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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 16, No. 3, July 17, 2017
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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J&K:
Pervasive Negligence
Ajit
Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
On July
10, 2017, at around 8:20 pm, a bus bearing Gujarat Registration
number GJ 09 Z 9976, carrying pilgrims returning from
the Amarnath Shrine was attacked in the Batangoo area,
near Pahalgam, in Anantnag District. At least seven persons,
including five women, were killed, and another 19 were
injured in the attack. Four of the dead were from Gujarat,
two from Maharashtra and one was from Daman. Of the 19
injured, 11 were from Gujarat, and eight from Maharashtra.
One of the injured, a woman from Gujarat, died in the
hospital on July 16 raising the death toll to eight.
Though
media reports claim that there had been attacks targeting
Amarnath pilgrims since 1993, no specific details regarding
the early attacks are available in the open source. According
to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database,
the first attacks on record were between August 5 and
9, when a series of sporadic attacks were engineered by
the Harkat ul Ansar (HuA),
though there were no casualties.
The first
prominent attack, however, took place on August 1, 2000.
On that day terrorists had attacked a pilgrim base camp
on the Pahalgam Route killing 32 persons, of which 21
were Amarnath pilgrims. This remains the worst attack
to date, in terms of fatalities. The second major attack
was recorded in the night of July 20, 2001, when terrorists
opened fire killing at least 13 people, including six
pilgrims, near a base camp on the Pahalgam Route. Seven
Muslims, mainly shopkeepers and porters, were also killed.
Again, on August 6, 2002, at least eight persons were
killed and 30 injured in an attack on the Nunwan camp
on the Pahalgam Route.
Since then,
according to partial data compiled by the SATP, another
at least three attacks targeting Amarnath Pilgrims have
been reported, which resulted in two fatalities and 19
injured. The last of the attacks, prior to July 10, 2017,
occurred on August 13, 2016. At least 18 persons, including
nine pilgrims, were injured, six of them seriously, when
a terrorist lobbed a grenade at Bagh Deodi near Akhara
Mandir in Poonch town.
The Amarnath
cave is situated at an elevation of 13,500 feet, and there
are two designated routes to reach to the shrine: the
Pahalgam Route and Baltal Route. The Pahlgam Route has
11 base camps (Nunwan, Chandanwari, Pissu Top, Zojibal,
Nagakoti, Sheshnag, Wabal, Mahagunus Top, Poshpatri, Panchtarni,
Sangam) extending across 46 kilometers. The Baltal Route
has six camps (Domail, Rail Pathri 1, Rail Pathri 2, Barari
Marg, Y Junction, Sangam) across a distance of 14 kilometers.
Though the Baltal Route is shorter, it is less preferred
because of the difficult terrain. It is the Pahalgam Route
that attracts the largest number of pilgrims.
The Amarnath
Pilgrimage had for long remained on the terrorists’ radar.
The terrorists had, for the first time, 'banned' the Pilgrimage
in 1994, demanding removal of security bunkers around
the Hazratbal Shrine [the Shrine had been under terrorist
'occupation' for over a month in 1993 and after restoring
orders the Security Forces (SFs) had put up bunkers].
HuA led the demand and was later joined by several other
terror groups. The security bunkers were removed subsequently
and the terror groups withdrew the 'ban'. The HuA again
'banned' the pilgrimage in 1995 in the aftermath of the
Charar-e-Sharief shrine incident – in May 1995 an encounter
between SFs and terrorists had resulted in significant
damage to the shrine. Such threats have been reiterated
time and again thereafter.
The number
of pilgrims, on year on year basis, has varied, depending
mostly on the terrorism situation in the State, though
inclement weather during the pilgrimage period has sometimes
also played a role. According to official figures, the
number of Pilgrims going to the Amaranth Shrine was 392,653
in 2009; 451,710 in 2010; 635,611 in 2011; 621,145 in
2012; 353,969 in 2013; 372,909 in 2014; 352,771 in 2015;
220,490 in 2016 and 202,705 in 2017 (till July 16, 2017).
According
to partial data compiled by SATP, Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K) accounted for a total of at least 375 terrorism-linked
fatalities in 2009; 375 in 2010; 183 in 2011; 117 in 2012;
181 in 2013; 193 in 2014; 174 in 2015; 267 in 2016 and
183 in 2017 (till July 16, 2017).
