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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 46, May 15, 2017
 
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Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Balochistan:
Unabated Bloodshed
Tushar
Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
At least
10 labourers were killed and another two injured when
unidentified motorcycle borne assailants opened fire at
a construction site in the Pishgan area of Gwadar town
in Balochistan on May 13, 2017. Senior Levies Official
Muhammad Zareef stated, "All the labourers were shot
at close range." The slain labourers belonged to
the Naushahro Feroze District of Sindh. Baloch Liberation
Army (BLA) claimed responsibility for the attack.
The attack
comes a day after suicide bombing targeting a convoy of
Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JuI-F) leader and Deputy Chairman
of the Senate (Upper house of Parliament) Maulana Abdul
Ghafoor Haideri. At least 27 people were killed in the
attack and another 40 injured in the Mastung town on May
12, 2017. The target of the attack, Maulana Haideri, is
also General Secretary of JuI-F, and hails from Kalat.
A motorcycle borne suicide bomber rammed into the vehicle
in which the Maulana was travelling on the Quetta-Karachi
National Highway. Haideri had just left a girls-only seminary
after attending a graduation ceremony. Daesh (the Islamic
State, IS, formerly Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham)
claimed responsibility for the attack through a statement
posted on the website of its propaganda agency Amaq
without any elaboration. Haideri bulletproof vehicle saved
his life. Though the explosion severely damaged the vehicle,
he and his co-passengers escaped with injuries.
This was
not the first time that JUI-F leaders have been targeted
by terrorists in the past in the Province, despite the
party’s long associations with the Taliban movement and
leaders acting as negotiators between the terrorists and
the Government in the past. On October 23, 2014, two persons
were killed and 22 injured in a suicide blast targeting
JUI-F chief Maulana Fazlur Rahman on the Meckangi Road
of Quetta, moments after he ended his address at a rally
in the Sadiq Shaheed Football Ground.
On April
4, 2017, Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri had invited the
Taliban to join his party at news conference at the Peshawar
Press Club, where he declared, “We invite them [the Taliban]
to join JUI-F and achieve their objectives with the help
of a peaceful and political struggle.”
Any slim
hope of a sustainable peace in the Balochistan was destroyed
after these attacks, despite the considerable decrease
of 83.91 per cent in violence in the Province in the first
four months of the year, in comparison to the same period
last year. The first four months of 2016 had recorded
230 fatalities, including 144 terrorists/militants, 43
civilians and 43 SF personnel, while 2017 saw just 37
fatalities, including 16 SF personnel, 12 militants and
9 civilians. The two recent major attacks have inflicted
fatalities equal to the total for the first four months
this year.
The complex,
multilayered, seemingly never-ending security crisis in
Balochistan appears more dangerous with the entry of Daesh
on the scene. Balochistan has been under attack by separatists,
insurgents, and Islamist terrorists for over a decade,
and Daesh adds to the cumulative threat. The Government,
however, insists that Daesh has no presence in the Province,
a position argued by Balochistan Home Minister Sarfaraz
Bugti on October 26, 2016. However, several of the major
attacks in the Province, including the suicide attack
on Lawyers of August 8, 2016 (75 persons killed), the
Quetta Police Training College attack of October 24, 2016
(62 persons killed) and the Shah Noorani Sufi shrine attack
of November 12, 2016 (55 persons killed) were claimed
by ISIS.
Though
Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack on Maulana
Haideri, the role of Baloch separatist militants cannot
be ruled out. Haideri earned the wrath of Baloch separatists
because of his support to the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) in the Province while addressing a public
meeting in Kalat on October 9, 2016, declaring that conspiracies
being hatched by India and other elements against the
CPEC project would be foiled. He added that JUI-F would
continue its struggle to remove the reservations people
had regarding the corridor project. A day before the attack
on May 11, 2017, Haideri contended that his party would
form the next Government in Balochistan in alliance with
other political parties, including nationalist parties.
The suicide
attack of May 12 and ethnic killings of May 13 in Balochistan
occurred while Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif was in
Beijing to ink agreements between Pakistan and China aimed
at boosting cooperation in various sectors, on the sidelines
of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) Forum. Sharif arrived
in Beijing on May 12, 2017, to participate in the OBOR
Forum. CPEC is the flagship programme of OBOR, and is
viewed by Baloch as a conspiracy by the Punjabi elite
to plunder their land and resources.
While Balochistan
is the starting point of CPEC, the lion's share of projects
under the programme has been assigned to Punjab, which
has been assigned 53 per cent of the projects currently
envisaged, according to Federal Ministry of Interior statistics
shared with the Parliament on September 2, 2016. Out of
the total of 330 projects, 176 are in Punjab while only
eight have been allocated to Balochistan.
