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AfPak:
Radical Redirection
Ajai
Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM & SATP
There has
been a tremendous and polarizing response to US President
Donald Trump’s announcement of a “new integrated strategy
for the U.S. approach to South Asia”, in particular, his
approach to the Afghanistan-Pakistan conundrum. However,
most commentary, other than that of Trump’s committed
partisans, has been dismissive of this new approach, abruptly
writing it off as ‘old wine in new bottles’; pointing
to its commonalities with past and demonstrably failed
strategies – particularly including those of the precedent
administration of President Barack Obama; criticizing
it for its excessive reliance on use of force, when ‘history’
has apparently demonstrated that ‘military solutions don’t
work’, and so forth.
But Trump’s
strategy deserves close attention because it does, in
fact, contain radically original elements, and also because,
irrespective of its actual implementation and eventual
probabilities of success, it will – indeed, has already
begun to – dramatically alter the geo-strategic environment
of South Asia and the wider Asian region.
Broad-stroke
counter-terrorism options with regard to the AfPak region
are, of course, limited. Simply put, they are exhausted
by the choice between reliance on use of force, on the
one hand, and negotiated settlements, on the other. Both
have been tried fitfully – or have been indiscriminately
mixed in – over the past decades, and it is not just the
‘military solution’ that has been unsuccessful; negotiations
have gone nowhere as well.
Behind
the sweeping generalizations on use of force and negotiations,
however, are an infinity of graded options and priorities,
and it is here that Trump – or, more likely, to borrow
a currently popular phrase, the ‘adults in his administration’
– breaks sharply with the past. It is useful to examine
some of the innovations of this new approach.
First,
it must be enormously emphasized, Trump’s AfPak (he does
not call it so, but it is a useful contraction) is by
no means a simple repackaging of Obama’s AfPak, though
he also proposes an increase (surge) in US armed presence
in Afghanistan. Indeed, for those who study these issues
with any measure of seriousness and non-partisan commitment,
the inevitable failure of Obama’s AfPak policy was evident
from the very moment of its announcement. Among its many
disastrous elements, the most self-destructive was the
announcement of a predetermined draw-down schedule. Indeed,
the underlying logic of the ‘surge’ – the pivot of Obama’s
AfPak policy – was the puerile
argument that, since adding 30,000
troops in Iraq had ‘succeeded’, this magical number would
also prevail in Afghanistan within an arbitrary and publicly
announced timeframe, presenting Pakistan and its proxies
in Afghanistan with a promise of preordained victory if
they could simply outlast the deadline.
The new
strategy explicitly recognizes the folly of offering a
determined adversary with, as Secretary of State Rex W.
Tillerson expressed it in a Press Statement released on
August 21, 2017, “artificial calendar-based deadlines”.
Instead, he declared, “We are making clear to the Taliban
that they will not win on the battlefield... ”
Announcing
his South Asia Policy on the same date, President Trump
reiterated,.
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A core pillar of our new strategy is a shift from
a time-based approach to one based on conditions.
I’ve said it many times how counterproductive it
is for the United States to announce in advance
the dates we intend to begin, or end, military options.
We will not talk about numbers of troops or our
plans for further military activities. Conditions
on the ground – not arbitrary timetables – will
guide our strategy from now on. America’s enemies
must never know our plans or believe they can wait
us out. I will not say when we are going to attack,
but attack we will.
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Trump had,
in his election campaigns, clearly advocated an exit from
Afghanistan – something President Obama also sought, but
failed to achieve in full measure – but has recognized
the error of this perspective, noting, “The men and women
who serve our nation in combat deserve a plan for victory...
the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable
and unacceptable... A hasty withdrawal would create a
vacuum that terrorists, including ISIS and al Qaeda, would
instantly fill…”
The Obama
and preceding George W. Bush administrations had both
recognized Pakistan’s dubious role in the troubles in
Afghanistan, but always sought to tread softly or, after
a particularly harsh statement (for instance, then Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton’s remark in Islamabad, “you can't
keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite
your neighbours”; or, earlier, then Secretary of State,
Richard Armitage’s alleged threat, confirmed by then President
Pervez Musharraf, to ‘bomb Pakistan back into the stone
age’), to quickly mollify Pakistan with aid and generous
praise of its ‘great sacrifices’ and role in the ‘war
on terror’.
