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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 50, June 12, 2017
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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NSCN-K:
Decisive Moment, Uncertain Outcomes
Nijeesh
N.
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
Shangwang
Shangyung Khaplang widely known as S.S. Khaplang, the
‘chairman’ of the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K)
died in the evening of June 9, 2017, after a prolonged
illness in a hospital at Taga in the Sagaing Division
of Myanmar. Confirming his death, Indian intelligence
sources disclosed that Khaplang, who belonged to the Hemi
Naga tribe, had lately moved to Taga, the NSCN-K’s headquarters,
from his native village Waktham, east of the Pangsau Pass
on the Arunachal Pradesh-Myanmar border. According to
reports, Khaplang is likely to be buried near the ‘NSCN-K
Council Headquarters' in Taga in Myanmar on June 12, 2017.
Athong Makury from the 'Council of Naga Affairs (CNA),
the apex body of Naga people in Myanmar, announced on
June 11 that the funeral would take place in the presence
of “revolutionary parties of WESEA Region and civil representatives
from all the Naga inhabited areas.”
Media reports
citing ‘sources within’ NSCN-K meanwhile stated that the
‘vice-chairman’ of the outfit, Khango Konyak, would replace
Khaplang as the new ‘chairman’. Khango Konyak was elected
as ‘vice-chairman’ of the outfit on May 20, 2011 and Khaplang
had earlier issued a statement declaring, “Konyak stood
steadfast for the rights of the Naga people through thick
and thin.” Nevertheless, a power struggle remains a possibility,
with reports also indicating that ‘brigadier’ Peyong Konyak,
and senior leader Akhio Konyak were also contenders for
the next NSCN-K ‘chairman’.
Unlike
Khaplang who was a Hemi Naga from Myanmar, Khango Konyak
is a Konyak Naga from the Mon District of Nagaland. As
one of the senior cadres in the outfit, Khango Konyak
was known as Khaplang’s ‘most trusted man’. Khaplang,
who has not been keeping well for some time had entrusted
all administration and public affairs of the outfit to
Khango Konyak. Most visiting delegations to NSCNK’s base
camp at Taga had been meeting with Khango Konyak. Though
the Indian nationality of Khango Konyak is an advantage
for New Delhi to reach out to him in order to get NSCN-K
back into ceasefire mode, his defiant stand in the past
will be a major hurdle, as he has expressed reservations
on the ceasefire process with India.
Khaplang’s
death will certainly hamper the ‘peace talks’ between
the Government and NSCN-K, which began recently. Nagaland
Chief Minister Shurhozelie Liezietsu disclosed, in his
condolence message, that the State Government had recently
sent delegations to meet the NSCN-K leadership in Myanmar
to convince the group to re-enter into the peace process
with the Government of India to find an early solution
to the Naga political problem: "And it was encouraging
to learn that Mr Khaplang had, a few months back, conveyed
his willingness to have dialogue with the Government provided
‘issues of substance’ were discussed.”
Khaplang
is believed to have exercised huge influence over the
Myanmarese authorities. On April 9, 2012, NSCN-K signed
a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar Government, as
a result of which NSCN-K members were given freedom to
move 'unarmed' across the country. Khaplang exercised
near untrammelled authority over vast ungoverned spaces
along the Indo-Myanmar border, and a tacit agreement that
preserved this influence had been in place with Myanmar’s
military junta at least since 2001. Not only had
Khaplang established long-standing military bases in the
Sagaing region, he was able to provide safe haven and
camps to a number of other militant formations operating
in India’s Northeast. On January 10, 2017, Additional
Director-General of Police (ADGP), Assam, L.R. Bishnoi
observed, "Taking into account at least ten North-eastern
rebel groups having their bases and hideouts in Myanmar,
there should be close to 2,500 militants from the region
in that country. Of them NSCN-K alone has a little over
1,000 men, followed by around 260 of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA),
230 of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
and a little over 200 of the Independent faction of United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I).”
Significantly, on July 16, 2016, during the first India-Myanmar
Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) Meeting held in New
Delhi, India reportedly asked Myanmar to hand over four
top NSCN-K leaders, including S.S. Khaplang, ‘military
commander’, ‘military advisor’ Niki Sumi, ‘brigadier’
Kurichu Pochury, and ‘kilonser’ Y. Asang.
The top
leadership of the NSCN-K remains inside Myanmar. It is
to be seen what impact Khaplang’s death will have on their
relationship with the Myanmar Government. NSCN-K’s operational
capabilities in India’s Northeast depend heavily on their
presence and safe havens in Myanmar.
