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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 9, No. 50, June 20, 2011
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
|
North
Waziristan: Shadow Wars
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
US pressure
on Islamabad to launch military operations to clear the
North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) has been mounting over the past months.
The Agency is the principal base area of the Haqqani Network,
one of the deadliest Afghan terrorist factions fighting
the Americans, ISAF and Afghan Forces in Afghanistan,
and is also host to a number of other terrorist groups,
including al
Qaeda linked international terrorist
formations.
Pakistan,
however, has made it clear that no such operations would
be launched ‘under pressure’. On June 9, 2011, Chief of
Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani declared, “The Army was
following a well thought-out campaign plan and is under
no pressure to carry out operations at a particular time.
Future operations, as and when undertaken, will be with
political consensus.” On June 1, 2011, Prime Minister
Yousaf Raza Gilani said, “We are not fond of any military
action and we want to have an exit strategy”, adding further
that the Government would “take action when its writ is
challenged”. Evidently, the conditions currently prevailing
in do not, in this interpretation, constitute a ‘challenge’
to the Government’s writ.
Meanwhile,
US drone attacks in the NWA have been steadily escalating
since 2004. In 2010, according to the Pak Institute
of Peace Studies’ (PIPS) Pakistan Security Report,
87 per cent of US drone strikes in Pakistan were located
in the NWA. The New America Foundation, which has
tracked drone strikes since 2004, found that 87 out of
a total of 118 strikes (73.73 per cent) in 2010 hit targets
in the NWA.
Drone
Attacks in North Waziristan Agency: 2004-2011*
Years
|
Pakistan
|
North Waziristan Agency
|
Number
of Drone Strikes
|
Killed
|
Number
of Drone Strikes
|
Killed
|
2004
|
1
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
2005
|
2
|
7
|
2
|
7
|
2006
|
2
|
23
|
0
|
0
|
2007
|
4
|
77
|
3
|
39
|
2008
|
33
|
314
|
15
|
141
|
2009
|
53
|
725
|
21
|
163
|
2010
|
118
|
993
|
87
|
806
|
2011*
|
40
|
308
|
23
|
241
|
Total
|
253
|
2452
|
151
|
1397
|
Source:
New America Foundation's Counterterrorism Strategy
Initiative project
[*Data till June 16, 2011]
US drones
have succeeded in eliminating some of the top ranking
militants of the Haqqani Network in the region. Among
the most notable successes was the September 14, 2010,
strike in which Saifullah Haqqani, ‘military commander’
of the Haqqani Network in Afghanistan and first cousin
to Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of the Network’s chief Jalaluddin
Haqqani, was killed along with 11 other militants, in
the Dargah Mandi area near Miranshah area of NWA. On February
18, 2010, Mohammed Haqqani, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother,
was killed along with three other militants in the Dandi
Darpakhel area of the NWA in another such attack.
On September
8, 2008, however, US drones had fired six missiles at
the home of the Haqqanis and a madrassa (seminary)
run by the network in the Dandi Darpakhel area, believing
that Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin were present.
Several family members were among the 23 persons killed,
including one of Jalaluddin's two wives, his sister, sister-in-law
and eight of his grandchildren. Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin,
however, were not present at the time of the attack.
Unintended
civilian fatalities have, in fact, been one of the most
significant factors in increasing US pressure on Pakistan
to launch ground operations. Only ground operations have
the potential of greater precision and lower collateral
damage – though past Pakistani operations have tended
to be far more indiscriminate and bloodier, relying on
area weapons, including artillery and aerial bombardments,
rather than face to face confrontations with armed extremists.
Nevertheless,
despite growing criticism of US drone attacks in Pakistan,
the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Mike Mullen, made it clear to General Kayani on April
21, 2011, that the US strikes would continue till Pakistan
had eliminated the Haqqani Network from its tribal region.
The Haqqani
Network, which works in cooperation with both al Qaeda
and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),
is the second largest terrorist group among the Afghan
Taliban, after Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. The Network
operates in Afghanistan's south-eastern Provinces – Paktika,
Khost, Logar, and Ghazni. It has established parallel
Governments in parts of Paktika and Khost, and controls
the countryside in several other Districts. The Network
has repeatedly attacked US and NATO Forces operating in
Afghanistan, as also Afghan Army deployments.