Trump is
far less compromising: “Today, 20 U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organizations are active in Afghanistan and
Pakistan – the highest concentration in any region anywhere
in the world… Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents
of chaos, violence, and terror.” Trump then commits himself
“to stripping terrorists of their territory, cutting off
their funding, and exposing the false allure of their
evil ideology.”
Significantly,
US funding to Pakistan has been gradually drying up, and
committed resources were recently
blocked by Congress because the Secretary
of Defence refused to certify that Islamabad had ‘done
enough’ against terrorist formations – particularly the
Haqqani Network – operating from its soil into Afghanistan.
Several terrorist formations – proxies of Pakistani state
entities – operating in Afghanistan and in India, have
also been put on to the US proscribed terrorist organizations’
list by successive US administrations, the latest being
the Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen,
headquartered at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
(PoK). Nevertheless, effective and concrete actions against
most of these groupings and sanctions against their state
sponsors are yet to be seen. The language of Trump’s ‘new
strategy’, however, clearly puts Islamabad on notice.
The President describes as a “pillar of our new strategy”,
the change of approach on “how to deal with Pakistan”:
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We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe
havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban,
and other groups that pose a threat to the region
and beyond. Pakistan… has much to lose by continuing
to harbor criminals and terrorists… Pakistan has
also sheltered the same organizations that try every
single day to kill our people. We have been paying
Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the
same time they are housing the very terrorists that
we are fighting. But that will have to change,
and that will change immediately. No partnership
can survive a country’s harboring of militants and
terrorists who target U.S. service members and officials.
It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment
to civilization, order, and to peace.
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Crucially,
Trump redefines, with absolute clarity, the US engagement
in Afghanistan:
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We are not nation-building again. We are killing
terrorists… That’s why we will also expand authority
for American armed forces to target the terrorist
and criminal networks that sow violence and chaos
throughout Afghanistan. These killers need to know
they have nowhere to hide; that no place is beyond
the reach of American might and Americans arms.
Retribution will be fast and powerful… From now
on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking
our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al Qaeda,
preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan,
and stopping mass terror attacks against America
before they emerge.
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This is
what troubles the liberal mind most. The notion that military
campaigns with an explicit emphasis on ‘killing’ are posited
as the critical element in a counter-terrorism strategy;
no ‘addressing root causes’; no ‘negotiated settlements’;
no ‘political’ and ‘diplomatic’ initiatives.
The rawness
of Trump’s language lends itself easily to parody and
exaggeration; to a representation of the President as
extremist and somehow unhinged. The strategy that Trump
proposes is, however, well supported by the history of
counter-insurgency successes, the most dramatic and comprehensive
of which have resulted precisely from ‘killing terrorists’.
However, not all terrorists are necessary or desirable
targets. It is the attrition of leadership and core infrastructure
that is crucial, and where these are destroyed, movements
disappear. But in the present case, it is not just the
Taliban or the Haqqani network leaderships that matter;
the principal leadership of the insurgency/terrorism in
Afghanistan lies in the Pakistan military leadership and
this will require a whole new level of strategy to address.
Nevertheless, the efficacy of targeting terrorist leaderships
and infrastructure has been demonstrated again and again
and is, indeed, currently being demonstrated in Iraq and
Syria. Trump demonstrates a clear awareness of this, observing,
“As we lift restrictions and expand authorities in the
field, we are already seeing dramatic results in the campaign
to defeat ISIS, including the liberation of Mosul in Iraq.”
If terrorist leaderships and infrastructure in AfPak can
be effectively targeted and destroyed, their sponsors
in Pakistan’s military will have little option but to
accept defeat.
It is ironic
in this context that Russia has chosen to criticize the
Trump strategy, even as it has been one of the most vigorous
advocates of the lethal use of force – at least on occasion
with counter-productive consequences – against terrorism.
Indeed, it was an aggressive Russian intervention in favour
of the Syrian state that transformed the tepid
and compromised Western campaigns
in that country into an uncompromising and increasingly
successful campaign across the Iraq-Syria theatre.
