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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 51, July 5, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Tentative Political
Coherence and Insurgent Consolidation
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
There is qualified good news from Nepal, with the major
democratic parties breaking through the political logjam
that has persisted for nearly 20 months. Prime Minister
Sher Bahadur Deuba's new Government has successfully convinced
its allies, the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist
Leninist (CPN-UML), the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP)
and the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP) to participate in his
Cabinet. On June 30, the Government finally announced its
43-point Common Minimum Programme (CMP),
which constitutes the basis for the allies' cohabitation.
The four constituent parties, including Deuba's Nepali Congress
- Democratic (NC-D), were part of the 'anti-regression'
movement directed against King Gyanendra's 'activism' and,
in joining the newly formed 'all-party' Government, have
declared that the 'regression' had ended. However, Prime
Minister Deuba's chief political rival, Girija Prasad Koirala's
Nepali Congress (NC), which decided to remain outside the
Government, criticized the present arrangement as a 'continuation
of regression'.
With Deuba's return to power, the country has, in one sense,
come full circle. Deuba's elected Government had been dismissed
by King Gyanendra in October 2002 on charges of 'incompetence'
for its failure to resolve the crisis caused by the Maoist
insurgency, and to hold fresh elections. It was
succeeded by the Lokendra Bahadur Chand and the Surya Bahadur
Thapa regimes nominated by the King under the disputed Article
127 of the 1990 Nepal Constitution, but the crisis has,
if anything, escalated, and the very possibility of holding
elections in the country today is minimal. The restoration
of a Government under Deuba, though this action is also
under the authority of the controversial Article 127, is
significant not only in the sense that it appears to right
a past wrong, but also in the fact of the present Government's
coalition character and the presence of two major parties
of the dissolved Parliament of 200 - the CPN-UML and the
NC-D.
As with past regimes, the 'All-Party' Government has emphasized
the seriousness of the Maoist insurgency and the need to
resolve it. The CMP, consequently, states that, "peace talks
will be prioritized with maximum flexibility for a dignified
political solution that is acceptable to all in national
politics on the basis of national consensus for restoration
of sustainable peace in the country." Immediately after
his appointment, Prime Minister Deuba made a public statement
inviting the Maoists to come forward for holding 'honest
talks', adding that his twin objectives were to restore
peace through dialogue with 'maximum flexibility' and to
hold election.
Significantly, when Deuba came to power for the first time
in 2001, he brought the Maoists to the negotiating table
with enormous expectations for a peaceful resolution of
the insurgency. However, the talks broke down in November
2001 after the Maoists stuck to their demand for elections
to a Constituent Assembly, which the Government rejected.
The Government has now pronounced its willingness to form
the Constituent Assembly on the basis of 'national consensus'.
A second round of peace talks in 2003 began with high hopes
but ended in escalated violence. Deuba has confidently claimed
that he can get the Maoists back to the negotiating table.
The inclusion in the Government of the CPN-UML, which has
elements of ideological compatibility with the Maoists,
is also a positive development. The Secretary of the CPN-UML,
Madhav Kumar Nepal, has reiterated that elections are not
possible without solving the Maoist problem and has stressed
a solution through peaceful means. Madhav Kumar Nepal held
a clandestine meeting at Lucknow in the Indian state of
Uttar Pradesh on November 20, 2003, with the Maoists' 'supreme
leader', Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, immediately
after the collapse of the second round of peace talks. The
CPN-UML has said that it is prepared to meet the Maoists
demands for holding a roundtable conference, for the formation
of an interim government and for the election of a Constituent
Assembly to draft a new Constitution. The spokesperson of
CPN-UML and its Central Committee member, Pradip Nepal,
has asked for the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire
to create a conducive climate for peace talks.
While the formation of the Deuba Government is a major and
positive development in the country's unruly democratic
politics, it is not clear that it will immediately advance
the movement to resolve the crisis of the Maoist insurgency.
The Maoists' first reactions to the Deuba Government have,
at best, been mixed. Baburam Bhattarai, the 'second-in-command'
in the Maoist hierarchy, had stated, "The main thing is
that the dialogue should not be held just for the sake of
holding it - it should be aimed at progressive restructuring
of state power. We are not willing to hold dialogue just
for the sake of it. However, if there is a credible effort
for negotiation for achieving progressive restructuring
of state power, we are always ready." Prachanda, who initially
dismissed Deuba's appointment as a continuation of the 'imperialist
regime', later demanded United Nations mediation in the
peace process. Deuba has not ruled out this alternative,
asserting that, "All options that can lead to a concrete
solution are welcome".
