The first five months of year 2006 has seen a continuation in the trend of decreasing terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). A total of 420 people have died in the year (data till May 28, 2006), including 147 civilians and 56 security force (SF) personnel.
Among the major incidents of terrorist violence in 2006 are:
May 21: Two terrorists in police uniform attack a rally of the Youth Congress at Sher-e-Kashmir Park in the capital Srinagar, killing three political activists and two police personnel, minutes before the scheduled arrival of Chief Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad. Inspector General of Police (Kashmir), K. Rajendra Kumar, is among 25 persons injured in the attack that is claimed by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Al-Mansoorian. The two terrorists are subsequently killed in an encounter.
May 1: Suspected LeT terrorists kill 22 Hindus in the mountain hamlets of Kulhand and Tharva in Doda district and 13 at Lalon Galla, a high-altitude meadow above the town of Basantgarh in the Udhampur district.
April 14: Terrorists trigger out seven grenade blasts in the capital city of Srinagar, killing five civilians and injuring 44 persons, including 14 SF personnel. A local news agency, Current News Service, reported that four terrorist groups – Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM), Al-Mansooran, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and J&K Islamic Front - claimed responsibility for these blasts.
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, announced on May 25, 2006 the formation of five Working Groups to discuss various issues relating to J&K. Addressing a press conference at the end of the two-day Roundtable Conference in Srinagar, he said that setting up of the Working Groups was the "best way to move forward and ensure that the views of different segments are incorporated." The Groups will deal with improving the Centre's relations with J&K, furthering the relations across the Line of Control (LoC), giving a boost to the State's economic development, rehabilitating the destitute families of militants and reviewing the cases of detainees and ensuring good governance. The Prime Minister also declared his Government’s readiness to talk to terrorist groups if they gave up the path of violence. "Anybody who shuns violence and gives up the path of terror, we are willing to find ways and means to interact with all such groups," he said. On the issue of alleged human right violations by the security forces, he said, "our armed force is not an armed force of occupation.... They have a proud record, though there could be some aberrations, but these aberrations cannot be allowed. There should be zero tolerance for human rights violations for all our security forces."
In retrospect, year 2005 witnessed a continuation of the secular decline in terrorist violence in J&K, a trend discernible since 2001. While the year witnessed a relatively lower level of violence, the terrorists’ capacity to strike at important targets and also maintain a threshold level of violence, however, was maintained. 2005 was also an eventful year for J&K in which the détente between India and Pakistan paved the way for reopening of the historic Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road and the Congress party was back at the helm of affairs after 30 years. It was also a year of tragedy with the devastating earthquake killing thousands of people on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC).
Jihad after the Quake
Many in South Asia had hoped that the earthquake of October 8, 2005, which killed tens of thousands of people and affected millions on both sides of the LoC would put a halt, at least momentarily, to the terrorist campaign in Jammu and Kashmir and allow for unhindered relief and rehabilitation operations. Some fantasists went so far as to see in this natural disaster a ‘window of opportunity’ for dramatic cooperation and an improvement of relations between India and Pakistan.
[The official death toll of the quake in J&K has been pegged at 1308, which includes 1206 civilians and 102 SF personnel. At least 6622 people are injured while 12 Army and 21 Border Roads Organisation personnel are still missing. While at least 40,000 people have died in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), 38,007 people have died in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan].
However, the terrorist campaign, evidently, recognizes no bounds and is not constrained by the humanitarian crisis in the wake of natural disasters. The assassination of J&K Minister of State for Education, Dr. Ghulam Nabi Lone, in the high security zone of Tulsibagh in capital Srinagar on October 18, 2005, was an indication that the Kashmir jihad will not be slowed down even by natural calamities. Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) legislator, Mohammed Yousuf Tarigami, escaped unhurt in a simultaneous assassination attempt at his house, approximately 300 yards from the Minister’s bungalow, though two SF personnel and a civilian were killed in these incidents. The assassination of Dr. Lone, reportedly carried out by the LeT, was intended to disrupt relief and rescue operations in the quake-hit Valley. It was also an attempt to bolster the ranks of the jihadis and mark their presence, especially after a significant loss of men and material in Pakistan and PoK. That terrorist groups would continue to maintain the now consistent and calibrated levels of violence is evident from the fact that, two days after the quake, 10 persons, belonging to four families, were killed by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) at Dhara and Gabbar in Rajouri district. At least 26 civilians, 18 SF personnel and 46 terrorists died in terrorist-related violence between October 8 and October 23.