None of
this is intended to suggest that the Trump approach has
just one component – lethal force – and ignores all other
instruments of strategic influence. Indeed, Trump speaks
explicitly of the “integration of all instruments of American
power – diplomatic, economic, and military – toward a
successful outcome.” But each component of strategy has
its own time and place. It has been sheer folly in the
past, to give terrorists and their state sponsors a privileged
place at the negotiating table, even as they continue
to escalate violence to exercise greater leverage in negotiating
processes. The Trump strategy does not repudiate other
instruments of influence, but recognizes clearly and correctly
that, while “Military power alone will not bring peace
to Afghanistan or stop the terrorist threat arising in
that country… strategically applied force aims to create
the conditions for a political process to achieve
a lasting peace” [emphasis added].
Crucially,
while the Trump strategy does indicate that there will
be a ‘surge’ of undefined proportions in US troop presence
in Afghanistan, surrounding circumstances – and the character
of the US-led campaigns in Iraq and Syria – suggest that
overwhelming reliance is to be placed on aerial targeting
of critical terrorist infrastructure and leaderships,
with local Afghan Forces seizing and holding the ground
after it has been ‘softened’ by targeted US air attacks.
Indeed, this approach has been in place in Afghanistan
even before the announcement of the new Trump strategy.
United States Air Force (USAF) data indicates that airstrikes
in Afghanistan rose from 705 in January to July 2016,
to 1,984 in January to July 2017. These strikes have disproportionately
– and very effectively – targeted
the incipient Islamic State of Khorasan infrastructure
in Afghanistan, but are yet to secure the scale and impact
necessary to reverse the growing
Taliban influence in the country.
Significantly,
the US determination to “attack terrorists wherever they
live” puts Pakistan clearly within the scope of future
campaigns. While this would not be a radical break with
the past – terrorists in Pakistan have been targeted by
US Drone and Aerial strikes on many occasions, prominently
including the killing of Osama bin Laden and, more recently,
the then Taliban chief Mullah Mansoor, on Pakistan soil
– it remains to be seen whether the scale and intensity
of such campaigns will augment dramatically.
Unsurprisingly,
the reaction to the announcement of the new Trump strategy
in Pakistan has been alarmed and negative, with the establishment
rejecting the ‘false narrative’ it imposes on the ‘complex
realities’ of the conflict, and arguing, “You can’t single
out one nation. There is not only one nation destabilizing
Afghanistan.” Some reactions have been a little less restrained,
with the Chairman of Pakistan’s Senate, Mian Raza Rabbani,
for instance, declaring, “If President of US wants that
Pakistan should be graveyard of American army, then we
will welcome them (sic)”. The Pakistani narrative
is, moreover, increasingly clear: create paranoia about
a ‘nuclear armed state’ at the edge of the abyss, and
also raise the bogey of Islamabad’s push into a rogue
alliance with China, Russia and Iran, as US sanctions
or punitive actions mount. Thus, Amir Rana, Director of
the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, warned that isolating
Pakistan as the ‘sole culprit’ could stymie efforts to
stabilize the region and increase the influence of Russia,
China and even Iran. Russian and Chinese responses to
the Trump strategy have been uniformly critical.
The declaration
of a new US strategy for Afghanistan – or the wider South
Asian region – has immense importance, and has already
triggered the beginnings of geo-strategic realignments
in the region. It will, however, prove decisive only in
the magnitude, quality and endurance of its implementation.
Half measures and indiscriminate campaigns will both fail,
but the potential for success, if appropriate scale and
persistence can be attained, is unprecedented. It remains
to be seen whether Trump’s policy will endure or, indeed,
whether Trump would himself last out his full term – a
prospect that both critics and supporters increasingly
doubt.
Crucially,
it is useful to remind ourselves that, despite the periodic
theatrics of public and mass murders executed by Islamist
terrorists, this is far from the best of times to be of
this persuasion. These movements and their state sponsors
are, as has been remarked earlier,
on the wrong side of history, and their ideological underpinnings
are based on an incorrect understanding of the nature
of power.
Unfortunately,
there has been a tremendous loss of confidence and of
legitimacy on the part of democratic leaderships across
the world, and an unwillingness to commit themselves to
consistent counter-terrorism goals in an environment where
petty ‘great games’ continue to define and dominate the
conduct of nations.
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