South Asia Terrorism Portal
Troubled Normalcy S. Binodkumar Singh Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On January 13, 2013, Sri Lanka Minister of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms, Chandrasiri Gajadeera, disclosed that, of 11,500 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres who were arrested or surrendered at the end of the war in 2009, and who were sent to rehabilitation camps thereafter, a total of 11,375 cadres had been ‘reintegrated’ into society. This left just 125 ‘un-integrated; LTTE cadres in the camps or under detention.
Earlier, on September 25, 2012, the Menik Farm camp in Vavuniya District, one of the largest camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), had been shut down. A total of 1,186 people from 361 families – the last of a group of more than 280,000 civilians displaced during the war in the north – left the camp for their original places of residence in the Mullaitivu District. According to Security Forces’ Commander Boniface Perera, the competent authority for IDPs in the northern region, “There will be no more IDPs in the country from today.”
Colombo has evidently met its commitments towards resettlement of civilians and rehabilitation and reintegration of the LTTE cadres.
Meanwhile, the Government continued its developmental program in the regions once devastated by insurgency. According to a June 17, 2012, report the Government allocated LKR 46,211 million for infrastructure development in Vavuniya, Mannar and Mullaitivu Districts. Under the development programme LKR 14,479 million has been allocated for Vavuniya District, LKR 11,584 million for Mannar District and LKR 20,148 million for Mullaitivu District. Further, the President Mahinda Rajapaksa on August 17, 2012, claimed that progress of academic activities and development projects in the conflict-affected Wanni region was at a higher level, as compared to other Districts of the country.
These claims have been validated by international agencies. On August 3, 2012, after a three-day visit to the country, the Director of Operations of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), John Ging, had observed, “The scale of what Sri Lanka has accomplished over the past three years, the pace of resettlement and the development of infrastructure, is remarkable and very clearly visible."
There have, however, been voices of contention on the domestic front. The leader of the main opposition United National Party (UNP), Ranil Wickremasinghe claimed, in March 2012, that the Government had not provided adequate relief to the resettled IDPs in the North. The main Tamil party, Tamil National Alliance (TNA), moreover, contested the claims of total resettlement. TNA Member of Parliament M. A. Sumanthiran alleged that the Government, in order to please the international community, had closed down the Menik Farm IDP camp and dropped the remaining refugees who lived there in a forest at Seeniyamotai: “And now these people weep while looking at their hereditary lands, which are less than one kilometre away. Now what they have is just barren land. Does resettling them mean dumping them on empty lands?”
Nevertheless, in an attempt to instill confidence in Tamil civilians, the Government, according to an October 2012 report, recruited 2,000 former LTTE combatants from the Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi Districts to the country's Civil Security Department (CSD). The Government has stated that it will recruit 5,000 former LTTE combatants to the CSD.
In the meantime, provincial council elections have been conducted in the Eastern, Sabaragamuwa and North Central Provinces, on September 8, 2012. Expectedly, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa won all three provincial councils.
On July 11, 2012, President Mahinda Rajapaksa had committed to elections for the Northern Provincial Council in ‘just over a year’, stating, “We want to hold elections in September 2013. We are working towards it [the elections] in a systematic manner.”
Nevertheless, Sri Lanka through year 2012, continued to face the daunting challenge of fashioning a reconciliation between the Sinhalese majority and the alienated Tamil minority. Indeed, the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC), which was set up by the Sri Lankan Parliament on November 23, 2011, to formulate a political solution to the country's ethnic issue, failed to deliver. The principal reason for this was the TNA’s refusal to join the PSC, despite the Government’s insistence that this was the best forum to resolve the ethnic issue. The TNA consequently, continues to remain outside the PSC, and all talks with the TNA have stalled since January 15, 2012. The TNA opposes the PSC claiming that it is another "time-buying tactic" of the Government. TNA leader R. Sampanthan told India's then External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna in New Delhi (India) in October 2012, "If the PSC has the intention of thrashing out a solution and has an agenda for (arriving at a political solution), we are ready to consider it. But, we are not ready to get cheated again."
Adding to the complexities was the continued skepticism over the implementation of the much-hyped Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC, appointed on May 15, 2010) report submitted on November 15, 2011. Despite Lalith Weeratunga, Secretary to President Mahinda Rajapaksa, claiming on June 13, 2012, that the task force appointed to oversee the implementation of the recommendations made by the LLRC was making progress, the task force had, on his own admission, selected only 33 recommendations out of the 135 listed by the LLRC, for implementation at the national level. Moreover, Weeratunga stated that only some of the shortlisted recommendations would be implemented in 2012, while others were scheduled for 2013, after the finalization of the annual budget, since 2012 budget allocations had already been finalized before the release of the LLRC report.