On the ground in J&K, the terrorists attempted to take advantage of the earthquake relief operations along the LoC. They carried out two unsuccessful infiltration attempts immediately after the quake in order to benefit from the disorder caused by the natural disaster. Defence Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, stated, on October 16: "Militants have made about five infiltration attempts since the October 8 earthquake, including two on a single day. About 25-29 of them have been killed." With the SFs engaged in relief, rescue and rehabilitation efforts, the terrorists were scouting for soft targets and also attempting to push in as many infiltrators as possible. The timing is crucial, since winter was rapidly setting in and plans for subversion have to be in place before the mountain passes close. The quake may have rendered the terrorists’ task somewhat easier, since unconfirmed reports suggested that the porosity of the border has increased slightly, for instance in the Uri sector of Baramulla District near the LoC.
While authoritative assessments are unavailable, a fair amount of damage is reported to have occurred to some terrorist training camps in Pakistan and PoK. According to sources, camps of groups such as the JeM, LeT, Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM), HM and Al-Badr, which were located within a radius of 10 kilometers from the epicenter of the quake in Muzaffarabad, have been damaged. A wireless intercept of the TuM indicated that one of the outfit’s building near Muzaffarabad, the capital of PoK, had been destroyed and some cadres were buried under it. The Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) training centres at Balakot and Batrasi (NWFP), the JeM camp at Attock (Punjab province), Al-Badr’s at Oghi (NWFP), an LeT camp at Mansehra (NWFP) and an HM recruitment camp at Jungle-Mangal (PoK) have also been damaged.
Major General M. S. Balhara, General Officer Commanding Kilo Force in J&K, stated: "We have intercepted many messages of militants in North Kashmir and they all indicate that around 600-700 militants were killed in the quake. The control stations of Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen have been destroyed, too, across the Line of Control opposite Kupwara sector. The launching pads of militants have also been smashed by the quake." Balhara added that an LeT message intercepted at Shamshabari range revealed that the group had lost 200 cadres in one PoK camp. At a briefing by the Union Home Ministry in New Delhi on October 16, Director General of Military Operations, Lieutenant General Madan Gopal, stated that the Hizb and LeT had suffered major losses in their PoK camps. While the exact number of destroyed camps is yet to be ascertained, it is safe to assume that significant destruction would have occurred to the jehadi infrastructure since the whole city of Muzaffarabad has been flattened. Sources said that communication centres of the HM (near Muzaffarabad) and TuM were among those that suffered severe damage.
Nevertheless, the jihadis are currently regrouping with the prevalent atmosphere also offering them an opportunity to reinforce their support structures within PoK and in Pakistan, at the expense of the administration, which has come in for a great amount of flak for its delayed and ineffective response to the disaster. Groups that advocate radical Islam consider relief efforts and social aid to people who have been disregarded by the state as an important part of their strategy. According to Mohammed Shehzad, who has reported extensively from the earthquake-hit areas in Pakistan and PoK, "the civil administration was seen nowhere in Muzaffarabad. The Army was in the bulk but it was not helping the people… A number of lives could have been saved had the Army soldiers helped the civilians. But the Army took no such initiative. Its officers still wore the starched uniform and the shining shoes; puffed the imported cigars; and ate the rich meals (sic)."