This has
compounded the sense of neglect and marginalization among
the Baloch people. on September 3, 2016, the Balochistan
Republican Party alleged that the Province’s abundant
resources were being diverted for the benefit of Pakistan's
dominant province, Punjab. Similarly, on March 13, 2017,
Munir Mengal, the President of Baloch Voice Foundation,
asserted, that CPEC was a 'strategic design' by Pakistan
and China to loot Balochistan's resources and eliminate
their culture and identity.
Dubbing
China as a 'great threat' to the Baloch people, UNHRC
Balochistan representative Mehran Marri argued, on August
13, 2016, that "China really-really is spreading
its tentacles in Balochistan very rapidly, and therefore,
we are appealing to the international community. The Gwadar
project is for the Chinese military. This would be detrimental
to international powers, to the people's interest, where
60 percent of world's oil flows. So, the world has to
really take rapid action in curbing China's influence
in Balochistan in particular and in Pakistan in general."
Asserting that CPEC would convert the Baloch people into
minorities in their own homeland, Noordin Mengal, a human
rights campaigner from Balochistan, stated that, with
an influx of outsiders as a result of the project, the
identity of the Baloch was being threatened.
Concern
about the demographic transformation of Balochistan was
reiterated in a report by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers
of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) on December 28, 2016,
which noted that, at the current rate of influx of Chinese
nationals into Balochistan and after completion of the
CPEC, the native population of the area would be outnumbered
by 2048.
The May
13-killing of Sindhi labourers who were working on a road
project are not specific CPEC-funded projects, but are
part of a network of connecting roads that are part of
the corridor – a common target for Baloch separatist militants
who view construction projects as a means to take over
their land. Militants trying to disrupt construction of
CPEC projects in the Province have killed 44 workers since
2014, according to Colonel Zafar Iqbal, a spokesperson
for the construction company, Frontier Works Organisation
(FWO). Colonel Zafar Iqbal stated, on September 7, 2016,
that “The latest figure has climbed up to 44 deaths and
over 100 wounded men on CPEC projects, mainly road construction
in Balochistan, which began in 2014”.
The attack
on labourers is an act of desperation from the Baloch
separatist as their struggle for a sovereign nation has
been losing tempo with the recent surrenders of their
cadres. Around 500 militants belonging to different banned
Baloch militant outfits surrendered to authorities on
April 21, 2017. At a ceremony held on the lawns of the
Balochistan Assembly building, the militants announced
that they had abandoned the armed struggle against the
Government and would join mainstream politics. Those who
surrendered included 12 ‘commanders’ and 16 ‘sub-commanders’
of the militant organisations. The militants belonged
to the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), BLA, Lashkar-i-Balochistan
and some other groups. On the occasion of the surrender
ceremony, one unnamed provincial official disclosed that
around 1,500 militants of Baloch outfits had surrendered
since the Government announced a political reconciliation
programme in the Province under the National Action Plan
(NAP). Earlier, on November 7, 2016, around 202 Baloch
separatists belonging to various militant formations surrendered
to Provincial Government authorities in Quetta.
On February
20, 2017, the Government deployed a special contingent
of 15,000 personnel from the Maritime Security Force (MSF)
and Special Security Division (SSD) to protect 34 CPEC
related projects, including Gwadar and other coastal areas,
and ensure safety of locals and foreigners working on
CPEC projects. Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayeed, Chairman
of the Parliamentary Committee on CPEC, after a committee
meeting in Parliament House on February 20, 2017, stated,
“The SSD is a force that will provide security to 34 CPEC
related projects, while the MSF will safeguard the Gwadar
port and other coastal areas of the country,”. He said
the SSD had been deployed in six zones from Gwadar to
Gilgit-Baltistan, including all four Provinces and Azad
Jammu & Kashmir (AJK). Despite all security arrangements,
however, the militants continue to succeed in engineering
major attacks.
Apart from
CPEC related projects, there has been a systematic plundering
of natural resources and neglect of real development in
Balochistan by the successive Governments. As long as
Pakistan’s all powerful Army and civilian leadership fail
to address legitimate grievances of the Baloch people,
Baloch separatism will persist. Worse, increasing Islamist
terrorist activities in the Province compound instability
and worsen the risks of violence and bloodshed.
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Assam:
BTAD: Discordant Accords
Giriraj
Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
On May
9, 2017, a Sub-Inspector of the 15th Battalion
of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and a suspected cadre
of the I.K. Songbijit faction of the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS)
were killed in an encounter in the forests around the
Manas National Park in Chirang District. One INSAS rifle
was recovered from the encounter site.