The Maoists' sincerity in engaging in a 'peace process'
must, however, remain deeply suspect. Not only have they
already abandoned negotiation on two occasions, launching
ferocious attacks on the security forces, Government installations
and the civilian population, but the exploitation of negotiations
as a tactic for consolidation is both an integral part of
their ideological perspective, and a demonstrable element
in their past practice. Given the success of this strategy,
and the current and expanding sweep of their influence,
there can be little reason to believe that the Maoists would
bring anything less than maximalist demands to the negotiating
table
The trajectory of the Maoist rampage since the beginning
of the movement in 1996 is interesting. In the first five
years, they were able to establish their strongholds in
three districts of the Midwestern Region, Rolpa, Rukum and
Jajarkot, at which stage the Maoists declared a cease fire
in July 2001 and entered into negotiations with the Government.
This 'peace process' ended with the attack on the military
camp at Dang, and a phase of widening and escalated violence,
with the Army engaging against the Maoists for the first
time. When the Maoists returned to the negotiating table
in January 2003, the entirety of the Far Western, Midwestern
and Western Region had virtually passed out of Government
control, and at least 68 of the country's 75 districts were
severely affected by the insurgency. After talks 'broke
down' on August 27, 2003, the insurgency entered its bloodiest
phase, with the Government presence progressively reduced
to the urban centers and district headquarters virtually
across the country, and no single district - including the
capital, Kathmandu - entirely outside the ambit of Maoist
violence.
Over the past ten months of violence, the Maoists have engaged
in a systematic and strategically coherent campaign to break
down the country's administrative structure. Mayors, Village
Development Committee (VDC) Chairmen and members, and Government
employees have been targeted for intimidation and selective
elimination. The insurgents have killed the Mayors of Birgunj,
Butwal and Pokhra, and have forced the nominated members
of a majority of VDCs and ward offices to resign from their
posts. Reports indicate that the insurgents have destroyed
more than 40 per cent of the total administrative infrastructure,
especially in the rural areas. Virtually all rural police
stations have been abandoned, and a majority of these have
been torched by the Maoists.
In the absence of the Governmental apparatus, the Maoists
have established their own 'People's Governments' and 'People's
Courts' at the village, district and regional level. Reports
indicate that at least 21 district level 'people's governments'
and nine 'autonomous regional people's governments' have
been established.
The Maoists are now levying 'taxes' based on personal income
in the regions of their domination. So far, only teachers
had been subjected to this rule, paying a month's salary
in every four months, but now all salaried individuals will
have to pay an annual 'tax' amounting to 13 days of their
salary. Farmers are also required to pay tax according to
the size of their landholdings. The insurgents have also
ordered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and community-based
organisations to pay tax to the respective 'district people's
government', and to secure written permission to operate
their projects in such areas.
Clearly, the Maoists are gradually transforming their insurgency
into a self-reliant political movement with the establishment
of enduring structures of administration. Militarily, the
Maoists have graduated from crude home made weapons and
arms snatched from the police and security forces, to a
far more sophisticated arsenal, including a limited supply
of AK-series rifles, and have acquired significant skill
in the manufacture and use of a range of explosive devices
and other small arms to sustain the war. The Maoists have
also secured access to a high-tech communications network
that comprehends wireless systems, cell phones and the Internet,
to coordinate their activities in and around the country.
Since the collapse of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003,
the escalated violence has killed an estimated 3,217 people
including, 394 civilians, 529 security force personnel and
2,294 Maoists. While the disproportionate fatalities inflicted
on the 'Maoists' may suggest increasing pressure on the
insurgents, this is far from the case, and most of these
fatalities have been peripheral cadres and sympathizers,
with little of the core of the armed strength affected.
The total fatalities in the eight-year-long insurgency have
now exceeded 10,000, with the injured and mutilated numbering
more than 50,000. There have been an estimated 250 bomb
blast incidents across the country since August 27, 2003,
with many of these located in markets and on public transport.
At the same time, the insurgents have combined a programme
of mass intimidation with indoctrination camps, where abducted
civilians are forced to attend undergo training and 'corrective
learning', and these have particularly targeted students,
teachers and poor labourers from the Western, the mid-Western
and the Eastern regions as a part of their 'People's War'
strategy. Since September 2003 and till June 2004, more
than 16,000 civilians, mainly teachers and students, have
been abducted and put through such camps in various parts
of the country. Further, the Maoists students organization,
the All Nepal National Independent Students Union - Revolutionary
(ANNISU-R) has organized a series of strikes in educational
institutions and is also involved in the process of creating
a combat force on its own, with a targeted membership of
over 4,00,000.
