South Asia Terrorism Portal
Bastar: Shrinking 'Heartland' Deepak Kumar Nayak Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
On November 25, 2016, a Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadre was killed during an encounter with the Security Forces (SFs) in a forested area under the Kondagaon Police Station in Kondagaon District. The body of the slain Maoist along with one rifle and one 12 bore gun was recovered from the encounter site.
On November 22, 2016, a Sub-Inspector (SI) of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was killed and a head constable was injured in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in the forest areas of Sukma District. The incident took place when two personnel of a patrolling team of the CRPF's 74th Battalion, which was out on an area domination operation between Burkapal Police camp and Chintalnar, inadvertently stepped on a pressure IED concealed beneath the ground by cadres of the CPI-Maoist.
In a similar incident, two CRPF personnel sustained injuries when they stepped on a pressure IED on November 21, 2016, half a kilometre away from the CRPF camp at Narsapuram in Sukma District.
On November 19, 2016, at least five Maoists were killed by the SFs in the jungles of Tuspal and Becha Kilam villages in the Abujhmaad area under the Chhote Dongar Police Station of Narayanpur District. Commenting on the operation, Superintendent of Police (SP) Abhishek Meena, disclosed, “The counter-insurgency operation led to the decimation of Military Company No. six of CPI-Maoist and killing of at least half a dozen Naxals [Left Wing Extremists (LWEs)]. However, we could recover bodies of five Maoists along with their weapons.” SFs recovered three 12 bore guns, one .315 rifle, and articles of daily use from the spot.
On November 16, 2016, six Maoists were killed in an encounter with SFs near the Bugum-Perma forest in Dantewada District. Special Director General of Police, Anti-Naxal Operations, D.M. Awasthi disclosed that the bodies of six slain Maoists were recovered, while many more may have been injured or even killed. “Of these six, three are men, all of them wore uniform and the weapons recovered include three .303 rifles, two 12 bore guns and one single barrel weapon among other items.’’ Two Naxals were arrested from the encounter site.
Incidentally, these three Districts – Sukma, Dantewada and Narayanpur – along with Bijapur, Bastar, Kanker and Kondagaon, form the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, which continues to remain the nucleus of Maoist-violence in Chhattisgarh in particular, and the country at large. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the Bastar Division has already recorded 190 fatalities in Maoist-related violence in 2016 (data till November 27). These include 124 Maoists, 33 civilians and 33 SF personnel. Total Maoist–linked fatalities in the State stand at 195 – 125 Maoists, 35 civilians and an equal number of SFs. Thus, of a total of 195 Maoist-linked fatalities in the State in 2016, the Bastar Division alone accounts for 190, i.e. 97.43 per cent.
Unsurprisingly, all 16 major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) that have occurred in Chhattisgarh during the current year were reported from Bastar Division. In these incidents, three civilians, 10 SF personnel and 56 Maoists have been killed.
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2016
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Spread over a geographical area over 40,000 square kilometres, the Bastar Division is afflicted by low standard human development indicators, as well as widespread absence and worsening access to healthcare, education, drinking water, sanitation and food, creating an alarming humanitarian situation. These conditions clearly suit the Maoists. According to the “District Development and Diversity Index Report for India and Major States,” a joint survey conducted by the US-India Policy Institute (USIPI) and the Centre for Research and Debates in Development Policy (CRDDP), New Delhi, released on January 29, 2015, among the 599 Districts across India covered by the survey, all the Districts of the Bastar Division were ranked towards the bottom . The seven Districts of the Bastar Division were also among the 35 worst Naxal-affected Districts identified by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) across the country.
An overview of fatalities over the last seven years shows that the Division has recorded 1,106 Maoist-linked fatalities, including 438 Maoist, 426 SF personnel and 242 civilians. Thus, of a total of 1,167 fatalities, including 456 Maoists, 432 SF personnel and 279 civilians, recorded in the State, since 2010, the Bastar Division alone accounted for 94.77 per cent. It is pertinent to recall here that Chhattisgarh alone contributes to 32.91 per cent of the total of Maoist-linked fatalities across the country over the corresponding period.
Current trends do, however, indicate that SFs have made considerable gains against the Maoists in the Division and in the State at large. According to the SATP database, between 2010 and 2015, a total of 314 Maoists were killed in the Division, as against 393 SF personnel, a ratio of 1:1.25 in favour of the rebels. Remarkable SF consolidation in the current year is evident in the ratio of 1:3.75 against the Maoists. Significantly, the Maoists are facing a challenging time across India, and particularly, the onslaught against them in their final bastion, in Bastar has registered dramatic gains. The marginal increase in civilian fatalities is, however, a cause for concern, as Maoists target alleged ‘police informers’, collaborators, and those who have left their ranks with increasing frequency in desperate measures to stem the fragmentation of their organisation.