The level
violence has certainly surged since 2013 and appears to
be continuing on an upward trajectory, significantly diminishing
the number of pilgrims in 2016 and 2017. Given the circumstances,
elaborate and robust security coverage to pilgrimage,
particularly around the Pahlgam Route which has witnessed
all the four major recorded attacks so far, was an imperative.
On June 27, 2017, S.N. Shrivastava, Special Director General,
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), had claimed, "This
Amarnath yatra will have the highest-ever security
setup to ensure an incident-free yatra.” According
to reports, in addition to the existing strength of the
CRPF in the State, the Centre provided over 250 companies
of Central Armed Police Forces to the State Government,
adding to five battalions provided by the Army. For the
first time ever, drones and helicopters were also used
for aerial surveillance.
There was
also specific intelligence regarding terrorist plans to
target the pilgrimage. On June 25, 2017, Munir Khan, Inspector
General of Police (IGP), Kashmir Zone, had written a letter
to the Indian Army, CRPF, and Deputy Inspectors General
of the State Police, stating,
Intelligence input received from SSP [Senior Superintendent
of Police] Anantnag reveals that terrorists have
been directed to eliminate 100 to 150 pilgrims and
about 100 police officers and officials [this year].
The attack may be in the form of stand-off fire
on yatra convoy which they believe will result in
flaring of communal tensions throughout the nation.
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laborate
security cover ensured that the pilgrims registered with
and coordinated by the Shrine Board remained protected,
but an incomprehensible lacuna which allowed the unregulated
movement of ‘independent vehicles’ and unregistered pilgrims
resulted in the avoidable tragedy of July 10, 2017, in
which seven pilgrims lost their lives and another 19 were
injured. Though the Jammu and Kashmir Police constituted
a six-member Special Investigation Team (SIT) on July
14, 2017, to look into the specifics of the attack and
to hold people accountable, criminal
negligence on the part of the chain
of decision-makers in the whole process that allowed unregulated
movement of pilgrims across high-risk routes in the night
cannot be denied on the basis of information available
thus far.
Some knee-jerk
responses have already been initiated. The time of patrolling
of Road Opening Parties (RoP) has been extended and every
(pilgrimage) vehicle is to be checked. No pilgrim vehicle
without is now allowed to ply without registration with
the authorities, and drivers have been instructed to move
to or call the nearest protected point in case of a breakdown
of the vehicle or any unplanned delay or change in schedule.
These very
rudimentary steps should have been in place well before
the attack. Their absence demonstrates an inexplicable
blindness on the part of the administration and security
setup, despite decades of experience of the disorders
in J&K, and despite the visible escalation in violence
in the recent past.
SFs have
inflicted tremendous
losses on the terrorist formations
active in J&K – particularly Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
– forcing these groups on to the back foot. At this juncture,
attacks such as the July 10 strike, which draw attention
to existing faultlines within the security establishment
and in the State, provide an impetus to the terrorist
machinery and encourage its supporters – both domestic
and foreign. SFs and their political masters must out-think
and outmaneuver terrorist formations and their sponsors,
rather than pursue belated 'corrective measures’ after
facing predictable and intermittent reverses.
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Balochistan:
Forces under Fire
Tushar
Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The Superintendent
of Police (SP), Mubarak Shah, and three of his Police
guards were shot dead when motorcycle-borne terrorists
opened indiscriminate fire at a Police Mobile unit while
it was patrolling in the Killi Deba area of Quetta, the
provincial capital of Balochistan, on July 13, 2017. Senior
Police Official Abdul Razzaq Cheema disclosed that the
attackers opened fire from different directions, killing
Quaidabad SP Mubarak Shah and his three Police guards,
adding that terrorists managed to escape from the scene
of the crime. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
faction, Jama’at-ul-Ahrar (JuA), claimed responsibility
for the attack. Asad Mansur, JuA spokesman, claimed in
a message issued on social media after the incident, “We
carried out the armed attack on police officials.”