Clearly, the Maoists cannot be expected to easily give away
at the negotiating table what they have won in the war.
There is, moreover, persistent confusion among the constitutional
forces, including the King and the political parties, on
how to deal with the insurgency, and the rhetoric of a 'negotiated
solution' continues to militate against the realities of
the sustained Maoist expansion. While the installation of
an 'All Party' coalition at Kathmandu is, consequently,
good news at the political level, there is clearly a very
long struggle ahead before a working democracy can be restored
in the insurgency wracked country. It is only after the
country's constitutional leadership manages to raise itself
out of its petty rivalries and personal animosities, and
recovers the will and determination to confront the more
intractable tasks of governance, that the possibility of
the restoration of a democratic order can be conceptualized.
The Chasm between
Rhetoric and Reality
Guest Writer: G. Parthasarathy
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan
Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar was in New Delhi
for the "Composite Dialogue Process" between India and Pakistan
during the weekend commencing June 26. The last round of
talks between the Foreign Secretaries, in 1998, had been
anything but cordial. When India's then Foreign Secretary
K. Raghunath referred to the growing terrorist violence
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by the Pakistani jihadi
group the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
his Pakistani counterpart Shamshad Ahmad claimed that he
was not even aware of the existence of such an organization
in his country. This assertion came despite the fact that
the then Governor of Punjab, Shahid Hamid, and the then
Information Minister, Mushahid Hussain, had paid a highly
publicized visit to the Headquarters of the LeT at Muridhke
near Lahore. Much water has since flowed through the Ganga
and the Indus. The LeT has proclaimed its intention to plant
the green flag of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and Delhi.
Its cadres have been apprehended while preparing for acts
of terrorism in places as far away as Washington and Sydney.
It has made no secret of its support for the Taliban
and Al
Qaeda and was belatedly declared a terrorist
organization by the Americans, British and others.
General Musharraf reacted predictably to western actions
declaring Pakistani jihadi groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
and the LeT as terrorist organizations. He pretended to
act against these groups, but allowed them to function under
new names. He, however, acted firmly against elements in
groups like the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),
who were involved in plots against him personally, or joined
the Al Qaeda in its moves to unseat the royalty in Saudi
Arabia. The LeT functions under its new name - Jamaat ud
Dawa - in Pakistan. Its cadres now carry arms more discreetly
than in the past. And its communications networks actively
give instructions to hundreds of its operatives, who have
been infiltrated across the Line of Control (LOC) in J&K.
More importantly, the LeT has evidently been assisted and
tasked by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to carry
out terrorist strikes all across India, targeting both strategic
installations like the Bombay Stock Exchange and political
leaders who are accused of abetting communal violence. The
political objective of such moves is clear. By targeting
political leaders, the LeT is aiming to incite communal
violence and create a deep communal divide within India.
This is similar to earlier ISI attempts to create a Hindu-Sikh
divide in Punjab by targeting innocent Hindus in the state.
The indictment of cadres of the LeT in last
year's bomb blasts in Mumbai and the recent gunning
down of its cadres in Gujarat has confirmed the role the
Lashkar intends to undertake across India.
What makes the Lashkar different from other ISI backed terrorist
groups operating in India? While other groups have confined
their activities to wresting the Kashmir valley from India
and occasionally pretending to be champions of Muslims in
India, the LeT avers that its objective is the liberation
of Muslims in India by the destabilization and unraveling
of the Indian Union. Hence its determination to establish
its presence all across India, from Kashmir to Kerala.
On June 29, the day after the talks between the Foreign
Secretaries of India and Pakistan ended, Kashmir's Police
Chief Gopal Sharma made some very interesting disclosures.
Sharma indicated that his force had broken up a complex
LeT network in the State. Two of its top leaders, both Pakistani
nationals, had been gunned down. Twenty of its cadres had
been arrested. Sharma also disclosed that the group was
planning to eliminate politically high profile persons and
some police officers. They were even planning to destroy
economic centres like the Bombay Stock Exchange and concentrate
their activities in Mumbai, Delhi, Pune and Srinagar. He
added that the group was acting under the directions of
the LeT leadership based in Pakistan and that it had amongst
others, killed Moulvi Mushtaq Ahmed, the uncle of prominent
All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. It was also revealed that the
LeT group was in close touch with its associates and Indian
contacts, who were killed recently by the Gujarat Police.