The state’s acts of commission and omission have reportedly sparked off enormous hostility against the Pakistan Army and the Musharraf regime. Indeed, it is this gathering animosity that has conferred legitimacy on the jihadi presence in the day-to-day chores of rescue and relief. Jamat-ud-Daawa, the parent organisation of the LeT, is reported to have diverted a considerable part of its network towards relief efforts. Among the other Islamist groups that have contributed to quake relief are the Karachi-based Al-Rashid Trust (ART), one of the 27 groups and organisations listed by the US State Department on September 22, 2001, for their involvement in financing and supporting a network of international Islamist terrorist groups; and the charity wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The Musharraf regime’s vacillating and deficient response has led people to seek assistance from the jihadis. The JD, according to credible Pakistani reportage, has emerged as the most "effective relief agency that has built up an excellent rapport with the victims." In Muzaffarabad, JD activists, numbering around 350 and connected through wireless telephony, manage 16 ambulances, motorboats, mobile X-ray machines/operation theatres, and are feeding approximately 3,000 people daily, according to the Pakistan Media Monitor. It also has an orthopedic unit near Sangam Hotel in Muzaffarabad under the supervision of Dr. Amir Aziz, who was arrested in 2002 (subsequently released) for treating Osama bin Laden.
Democracy
Attempts to strengthen political contestation and civic participation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) received a significant boost when civic polls were held in eight phases between January 29-February 17, 2005. Elections to civic bodies were held after a gap of 27 years. Polls were successfully held for all civic bodies in the State, including the municipal corporations of the two capital cities of Srinagar and Jammu. The electoral process, which began on January 8 covered Srinagar, Baramulla, Budgam, Anantnag, Pulwama and Kupwara to elect a corporation, three councils and 30 committees - with a 33 per cent quota of all posts reserved for women.
Electoral turnouts averaged a satisfactory 45.5 per cent across the State despite terrorist groups and the over-ground separatist formations having once again given a call for a boycott of the elections, as they have been doing for over a decade in J&K. Dismissing the polls as a 'useless exercise', and "against the interests" of the people, they called for a boycott 'at every level'. Some efforts were made to enforce the boycott with violence, and terrorists killed some candidates, while several others were attacked in the run up to the polling.
Targeting the democratic ethos has been integral to the strategic orientation of terrorist groups in J&K. The Al-Mansooran, a front outfit of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), issued threats to all candidates, demanding their withdrawal from the electoral contest. The Congress candidate in Baramulla, Noor-ud-din Sherwani, was shot dead on January 17, while People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and National Conference (NC) candidates were targeted in the same area, and in Srinagar.
The unprecedented participation of the people in the civic polls has transformed elements of the situation on the ground. The then Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed declared, after the first phase, that, with the increased participation in civic polls, the myth that "everything about Kashmir was being decided in Delhi has also gone." Though it is still too early to judge the overall impact of the current electoral processes, it is certain that municipal structures would provide for a substantive system to address legitimate local grievances. The empowerment of people through their representatives at the lowest and most dispersed levels of Governance is bound to gradually change the micro-politics of terrorist violence.
Since the escalation of terrorism in 1988 and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions, terrorist groups have managed to build pockets of influence across the State and, at one point of time, had even replaced local structures of governance in some areas. The operation of local government institutions is bound to erode the support base of the extremists and, if the initial response generated is a yardstick, these elections could change the ground realities in ways that would consolidate the cumulative impact of the 2004 Parliamentary polls and the 2002 State Assembly elections. Both these earlier electoral exercises saw a significant turn out of voters in defiance of terrorist threats, and extended the spheres of non-violent political activity, even as they helped restore the integrity of civil administrative institutions in wide areas of neglect. Over time, the increasing popularity of electoral processes is also bound to impact on the over-ground separatist camp, with organisations like the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) being forced to prove their popularity through democratic means.
