South Asia Terrorism Portal
Strategic Realignment Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
In a country notorious for its inability to 'think strategically', the rudiments of a strategic perspective are beginning to fall into place under the extraordinary threats and pressures generated by the enveloping shadow of terrorism in South Asia. India has, for the whole of its independent existence, remained committed to a policy of importunate conciliation towards Pakistan - a country that has, at the same time, exhausted the preponderance of the Indian security perspectives and resources, and that has adopted a posture of unrelenting hostility towards India. This hostility has been expressed in four conventional wars (including the Kargil War of 1999) and a campaign of cross border terrorism that was initiated in Indian Punjab in the mid-1980s; that has steadily intensified in Jammu & Kashmir since 1989; and that is being gradually and systematically extended to other parts of the country as well. This hostility was extended into Afghanistan during the Taliban regime, and was particularly noticeable during the hijack of IC 814 in December 1999, and in the Pakistan-Afghan collusion with the hijackers at that time. Though too much cannot be read into the visit (as chief guest at India's 54th Republic Day celebrations) of the Iranian President, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, it is possible to identify elements of an evolving strategy for the containment of the crystallizing epicentre of Islamist extremist terrorism in Pakistan, as well as a shared interest in, and strategy for, the stabilization and development of Central Asia. India's efforts to cultivate relationships with Iran are also driven by an attempt - at this juncture essentially optimistic and in the extended long-term - to ensure India's energy security by looking for alternative and cost-effective sources of oil and natural gas supplies. President Khatami was careful to balance his present visit to India with another, just a month ago, to Pakistan; as well as to moderate his rhetoric on the more contentious aspects of the Indo-Pakistan confrontation over Kashmir. The deepening of relations with India, he emphasised, was "not aimed at any third country". Nevertheless, India and Iran have found it possible to agree that the current campaign against terrorism 'should not be based on double standards,' and have sought to work for the early finalisation of a comprehensive convention against international terrorism. It is, however, the pattern of agreements for cooperation in the 'energy, transport and trade sector' that provide an outline of the strategic architecture that is being evolved in the tentative India-Iran entente. The most significant elements of the agreements signed at Delhi on Saturday, January 25, 2003, were the prospects of joint development of new road and rail routes to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chahbahar. The Indian Border Roads Organisation is to upgrade the 200-kilometre track between Zeranj and Delaran - which links up with the Garland Road network in Afghanistan, and goes forward into the Central Asian Republics. Iran is also asking India to take up construction of the Chahbahar-Fahraj-Bam railway link. The direct consequence of these developments is that India would be able to bypass the Pakistani blockade of its westward linkages, and restore efficient connections to Afghanistan, and through these, into Central Asia - a region that has become crucial to India's perceptions of its future energy security. As West Asia - India's principle source of oil at present - edges towards destabilisation, cementing the stability of the infant Central Asian republics, which currently sit on significant resources of oil and natural gases, has become a crucial strategic objective, not only for this country, but indeed, for the US and the Western world as well. Energy stability lies at the core of the stability of the international order today, and Iran, by virtue of its location, will remain a crucial player in the structure of relationships with the Central Asian republics. At the same time, Iran and India have come to share concerns regarding the potential for renewed Pakistani mischief in Afghanistan. It is significant that India and Iran had cooperated with the Northern Alliance (NA) in Afghanistan to confront the Pakistan backed Taliban regime in that country, well before such support became 'accepted wisdom' after the events of September 11, 2001. Eventually, despite initial hesitation, the US Forces had also combined with the NA to expel the Taliban from Afghanistan. The US campaign in Afghanistan, however, failed to establish a strong and credible regime with the will and the power to extend its fiat over the whole country, and the Pashtun areas along its borders with Pakistan remain virtually ungoverned. In addition, the fundamentalist Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has consolidated its hold over the bordering provinces in Pakistan - the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan; and if even Pakistani commentators are to be believed, this has happened through the active intervention of President Musharraf's military regime. America's persistent indulgence of Pakistan's double dealing on terrorism, the regrouping of the Taliban - al Qaeda combine in Pakistan, and the ambiguity of the situation along the Pakistan-Afghan border, have once again created a situation of enormous potential destabilization; an opportunity that Pakistan, with its appalling track record, cannot be expected to ignore. India's misgivings have been exacerbated after the US recently - on Pakistan's behest - told it to 'go slow' on its developmental and diplomatic interventions in Afghanistan. Iran's relations with Pakistan, it may be recalled, soured substantially over Pakistan's support to the Taliban regime - and consequently to the atrocities that regime inflicted on Afghanistan's Shia minority. Tensions have also been high over Pakistan's treatment of, and what is widely believed to be state-tolerated terrorism against, its own Shia minority. The extent of the shift in the Iranian position can be assessed by the fact that, during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, Iran had openly and actively supported Pakistan, providing that country with arms and military spares. What has been left out of the Delhi Agreement is, perhaps, as significant as what has been included. There has been a strong interest for some time now in building a pipeline for oil and natural gas from Iran to India, either over land through Pakistan, or under sea, skirting the Pakistan coast. Iran had vigorously been pushing for the more economical overland link through Pakistan, a proposal that would have given Pakistan an estimated US $ 500 to $ 600 million annually in royalties. The prospects for an overland pipeline have now receded amidst rising concerns about the security of the pipeline - and possible misgivings in the Indian establishment of channelling a substantial and assured revenue to Pakistan, which could well end up feeding the supply lines of Pakistan's jihad against India. General Musharraf has, of course, given an assurance that Pakistan would protect the pipeline through its territory - but his competence, if not his intentions, on this count are in question after the main gas pipeline to the Punjab and the NWFP from Sui has been attacked and disrupted twice in January 2003 itself (on January 21 and 26). Iran is, of course, categorised as one of the countries along the 'axis of evil'. India, however, has reservations on this characterization and sees Iran as a potentially stable and increasingly moderate and democratising influence in the world of Islam. Significantly, at Delhi, Khatami endorsed the idea that "an Islam that relied on democracy would be sustainable." It is this possibility, an increasing convergence on strategic perceptions, and a commitment to democratic governance in Iran, that India seeks to actualise through strengthening bilateral relations. While Iran's role in West Asia remains under an international microscope, the possibility that it will eventually be replaced by Pakistan in the 'axis of evil' is not altogether remote.