The LeT makes no secret that its cadres do indeed operate
not only across the LOC but also elsewhere within India.
A large number of LeT leaders and cadres, who are Pakistani
nationals, have been killed in recent years in anti-terrorist
operations within J&K.
Despite much talk of a fall in infiltration across the LOC
in J&K, terrorists did strike on a number of occasions just
before the composite dialogue with Pakistan commenced. These
attacks included the killing of four Indian tourists on
June 12, the brutal murder of an Indian railway Engineer
and his brother on June 25, and the gunning down of 11 members
of the Gujjar community, including women and children in
the Jammu Region on June 26. They follow careful targeting
across J&K of candidates and others taking an active part
in the General Elections in April - May 2004. The ISI strategy
in J&K is clear. They will use terrorist violence to disrupt
political and economic life across the State. At the same
time, they will target political activists who seek to distance
themselves from Pakistan's ambitions, either by attacking
them directly, or by killing their close relatives and associates.
The assassinations of Abdul Ghani Lone and Moulvi Mushtaq
Ahmed are a part of this strategy. It is significant that
not a single leader of the APHC or the ruling People's Democratic
Party in J&K has yet issued a single statement categorically
condemning acts of terrorist violence and pointing out that
Pakistani nationals involved in such activities have no
business to enter the State. More importantly, a message
has been sent across the Valley by the terrorists that they
will not hesitate to target tourists and others who provide
employment and earnings for the people of the State.
Gopal Sharma also made another interesting revelation. He
indicated that the predominantly Pakistani LeT was now working
in close coordination with the largest Kashmiri group operating
in Jammu and Kashmir, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM).
Both the Hizb and the LeT are associated with the ISI-sponsored
United Jihad Council that operates out of Muzaffrabad. The
ISI evidently realized that the Punjabi speaking cadres
of the LeT were no longer welcome in the Kashmir valley.
They are, therefore, endeavoring to ensure that they receive
a measure of support by coordinating their activities with
the cadres of the Hizb, who have widespread local contacts.
The ISI establishment has also been concerned by the split
in the Hurriyat. They are uncomfortable with exclusively
supporting the faction led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Hence
the frantic efforts of Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar to
persuade separatist leaders and groups to close ranks during
his meetings with them in New Delhi. The effort will be
to coax the various factions of the Hurriyat to fall in
line through a judicious mix of fear and incentives. Security
agencies in India have estimated that there are around 2,500-3,500
armed terrorists operating in J&K. Roughly sixty percent
of these terrorists are estimated to be Pakistani nationals.
With hundreds of trained terrorists having moved to staging
areas for infiltration across the LOC, it should be evident
that Pakistan has no intention of ending its use of violence
and terrorism as instruments of State Policy.
It is interesting that on the very day that that Foreign
Secretary Khokhar was meeting the Prime Minister and other
leaders in Delhi two important security related meetings
took place in Islamabad and New Delhi. Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh and his colleagues in the Cabinet Committee on Security
received a detailed briefing on the security situation from
the Army Chief, General Nirmal Vij, the same day. General
Musharraf also addressed a meeting of his senior army colleagues,
including the Pakistan Army's nine Corps Commanders on June
28. The main focus of this meeting was on the situation
on Pakistan's western borders with Afghanistan, though the
situation on the LOC and the internal situation, including
the attacks on General Musharraf and the Karachi Corps Commander
also figured in the discussions. General Musharraf now has
his hands full, with his Army and Air Force attacking and
laying siege on their own countrymen in North and South
Waziristan, along the Pak-Afghan border. General Musharraf
has little choice in this matter as George Bush desperately
needs to "get" Osama bin Laden before the US Presidential
elections. The meeting of the Corps Commanders took place
just before a visit to Pakistan by the American CENTCOM
Chief General John Abizaid. The United States obviously
wants General Musharraf to devote full attention to the
operations against the Al Qaeda and not fritter away his
energies on tensions with India. General Musharraf has little
choice but to fall in line, in much the same manner as General
Zia was all milk and honey and even proposed a "No War Pact"
with India, when the US commenced its jihad against
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Hence the sweet talk and
soft approach of Mr. Khokhar.