NSCN-K,
along with the Isak-Muivah faction of National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM),
was formed on April 30, 1988, when the principal split
within the parent National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) took place. Clannish divisions among the Nagas
(Konyak and Tangkhul) were the primary reason for the
fracture. The Konyak and Pangmei (Naga tribes largely
found in Myanmar) dominated NSCN-K under the leadership
of Khole Konyak and ‘Chairman’ S.S. Khaplang. NSCN-IM
constituted the mainly Tangkhul faction, and was led by
‘president’ Isak Chisi Swu and T. Muivah. Other prominent
leaders of the undivided NSCN-K were ‘general secretary’
N. Kitovi Zhimomi and ‘publicity secretary’ Akaho Asumi.
On November 23, 2007, several NSCN-IM cadres led by its
one-time ‘home minister’ Azheto Chopey broke away from
the group and formed a new outfit called the NSCN – Unification
(NSCN-U) also known as Neokpao–Khitovi faction of NSCN
(NSCN-NK). The NSCN-K split further in 2011 when two senior
founding leaders of the outfit N. Kitovi Zhimoni, the
Ato Kilonser (Prime Minister) and Khole Konyak, broke
away to form a new group called Khole-Kitovi faction of
NSCN (NSCN-KK).
On April
28, 2001, NSCN-K signed a ceasefire agreement with the
Government of India (GoI). The splinter NSCN-KK signed
a ceasefire agreement with GoI on April 27, 2012, and
these were extended annually. Meanwhile, NSCN-IM signed
a ceasefire agreement for an indefinite period as well
as an historic “framework
agreement” with GoI on August 3, 2015.
Crucially,
however, on March 27, 2015, NSCN-K unilaterally exited
the ceasefire, declaring that “any ‘meaningful peace and
political interaction’ between the two entities (NSCN-K
and GoI) should be premised on the concept that Nagas
were sovereign people”. Soon after, the Reformation faction
of NSCN (NSCN-R) was formed on April 6, 2015, by two senior
'kilonsers' (ministers), Wangtin Konyak, also known as
Y. Wangtin Naga, and T. Tikhak. The duo had attended the
ceasefire supervisory board (CFSB) meeting at Chumukedima
(Dimapur) on March 27, 2015, defying S.S. Khaplang’s diktat
and were consequently ‘expelled’. A ceasefire agreement
with NSCN-R was signed on April 27, 2015. The GoI recently
renewed the ceasefire agreement with NSCN-R and NSCN-U,
for a further period of one year with effect from April
28, 2017.
After the
unilateral withdrawal from ceasefire agreement and a series
of attacks on Security Forces (SFs), including the killing
of 18 Army persons at Chandel in Manipur on June 4, 2015,
by NSCN-K, GoI banned NSCN-K for five years, on September
16, 2015, under the Unlawful Activities [Prevention] Act
(UAPA), 1967. Subsequently, on November 16, 2015, the
Central Government declared NSCN-K a terrorist organization.
The ceasefire
with NSCN-K, which was only enforceable within Nagaland,
had hardly been peaceful. According to partial data compiled
by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the
outfit was involved in at least 282 fatalities (25 civilian,
eight SF personnel and 249 militants) between April 28,
2001, (the date of signing of the ceasefire agreement)
and March 27, 2015, (the date of abrogation of the ceasefire)
in Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh. The
large number of militant fatalities are at least partially
an index of the turf wars between extremist formations,
particularly including various factions of NSCN. After
the abrogation of the ceasefire, NSCN-K has been found
involved in several militant attacks in three Northeastern
States – Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland. According
to partial data compiled by SATP, NSCN-K was linked to
a total of 79 fatalities (seven civilians and 32 SFs personnel,
and 40 NSCN-K militants) in the three States since March
27, 2015 (all data till June 10, 2017). During the same
period, these three States had recorded a total of 208
fatalities (53 civilians and 56 SF personnel and 99 militants).
NSCN-K was linked to 37.98 per cent of fatalities (12.5
per cent of civilian fatalities, 57 per cent of the SF
fatalities and 40.4 per cent of the militant fatalities)
among the at least 19 currently active groups in these
three States.
Unsurprisingly,
SFs had intensified their offensive against NSCN-K soon
after the June 4, 2015, Chandel attack. At least 40 NSCN-K
militants have since been killed. Among those neutralized
were ‘captain’ Wangchuk and ‘2nd lieutenant’ Tokihe Yepthomi.