The small truth of these civic elections is that the youth in the Kashmir Valley, including a large number of women, have been brought to the forefront. The then Urban Development Minister, G.H. Mir, put the average age of women candidates at 35 and that of men at 30. Opportunities to be part of the developmental process and to secure gainful employment have been critical influencing factors. The decision to reserve 33 per cent seats for women has enormous potential for transformation, bringing a much larger proportion of women into the wider political process. Another significant spin-off is that a representative character would give local bodies more powers for decision-making and also augment accountability, factors sorely lacking in the violence-wracked State.
There was, however, one stark blemish on the representative character of the current elections: the names of approximately 200,000 Kashmiri Pandits (descendents of Brahmin priests) were found deleted from the electoral rolls. According to the Municipal Corporation Act, those who do not live at a particular address for more than three years are automatically deleted from the rolls, which means that virtually the entire population of Kashmiri Pandits, who were forced out of their home in 1989-90, are mechanically disenfranchised.
There was also a smooth transfer of power from the Mufti Mohammed Sayeed-led PDP coalition Government to the Ghulam Nabi Azad-led coalition on November &&, 2005. The Congress party returned to power in J&K after 30 years under a power sharing agreement with its coalition partner PDP that ruled the state for a three-year term after NC was dethroned in the 2002 Assembly elections.
Troop Withdrawal
During the India-Pakistan dialogue in New York, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in September, Pakistan identified the districts of Baramulla and Kupwara in J&K for immediate troop withdrawal by India as a gesture that, it claimed, would help build the 'impetus for peace'. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, who said progress in the peace process could only take place if there was a complete cessation of cross-border infiltration and violence, rightly dismissed the Pakistani demand.
A scrutiny of the trajectory of violence in J&K helps understand why General Pervez Musharraf is insisting on troop withdrawal specifically from these two districts, and indicates that the rationale goes beyond concern for the 'impetus for peace' or for the welfare of the people of Kashmir. Further, it goes well beyond the fact that these districts are close to the LoC. Baramulla and Kupwara have traditionally served as a gateway to terrorism in the Kashmir Valley, and have, for long, been crucial to the Jihad in Kashmir.
The issue of troop reduction has been a central part of Pakistan's long-standing demands on Kashmir and had, in the past, been projected as a pre-condition for talks with India. It is also an indication of the end-game Musharraf proposes to pursue on the Kashmir issue, comprehending a partition of the Valley under which these two districts, both with a Muslim majority of over 90 per cent, would be ceded to Pakistan.
During his sojourn in New York, Musharraf is also reported to have impressed upon the U.S Administration the need to influence India into agreeing to a troop reduction. Pakistan's efforts to engage US 'good-offices' are at least partially influenced by the fact that, in 1963, the then US administration did bring some amount of pressure on India to consider ceding the "north-west" part of the Valley to Pakistan. India cast off the idea then and has since been steadfast in rejecting any such thoughts of a further Partition, a point that the Government of India has often reiterated in the current context, with the Prime Minister himself insisting that there can be no redrawing of boundaries along religious and ethnic lines.
According to those who oversee security in the State, the prevailing situation in the two Districts, does not warrant any re-adjustment of the counter-insurgency grid, and any dilution of Forces is bound to affect the counter-insurgency grid and the security base. Pakistan-backed terrorist groups active in the Districts include the HM, which has a northern division for Kupwara-Bandipora-Baramulla; LeT, JeM, Al Umar Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen and Al Badr. Kupwara and Baramulla witness high levels of infiltration and terrorist activity, and any lowering of guard there would allow the terrorists, who have been under extraordinary pressure lately, to regroup and recover lost ground. It would also mean granting unhindered access to the Valley, especially to Srinagar, which is to the south-east of Baramulla. Being border districts adjacent to the LoC, any withdrawal of troops from Baramulla and Kupwara would undermine the internal security grid and would facilitate infiltration into the Valley. The operational advantage in these districts, vis-à-vis the execution of operations, accruing primarily due to terrain and location, lies with the terrorists. Troop withdrawal would simply cede the entire territory to the terrorists. Furthermore, the flow of actionable intelligence of terrorist movement into other Districts in J&K would also be adversely affected.