Just three
days earlier, the District Police Officer (DPO) of Qilla
Abdullah, Sajid Khan Mohmand, and his security guard and
driver were killed and over 10 other people, including
five Police personnel, were injured in a suicide blast
in the border town of Chaman in the Qilla Abdullah District
of Balochistan on July 10, 2017. Sources indicated that
DPO Mohmand was on an inspection of the Eidgah area of
Boghara Road with his team, when the suicide bomber riding
a motorcycle blew himself up after hitting the Police
vehicle. Mohmand died on the spot as the suicide bomber
hit the vehicle on the side where he was sitting. The
TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.
On June
23, 2017, seven Policemen were among 13 killed, while
20 others were injured in a suicide attack near the office
of the Balochistan Police Chief on Gulistan Road, Quetta.
The Police stated that the bomber blew up his vehicle
after he was stopped by law enforcement personnel for
screening, while he was suspiciously circling the area.
The Bomb Disposal Squad (BDS) confirmed that the explosives
were planted in the vehicle. "The blast took place
near the IGP (Inspector General of Police) office and
it´s possible the assailants were trying to enter the
(Army) cantonment which is close by," Provincial
Government Spokesman Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar said. Two separate
outfits, JuA and the Islamic State, claimed responsibility
for the attack.
On June
19, 2017, two Navy sailors were shot dead and three others
were wounded when their vehicle was ambushed by four assailants
on two motorcycles in the Jiwani area of Gwadar District.
The sailors were transporting iftar items during a routine
run from Jiwani town, when their vehicle came under attack.
There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack.
On June
11, 2017, three Balochistan Constabulary personnel were
killed and one wounded in a gun attack on a check post
in the Chakki Shahwani area of the Sariab Road in Quetta.
Balochistan Deputy Inspector General of Police Abdul Razzaq
Cheema disclosed that four unidentified assailants riding
two motorcycles had opened fire on the check post.
Against
the backdrop of a renewed wave of targeted attacks against
Senior Police Officers in Balochistan, Chief of the Army
Staff (CoAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa arrived in Quetta
on July 14 and reviewed the security situation prevailing
in the restive Province. According to a statement issued
by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the Army
Chief was apprised that “terrorists in desperation” were
targeting law enforcement agencies and soft targets since
there had been a phenomenal reduction in targeted killings
on sectarian grounds in the Province.
The first
six and half months of the year, however, have registered
dramatic declines in violence against Security Force (SF)
personnel in Balochistan, as compared to the same period
in 2016. A 39.68 per cent decrease in SFs fatalities was
recorded, from 63 SF personnel killed in 2016, down to
38 such fatalities in 2017. Nevertheless, Balochistan
still leads among all the Provinces of the country on
this index. According to partial data compiled by the
Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), out of
the 38 SF personnel killed in the Province in 2017, 26
were killed in Northern Balochistan, while the remaining
12 were killed in Southern Balochistan. As has been noted
in the past, the North is afflicted by Islamist extremist
groups such as TTP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ);
Baloch nationalist insurgent groups operate in the South.
The major Baloch insurgent groups include the Baloch Republican
Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan
Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA).
A North-South
breakup of SF fatalities over the last seven years indicates
that SF fatalities in North Balochistan are consistently
higher than South Balochistan, while extra-judicial killings
of civilians account for a large proportion of the killings
in South Balochistan.
Balochistan
North-South SFs breakup
Year
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Balochistan
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North
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South
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2011
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122
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79
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43
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2012
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178
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116
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62
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2013
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137
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79
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58
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2014
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83
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60
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23
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2015
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90
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61
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29
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2016
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153
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130
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23
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2017
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38
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26
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12
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Total
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801
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551
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250
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Sources:
SATP, *Data updated till July 16, 2017.
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The higher
levels of SF killings in South Balochistan in 2011-13
was the direct result of the extra-judicial killings of
civilians by SFs, and the retaliatory targeted killing
of SF personnel by ethnic Baloch insurgents. Despite,
continued civilian killings, however, the retaliatory
killing of SF personnel has seen a downward trend. Through
2016, at least 251 civilians were killed in Balochistan,
of which some 138 were attributable to one or other terrorist
or insurgent formation. The remaining 113 'unattributed'
fatalities were overwhelmingly the work of the State
apparatus and its surrogates..
Of the
3,880 civilian fatalities recorded in Balochistan since
2004 [data till July 16, 2017], at least 1,090 have been
attributable to one or other terrorist/insurgent outfit.