SFs also arrested 128 NSCN-K militants, including 'health
minister-cum-political advisor' Ngamsinlung Panmei and
‘captain’ Atoka aka Kughahoto Sema.
SFs have,
indeed, succeeded in minimizing the immediate threat originating
from NSCN-K. Khaplang’s death is likely to provide them
further relief, at least till the leadership issue is
clearly settled. Khaplang’s death will also open up leadership
issues in the United National Liberation Front of West
East South Asia (UNLFWESA)
. Significantly, after suffering losses at the hands of
the SFs in the region, various northeast militants groups,
including ULFA-I, the IK Songbijit faction of the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS);
and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO),
had joined hands to work under the banner of the umbrella
UNLFWESA, which was formed on April 17, 2015, in Myanmar,
and mostly
concentrated its increasing terror
activities in the Indo-Myanmar border Districts. The Front,
headed by S.S. Khaplang, was formed with the aim to set
up a ‘northeast government-in-exile’, reportedly to be
based in Myanmar.
Despite
speculative assessments of a diminution of capabilities
– even if transient – the NSCN-K capacities and threat
remain formidable. Since the organisation’s principal
infrastructure and cadre base lies in safe havens in Myanmar
and is under no urgent threat – notwithstanding the showcasing
of the June 9, 2015, operation ‘inside Myanmar’, a few
kilometers beyond a notional border – the incentive to
intensify the spiral of violence certainly remains.
Indeed,
in the Northeast Security Review meeting, chaired by Union
Home Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh, held at New Delhi on
May 16, 2017 it was emphasized that five contiguous Districts
of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland along the Indo-Myanmar
border (Tirap, Changlang and Longding Districts of Arunachal;
and Mon and Tuensang Districts of Nagaland) had emerged
as the hub of the ‘last
remaining militants’ in the Northeast.
Significantly, on June 6, 2017, Major David Manlun of
the Army's 1st Naga Regiment, who was on deputation
to the 164th Territorial Army, a civilian and
three militants were killed during an encounter in an
area between Lapa Lempong and Oting villages near the
Tizit Subdivision of Mon District in Nagaland, along the
India-Myanmar border. Three troopers were also critically
injured in the encounter. Following information about
the presence of militants belonging to the ULFA-I and
NSCN-K in the area, SFs launched an operation, during
which they were targeted. Army sources disclosed that
the militants had sneaked in from Myanmar into Mon District
to carry out attacks against Army personnel. Two AK-56
rifles, an AK-47 rifle, nine magazines, 277 rounds of
ammunition, two hand grenades, four mobile handsets, medicines,
blankets, sharp weapons and other warlike stores were
recovered from the encounter site.
More worryingly,
activities like extortion and illegal 'tax collection',
which provide the oxygen for the survival for these militant
formations remain widespread. On April 26, 2017, the National
Investigation Agency (NIA) arrested three senior officials
of the Nagaland Government for their alleged role in large-scale
extortion and illegal 'tax collection' on behalf of the
NSCN-K from various Government Departments. On August
1, 2016, NIA registered a case following the arrest of
an NSCN-K militant, S. Khetoshe Sumi, from Dimapur on
July 31, 2016. The subsequent probe revealed that at least
12 Government departments in the State regularly paid
huge amounts of money to members of NSCN-K and other militant
organizations, including NSCN-IM, NSCN-R, Naga National
Council (NNC), among others. Subsequently, on May 4, 2017,
in a statement issued to the media, NSCN-K declared that
it would not tolerate any departmental authorities collaborating
with NIA and threatened ‘punitive actions’ against those
‘conniving’ with the agency. NSCN-K also asserted that
it would continue to levy ‘reasonable and affordable taxes’
on the people for the sustenance of their ‘national struggle’.
There can
be no ambiguity in the Government’s strategy to deal with
NSCN-K. Any attempt to enter into formal talks with the
outfit must be preceded by an unequivocal assurance from
the group that it will not engage in armed violence, and
any agreement to this effect would need to be implemented
in toto on the ground.
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What
Pakistan Wants
Ajit
Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
In a scathing
commentary on Pakistan’s direct role in Afghanistan’s
continuing misery, Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani
declared that Afghanistan could not “figure out” Pakistan’s
intention. Delivering a speech at the first meeting of
the Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation on
June 6, 2017, Ghani stated,
… We want to be able to trust Pakistan. And we want
the chance for friendly, cooperative relationships
that will reduce poverty and promote growth on both
sides of the Durand line. Our problem, our challenge,
is that we cannot figure out what is it that Pakistan
wants. What will it take to convince Pakistan that
a stable Afghanistan helps them and helps our region?