It is useful to note that approximately 34 terrorist 'commanders' were killed in the two districts between January 2003 and September 2005 (10 in Baramulla and 24 in Kupwara). While the number of civilian and SF fatalities is not as high as in some other districts of J&K [Baramulla witnessed 55 civilian and 19 SF deaths; and Kupwara: 13 civilian and 16 SF deaths this year, till September-end], the two districts serve as a gateway to the Valley. As many as 159 terrorists have been killed in Kupwara and 122 in Baramulla in the current year (the highest and second highest numbers in the State), and the two districts continue to be vital for terrorist and subversive activities. Further confirmation of this centrality to the terrorist enterprise comes, for example, from recent seizures of arms and ammunition. On September 19, the Army recovered a large cache of arms, ammunition and sophisticated devices for making bombs from a cave in the Gurez sector of Baramulla District. It included 14 AK rifles, a rocket projectile gun, rocket propelled missiles, 12 under-barrel grenade launchers, six pistols of Chinese and Pakistani origin, 80 sticks of RDX, 69 battery-operated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and a large number of grenades. Incidentally, it was in the Gurez sector that Indian troops had killed at least 18 infiltrators in July 2005. Consequent to border fencing and advanced detection devices, Army sources indicate that infiltrators are now using difficult and relatively inaccessible terrain as new routes, crossing the LoC through a mountain pass into the rocky and snow-covered region at a height of approximately 16,000 feet. In the past, infiltration through the Gurez sector had been rare, primarily because of the harsh terrain and poor weather conditions.
A comparatively low number of civilian and SF fatalities in Baramulla and Kupwara also means that the sustained terrorist pressure has not led to any measure of abatement of counter-terrorism operations by the SFs. Even the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service, despite the initial attempts to target it, continues to roll out on schedule every fortnight. Indeed, continuous terrorist efforts and the rationale of area domination make a strong case for the maintenance of existing troop presence, so that the zone does not lapse into greater terror, and serve as a gateway of subversion into the rest of the State - objectives that the jihadis seek to achieve.
The Army currently holds commanding positions on the Shamshabari mountain range, north of Kupwara and above Uri in Baramulla. It is here that the Indian positions commence, on an approach from the PoK side, and these are crucial for any counter-infiltration plan. For instance, after the snow began to melt in the higher reaches sometime in July 2005, terrorists crossed the LoC from Chakwali to Kaobal Gali and the Kanzalwan area, in the Gurez sector. While the Security Forces (SFs) have, to a large extent over the past few years, been able to block ingress sites across Kishan Ganga River, which flows through the Gurez Valley in the Baramulla District, and also physically dominate the area up to Shamshabari range, the fact that heavy snowfall and avalanches earlier in the year destroyed a portion of the LoC fencing has made the task of the Army a wee bit difficult. Diluting presence on these positions would lead to unbridled infiltration, affecting the security grid right up to the plains of Srinagar.
Overground
Among aspects of the 'collateral damage' inflicted by 9/11 on Pakistan's enterprise of terror and covert warfare in South Asia is the increasing uncertainty it confronts in managing both the underground and the 'overground' movements it created and sustained over the past decades. In J&K, the underground has been forced to de-escalate under increasing international pressure and media focus; the 'overground' - front and proxy organizations of the Pakistani intelligence apparatus and of the Islamist terrorists - has, consequently, been recipients of increasing largesse from Islamabad.
The first formal visit of a faction of the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) to PoK and subsequently, though unsanctioned by Indian authorities, to Pakistan between June 2-16, 2005, was thus projected as a major event and 'development' in the process of 'solving' the 'Kashmir issue', and was dominated by lengthy photo-ops and, importantly, by the separatists' vigorous reiteration of the Pakistani line on the peace process and the Kashmiri jihad. Indeed, the visit strongly reiterated the fact that the APHC continues to be a faithful Pakistani proxy, although its dramatis personae may be gradually changing.