Moreover, sustained SF pressure has resulted in at least 821 Maoist surrenders in the Bastar Division. Overall surrenders in the State stand at 944 since the beginning of 2016. Hitting further at the Maoist cadre strength, SFs in the Bastar Division have arrested 330 rebels in the current year. The number of arrests in Chhattisgarh stands at 343.
Further weakening Maoist capacities, the Police have seized 45 automatic weapons, among a large cache of other weapons and explosives, from the Naxals during various anti-Naxal operations during the past two years, in the restive Bastar region, Inspector General of Police (IGP, Bastar), S.R.P. Kalluri disclosed on November 14, 2016. Significantly, according to the UMHA, during the same period 1,971 arms were recovered from Left Wing Extremists from various parts of the country (data till October 31, 2016).
The recent battering of the Maoists in their own ‘capital’ is, without doubt, extraordinary, but the Maoists continue to experiment with new plans to find spaces for survival. The State Intelligence Bureau (SIB), on October 26, 2016, disclosed that CPI-Maoist is reportedly working on a plan to create a new ‘guerrilla zone’ along the Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra-Madhya Pradesh (MP) border region as an “extension” of its current stronghold in Bastar. The proposed new ‘guerrilla zone’, will be nestled in the Satpura Hills range, spreading over eight Districts in the three States of Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and MP. It is said that this will facilitate the expansion of the CPI-Maoist base north and east of Bastar. According to the SIB, of the eight Districts, Maoists have already established bases in Rajnandgaon in Chhattisgarh, Balaghat in MP and Gadchiroli in Maharashtra. The extremists are on their way to expand to other border Districts of Kawardha and Mungeli in Chhattisgarh, Mandla and Dindori in MP and Gondia in Maharashtra. The new ‘guerrilla zone’ would function under the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), the most powerful entity within the CPI-Maoist operational setup.
Despite reverses inflicted on them, to believe that the Maoists are a spent force and will be ready for talks would be ill-advised. On October 23, 2016, the Chhattisgarh Government announced that they were open for dialogue with the Naxals. Reiterating Chief Minister Raman Singh’s statement on peace talk with Naxals if they shun violence and arms, State’s Home Minister Ramsewak Paikra, stated, “Government’s doors for talks with Naxals are always open provided that the dialogue must be under the purview of democracy and constitution.” The Maoists have not even acknowledged these overtures.
The battle against the Maoists in the Bastar Division is far from over. Despite mounting SF successes in this region, the Division continues to be the core of the surviving Maoist movement, and it is here that the decisive battle against the rebels would be won or lost.
Assam: Troubles in Tinsukia Ajit Kumar Singh Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
Three Army personnel were killed and another four were injured when militants ambushed an Army convoy at Pengaree near Digboi in Tinsukia District on November 19, 2016. According to Defence Public Relations Officer (PRO) Lieutenant Colonel Suneet Newton, “They (the militants) had planted an improvised explosive device (IED) on the road. When the IED exploded, the convoy stopped. Then the militants fired indiscriminately.” On November 20, the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I) claimed that this was a “joint operation” carried out by the outfit and four members of the Manipur-based Coordination Committee (CorCom) - Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF, the political wing of the People's Liberation Army, PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), and progressive faction of PREPAK (PREPAK-Pro). The other two members of the CorCom, a conglomerate of six Manipur Valley-based militant outfits are the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL).
On November 16, 2016, a civilian was killed while two others, including one Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) trooper, were critically injured in an attack by suspected ULFA-I militants on a commercial vehicle belonging to the Pengaree Tea Estate in Tinsukia District. The vehicle was fired upon when it was passing through a thick forested area alongside the Pengaree-Digboi road under the Digboi Police Station. Tinsukia Superintendent of Police Mugdhajyoti Dev Mahanta stated, “Though it is yet to be confirmed, the attack could have been carried out by the banned United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent).”
On August 12, 2016, suspected militants of the Independent faction of the ULFA-I killed two persons, identified as Kishori Shah and Rajen Shah, and injured eight, at Bahbon village in the Philobari area of Tinsukia District. Police said that a group of five militants came on foot and opened fire at the two households at around 7.30 pm, killing two persons and injuring the others.