There are problems, of course, arising out of a strident politics of Sinhala triumphalism and President Rajapaksa’s growing authoritarianism, his personalized vendettas against critics and opponents, and the progressive undermining of institutional governance. These proclivities have undermined the natural legitimacy that would have accrued to the regime as a result of the no doubt extraordinary record of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war torn regions of the country.
The Government’s international legitimacy also continues to be compromised by a vicious, motivated and one-sided campaign of disinformation on the question of human rights violations during the terminal phases of the conflict with the LTTE. Various European interlocutors have threatened Sri Lanka with international prosecution for ‘war crimes’ and ‘human rights violations’, and have managed to orchestrate a feckless intervention by the United States resulting in a gratuitous resolution in the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) on March 22, 2012, demanding the ‘expeditious implementation’ of the LLRC’s recommendations. If anything, the prejudiced international discourse on the subject has resulted in greater polarization in the ethnic politics of Sri Lanka, and contributed to competitive intransigence on the part, both, of the state and of the principal Tamil formations.
Another source of disquiet for Sri Lanka through 2012 were reports of the activities of cadres and sympathizers of the LTTE, within and outside Sri Lanka. According to an October 28, 2012, Australian report, former LTTE combatants wanted for crimes in Sri Lanka were being funded to migrate to Australia as asylum seekers by the former members of the group already domiciled in Australia. Another report, datelined December 20, 2012, noted that Sri Lanka’s Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) had arrested 43 people, since November 27, 2012, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Summing up the situation on January 18, 2013, Construction, Engineering Services Housing and Common Amenities Minister Wimal Weerawansa observed, "Though the LTTE was defeated, we still have external and internal enemies. All Sri Lankans should recognize these enemies and support the government to defeat these enemies." Earlier, on October 28, 2012, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had said,
Though there is no impending threat to Sri Lanka’s security, the real challenge since the comprehensive defeat of the LTTE has been to secure a substantive resolution of the political confrontation between the majority Sinhala and the minority Tamil community. Unless such a reconciliation is engineered, Sri Lankan politics will remain fraught with the extreme ethnic tensions that, four decades ago, gave rise to protracted terrorism in the country. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka’s political leadership – across the ethnic divide – has failed to demonstrate the political sagacity necessary for the settlement of long-standing disputes over the structural inequities of the prevailing order in the country.
Manipur: Violent Surge Veronica Khangchian Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On December 28, 2012, United National Liberation Front (UNLF) militants killed two Tangkhul tribal hunters at Kongkan village under the Chassad Police Station of Ukhrul District. A day later, owning responsibility for the killing, the UNLF sought forgiveness from the tribe, claiming that it was a case of ‘mistaken identity’, as its armed cadres mistook the hunters for Assam Rifles (AR) troopers.
Further, on November 23, 2012, on the eve of its 38th foundation day, UNLF militants had simultaneously triggered two improvised explosive devices (IEDs), planted at a distance of about 20 feet by the roadside, injuring two Army personnel and a sniffer dog at Konthoujam along the Imphal-Jiribam highway in Imphal West District. UNLF again claimed responsibility for the ambush and reiterated its demand of holding a ‘plebiscite’ to resolve the armed conflict in Manipur. Refusing to hold talks with the Government, it declared that the conflict could only be resolved with restoration of Manipur’s ‘sovereignty’.
Earlier, on September 28, 2012, at least two AR personnel and a civilian were killed, while another five AR personnel and two civilians sustained injuries, in serial bomb blasts triggered by UNLF cadres at Kwatha village in Chandel District near the Indo-Myanmar border. While claiming responsibility for the ambush, the UNLF disclosed that the operation was carried out by its ‘mobile unit’ operating in Chandel District.
After a dramatic decline in insurgent violence over the preceding two years, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, total fatalities, at 110 in 2012, increased by 69.23 per cent over the 65 recorded in 2011. While civilian fatalities remained at the same number, fatalities among the Security Forces (SFs) increased by two, from 10 in 2011 to 12 in 2012. There was a two-and-a-half fold increase in militant fatalities, from 30 in 2011 to 73 in 2012.