Notably,
on December 30, 2009, a suicide bomber killed at least
six Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers and seriously
injured six others at Forward Operating Base Chapman in
Afghanistan, which is used by the CIA to coordinate drone
attacks in Pakistan. The Haqqani network claimed responsibility
for the attack.
Again,
on August 28, 2010, Haqqani Network militants launched
coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno
and Chapman in Khost province. US troops retaliated, killing
more than 35, including a ‘commander’, during and after
the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army
uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests.
On September
2, 2010, Haqqani Network cadres attempted to storm Combat
Outpost Margah in the Bermel District of Paktika Province.
20 militants were reportedly killed in the retaliatory
attack by US troopers.
US drone
attacks have repeatedly demonstrated the presence of the
Haqqani Network’s leadership in the Miranshah area of
NWA. The Network’s senior leadership maintains influence
throughout Pakistan’s tribal region and often plays a
central role in mediating disputes between militant groups
and the Pakistani state, most recently including the Kurram
Peace Pact of February 2011.
NWA also
hosts a blend of other insurgent and terrorist formations
operating against both Afghanistan and Islamabad, with
at least some of these also looking at the US homeland
as a potential target.
Perhaps
the most influential tribal leader in NWA, Hafiz Gul Bahadur,
maintains influence in the territory west of Miranshah.
Bahadur is a close ally of the Haqqanis and provides resources,
shelter, and facilitation for Haqqani Network operations
in Afghanistan. Bahadur was allied with militants acting
against the Pakistani State in the past. However, after
the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the chief of TTP, he has
avoided direct confrontation with the Pakistani military.
The Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union
(IJU) are two predominately Uzbek militant groups with
a presence in NWA. Both the IMU and IJU are located around
the Mir Ali area in NWA. Both groups have close ties to
al-Qaeda, the TTP, and the Haqqani Network. Other militants
of foreign origin including Arabs, Chechens, Uighurs,
and Turks affiliated with al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP),
and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),
have also found safe haven in NWA. The majority of these
individuals operate out of Mir Ali under the protection
of the Haqqanis and Gul Bahadur.
The US
considers the Haqqani Network and its role in the insurgency
in Afghanistan among the most difficult challenges the
ISAF faces, but has failed to ‘convince’ Islamabad to
take action against the Network’s safe havens on Pakistani
soil. Significantly, while talk of ‘imminent’ military
operations in NWA is now rife, it is clear that delays
are being deliberately orchestrated to provide time for
the Haqqanis to shift their base to the Kurram Agency,
before ‘showcase’ operations are launched.
Moreover,
by delaying operation, the Pakistani establishment is
deliberately providing time to Haqqani Network to shift
its base to the Kurram Agency. An American Enterprise
Institute report of June 1, 2011, for instance, noted:
"The Haqqani Network has been preparing an alternative
safe haven for itself in Kurram Agency to the north, in
the event of a Pakistani operation in North Waziristan.”
Militants had been ‘flushed out’ of the Kurram Agency
during operations in 2009-2010, reflecting an interesting
cycle of relocation, where ‘good Taliban’ and ‘good terrorist’
elements are simply whisked around by dramatic ‘military
operations’ from one area to another, with little enduring
impact on their strength or capacity.
Indeed,
the stage had been set for the relocation of the Haqqani
Network to the Kurram Agency with the Haqqanis’ involvement
in the Kurram Peace Pact of February 3, 2011. Ceding space
to the Haqqanis in the peace initiative, the Pakistan
Government and Army created the grounds for the outfit
to move into this area whenever it needed an alternate
sanctuary, in case Islamabad was forced to launch a sham
operation in the NWA.
Pakistan’s
reluctance to target the Haqqanis has obvious reasons.