On March
30, 2017, two NDFB-IKS militants, identified as Lukash
Narzary aka Langfa and David Islary, were killed
by the Security Forces (SFs) in an encounter at Simlagri
under Amguri Police Station in Chirang District. One INSAS
Rifle with 10 rounds of live ammunition, one 7.65 mm revolver
with three rounds of ammunition and one Chinese grenade
were recovered from the possession of the slain militants.
On February
9, 2017, unidentified militants shot dead two civilians,
Bakul Rabha (40) and Saru (35), at Chengapara village
under Kolaigaon Police Station in Udalguri District. Militants
also set ablaze the hut of the deceased couple. "Since
we found bullets, we are certain about the involvement
of militants in the incident but we are yet to pinpoint
the group. Both United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent
(ULFA-I)
and NDFB-IKS are active in the area and we are trying
to identify the assailants," an unnamed Police official
in Udalguri said.
These two
districts – Chirang and Udalguri – along with two other
districts – Kokrajhar and Baksa – form Bodoland Territorial
Autonomous Districts (BTAD). BTAD was formed after the
signing of the Memorandum of Settlement (MoS)
in February 2003 and the subsequent creation of the Bodoland
Territorial Council (BTC) in December 2003 under the Sixth
Schedule of the Indian Constitution. BTC administers BTAD.
An earlier
Bodo
Accord of 1993 had led to the formation
of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC). The BAC arrangement
ended in failure; its territory was not fully demarcated
resulting in confusion and conflict, and further resentment
amongst the Bodo tribesman.
Despite
the MoS, the region has witnessed continuing violence.
According to partial data collected by the South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP), since its formation on December
7, 2003, BTAD has registered a total of at least 452 fatalities,
including 188 civilians, 21 SF personnel and 242 militants,
in 285 incidents of killing (data till May 14, 2017).
Worryingly,
in year 2016, BTAD witnessed at least 41 fatalities (19
civilians and 22 militants) as compared to 22 fatalities
in 2015 (two civilians and 20 militants), thus witnessed
an alarming increase of 86.34 per cent. Though the number
of total fatalities in the region has witnessed a cyclical
trend, on year on year basis, the
incidents of killing have been constantly increasing since
2013. The number of killing incidents stood at 23 in 2016
as against 21 in 2015 and 14 in 2014. There were 11 such
incidents in 2013 as against eight in 2012.
The region
has already recorded six fatalities, including two civilians,
three militants and one trooper, in three separate incidents
in 2017 (data till May 14, 2017).
NDFB-IKS
continues to be linked to most of the violent incidents
in BTAD. Of 78 fatalities (73 civilians and five SF personnel)
reported from BTAD since November 20, 2012, the date of
the announcement of the formation of the outfit, NDFB-IKS
has been found responsible for 69 (64 civilian and five
SF personnel). Of 19 civilian fatalities reported from
the region in 2016, NDFB-IKS was responsible for 16. While
one surrendered NDFB cadre was killed during a group fight
in a camp, two civilian fatalities remain unattributed.
No SF fatality was reported in 2016.
In the
meantime, the outfit itself has suffered severe
losses during ‘Operation All Out’
launched against the outfit on December 26, 2014, after
the NDFB-IKS militants massacred
over 69 Adivasis on December 23, 2014.
The operation which still continues has resulted in elimination
of 48 NDFB-IKS cadres.
NDFB, the
parent party, was formed on October 3, 1986, with the
aim of creating a “Sovereign Bodoland’ and to secure “self-determination
of the Bodos”. NDFB entered into a Suspension of Operation
(SoO) agreement with the Central and State Governments
on June 1, 2005. However, following the October 30, 2008,
serial
blasts in Guwahati, which resulted
in 81 deaths, the organization suffered a vertical split
– the pro-talks faction of NDFB (NDFB-PTF) led by B. Sungthagra
aka Dhiren Boro, and an Anti-talks faction led
by the Ranjan Daimari aka D.R. Nabla, NDFB-Ranjan
Daimari (NDFB-RD). On November 20, 2012. NDFB-RD split
into two – NDFB-IKS and NDFB-RD. NDFB-RD entered into
a formal SoO agreement on November 29, 2013, and this
has been renewed periodically. Most recently, on January
1, 2017, the SoO agreements with NDFB-RD and NDFB-PTF
were extended by another six months.