Years
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total*
63 incidents of killing were recorded in 2012, as compared to 33 in 2011. The number of major incidents (each involving three or more killings) in 2012 stood at eight, as against three in 2011. Similarly, 107 incidents of explosion were recorded in 2012, resulting in nine killed and 90 injured, as compared to just 39 bomb blasts in 2011, with eight fatalities and 52 injured.
46 abductions were recorded in 30 registered incidents, as compared to 32 abductions in 14 reported incidents in 2011 [a large proportion of abductions go unreported]. In one such incident, suspected Kuki National Army (KNA) militants abducted four employees of the State Electricity Department, from Tengnoupal in Chandel District, on December 18, 2012. The militants allegedly made a demand of INR 500,000, though no further reports are available in the open source.
Extortion continues to remain a major concern in the State, with SATP recording at least 35 incidents in 2012. 40 incidents of extortion were recorded during the preceding year. According to a January 18, 2012, report, a probe carried out by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) discovered that the UNLF alone earned around INR 1.5 billion between 2007 and 2010 through extortion.
Incidents of violence were reported from all the nine Districts of Manipur, both in 2011 and 2012.
Meanwhile, the CorCom, which comprises of seven Valley-based militant groups, including the UNLF, remained the most violent formation in the State. Of 12 SFs fatalities in 2012, nine were attributed to CorCom. Further, of 107 blasts in 2012, the formation was responsible for 33. It had escalated violence particularly during the Assembly Elections of January 2012. In once such incident, on January 26, 2012, two days before elections and on the occasion of India’s Republic Day, at least four SF personnel and three militants were killed in two separate clashes in Manipur, at Aishi village in Ukhrul District and at Taretlok, bordering Thoubal and Ukhrul District.
Manipur also saw an escalation of violence by Naga groupings engaged in factional clashes in the Tamenglong District. The year recorded at least 10 clashes between the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) – at times a combined force of ZUF and Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (NSCN-K)] – and the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), which resulted in 25 fatalities, as compared to seven fatalities in four such reported incidents in 2011. The worst fratricidal clash between ZUF and NSCN-IM cadres erupted in the evening of September 25, 2012, and continued late into the night of September 26, leaving six persons dead. The incident occurred inside a forest near Wairangba village in the interior Tamenglong District.
The PLA’s close links with the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI-Maoist) further accentuated apprehensions. According to a December 18, 2012, report, a supplementary charge sheet filed by the NIA in the CPI-Maoist-PLA nexus case revealed that the CPI-Maoist had been procuring Chinese arms and communication equipment from PLA via Myanmar, and routing it to Kolkata (West Bengal) through Guwahati (Assam) between 2006 and 2011. The charge-sheet has been filed against Maoist leaders, Pallab Borborah alias Profull (‘chief coordinator’ for ‘expanding’ Maoist activities and ‘forging ties’ with the Northeastern insurgent group); Indranil Chanda alias Raj (described by NIA as the Maoists' chief in Assam); and PLA's ‘external affairs chief’ Asem Ibotombi Singh alias Angou, who were arrested in 2012 from Assam, Kolkata and Odisha, respectively. The accused are alleged to have played a significant role in the training of Maoists by PLA in Jharkhand's Saranda Forest, apart from facilitating procurement of arms and communication equipment.
Security agencies believe that the CPI-Maoist is making rapid inroads into the North-East, immediately to gain access to the arms market in the neighbouring Yunan Province of China, as well as in Myanmar and the Southeast Asian countries.
Amidst rising fratricidal violence, the SFs also intensified their operations. The year registered a total of 33 encounters between SFs and militants, in which 48 militants were killed (the remaining 25 militant fatalities were the result of factional clashes) as compared to just 10 encounters in 2011, in which 23 militants were eliminated (another seven were killed in factional clashes). In a major encounter, on June 30, 2012, at least four cadres belonging to the Lungam group of KNA, including its ‘commander-in-chief’ Lunkhongam, were killed at Phaikok village, located close to Myanmar border, in Ukhrul District.
The State recorded 609 arrests of insurgent cadres in 2012, as compared to 546 in 2011. The arrested militants in 2012 prominently belonged to different factions of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP, 117), People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK, 87), People's Liberation Army (PLA 62), UNLF (43), the Progressive faction of PREPAK (PREPAK-Pro, 35), NSCN-IM (28), United Peoples’ Party of Kangleipak (UPPK, 19), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL, 11) and NSCN-K (4). In one significant arrest outside the State, on November 1, 2012, Ningthoujam Romen Singh aliasRocky (27), the 'Commander-in-Chief', who is also the 'Finance Secretary', of the Military Council faction of KCP (KCP-MC) was arrested from Sarai Kale Khan in New Delhi, for his alleged involvement in unlawful activities and several cases of murder, abduction and extortion.