The ISI has long nurtured ties with the Network, which
it sees as a strategic asset that can help Islamabad consolidate
influence in Afghanistan. Indeed, this is confirmed by
a transcript passed, in May 2008, to Mike McConnell, the
Director of US National Intelligence, according to which
Pakistan’s Army Chief General Kayani is reported to have
referred to Haqqani as “a strategic asset.” The Haqqanis
controls large areas of Eastern Afghan, and are expected
to play an important, if not decisive, role in any projected
post-American dispensation. Islamabad has always sought
to project the myth of the ‘good Taliban’, and, in its
imaginings, the Haqqani Network has always been part of
this virtuous grouping. The Haqqani Network, moreover,
has never threatened or executed any operations against
the Pakistani state.
The Haqqanis
have also demonstrated their utility in helping secure
Pakistani ‘strategic’ goals in limiting Indian ‘influence’
in Afghanistan. An unholy liaison between the ISI and
the Haqqani Network was demonstrated in the suicide car
bombing on the Indian Embassy in Kabul on July 14, 2008,
which left 41 people dead. US intelligence had closely
followed the build-up to this attack, and had passed on
detailed intelligence to Indian agencies, though this
proved insufficient to prevent the attack. Further, WikiLeaks
documents published on July 27, 2010, indicated that the
ISI had paid the terror outfit to plan and execute attacks
against Indian interests in Afghanistan. A March 2008
intelligence report claimed that the ISI paid the Haqqani
network USD 15,000-30,000 to eliminate Indian nationals
working on the key Zaranj-Delaram road project. The report
noted that “in one particular case, it was reported that
the ISI ordered Sirajuddin Haqqani to eliminate Indian
nationals working in Afghanistan” and to kidnap “doctors,
officers, engineers and labourers” working on the road
project.
Islamabad’s
perceptions of its ‘strategic interests’ are too deeply
intertwined with the fate of the Haqqani Network to allow
any effective operations by the Pakistan Army to be directed
against this formation, or against its close allies. US
pressure may eventually force Kayani to launch a fake
campaign, but it is unlikely that this would do any measurable
damage to what continues to be regarded as a crucial ‘strategic
asset’ by the Army, and by the wider power elite in Islamabad.
|
Volte
Face?
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
In a dramatic
volte face, the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic
of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, on June 7, 2011, declared
that she wished to keep Islam as the ‘State Religion’,
thus preserving the illegal changes made to the Constitution
in 2007 by the Provisional Government led by Dr. Fakhruddin
Ahmed. The announcement was in complete contrast to the
ruling Awami League’s (AL) declared pro-secular approach.
Hasina, who also leads the AL, appears to be targeting
the support of some radical Muslim formations in a replay
of her last tenure, 1996-2001. The present posture suggests
that the Hasina Government may increasingly incline to
the use of Islam for political maneuver. Meanwhile, the
Dhaka High Court, on June 8, asked the Government to explain
the legality of its standpoint on the status of Islam
as the ‘State Religion’.
The instrumentalisation
of Islam to secure political legitimacy began in Bangladesh
after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August
15, 1975. The successor President and Chief Martial Law
Administrator, General Zia-ur-Rahman, passed a Presidential
decree in 1977, removing the principle of secularism from
the Preamble of the Constitution and, instead, inserted
the infamous Fifth Amendment declaring "absolute
trust and faith in the Almighty Allah". Further,
in 1988, Islam was given the status of ‘State Religion’
through the Eighth Amendment by the even more zealous
military regime of H. M. Ershad – Rahman’s successor.
The ongoing
controversy regarding the status of Islam and its legality
as the 'State Religion' came to the forefront after the
General Elections that restored Hasina to power in January
2009. Her Government immediately focused attention on
the challenge of tackling religious extremism and terrorism.
At that time, the AL Government had made it clear that
it would re-introduce the original ‘Four State Principles’
– democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism.
Meanwhile,
on January 3, 2010, Bangladesh’s Supreme Court lifted
a four year stay against a ban on ‘the abuse of religion
for political purposes’. By lifting the stay, the Supreme
Court approved the August 29, 2005, judgment of a three
judge Bench, led by Justice A. B. M. Khairul Haque, which
declared the Fifth Amendment illegal. The Bench also defined
the meaning of secularism as religious tolerance and religious
freedom. Subsequently, on February 20, 2010, Law Minister
Shafique Ahmed stated, "Now we don't have any bar
to return to the four state principles of democracy, nationalism,
secularism and socialism, as had been heralded in the
1972 statute of the State”.