New Delhi obviously has to embark on a process that enhances
cooperation, builds confidence and seeks to resolve differences
with Pakistan. But it would do well to remember that even
as it treaded softly on issues like Pakistan's membership
of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its readmission to
the Commonwealth, the Musharraf dispensation spared no effort
to fulfill its ambitions on the Kashmir issue at the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Foreign Minister's Conference
in Istanbul. The vicious propaganda against India on the
State run Pakistan television and radio continues. But far
more dangerous than all this is the ISI supported effort
by the LeT to exacerbate communal tensions and target political
leaders and economic centres across India. Has any thought
been given to how the costs for Pakistan can be raised,
if it persists with these efforts?
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
June
28-July 4, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
11
|
17
|
31
|
59
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Manipur
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
Tripura
|
3
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
Total (INDIA)
|
17
|
20
|
33
|
70
|
NEPAL
|
4
|
1
|
13
|
18
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Islamic
militant
groups
planning
armed
uprising,
alleges
Sheikh
Hasina:
Former
Prime
Minister
and
Opposition
leader,
Sheikh
Hasina,
alleged
on
June
30,
2004,
that
Islamic
militant
groups
patronised
by
the
Government
are
planning
an
armed
uprising
in
Bangladesh.
"Why
should
I
foresee?
The
radicals
and
fanatics
are
already
there
and
being
patronised
by
the
Government.
They
have
already
captured
different
areas
where
you
cannot
move
freely,
work
freely…"
she
told
a
reporter
during
a
news
conference
in
Dhaka.
Hasina
also
said
that
vigilanté
Islamist
leader
Bangla
Bhai
has
introduced
a
parallel
rule
in
northern
Rajshahi
with
the
police
and
Government
giving
his
organization
shelter.
The
New
Nation
,
June
30,
2004.
INDIA
Six
police
personnel
killed
during
attack
on
Parliament
member's
convoy
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
Six
police
personnel
were
killed
and
two
others
sustained
injuries
when
terrorists
attacked
the
convoy
of
Member
of
Parliament,
Choudhury
Lal
Singh,
by
detonating
two
Improvised
Explosive
Devices
at
Sangom
Bahthi
in
the
Doda
district
on
July
2,
2004.
Among
those
who
died
was
Deputy
Superintendent
of
Police
Mushtaq
Mir.
Lal
Singh,
Member
of
State
Legislative
Assembly
Ghulam
Mohammad
Saroori
and
some
Congress
leaders
reportedly
escaped
unhurt.
Daily
Excelsior,
July
3,
2004.
Cease-fire
by
terrorists
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
will
be
a
welcome
step,
says
Union
Home
Minister:
The
Union
Home
Minister
said
on
July
2,
2004,
that
a
cease-fire
call
by
terrorists
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
(J&K)
will
be
a
"welcome
step."
"If
they
(militants)
announce
ceasefire,
well
it
is
a
welcome
step.
Let
them
say
it,"
Home
Minister
Shivraj
Patil
said
during
an
interview
in
New
Delhi.
He
was
responding
to
a
query
whether
the
new
Government
will
initiate
a
cease-fire
in
J&K
on
the
lines
of
the
announcement
made
by
the
previous
Government
during
Ramzan
period
two
years
ago.
Further,
while
stating
that
talks
with
the
separatists
could
not
go
beyond
the
framework
of
the
Indian
Constitution,
Patil
added
"the
Centre
is
willing
to
talk
to
anybody
who
is
willing
to
talk
to
us,
but
with
preparation.
Without
preparation
if
you
jump
into
it
(talks),
nothing
comes
out."
The
Home
Minister
also
observed
that
there
has
been
no
escalation
in
violence
in
J&K
going
by
the
feedback
the
Government
has
received.
According
to
him,
"incidents
have
taken
place
but
if
you
take
sum
total...
I
don't
think
there
is
a
scope
to
come
to
the
conclusion
that
there
has
been
an
escalation."
Daily
Excelsior,
July
3,
2004.
Pakistan
and
India
agree
to
continue
dialogue
to
solve
the
Kashmir
issue:
In
a
joint
statement
released
on
June
28,
2004,
India
and
Pakistan
stated
that
their
Foreign
Secretaries,
Shashank
and
Riaz
Khokhar,
had
held
a
"detailed
exchange"
of
views
on
Jammu
and
Kashmir
and
agreed
to
continue
their
"sustained
and
serious"
dialogue
to
find
a
peaceful,
negotiated
and
"final"
settlement
of
the
issue.
The
joint
statement
issued
after
two
days
of
talks
also
stated
that
strength
of
the
respective
High
Commissions
would
be
"immediately
restored"
to
110
and
that
the
two
sides
had
agreed,
in
principle,
to
re-establish
the
consulates
in
Karachi
and
Mumbai.