The intensified pressure of SFs resulted in the surrender of at least 303 militants in 2012, as against 271 in 2011. In the most significant surrender of the year, 114 militants belonging to different outfits surrendered, along with arms, before Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh, at Mantripukhri in Imphal East District, on September 26, 2012. The 114 cadres who lay down their arms in the ceremony included 16 from the Kazi Umar faction of the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF); 18 from UNLF; 17 each from KYKL and PREPAK; 12 from the Kuki National Liberation Front (KNLF); nine from various factions of KCP; 13 from PLA; six from UPPK; and three from the United Naga People's Council (UNPC). Among those who surrendered, five were women.
On the political front, the State remained a major player in negotiations for a ‘solution’ to the ‘Naga issue’. On October 10, 2012, Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde, hinting that a ‘solution’ to the ‘Naga issue’ was likely before March 2013, when Assembly polls in Nagaland are due to be held, disclosed, "I have been talking to the Chief Ministers of both Arunachal and Manipur, and we are trying to reach a consensus on this.” The Kukis in Manipur opposed the talks, threatening to renew their demand for statehood, even as the Meiteis vehemently rejected the talks, claiming that settlement proposals would disturb the ‘unity of Manipur or its territorial integrity’. On October 19, 2012, Thangkhosei Haokip, the newly re-elected President of Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), the apex traditional institution of the Kukis in the State, asserted, “Justice has to be delivered to the Kukis before any settlement is arrived at between the NSCN-IM and the GoI (Government of India)”. He then asserted that any further denial of justice to the Kukis was bound to compel the apex Kuki body to review its fundamental principles of non-communal, peaceful co-existence and justice for all.
Further, on November 2, 2012, the Kuki National Organization (KNO), an umbrella organization of 16 Kuki militant groups, threatened to resume armed struggle and to ‘secede from Manipur’ if the Centre did not begin talks with them. Meanwhile, the Suspension of Operations (SoO) pact signed between the two umbrella bodies of KNO and UPF, the Central Government and the State Government, in August 2005, which was extended by three months on August 31, 2012, expired on November 22, 2012. According to a January 2, 2013, report, Joint Secretary (North-East) Shambhu Singh was to finalize the modalities with the two Kuki militant formations to initiate formal peace talks at the earliest.
On the other hand, the United Committee Manipur (UCM), the apex body of the Meiteis, on October 18, 2012, categorically stated that it would demand ‘pre-merger status’ of Manipur if the ongoing political dialogue between NSCN-IM and GoI disturbed the unity or territorial integrity of Manipur in any way. UCM argues that Manipur was ‘forcibly merged’ with India on 15 October, 1949.
On October 26, 2012, the United Naga Council (UNC), the main apex body of the Nagas, asserted that a peaceful parting of the Nagas in Manipur and the Meiteis, as good neighbours, was the only way to avert a catastrophic situation that would arise out of the prolonged 'forced union of the two'.
Conspicuously, the growing ‘unity’ of valley based militant groupings, turf war-related rivalries among Naga militant groupings, and ethnic tensions between the three principle ethnic groups – Kuki, Naga and Meitei – continued to undermine peace efforts in the State, notwithstanding the earlier tainted recovery. Unsurprisingly, on December 3, 2012, the State Government extended the Disturbed Areas Act in Manipur for another year, till November 30, 2013. It remains to be seen whether New Delhi and the State Government are able to counter the insurgents effectively, and extract the State from the endless violence that has now continuously plagued it for 48 years.
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
Terrorists/Insurgents
Total
INDIA
Assam
Meghalaya
Nagaland
Left-wing Extremism
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
Total (INDIA)
PAKISTAN
Balochistan
FATA
KP
Sindh
Total (PAKISTAN)
Six Maoists killed in Maharashtra: Security Forces killed six Communist Party of India-Maoists (CPI-Maoist), including three senior cadres, in the forests near Jimulgatta in Aheri tehsil (revenue unit) of Gadchiroli District in the morning of January 20 and recovered all their bodies. The encounter between at least 12 Maoists armed with self-loading rifles, 303s and other crude arms and the elite C-60 commandos equipped with sophisticated arms lasted for half-an-hour. Among the senior cadres killed were Muneshwar Lakda alias Shankar (divisional committee member of Aheri Local Guerilla Squad), Chandrayya Kodape alias Vinod ('commander' of Aheri dalam), Vinod's wife Geeta Usendi ('deputy commander' of a platoon), Mohan Kowase alias Tulsi ('deputy commander' of Aheri dalam). All the Maoists were in uniform. Times of India, January 21, 2013.