Finally,
the 184-page judgment of the Supreme Court was issued
on July 28, 2010. The apex Court got rid of the bulk of
the Fifth Amendment, including provisions that had allowed
religious political parties to prosper, or that legitimized
military dictatorship. The verdict further dubbed such
parties as extra-constitutional adventurers and suggested
"suitable punishment" for those who installed military
regimes and imposed martial laws. The simultaneous
trial of 1971 War Crimes and the arrest of
prominent leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) on such charges
further heated up the debate on the role of Islamic parties
in the political arena.
At that
juncture, it appeared that the Hasina Government was determined
to take on the radical Islamic groups – both militant
outfits and political parties. On March 16, 2009, Home
Secretary Abdus Sobhan Sikder placed a report that identified
12 ‘militant’ outfits – the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
(JMB),
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B),
Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Ulama Anjuman al Bainat, Hizb-ut-Tahrir,
Islami Democratic Party, Islami Samaj, Touhid Trust, Jagrata
Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB),
Shahadat-e-al-Hikma Party Bangladesh, Tamir-ud-Deen (Hizb-e-Abu
Omar) and Allahr Dal. The Government has so far banned
four Islamist militant groups – the JMB, HuJI-B, JMJB
and Shahadat-e-al-Hikma. The main targets of the law enforcers,
however, were the party activists and cadres of five main
groups – Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS,
youth wing of the JeI)), JMB, HuJI-B, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and
Hizb-ut-Tawhid.
The Institute
for Conflict Management database indicates quick follow-up
action to arrest leaders and cadres of these militant
formations. The numbers do not, however, include mass
arrests that are common during political rallies, protest
marches and violent mass activities. For instance, on
April 12, 2010, the Chittagong Police filed a case accusing
1,500 to 2,000 leaders and cadres of JeI and ICS for attacks
on the Police at the city's Anderkilla Intersection. The
arrests in this incident are not included in the data.
Arrests
of Militant Leaders and Cadre: 2009-2011*
Islamist
Party/Organisation
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011*
|
Total
|
ICS
|
31
|
235
|
40
|
306
|
JMB
|
107
|
51
|
12
|
170
|
HuJI-B
|
10
|
16
|
13
|
39
|
Hizb-ut-Tahrir
|
43
|
43
|
46
|
132
|
Hizb-ut-Tawhid
|
31
|
33
|
90
|
154
|
Total
|
222
|
378
|
201
|
801
|
Source:
South Asia Terrorism Portal [*Data till June 19,
2011]
Among the
arrested are important leaders, such as the founder of
HuJI-B, Sheikh Abdus Salam; its current chief, Mufti Abdul
Hannan Sabbir; the chief of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Mahiuddin
Ahmad; the regional leader of Hizb-ut-Tawhid, Mohammed
Moinuddin; among others. Recoveries from the site of arrest
have included arms and ammunition, with typical variety
of cocktail and hand made bombs, bomb-making manuals,
Jihadi literature, anti-Government leaflets, etc.
Contradictions
were, however, sharpening within the country, with three
visible and polarizing trends consolidating: the ongoing
1971 War Crimes trials; the anti-women Islamist demonstrations
protesting the formulation of the National
Women’s Development Policy (2011);
and the re-emergence of mass and violent street politics,
after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party called a 36-hour
national protest on June 13, 2011. The Islamist Parties
clearly have huge stakes in all three issues, with JeI
as the principal target of War Crimes trials, and Islamist
allies of the BNP as key components in the anti-women
and street demonstrations and protests. Bangladesh has,
moreover, a long and infamous tradition of protracted
and violent street protests and bandhs (general
shutdowns) that have paralysed the country for weeks and
months at end.
It is
under these cumulative pressures that the AL’s stand on
Islam began to shift. When Sheikh Hasina appeared before
a Parliamentary Committee (PC) which was reviewing the
Constitution in the light of the Supreme Court verdict
in April 2010, she had already modified her position to
concede that her party was “not against having Islam as
state religion”. This constituted a complete reversal
of the policy laid down by her father, Bangabandhu
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Hasina also stated that her party
was against banning religion-based political parties,
though it wanted ‘some restrictions’ on them.