Though
talks are also being held with Adivasi militant groups,
including the All Adivasi National Liberation Army (AANLA),
Adivasi Cobra Militants of Assam (ACMA),
Adivasi People’s Army (APA), National Santhal Liberation
Army (NSLA), Birsa Commando Force (BCF) and Santhal Tiger
Force (STF); anti-talks faction of the NSLA (NSLA-ATF)
and Adivasi Defence Force (ADF) remain active in BTAD.
There is,
moreover, a schism between the various groups inhabiting
shared spaces in BTAD. Since its formation, the BTAD region
has witnessed three ethnic clashes between Bodos and Non-Bodos.
In 2008 clashes claimed 55 lives, 109 lives were lost
in 2012
and 46 in 2014.
During the May 1-12, 2014, violence, heavily armed NDFB-IKS
militants targeted the Muslim community living across
the Baksa and Kokrajhar Districts.
Worryingly,
another emerging threat is the radicalization of Muslims
and the presence of Islamist militants in the BTAD.
31 Islamists militants [including 19 from Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB)]
have been arrested in the BTAD area since the October
2, 2014, Burdwan
blasts in neighbouring West Bengal.
Indeed, one of the key JMB operative, Lal Mohammed aka
Ibrahim (30), suspected to be involved in the Burdwan
blasts, reportedly told his interrogators that JMB’s subversive
activities in Assam were to ‘counter Bodo aggression’
against Muslims. Ibrahim was arrested on April 18, 2015,
from Jharkhand's Pakur District.
That the
2003 accord has failed to bring desired results is evident
from the continuing violence in the region. Worse, even
NDFB-PTF is demanding a separate Bodoland State. NDFB-RD
also supports the creation of a separate State. The separate
statehood demand is also backed by the All Bodo Student’s
Union (ABSU), the initiator of the separate ‘Bodoland
State’ with ‘Divide Assam 50-50’ slogan in the 1980’s.
Claiming that the BTAD experiment has failed, ABSU ‘president’
Promod Boro observed, on April 27, 2017
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Creation
of the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) after the
first Bodo Accord of 1993 proved futile, leading
to its scrapping and a fresh Bodo Accord in 2003...
After that, the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous
Districts (BTAD) experiment too has proved inadequate,
convincing all Bodo groups that a separate Bodoland
State is the only option left.
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Promod
Boro issued this statement a day after meeting Union Home
Minister (UHM) Rajnath Singh along with Assam Chief Minister
Sarbananda Sonowal and leaders of other Bodo organizations,
including NDFB-PTF. In the meeting, Union Home Minister
(UHM) Rajnath Singh had offered a vague assurance that,
“Our Government will take all-out measures to ensure overall
development of the Bodos living in Assam.”
ABSU renewed
its demand for a separate ‘Bodoland State’ on December
2, 2010, on the grounds that BTC had failed to fulfil
the hopes and aspirations of the Bodos and that the Assam
Government had failed to protect the identity, culture
and language of the people. The creation of a separate
Telangana State through the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh
in Southern India on June 2, 2014, was also a factor,
since an implicit moratorium of the formation of new states
was broken. Indeed, in an interview, published on August
20, 2013, Promod Boro argued, “It’s the same justification
that was applied in Telangana, or before that in the creation
of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand. The aspirations
are the same, only the people are different.”
BTAD has failed to address Bodo grievances, even as it has
exacerbated conflict with other ethnic groupings. Such
group-focused autonomous bodies give rise to further sets
of grievances, both within and outside the target group.
Clearly, generous developmental funding and autonomy are
no panacea to ethnic insurgencies. Issues related to identities
are barely static and are often competitive in the Northeast;
consequently attempting to pacify individual ethnic groups
through partisan accords in an ethnically diverse region
is fundamentally flawed approach. Inclusive democracy,
founded in the rule of law, and an urgent focus on long
neglected issues of development are needed, even as groupings
that choose armed violence are dealt with through effective
counter-insurgency campaigns.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
May
8-14, 2017
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Civilians
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorists/Insurgents
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Total
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BANGLADESH
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Islamist Terrorism
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0
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1
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5
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6
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Left-wing
Extremism
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0
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0
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2
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2
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BANGLADESH
(Total)
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0
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1
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7
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8
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INDIA
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North East
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Assam
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0
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1
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1
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2
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Jammu and
Kashmir
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1
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1
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2
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4
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Manipur
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0
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2
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0
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2
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Left-Wing
Extremism
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Chhattisgarh
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0
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1
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1
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2
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Jharkhand
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0
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0
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1
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1
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INDIA (Total)
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1
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5
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5
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11
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PAKISTAN
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Balochistan
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37
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0
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1
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38
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FATA
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2
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0
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0
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2
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Punjab
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0
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0
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4
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4
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PAKISTAN
(Total)
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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