We continue to make an unconstrained offer for a
state-to-state peace dialogue. But we cannot – nor
can any signatory to the UN Counter-Terrorism Convention
– accept that the global consensus against terrorism
is not acted upon. So we again call on the Government
of Pakistan to propose its agenda and a mechanism
for that dialogue which can lead to peace and prosperity…
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The meeting
was attended by representatives of 24 countries and three
international entities, the European Union (EU), the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations
(UN). Explaining the
Kabul Process, the Afghan Ministry
of Foreign Affairs website says “while multiple fora have
been held to help with peace and security in Afghanistan
and the region over the past few years… the purpose of
the Kabul conference is to place the Afghan Government
as the key driving force for achieving peace, with the
earnest support of regional and international partners.”
Meanwhile,
in the most recent assertion of Pakistan’s direct role
in terror activities inside Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s
National Directorate of Security in a statement released
on May 31, 2017, noted, “The plan for today's [Wednesday's]
attack was drawn up by the Haqqani network with direct
coordination and cooperation from Pakistan's Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI)." The statement referred to the
May 31, 2017, suicide attack in Kabul, referred to as
one of the deadliest attacks in Kabul since 2001, in which
at least 150 people were killed and over 400 other injured.
Most of the victims were civilians. The explosion went
off near Zanbaq Square in the Wazir Akbar Khan area, where
most of the foreign embassies located. Though no fatalities
among the foreign embassy people were reported, there
were reports of damages to the buildings of some foreign
embassies, including that of Germany, India, and Turkey.
Reiterating Pakistan’s direct role in the attack, the
Afghanistan Cricket Board (ACB), declared,
By killing innocent and destitute people today,
the enemies of Afghanistan's peace and stability
showed that they are not worthy of friendship and
will not change their stance against Afghans. In
light of findings of security services and calls
by the Afghan people, the ACB hereby cancels all
kinds of cricket matches and mutual relationship
agreement with the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB).
No agreement of friendly matches and mutual relationship
agreement is valid with a country where terrorists
are housed and provided safe havens.
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Indeed,
the surge in violence against civilians across Afghanistan
remains unabated. The United Nations Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in its latest quarterly report
released on April 25, 2017, disclosed that, in the first
quarter of 2017 (January 1 – March 31), it documented
2,181 civilian casualties (715 dead and 1,466 injured).
During the corresponding period of 2016, according to
the report released on April 17, 2016, UNAMA had documented
1,943 civilian casualties (600 deaths and 1,343 injured).
UNAMA reports which categorize civilian casualties by
“party to the conflict”, i.e., civilian fatalities by
Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), Pro-Government Forces
(PGFs), jointly by the AGEs and PGFs, and Unattributed
Explosive Remnants of War, states that while AGEs were
responsible for 60 per cent of the total casualties in
the first quarter of 2016, their involvement increased
to 62 per cent in 2017. According to partial data compiled
by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM),
at least another 240 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan
since April 1, 2017 (data till June 9).
Fatalities
among Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
also continue to remain alarmingly high. According to
the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s
(SIGAR) quarterly report released on April 30, 2017, from
January 1, 2017, through February 24, 2017, at least 807
ANDSF personnel were killed and 1,328 were wounded. SIGAR’s
quarterly report released on April 30, 2016, had stated
that in the first two months of 2016, at least 820 ANDSF
personnel were killed in action and 1,389 were wounded.
Worryingly
casualties among civilians and SF personnel have been
constantly rising. According to UNAMA, civilian fatalities
have increased, on year on year basis, since January 1,
2009, when UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian
casualties in Afghanistan, with an exception of 2012 when
they declined marginally from 7,842 in 2011 to 7,590 in
2012. Also, according to the SIGAR report, at least 6,637
ANDSF personnel were killed and 12,471 wounded in 2015.
The number of ANDSF personnel fatalities increased to
6,785 the period between January 1, 2016, and November
12, 2016. At least 11,777 personnel were wounded.
Though
there is no authoritative data on the number of terrorists/insurgents
killed in Afghanistan, according to partial data compiled
by the ICM, this figure is also increasing, on year on
year basis, since 2015. At least 6,030 militants were
killed in 2014, rising to 10, 628 in 2015, and further
to 11,469 in 2016. The current year has already seen at
least 4,318 insurgent fatalities. Most of the militants
killed belonged to the Taliban though, according to President
Ghani, there are at least 20 international terrorist groups
operating inside the country.