Both
countries
also
agreed
to
immediately
release
all
detained
fishermen
and
civilian
prisoners
in
each
other's
custody
and
a
mechanism
put
in
place
for
the
return
of
unintentionally
transgressing
fishermen
and
their
boats
from
the
high
seas
without
apprehending
them.
The
Foreign
Secretaries
also
reiterated
their
commitment
to
the
principles
and
purposes
of
the
United
Nations
Charter
and
their
"determination
to
implement"
the
Shimla
Agreement
in
letter
and
spirit.
The
Hindu,
June
29,
2004.
NEPAL
Political
Parties
release
Common
Minimum
Programme:
The
ruling
Nepali
Congress
(Democratic),
CPN-UML,
Rashtriya
Prajatantra
Party
and
Nepal
Sadbhawana
Party,
jointly
released
a
Common
Minimum
Programme
(CMP)
at
a
press
conference
in
the
capital
Kathmandu
on
June
30,
2004.
The
43-point
CMP,
divided
into
four
parts,
primarily
emphasizes
the
need
to
resolve
the
Maoist
insurgency
and
hold
general
elections
at
the
earliest,
with
consensus
among
all
political
parties.
Socio-economic
reforms
and
development
programmes
are
other
priority
areas
outlined
in
the
CMP.
Speaking
at
the
press
conference,
Prime
Minister
Sher
Bahadur
Deuba
said
the
functioning
of
the
upcoming
all-party
Government
would
be
based
on
the
CMP.
Nepal
News,
July
1,
2004.
PAKISTAN
President
Musharraf
orders
crackdown
on
30
terrorist
groups
in
Karachi:
President
Pervez
Musharraf
has
reportedly
ordered
a
crackdown
on
almost
30
terrorist
groups
in
Karachi,
after
a
report
on
various
dimensions
of
terrorism
in
the
city
was
presented
to
him.
"A
comprehensive
report
covering
all
aspects
of
terrorism
in
Karachi,
with
particular
focus
on
major
terror
groups,
prepared
by
the
Interior
Ministry
in
collaboration
with
the
provincial
government
and
the
law-enforcement
agencies,
was
presented
to
President
Musharraf
at
a
recent
high-level
meeting.
The
president
has
ordered
an
immediate
crackdown
against
these
groups,"
sources
told
Daily
Times
on
July
2,
2004.
Of
the
identified
terrorist
groups,
15
are
sectarian-related
whereas
15
are
related
to
terrorism
directed
against
Western
interests,
according
to
the
report.
It
added
that
184
terrorists
belonging
to
these
groups
have
been
arrested
and
79
have
thus
far
been
convicted,
including
51
who
were
awarded
death
sentences.
Daily
Times,
July
3,
2004.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
has
prepared
women
suicide
bombers,
claims
detained
terrorist:
The
outlawed
Sunni
group
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ)
has
prepared
women
suicide
bombers
for
attacking
Shia
places
of
worship
in
Karachi,
a
suspected
mastermind
of
bomb
blasts
at
two
mosques
is
reported
to
have
disclosed
to
the
police.
Police
officer
Manzoor
Mughal
said
on
July
1,
2004,
that
Gul
Hasan
had
disclosed
during
interrogation
that
LeJ
had
brainwashed
a
few
girls
aged
between
16
and
20
years,
reported
the
Dawn.
The
girls,
reportedly
persuaded
to
explode
themselves
in
the
women's
areas
of
mosques,
would
be
wearing
veils
or
school
uniform,
carrying
handbags.
Dawn,
July
2,
2004.
Taliban-led
terrorists
still
supported
from
Pakistan,
says
US
Ambassador
to
Afghanistan:
Taliban-led
terrorists
are
still
launching
operations
against
American
and
other
forces
from
safe
havens
in
Pakistan,
US
Ambassador
to
Afghanistan,
Zalmay
Khalilzad,
said
on
June
29,
2004.
While
stating
that
a
Pakistani
military
operation
in
South
Waziristan
during
this
month
in
which
at
least
100
foreign
terrorists
and
allied
tribesmen
were
killed
"really
has
disrupted"
Al
Qaeda
and
Taliban
operatives
there,
he
added
there
were
other
areas
of
Pakistan
from
which
Taliban
crossed
into
Afghanistan.
"In
that
regard,
there
hasn't
been
any
change.
They've
dealt
with
part
of
the
problem,
but
the
problem
is
obviously
larger
than
that,"
said
the
Ambassador.
Daily
Times,
June
30,
2004.
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