By conferring a 'one-to-one' audience on the Hurriyat faction chairman Mirwaiz (a hereditary title of one of Kashmir's important religious seats, and also head priest of the Jamia Masjid) Umar Farooq, President Pervez Musharraf, anointed the 'moderate' separatist leader as Pakistan's new surrogate, suggesting that Syed Ali Shah Geelani, head of the 'hardline' faction of the Hurriyat (who refused to travel to PoK by the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus) may have finally fallen out of favour. After his meeting with the President, Umar Farooq declared that discussions had covered "two-three proposals in great detail", though he refused to elaborate on the Hurriyat roadmap. He did, however, add that, "We want Kashmir to be divided on geographical grounds. We don't want Kashmir to lose its identity.... we support his [President Musharraf] approach."
In May 2005, Musharraf had told a conference of South Asian Parliamentarians in Islamabad that "We do understand the Indian sensitivities of their secular credentials therefore it (the solution to the Kashmir issue) cannot be on any religious basis… Therefore it should on a people basis and on regional basis." Disingenuously, he had earlier pointed out at a meeting with editors and senior journalists in October 2004, "The beauty of these regions is that they are still religion-based even if we consider them geographically". He outlined his 'formula' further: "To identify a region, allow maximum self governance to the people, de-militarize and take some actions to make border irrelevant."
A further endorsement of the Pakistani position was discernible in the claim of Bilal Lone, son of the assassinated Hurriyat leader Abdul Gani Lone, that Kashmiris should have no problem with the thinking of President Musharraf on Kashmir as long as there is a consensus. Gen. Musharraf was quoted as saying in Canberra on June 14, 2005, that an 'autonomous Kashmir' was his 'earnest desire' and that complete independence for Kashmir would not be acceptable to either India or Pakistan.
The visit broke little new ground, and Hurriyat leaders have been routinely airing these views, and have been meeting visiting Pakistani leaders on a routine basis in Delhi, even as they have tended to receive their instructions, and at least on several occasions, substantial sums of money, from the Pakistani High Commission in India's capital. The only novelty, as Pakistani analyst Mariana Baabar noted, was that the Mirwaiz impressed the people of Pakistan with his sartorial elegance, sporting a new outfit for every public appearance, although he seemed devoid of ideas. The biggest gainers of this inflated public relations exercise have been the Mirwaiz, Bilal Lone and JKLF chief Yasin Malik, the last of which created some space for himself with his controversial statements on Pakistan's Minister for Information, Shiekh Rashid Ahmed, who Malik claimed played host to at least 3,500 Kashmiri terrorists who received training at his farm house and lands at Tarnol near Rawalpindi in the end 1980s and early 1990s. Malik's disclosure was subsequently confirmed by, among others, the ex-army chief of Pakistan, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, a statement from the Pakistan People's Party, former Interior Minister Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Naseerullah Babar, and Choudhury Nisar Ali Khan, acting president of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). The other visiting Hurriyat leaders, including Abdul Gani Bhat and Maulana Abbas Ansari, were completely sidelined, both in the talks and the media.
Mirwaiz Farooq's new pre-eminence implies that a new equation is emerging in the separatist camp in Srinagar. This may lead to Geelani's marginalization. Geelani, who once described himself as a proud Pakistani, has of late been as critical of Pakistan's Kashmir policy (too flexible, he alleges) as of Delhi. With the Mirwaiz endorsing the Pakistani line unequivocally, a war of claims and counter-claims has already begun, with Umar Farooq announcing at the Jamia Mosque after Friday prayers on June 17 that the leadership in PoK has recognised his faction as the "true representatives" of the people of J&K.