Of these, 371 civilian killings (205 in the South and
166 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist
formations, while Islamist and sectarian extremist formations
– primarily LeJ, TTP and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of
India) – claimed responsibility for another 719 civilian
killings, 660 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta)
and 59 in the South. The 373 civilian killings attributed
to Baloch formations include at least 155 Punjabi settlers
since 2006. The remaining 2,790 civilian fatalities –
1,675 in the South and 1,115 in the North – remain 'unattributed'.
A large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities, particularly
in the Southern region, are believed to be the result
of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies,
or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Aman
Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace,
Balochistan). The large and continuously mounting number
of unattributed civilian fatalities reconfirms the widespread
conviction that security agencies engage in 'kill and
dump' operations against local Baloch dissidents, a reality
that Pakistan's Supreme Court has clearly
recognized.
According
to the Federal Ministry of Human Rights, at least 936
dead bodies of ‘disappeared’ persons, often mutilated
and bearing the signs of torture, have been found in Balochistan
since 2011. Figures obtained from the Federal Ministry
of Human Rights by the BBC Urdu on December 30, 2016,
pointed to large-scale extrajudicial killings by state
agencies and their proxies. Most of them were dumped in
Quetta, Qalat, Khuzdar and Makran areas where the separatist
insurgency has its roots. The irony is that none of mainstream
media reported such state sponsored atrocities, as media
reporting from these areas is strictly forbidden. The
International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons
(IVBMP) says it has recorded 1,200 cases of dumped bodies
and there are many more it has not been able to document.
According
to IVBMP, Pakistani Forces (military, Frontier Corps,
intelligence and Paramilitary) have abducted 480, killed
26 persons including women and children, and torched at
least 500 properties in more than 100 offensives from
March 1 to March 31, 2017. Only 30 persons among those
abducted have been released so far. None of the abducted
persons have been presented to any court or given the
right to defend themselves. Balochistan’s Dasht, Tump,
Mand, Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Quetta, and Makran regions have
been the most affected areas, where Pakistani military
carried out attacks and offensives against Baloch civilians.
Recently on July 8, 2017, three civilians were killed
and 265 were abducted by the Army from Dera Bugti and
Mastung. The Army also reportedly ‘stole’ civilian property
and valuables, including 300 camels.
While the
SFs are engaged in a systematic campaign of extermination
of the ethnic Baloch people through enforced disappearances
and extrajudicial killings, they are, in turn, frequently
targeted by Islamist terrorist formations such as TTP
and LeJ in the northern Districts. 833 Policemen, including
17 DSPs, two DIGs and other Police Officials have been
killed in numerous attacks including suicide hits and
target killing in recent years, according to a July,
13, 2017, report quoting data collected from Balochistan
Police Headquarters.
The Balochistan
Government has prepared a new security plan for Quetta
and other troubled Districts in the Province, in the wake
of nation-wide terror attacks in the month of January.
Official sources claimed, on February 19, that under the
security plan jointly prepared by the Police, Frontier
Corps and other security agencies, profiling of houses
in the provincial capital would be carried out to track
down the elements working as facilitators of banned outfits.
A ban has been imposed on residing in mosques, seminaries,
schools and Government buildings, each of which is required
to get itself registered with the Police Station concerned.
Registration of tenants has been made mandatory, with
legal penalties for any failure to comply. Under the plan,
the hosts will have to inform a committee to be formed
by the area Police Station about the visit of any guests.
Terrorist
and insurgent attacks on SFs at regular intervals have
punched holes in the state’s security approach and orientation
in the Province. The complex, multilayered, seemingly
never-ending security crisis in Balochistan persists.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
July
10-16, 2017
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Civilians
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorists/Insurgents
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Total
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INDIA
|
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Jammu and
Kashmir
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8
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0
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10
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18
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Manipur
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1
|
1
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0
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2
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Left-Wing
Extremism
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Bihar
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3
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0
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0
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3
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Chhattisgarh
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1
|
0
|
0
|
1
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Maharashtra
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0
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0
|
3
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3
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INDIA (Total)
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13
|
1
|
13
|
27
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PAKISTAN
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Balochistan
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0
|
7
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7
|
14
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FATA
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0
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0
|
2
|
2
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Sindh
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0
|
0
|
1
|
1
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PAKISTAN
(Total)
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0
|
7
|
10
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17
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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