The emergence
of Islamic State and the resultant turf
war between the Taliban and the Islamic
State has further worsened the security situation. According
to the SIGAR quarterly report, as of February 20, 2017,
insurgents controlled or influenced around 11 per cent
of Afghanistan’s total territory. Significantly, insurgents
were controlling or had influence over just six per cent
of total territory in January 2016. Moreover, the Afghan
Government, which controlled or had influence over 71
per cent of territory in January 2016, now controls or
has influence over just 60 per cent of the territory.
The ‘contested areas’ increased from 23 per cent in January
2016 to 29 per cent in February 2017.
Pakistan
for long has been held responsible for Afghanistan’s prolonged
torments by almost all who are in the know of developments
in the region. Most recently, on April 17, 2017, US National
Security Advisor Gen H.R. McMaster, stated,
As all of us have hoped for many, many years, we
have hoped that Pakistani leaders will understand
that it is in their interest to go after (militant)
groups less selectively than they have in the past
and the best way to pursue their interest in Afghanistan
and elsewhere is through diplomacy and not through
the use of proxies that engage in violence.
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Thus far,
however, Pakistan has evaded any meaningful penalty for
sustaining its reprehensible strategies to rule Afghanistan
through its proxies (Taliban). Indeed, Islamabad continues
to receive funds for purportedly ‘waging war against terror’
and is also ceded a pivotal role in the Afghan peace process.
There are,
nevertheless, some early signs of changes. The Kabul Process
seeks to confer on Afghanistan the pivotal role in peace
talks. Almost all the earlier initiatives, including the
Qatar
Process and the
Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) process
had provided prominence to Pakistan. This was done primarily
because Pakistan had deceived a willfully gullible international
community into believing that peace could only be achieved
by making the Taliban the principal stake holder in the
talks process.
Ironically,
and despite the significant losses US and coalition Forces
have suffered as a result of proxies operating from Pakistani
soil, Washington has remained one of Pakistan’s principal
backers, and forged its Af-Pak
policy on the assumption of centrality
of Islamabad’s role and of bringing Taliban to the negotiating
table. However, as SAIR has noted earlier,
a US revaluation of its Af-Pak policy has been under consideration
since Donald Trump assumed the Presidency. Indeed, during
a press conference in Canberra, Australia, US Secretary
of Defence James Mattis stated on June 5, 2017,
As far as Afghanistan goes, as Secretary Tillerson
[US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson] said, the
policy is under review, but at the same time we’re
up against an enemy that knows that they cannot
win at the ballot box, and you think – we have to
sometimes remind ourselves of that reality. That’s
why they use bombs, because ballots would ensure
they never had a role to play, and based upon that
foundation, that they cannot win the support, the
affection, the respect of the Afghan people... But
the bottom line is we’re not going to surrender
civilization to people who cannot win at the ballot
box..
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Tillersons’s
statement originally noted,
As to the Afghanistan policy which is still under
development and review, so there is no conclusion…
I think clearly, though, what we do understand is
we can never allow Afghanistan to become a platform
for terrorism to operate from. And so our commitment
to Afghanistan is to ensure that it never becomes
a safe haven for terrorists to launch attacks against
the civilized world or against any other part of
the world or any of their neighbors. And so this
is really a question of what is the end state and
how do we reach that end state, and that’s part
of the policy review that is still under development
so I don’t want to go further than I would say the
thinking currently in the administration is, but
other than to say we are committed to ensuring Afghanistan
does not become that platform from which terrorist
activities can be launched… [sic]
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While the
persisting incoherence of US policy is apparent in this
statement, there are indications that the US may deny
Taliban and Islamabad centrality in any process to secure
a ‘political solution’ in Afghanistan. This would constitute
a major shift in US policy, and a sustained commitment
to such a posture would help Afghanistan emerge stronger.
It would also help isolate Pakistan further. The critical
question would then no longer be “What does Pakistan want?”
Rather, Afghanistan would be helped to secure progressive
control over its own destiny.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
June
5-11, 2017
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Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorists/Insurgents
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Total
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BANGLADEH
|
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
BANGLADESH
(Total)
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
INDIA
|
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
0
|
1
|
13
|
14
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Nagaland
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
Left-Wing
Extremism
|
|
Jharkhand
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
|
3
|
2
|
21
|
26
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
2
|
3
|
0
|
5
|
KP
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
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|
|
|
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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