Internal
conflicts within the ruling alliance make Hasina’s situation
more complex. The Jatiya Party, headed by H.M. Ershad
and commanding 29 MPs, is against any ban on religion-based
political parties. On the other hand, Left-leaning parties
– including the Workers Party, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal,
Ganotantri Party and National Awami Party – are strongly
opposed to the Jatiya Party’s proposal. The Left-parties
are lightweight, with three MPs in the Jatiya Samajtantrik
Dal, two in the Workers Party, and none in Ganotantri
Party and National Awami Party. The AL, with a more than
three fourths majority in Parliament (270 MPs in a House
of 345), is, in any event, under no threat, but values
the alliances for the stability and inclusive mandate
they provide. The management of the alliance, consequently,
will remain a matter of concern as polarizing issues come
to dominate the agenda.
Against
this backdrop, Hasina’s June 7 statement can only worsen
the political muddle in the country, as it dilutes its
projected Constitutional identity, in the words of Foreign
Minister Dipu Moni, as “a secular, not moderate Muslim,
country”, and embarks on the slippery slope of an Islam
pasand (committed to Islam) country. AL’s progressive
‘secular disillusionment’ can only intensify the percolation
of radical thought through Bangladeshi politics and society,
even as voices against Islamist extremist dogma are gradually
stifled by the original initiator of secular politics
in the country.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in
South Asia
June 13-19, 2011
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu &
Kashmir
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
4
|
Manipur
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Maharastra
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Odisha
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
6
|
0
|
4
|
10
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
8
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
FATA
|
9
|
11
|
74
|
94
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
0
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
Punjab
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
2
|
Sindh
|
44
|
0
|
0
|
44
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
61
|
13
|
79
|
153
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
High
Court begins hearing on petition challenging insertion
of Islam as 'State Religion': The hearing
on a writ petition challenging the validity of
the insertion of Islam as state religion by the
8th Amendment of the Constitution began
with deliberations by the amici curiae
(friends of the court) at the High Court in Dhaka
on June 16. The amici curiae expressed
the identical view that the issue should be left
for Parliament to decide as it enjoys the sovereign
authority to amend the Constitution. Daily
Star, June 17, 2011.
Enough
evidence to prove War Crimes charges against JeI
leader Kamaruzzaman, claim investigators:
Investigators on June 14 claimed that they have
enough incriminating evidence to prove the War
Crimes (WCs) charges against Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)
leader Muhammad Kamaruzzaman. A four-member investigation
team quizzed Kamaruzzaman, an assistant secretary
general of JeI, on his involvement in crimes against
humanity and genocide at Dhaka's Mirpur and Jamalpur,
Sherpur and Mymensingh during the Liberation War.
Daily
Star, June 15, 2011.
INDIA
India
could be a key target of new al Qaeda 'chief'
Ayman al-Zawahiri: Following the appointment
of the new 'chief' of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
intelligence sources fear that India may figure
as a potential target of the international terrorist
outfit. Fears that al Qaeda will choose India
as a theatre to expand had been mounting since
2011, when al-Zawahiri's former deputy, Sheikh
Said al-Masri released an audiotape claiming responsibility
for the 2009 bombing of a café in Pune in Maharashtra.
The
Hindu, June 17, 2011.
Ex-militants
getting active, says Jammu and Kashmir DGP Kuldeep
Khoda: Director General of Police (DGP) Kuldeep
Khoda on June 18 expressed concern over active
involvement of former militants in various crime
and anti-social activities in the Valley. He said
that these people are getting access to weapons
being supplied from across the border, adding
that militancy is slowly but surely waning. Daily
Excelsior, June 19, 2011.
Just
10 per cent target met in road construction in
Naxal areas: Having met barely 10 per cent
of its road-construction target in the eight Naxalite
[Left Wing Extremism]-hit States, the Government
plans to enlist locals as workers and settle for
"semi-kuchcha" or simple motorable surfaces in
place of the metalled ones that are standard for
national highways. In two years, just 251 kilometres
of roads have been built of a total of 5,477 kilometres
to be completed by March 2014. Indian
Express, June 15, 2011.
