatalities per year, underlining the enduring peace in the State. Significantly, Mizoram witnessed two decades of insurgency between 1966 and 1986. It ended with an accord signed on June 30, 1986, between the Government of India, Mizoram Government and the rebel Mizo National Front (MNF).
Thereafter, two major Mizoram-based insurgent groups – the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) and Hmar People's Convention-Democracy (HPC-D) have become dormant. Peace talks between the Mizoram Government and BNLF began on September 7, 2001. At least 12 rounds of talks were held between 2001 and 2005. Finally, the Mizoram Government and BNLF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on April 26, 2005. Subsequently, on July 25, 2005, at least 195 BNLF cadres, including the outfit's ‘president’ Surjya Moni Reang and ‘general secretary’ Solomon Prophul Ushoy, surrendered. No BNLF related incident have been reported from Mizoram thereafter.
Meanwhile, five rounds of official level talks have been held between HPC-D and the Mizoram Government since August 10, 2016. On February 5, 2018, Mizoram Home Minister R. Lalzirliana disclosed that the State Government would hold the next round of talks with HPC-D on March 5, 2018, though he cautioned that they were not sure whether both sides would be able to settle all issues within the month of March. The main issues involve greater autonomy to the Sinlung Hill Development Council (SHDC), as well as financial aspects, including proposals for rehabilitation and resettlement of HPC-D militants, after they lay down arms in the event of an agreement being signed. SHDC was created in accordance with the 1994 Accord signed between the Mizoram Government and HPC, the parent outfit of HPC-D.
BDFM, which operates out the jungles in Bangladesh, had a presence in the Mamit District of Mizoram, in the Mizoram-Bangladesh-Tripura border area. It operated in connivance with the Tripura-based National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). State Home Minister Lalzirliana had informed the State Assembly on November 17, 2014, that at least 10 alleged militants involved in the abduction of at least 31 people in nine separate incidents within Mizoram over the preceding four years (2010 and 2014) were arrested. Seven of the 10 arrestees belonged to BDFM, while the remaining three belonged to two other outfits: two to NLFT and one to the Assam-based United Democratic Liberation Front of Barak Valley (UDLFBV). There are no further reports available relating to BDFM activities in Mizoram or elsewhere, thereafter.
Despite the enduring peace, the process of Bru resettlement has still not been completed. About 30,000 Brus (5,000 families) had fled from Mizoram to Tripura in the wake of ethnic clashes with the dominant Mizos in September 1997. In 2016, the number of refugees was revised to 32,857, drawn from 5,413 families. According to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), as on March 31, 2017, about 1,622 Bru families (approximately 8,573 persons) have been repatriated and resettled in Mizoram.
On January 29, 2018, the Mizoram Government stated that they will start repatriating Brus from six relief camps in neighboring Tripura from the first week of March 2018. GoI has released INR 79 million as the first installment for repatriation expenditure; the State Government estimated that over INR 123 million would be required for the purpose. Earlier the proposed repatriation date had been set for November 2017. However, on October 6, 2017, the Mizoram Government declared that it was not ready to begin repatriation and postponed the process to December 2017. The date was again rescheduled to March 2018. The reason for the postponement, as cited by a State Government official, was that UMHA had not released funds meant for repatriation.
Meanwhile, according to February 5, 2018, report, the Mizoram Bru Displaced People Forum (MBDPF), the apex body of Bru refugees lodged in six relief camps in Tripura, had submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister and Union Home Minister claiming that refugees had not received cash assistance from the Government since July 2017. The MBDPF also raised other demands, including allotment of a minimum of five acres of land to each family after repatriation to Mizoram, and a ‘resettlement package’ of INR 1.5 million per family.
Additional worries came to the fore during 2017, when the influx of Myanmarese nationals begun in May, in the aftermath of the violence in neighbouring Myanmar (which borders Mizoram). On May 19, 2017, nearly 300 Myanmarese nationals crossed over from Myanmar after clashes between Arakan Army (AA) cadres and the Myanmar Army. The refugees were, however, sent back to Myanmar two days later, on May 21, 2017.
Providing further details on the influx, State Home Minister Lalzirliana disclosed, on November 15, 2017, that 400 people from the Arakan region in Myanmar had entered Mizoram after further clashes between AA and the Myanmar Army. By the first week of December, the number had swelled to 1,600. The refugees were staying in four villages identified as Laitlang, Dumzautlang, Zochachhuah and Hmawngbuchhua of Lawngtlai District. Further, on December 7, 2017, Arun T, Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Lawngtlai District stated that registration of 1,600 Myanmarese nationals had already taken place. More recently, on January 22, 2018, Superintendent of Police (SP, Lawngtlai District) Lalsanglura stated that over 1,400 of these Myanmarese nationals have refused to return to Myanmar, even though the fighting between Myanmar Army and AA had died down.