Confidence Building Measures
In what was perceived as a win-win situation for both India and Pakistan, both the countries agreed on February 16 to commence a bus link from April 7, 2005, between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad, the respective capitals of J&K and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). While much of the hype surrounding the decision was on expected lines, given the current 'honeymoon', between Delhi and Islamabad, it has been made amply clear that this confidence building measure (CBM) does not, in any manner, change the stated positions of either country on the status of J&K. Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, noted in Islamabad on February 16 that "It is a humanitarian procedure that we have adopted." The bus would bring together sundered families and communities living across the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border (IB).
The proposal for such a service was first floated in July 2001 during the Agra Summit between the then Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad highway, known in the Kashmir Valley as the Uri road, was closed in 1947 after the formation of Pakistan. Prior to Partition, the approximately 170-kilometer highway was the only road that connected Kashmir with the rest of the world. The road commences from Srinagar and reaches Muzaffarabad, via Baramulla and Uri in India, and Kohla and Kotli in Pakistan. The route has significant historical importance. While the 16th century Mughal emperor, Akbar, is believed to have once marched into Kashmir through this route, the road was also the main trade link between Kashmir and the rest of the world, linking the Valley with Afghanistan and China.
Humanitarian considerations have been paramount in this decision, and the opening of the bus link will allow many Kashmiri families, on both sides, to visit each other frequently. Over time, it may also help boost the economy of the region. For instance, if there is an agreement to send fruits, a mainstay of the Kashmiri economy, to Muzaffarabad through this route, this could plausibly open several new trade avenues.
Politically, the then Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed opined that, once the people of PoK start coming to India, they would see that people in the Indian side of Kashmir were much better off. Tahir Mohiuddin, editor of the Srinagar-based Urdu weekly, Chattan, notes, "There is a lot of propaganda in PoK that Kashmiris in India are not allowed to pray and are very poor. Once they come here and see, it will be an eye opener for them." The free movement of people, it is believed, would allay misconceptions about each other on the two sides of the LoC. It is useful to note, in this context, that many Pakistan-based Jihadi groups are headquartered in Muzaffarabad or have 'camp offices' in the area.
While this "mother of all CBMs" as one Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) official expressed it, has been hailed as the boldest peace move between the two countries, terrorist groups, unsurprisingly, have been vocal in their opposition. The Al-Mansooran claimed that the bus service deal was due to political compulsions. "The agreement reached between the two countries on the bus service will have no bearing on the ongoing struggle in the Valley," said Umer Mukhtar, a spokesman of the outfit. At least three terrorist groups, while declaring their opposition, threatened to (although such efforts were foiled by the security forces) disrupt the bus service. "This will weaken the idea of Kashmir uniting with Pakistan. This is a conspiracy by India to weaken jihad… We will see what benefits India wants to get from this bus service... we will certainly try to stop it," Mufti Abdur Rauf, a spokesperson for the Jaish-e-Mohammed, told The Associated Press in Pakistan on February 17. Echoing a similar line, the HM chief, Syed Salahuddin, in a statement issued from Muzaffarabad claimed the bus service was unimportant and "is a failed effort to put ointment on the wounds of Kashmiris."
The bus agreement has set the tone for a further deepening of people-to-people links, as well as other critical linkages. Both sides have agreed to look at the oil pipeline from Iran through Pakistan, subject to the satisfaction of India's concerns relating to security and assured supplies. It has also been agreed, in principle, to start a bus service between Amritsar and Lahore and to religious places such as Nankana Sahib. While the procedure of bringing an oil pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan is to be decided tri-laterally, prospects for such a venture, currently, remain grim in view of the continuing attacks on gas pipelines and other vital installations in the insurgency-wracked Balochistan province, on the Pakistan-Iran border.
Prognosis
While there has been a secular decline of violence in J&K since 2001, an end to the bloodshed in the State seems as unlikely as it was at any given point since the dramatic escalation of the militancy in 1989. Even as measures like the bus link and other CBMs may go a long way in removing some of the chronic mistrust between the two countries, they will do little to alter the fundamentals of the basic conflict in and over Kashmir.