NEPAL
Number
of armed outfits 'goes down drastically', claims
MoHA: The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)
on June 16 claimed that the number of armed outfits
operating across the country has significantly
come down, due to the government's operations
against the groups that were launched nationwide
one-and-a-half years ago. While there were 108
groups earlier, only 26 of them are active now.
ekantipur,
June 18, 2011.
AISC
misses deadline for finalisation of Army integration
model: The Army Integration Special Committee
(AISC) missed its set deadline of June 19 to finalise
the integration model and determine the number
of former combatants to be integrated. Leaders
of the major political parties have blamed each
other for the delay. Nepal
News, June 19, 2011.
Special
Committee starts monitoring PLA cantonments:
A team of the Army Integration Special Committee
Secretariat has started monitoring the Peoples'
Liberation Army's (PLA) Third Division camp in
Chitwan. The monitoring team comprising 19 people
completed monitoring at the Basu Memorial Brigade
and the Pratap Memorial Brigade under the PLA
Third Division in the first phase, said Janak
Bista, spokesman of the PLA Third Division Camp
(Shaktokhor). ekantipur,
June 14, 2011.
PAKISTAN
74 militants and 11 SFs among 94 persons killed
during the week in FATA: At least 50 terrorists
attacked a paramilitary checkpoint in Walidad
area of Mohmand Agency in Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) near the Afghan border on
June 19, triggering intense clash that killed
four soldiers and up to 25 terrorists.
Security
Forces (SFs) killed six militants after militants
attacked a military checkpost in the Ladha area
of South Waziristan Agency along the Afghanistan
border, killing two soldiers on June 18.
SFs
backed by artillery killed 12 militants during
a search operation in the Mamond area of the Bajaur
Agency on June 17.
Four
militants were killed and five others injured
when jet fighters bombed suspected hideouts near
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the Baizai
tehsil (revenue unit) of Mohmand Agency.
Three
women were killed and two children sustained injuries
when a mortar shell fired by a militant group
hit their house in Tirah in Orakzai Agency.
More
than 300 militants crossed the border from Kunar
province of Afghanistan to Khar area of Bajaur
Agency at around 4:00am on June 16, resulting
in hours of clashes that left 15 persons dead.
Three
US drone attacks killed 18 suspected militants
in South and North Waziristan Agencies on June
15.
Three
Punjab Regiment personnel were killed and four
others sustained injuries when a remote-controlled
bomb planted by suspected militants hit their
vehicle in the Ghundai Sra area of South Waziristan
Agency on June 13.
Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News; Tribune,
June 14-20, 2011.
Judge
conducting trial of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks
suspects transferred: The judge of the anti-terrorism
court conducting the trial of seven Pakistani
suspects charged with involvement in the 26/11
Mumbai attacks has been changed for the fourth
time, with the current incumbent being transferred
to another court in Punjab Province. Rana Nisar
Ahmed, who had been hearing the 26/11 Mumbai attacks
case since he was appointed judge of Rawalpindi's
Anti-Terrorist Court no III in November 2010,
was transferred on June 11. Ahmed had also been
conducting the trial of five suspects charged
with involvement in the 2007 assassination of
former premier Benazir Bhutto.
Times
of India,
June 14, 2011.
Pakistan
arrests CIA informants who helped in Osama bin
Laden raid, reveals New York Times:
The ISI on June 14 arrested some of the Pakistani
informants who fed information to the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the months leading
up to the raid that led to the death of Osama
bin Laden on May 1. The arrestees included a Pakistan
Army major who officials said copied the license
plates of cars visiting bin Laden's compound in
Abbottabad. The
News, June 15,
2011.
HuM
leader Fazle-ur-Rahman Khalil lives near Islamabad,
says Government Official: Fazle-ur-Rahman
Khalil, the head of anti-India militant outfit
Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen (HuM), lives on the outskirts
of Islamabad in the suburb of Golra Sharif. It
was reported that Pakistan authorities, clearly
aware of Khalil's whereabouts, leave him alone,
just as they tolerate other Kashmiri militant
groups. Indian
Express, June 16, 2011.