According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 11 persons, including three civilians, three Security Force (SF) personnel and five militants have been killed in the Tinsukia District in the current year (data till November 25, 2016). During the corresponding period of 2015, the District had recorded just two fatalities (both civilians), and there were no further fatalities in 2015. There was only one fatality (civilian) through 2014. In terms of total insurgency-linked fatalities, the 2016 total of 11 is the highest since 2008, when such fatalities stood at 26. The three SF fatalities are the highest recorded in this category since 2006, when 10 SF personnel were killed. There were no fatalities among SFs in the District in 2014 and 2015. Similarly, with an aberration of 2013 which recorded four civilian fatalities, the three fatalities recorded in this category are highest recorded since 2008, when nine civilians were killed.
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While there was only one incident of killing through 2015, the number of such incidents has already risen to five in the current year. Two of these five incidents were major (involving three or more fatalities), including the November 19 incident. In another major incident this year, SFs killed four militants in Na Kathalguri village under Bordumsa Police Station in Tinsukia District on February 16, 2016. The District had previously recorded its last major incident on April 19, 2013, when an Inspector of a commando unit of Assam Police, identified as Lohit Sonowal, two militants of ULFA-I (then known as ULFA-ATF, Anti Talk Faction) and a civilian, were killed in an encounter at Kordoiguri village in Tinsukia District.
There were nine incidents of explosion in 2016 as against just two recorded through 2015. This is the highest number of such incidents recorded in the District since 2007, when there were such 13. In 2016, SFs recovered arms and ammunition on at least 13 occasions from militants active in the District. There were eight such incidents through 2015.
Tinsukia District covers an area of 3,790 square kilometers in the eastern part of Assam. It shares borders with five Districts of Arunachal Pradesh (East Siang, Lower Dibang Valley, Lohit Changlang, and Tirap) and two Districts of Assam (Dibrugarh and Dhemaji). All these Districts are insurgency infested. Two of these – Changlang and Tirap – share borders with Myanmar, which has for long served as a safe haven for major insurgent groups operating in the Northeastern region. Adjoined to the areas with thick rain forests, such as Dibru-Saikhowa, Naamsang and other hilly forest areas of Arunachal Pradesh, Tinsukia provides a safe sanctuary to insurgents and its strategic location is used by the militants as a transit route. Significantly, according to an August 22, 2016, report, an arrested militant of the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), Phoren Ramwaone, revealed during interrogations that Tinsukia District was being used as a transit route and corridor by NSCN-IM militants, from their Headquarters at Hebron in Dimapur (Nagaland) to the Lohit District of Arunachal Pradesh, over the past several years.
Tinsukia District has recorded at least 297 fatalities, including 147 civilians, 120 militants and 30 SF personnel, since March 2000, according to the SATP database (when the database commenced recording insurgency-related incidents in the region). At the peak of insurgency, the District recorded 74 fatalities (50 civilians and 24 militants) in 2007. Though fatalities in the District have reduced considerably since then, the recent upsurge in insurgent activities is worrisome.
Since the insurgents have suffered losses across the Northeast over the last several years, they are trying to regain footholds in areas which they once dominated. Because of its strategic location, Tinsukia is one among these. To recover some operational presence here, as SAIR has noted earlier , the major terror outfits operating in region have reportedly joined hands. Significantly, claiming responsibility for the November 19, 2016, incident, ‘Captain’ Arunudoy Asom of ULFA-I in an e-mail statement claimed that ’Operation Barak’ was carried out jointly by cadres of the ULFA [ULFA-I] and four CorCom members.
Perturbed by increasing insurgency-related incidents in Tinsukia, Assam Chief Minister Sarbananda Sonowal held a review meeting on September 14, 2016, and urged the Police and other security agencies to work in tandem to prevent such violence. He also announced that the Police would be provided modern equipment. Similarly, during a meeting of the Unified Command chaired by Vinod Kumar Pipersenia, Chief Secretary to the Assam Government, in the aftermath of the November 19 attack, it was decided to step up operations in the Upper Assam Districts, particularly the Districts bordering Arunachal Pradesh (Tinsukia lies in this region) and Nagaland, as the rebels have reportedly been sneaking into the Assam through those States.
The relatively deteriorating security scenario in Tinsukia reflects the overall security situation in Assam. The State has recorded increases in insurgency-linked fatalities – 82 in 2016 so far as, against 58 during the corresponding period of 2015. It is crucial, consequently, that the State and Union Governments work together with other bordering States, to contain the insurgent groups operating in the region. Implementation of an effective border management policy is another critical need, as most of the infrastructure of terrorism used by these groups is located in areas which lie beyond Indian territory.
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
Terrorists/Insurgents
BANGLADESH
Islamist Terrorism
INDIA
Jammu and Kashmir
Meghalaya
Left-Wing Extremism
Chhattisgarh
Jharkhand
Kerala
Total (INDIA)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
FATA
KP
Punjab
Sindh
Total (PAKISTAN)