US to pursue case against six accused in 26/11: The US on January 18 aid that it would continue its hunt for Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) chief Ilyas Kashmiri, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) handler Sajid Mir and four others involved in the November 26, 2008 (26/11), Mumbai (Maharashtra) terrorist attacks that killed 166 people, including six Americans. US prosecutors have named the six individuals - Ilyas Kashmiri, Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed alias Pasha, Sajid Mir, Abu Qahafa, Mazhar Iqbal, and Major Iqbal - as involved in the conspiracy and declared them fugitive. Kashmiri, according to media reports, died in US drone attacks, the rest are said to be in Pakistan. Indian Express, January 19, 2013.
RBI alerts banks on FICN circulation on Indo-Nepal border: Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has alerted all the braches of banks in north Bihar adjoining Indo-Nepal border to take serious precaution in transactions of currencies at their counters as this area has been marked as sensitive for circulation of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN). The RBI circulated a letter directing the banks to take extra precaution in transaction of notes of denominations of INR 100, 500 and 1000 and install machines to check fake notes. Times of India, January 16, 2013.
Four States to raise anti-Naxal forces on lines of Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) has cleared a proposal whereby four States - Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Bihar - affected the most by the Naxal [Left Wing Extremists (LWE)] violence will raise specialized forces trained in guerrilla warfare and equipped with modern weaponry to take on the extremists. To be raised on the lines of Andhra Pradesh Police's Greyhounds special force that managed to neutralise the Naxalites in the State, the project has the backing of the Centre as LWEs now possess modern weapons and communication equipments to take on even well-equipped central paramilitary forces. The Hindu, January 16, 2013.
Maoists will take up arms, says CPN-Maoist-Baidya Chairman Mohan Baidya: The Mohan Baidya led Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist-Baidya) on January 16 warned that the party will take up arms if the state power cannot assure the rights of the people. Speaking at a press meet following the conclusion of the party's seventh general convention, he said, "Give rights to the people. It the people get their rights, who will take up arms? Nobody. Why is the state conspiring instead of assuring people their rights in accordance with previous agreements and assurances? If rights are not given to people, it is sure that arms will be taken up." He further said, "We will launch the people's revolt or people´s war as and when circumstances compel us because no one takes up arms just on the basis of the whim or interests of certain leaders. Arms will be taken up by any other force also when the situation so demands, even if we ourselves drop the idea." Republica, January 17, 2013.
23 civilians and 10 SFs among 37 persons killed during the week in FATA: At least five persons, including two women and two children, were killed and nine others were injured when helicopter gunships shelled targets in Mir Ali tehsil (revenue unit) of North Waziristan Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on January 17.
Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militants attacked the house of a Frontier Corps (FC) trooper Shabir in Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency and killed his father Abdul Jalil and four brothers on January 15.
Seven soldiers and four militants were killed in fighting between banned Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) and Security Forces in Bara tehsil on January 15.
13 bullet-riddled bodies of local people belonging to three families were also found in Alamgudar and Dogra areas of Bara populated by Sepah Afridi tribe.
Three khasadar (tribal police) personnel, captured by militants during a clash in Kohikhel area of Shalobar, were beheaded on January 14. Daily Times; Dawn; The News; Tribune; Central Asia Online; The Nation; The Frontier Post; Pakistan Today; Pakistan Observer, January 15-21, 2013.
23 civilians and three SFs among 28 persons killed during the week in Sindh: AAt least six persons were killed in separate incidents in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, on January 18.
At least eight persons, including Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA), were killed in separate incidents in Karachi on January 17.
At least five persons were killed in separate incidents in Karachi on January 16.
At least five persons were killed in separate incidents in Karachi on January 15. Daily Times; Dawn; The News; Tribune; Central Asia Online; The Nation; The Frontier Post; Pakistan Today; Pakistan Observer, January 15-21, 2013.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal
Recommend South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) To A Friend