Large
elements of ISI is pro-Taliban, says former speaker
of the US House of Representatives Newt Gingrich:
Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the US House
of Representatives and Republican Presidential
aspirant for the 2012 presidential elections,
said on June 15 that a large element in the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) have become pro-Taliban and
pro-al Qaeda.
Indian Express, June 16,
2011.
US
fears Pakistan nuclear weapons falling into hands
of terrorists: US on June 16 expressed apprehension
that the nuclear weapons and technology of Pakistan
might fall into the hands of terrorists and thus
stressed on having the lines of communications
open with Islamabad. "It's a country with an awful
lot of terrorists on that border. Things that
I fear in the future, it's the proliferation of
that technology, and it's the opportunity and
the potential that it could fall into the hands
of terrorists, many of whom are alive and well
and seek that in that region…," said Admiral Mike
Mullen Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Times
of India, June 17, 2011.
United
Nations splits al Qaeda and Taliban on sanctions
list: The United Nations (UN) Security Council
on June 17 split the international sanctions regime
for the Taliban and al Qaeda to encourage the
Taliban to join reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan.
The council unanimously passed two resolutions
which set up one new blacklist of individuals
and organizations accused of links to al Qaeda
and a second for those linked to the Taliban militia.
Dawn,
June 18, 2011.
Ayman
al-Zawahri takes over as al Qaeda 'chief':
Ayman al-Zawahri took over the command of al Qaeda,
a website Ansar al-Mujahideen affiliated
with al Qaeda said on June 16. Zawahri vowed to
press ahead with al Qaeda's campaign against the
US and its allies. Daily
Times,
June 17, 2011.
'We
will hunt and kill new al Qaeda chief', vows US
Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike
Mullen: The United States (US) on June 17
vowed to hunt down and kill new al Qaeda "emir"
(chief) Ayman al-Zawahri like it did in the case
of Osama bin Laden. "He (Zawahiri) and his organisation
still threaten us. As we did both seek to capture
and kill and succeed in killing bin Laden, we
certainly do or will do the same thing with Zawahri,"
Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff said. Indian
Express; Times
of India, June 18, 2011.
'Seminaries
in Islamabad illegal', says Capital Development
Authority Director General Sarwar Sindu: The
Federal Capital has a total of 153 madrasas
(seminaries) but all of them are 'unauthorised'
and have been built without approval of the Government,
said Capital Development Authority (CDA) Director
General Sarwar Sindu on June 14. The official
said each mosque in the city had a madrasa despite
the fact that there was no provision for building
a seminary in any mosque. Dawn,
June 15, 2011.
US
House panel limits Pakistan aid: The House
Appropriations Committee on June 14 approved a
defence spending bill that imposes limits on US
aid to Pakistan and creates a special bipartisan
group to review the US role in Afghanistan. The
panel gave the go-ahead to the bill on a voice
vote on June 16. The legislation would provide
USD 530 billion for the Defence Department and
USD 119 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Daily
Times, June 15, 2011.
SRI LANKA
UN
issues fresh call to Sri Lanka to investigate
war crime allegations: In the wake of a documentary
aired by Britain's Channel 4 on Sri Lanka's war,
the United Nations on June 15 renewed its call
for Sri Lanka to investigate the alleged violations
of human rights during the last phase of the three-decade
long conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) militants. Responding to media queries
at the press briefing about the documentary, Martin
Nesirky, the Spokesperson for the UN Secretary-General
ban Ki-moon said the UN Chief was aware of the
documentary.
Colombo
Page, June 16, 2011.
Government
urges people to defeat elements trying to revive
LTTE remnants: Defence Secretary Gotabhaya
Rajapaksa requested all communities of Sri Lanka
to stand up against elements attempting to revive
the remnants of the defeated militant outfit Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who were involved
in tarnishing the country's image in the aftermath
of the Government's victory over terrorism.
Colombo
Page, June 18, 2011.
Government
plans to use former LTTE leader as a 'crown witness':
Sri Lankan Government intends to use the detained
leader of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
Kumaran Pathmanathan alias KP as a State
witness to discover more information about the
LTTE's overseas operations.
xinhuanet,
June 14, 2011.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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