The spillover of the violence in Myanmar resulted in two deaths in Mizoram. An Indian national, identified as Jitua Tongchongya, was wounded in a mine explosion in the Lawngtlai District of Mizoram near pillar number two along the Indo-Myanmar border on January 15, 2018. Later on January 18, 2018, another individual, identified as Khusoma, was wounded in a landmine explosion in the same District and later died on January 19. Police suspects that both blasts were caused by landmines that were possibly planted in the jungle by Myanmar Army personnel or AA insurgents. Later on January 25, 2018, it was reported that the Bomb Disposal Squad of Assam Rifles had been deployed along the border after the two incidents. On February 15, 2018, the Bomb Disposal Squad defused a landmine which had allegedly been planted by AA.
In a further complication, according to statistics provided by the Mizoram Excise and Narcotics department, 60 people died of drug abuse in 2017 (till December 14) as against 59 people in 2016. The number of such deaths stood at 27 in 2015 and 38 in 2014. Between 1984 and 2017 (till December 14), at least 1,462 people have died of drug abuse in the State. According to the Mizoram Excise & Narcotics Department Commissioner, between 2010 and 2017 (till July 21), at least 3,318 people have been arrested under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act.
Although Mizoram has been at peace since 1986, it continues to grapple with problems related to Hmars and Brus. Rampant drug abuse is adding to the State’s worries. In the meantime, developments through 2017 and in the early days of the current year along the border with Myanmar raise new concerns. Minor irritants have been allowed to linger on for much too long, and it is time for the State and Union Governments demonstrate a greater sense of urgency in addressing these.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia February 12-18, 2018
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
Terrorists/Insurgents
Total
INDIA
Jammu and Kashmir
Meghalaya
Left-Wing Extremism
Chhattisgarh
Odisha
INDIA (Total)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
FATA
Punjab
PAKISTAN (Total)
UNAMA releases report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2017: The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on February 15 released its report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan during the year 2017. A total of 10,453 civilian casualties included 3,438 people killed and 7,015 injured. The khaama, February 6, 2018.
Taliban will not win on the battle field, says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on February 15 that Taliban have to understand that they will never win on the battlefield and urged them to come to the negotiating table and agree to a political solution. “Our Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan is a condition-based mission and the aim is to continue to strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces, enabling them to secure their own country and to be fully responsible, as they now are, for security in Afghanistan. And we have seen a lot of progress” he stated. Pajhwok, February 16, 2018.
LeT, JeM, and HM have joined hands for terror attacks in J&K, says Northern Command ‘chief’ Lieutenant General Devraj Anbu: Northern Command chief Lieutenant General Devraj Anbu on February 14 said that three major militant groups including Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have joined hands whether it’s Kashmir Valley or Jammu and are jumping from one outfit to another to carry out terror attacks. “HM, LeT and JeM are hand in glove with each other after coming together in the later part of the last year. Though there is no differentiation as the terrorists keep jumping from one outfit to other and as far as we are concerned any one picking up the arms against the State is a terrorist and will be dealt with accordingly,” he said. Lieutenant General Anbu said coming together of HM, LeT and JeM is a matter of concern for the security agencies but would be taken care of. Daily Excelsior, February 15, 2018.
Pakistan-supported terror outfits continued to attack India, says US Intelligence Chief: In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the United States’ (US) Director of National Intelligence Daniel Ray Coats warned that Pakistan-backed terror organisations would continue their terror operations against India that further escalate the tensions between India and Pakistan “Militant groups supported by Islamabad [Pakistan] would continue to take advantage of their safe haven in Pakistan to plan and conduct attacks against and in India and Afghanistan, including US interests,” said Coats. Coats’ statement came a day after Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorists attacked the Indian Army camp in Sunjuwan in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The Tribune, February 13, 2018.
UMHA proposed courses for law and Police officials to tackle cybercrime efficiently, says report: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) has proposed the programmes for judicial officers, prosecutors and Police officers to learn skills required tackle cybercrime incidents efficiently. This is a first of its kind of upgrade to the quality of cybercrime investigations. Times of India, February 16, 2018.
CPN-UML Chairman Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli sworn in as new Prime Minister: Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) Chairman Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli who guided the CPN-UML-led left alliance to a historic win in the parliamentary and provincial polls was sworn in as new Prime Minister at Office of President on February 15. Oli, who was unanimously elected the parliamentary party leader by his party on February 14, was administered the oath of office by President Bidya Devi Bhandari shortly after his party, backed by another left party, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-Maoist Centre), staked claim to the helm of the Government citing the support of majority lawmakers in Parliament. Oli is Nepal's 38th Prime Minister. My Republica, February 16, 2018.
Government decides to abolish Gilgit-Baltistan Council, says report: Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi has decided to abolish the Gilgit-Baltistan Council (GBC) and transfer its powers to the GB Legislative Assembly. An unnamed official of the GBC said that a high-level meeting was held in Prime Minister House, Islamabad, on February 15 where Abbasi directed the authorities concerned to abolish the Gilgit-Baltistan council within a month. The powers currently exercised by the GB Council would be shifted to the elected GB Legislative Assembly. Dawn, February 16, 2018.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
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