South Asia Terrorism Portal
Tripura: The Politics of Ethnic Terror Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
On August 20, 2002, terrorists belonging to a faction of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), killed 20 personnel of the paramilitary Tripura State Rifles (TSR) in a daylight ambush at Hirapur, in the West Tripura district [Map] of this troubled State in India's Northeast. Clearly acting on inside information, the militants had attacked 25 Security Force (SF) personnel traveling in a single truck, on their way to a hospital where they were taking three of their number for treatment. A shortage of vehicles had resulted in the truck traveling unescorted, against established norms in the area. The Hirapur ambush was among the worst ever attacks on the security forces in Tripura, but terrorists, particularly belonging the NLFT and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), have long wreaked havoc in the State, and more than 129 persons, including 71 civilians and 30 SF personnel, have already lost their lives to terrorist violence this year. In addition to the August 20 incident, the NLFT alone has been responsible for at least five major attacks - among a large number of smaller strikes - in 2002.
The persistent violence in Tripura occurs within the context of a deepening nexus between major political parties and terrorist groups. Terrorist groups in the State also have strong connections with other insurgent organisations in the region. These groups, often aided by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), exploit the 865 kilometre-long porous border with Bangladesh to establish their hideouts beyond Indian territory. The State has emerged as a major corridor for pushing arms into the Northeast, with groups such as the NLFT procuring arms and ammunition from South East Asian countries such as Thailand and Singapore, and depositing them at Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh, one of the major illegal arms centres in the region. Terrorists groups in the State are deeply criminalised and have transformed abduction into a lucrative industry. The State, which has barely 8.29 per cent of the Northeast's population, accounts for over 70 per cent of all abductions in the region. The State Government has long argued its inability to contain the militancy in the State without greater support from the Centre, and Chief Minister Manik Sarkar has repeatedly blamed the withdrawal of the Army from counter-insurgency operations for the worsening situation. Three Army battalions had been engaged in counter-insurgency operations when they were abruptly withdrawn from the State in the wake of the Kargil war in Jammu & Kashmir in 1999. Worse, the total force guarding the extended and troubled border with Bangladesh has also been halved. Sarkar disclosed that nine of the 18 BSF battalions patrolling this border had been withdrawn by the Centre, making it much easier for the militants to strike and flee into their safe havens across the border. The Chief Minister is also reported to have provided the Union Government with a list of 51 terrorist camps in Bangladesh, including 32 of the Biswamohan Debbarma faction of the NLFT, three of the NLFT Nayanbasi Jamatia faction, and 16 of the ATTF, spread across the Sylhet, Habigunj and Laulavi Bazar districts and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is known to have been deeply supportive of these groups during its last tenure, and acted in collusion with the ISI to help set up these camps and facilitate insurgent activities against India. The ruling Left Front government at Tripura apprehends that the insurgency in the State will escalate following Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's recent visit to Dhaka. It is significant that the Hirapur massacre was executed by the Nayanbasi Jamatia faction of the NLFT, and this was confirmed by Jamatia himself in Fax messages to newspapers and an interview to the BBC from Srimangal in Bangladesh. Chief Minister Manik Sarkar says, "We have been repeatedly urging the Central Government to take up the matter of Tripura militant groups having camps in Bangladesh with Dhaka." Safe havens in Bangladesh and the ISI's machinations apart, the real obstacle to peace in the State lies in the deep vested interests that are now entrenched both within the political scenario and in the operations of militant groups. The unyielding polarisation between the tribal population and the non-tribals has been exacerbated, at once, by electoral politics and by extremist atrocities. There is now incontrovertible evidence of a deepening nexus between major political parties and terrorist groups. The NLFT is said to have close links with the Congress (I), while the ATTF is aligned with the ruling Left Front. There are clear indications that terrorism in the State - with its disproportionate emphasis on criminal activities such as abduction and extortion - is substantially supported and sustained by political patronage. Insurgency in the State of Tripura has its roots in demographics, and this is the only State in India's Northeast that has been transformed, in recent history, from a predominantly tribal to a predominantly non-tribal State. Tribal terrorist groups specifically target the non-tribal population, whom they call 'settler refugees'. Insurgent violence in the State dates back to the first Communist Party of India (CPI) led movement in 1948-51, but assumed its current contours of tribal vs. non-tribal violence through a succession of militant organisations and movements since the creation of the now defunct Tripur Sena in the early 1970s. With State Assembly elections due again in February 2003, the volatile ethnic politics, and its exploitation by short-sighted political groupings in Tripura, can be expected to create a crescendo of violence in the State. It is hardly unexpected if this is encouraged further by the interventions of unfriendly neighbours in the South Asian region.