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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 9, September 1, 2014

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT

INDIA
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Dangers of a Deepening Darkness
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management

Independent India's history is replete with examples of the state's unpreparedness for the challenges of terrorism and armed violence, even where the emergence of the most vicious movements was abundantly augured. We appear, today, to be standing at another such crossroads, blissfully unready.

Islamist radicalization on Indian soil has long been a Pakistan-backed project, and it secured extraordinary success in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), after decades of sustained effort, progressively transforming a cultured and inclusive Sufi Islam into a hardline jihadi cult of murder. Pakistan's efforts to extend this violent creed across the rest of India have met with no more than fitful success, often driven by fanatical Pakistani cadres, rather than by any dramatic support from Indian Muslims, other than the very fringe of an extremist fringe. The steady decline in Islamist terrorist incidents, both in J&K and across the rest of India, and the continuous successes against Indian jihadi cadres and leadership, however, can only provide transient comfort, as another, and potentially greater, storm gathers.

There are ample portents of the new danger of an increasingly globalized jihad, with escalating levels of tolerance for the most brutal violence, unprecedented even in the past record of a fairly malevolent Islamist terror. Indeed, rarely in history have there been such clear forewarnings of a danger of this nature, at such an early stage. If these warnings are taken seriously, India has sufficient time to prepare; and preparing an effective response must, indeed, take precedence over any other concern of the Government.

It is the rise of the Islamic State (IS, formerly Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, ISIS), and the tremendous magnetism that both its successes and its excesses have exercised over the imagination of Muslim youth across the world, that indicate that much worse is to come. Crucially, our security and intelligence apparatus is woefully inadequate and ill-equipped to repel a likely two-pronged assault: an increasingly internationalized Islamist jihad backed by Pakistan, and a strengthening Islamist fifth column within the country.

It had long been India's boast that no Indian citizen had ever joined the global jihad, though this has been compromised for some time now. However, few expected the very quick success of IS in attracting Indian cadres, without any presence in India or direct effort of recruitment. Already, at least seven confirmed cases of Indians having gone to Syria or Iraq to join IS have been documented (one of these, Aarif Majid from the Kalyan area of Thane District in Maharashtra, has already been killed fighting along with IS cadres), and another dozen or so are suspected, with these youth having travelled to Syria, Iraq or a neighbouring country on a one-way ticket, and subsequently having 'disappeared' towards the war zone.

In one sense, of course, this is still reassuring; this is a tiny number, considering the estimated 175 million Muslims in the country. The comparison with the West is particularly startling. Worried over the growth of extremism, most Western nations have introduced a range of policies to counter the trend, prominently including 'multiculturalism', 'deradicalization' and 'community policing', and many 'security experts' have long lamented the absence of these in India. And yet, we find that Belgium, with a tiny Muslim population of just under 629,000, officially estimated that over 250 fighters had joined IS by April this year, and the number, now, may have risen beyond 500; Australia accounted for another 250; Denmark, 100; France, over 700; Germany 320; and UK, 500. Even Sweden with a Muslim population of 47,000, has seen at least 30 of its citizens joining the IS; and Switzerland, with 46,000 Muslims, has confirmed 10 citizens in the IS ranks, outnumbering the confirmed Indian cases. There are an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters in Iraq alone, drawn from at least 82 countries across the world. With the rapid IS expansion in Iraq and Syria, the dramatic global projection of these 'successes' through an extraordinarily sophisticated media campaign, as well as the declaration of a new Caliphate under 'Khalifa Ibrahim' aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi claiming that all Muslims are duty bound to support the Caliphate, and the constantly escalating rhetoric of a resurgent Islam rising against the 'loathsome infidel', many thousands of youth from these countries may by now have added to the ranks of the 'holy warriors'.

Islam has grown organically within India, and has, over centuries, evolved elaborate cultures of accommodation with other Faiths. It is these, rather than any conscious effort or intervention by the state, that has kept Muslims in India substantially insulated against extremist doctrines and violence. These cultures have, however, been under continuous assault over decades, and have certainly begun to fray, at least along their more extreme and isolated edges. Already, a breakaway faction of the Indian Mujahiddeen, the Ansar ut Tawheed wal Jihad fi Bilad al Hind, located in Pakistan, has declared its intention to fly the IS flag over South Asia; a Pakistani group, the Tehreek-e-Khilafat, has also declared, "We are praying from the almighty Allah to give us chance in our lives to see the expansion of Islamic State boundaries toward the Sub-Continent and Khorasan region..." IS has, of course, issued a farcical map that includes India within a projected Islamic empire of which this imagined 'Khorasan' is a part. With Pakistani provocateurs and a substantial flow of West Asian money to a widening network of hardline Wahabi mosques and institutions across the country, these various streams may eventually coalesce into a much wider extremist mobilisation than has hitherto been the case. Disturbingly, the influential Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, long celebrated as a moderating influence in Indian Islam and a strong opponent of the Partition, in one editorial in its mouthpiece, Dawat, has argued, "it is very necessary to welcome the announcement of the establishment of Islamic Caliphate by the ISIS because Islamic caliphate is the aspiration of every Muslim and there has never been a disagreement on the issue among the Muslims in any period of history." It is not clear whether this is the opinion of a single commentator or the emerging consensus in the Jamaat, but if this line of thinking inflates, the dangers within India and across the sub-continent could swell exponentially. Significantly, the leader of another prominent Sunni religious institution, the Nadwatul Ulama, Salman Al-Husaini Nadwi, wrote to Abu Bakr Baghdadi after the latter's declaration of the Khilafat, referring to him as Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the Faithful), praying, "May Allah protect you", and calling on all Muslims to "abide by" Abu Bakr's directives, "if he follows Allah's Sharia".

The sectarian angle is a further compounding factor. Shia-Sunni bloodletting has, of course, a significant history in some areas of the country. Nevertheless, the unending slaughter of Shias in Pakistan, among other minorities there, has found no resonances in India, other than occasional attacks by Pakistan-backed extremists in J&K. IS actions and declarations have, however, already provoked some disruptive posturing. In an open letter, Salman Al-Husaini Nadwi asked the Government of Saudi Arabia to prepare an army of 'five lakh Indian Sunni Muslim youth' to fight against the Shia militia in Iraq and elsewhere. On the other hand, responding to the destruction of a number of shrines in Syria and Iraq, and particularly the IS threat to demolish Najaf and Karbala, the Shia's most sacred spaces (located in Southern Iraq) the Anjuman-e-Haidiri, a nondescript organisation in Delhi, has sought to augment its identity by calling for a million Shias to join it in protecting these holy places. While the organisation has made exaggerated claims of a 100,000 who have already signed up, intelligence sources indicate that no more than a few hundred have actually done so. Most of these pretensions will quickly fizzle out, but it is impossible to be sure, especially where elements within at least some influential orthodox Muslim institutions have begun to speak a disturbing language.

The IS phenomenon, moreover, is just a beginning. As is the usual case, most current analysis remains focused on the ongoing crisis, which is most visible in Syria and Iraq; but it is the entire Arab World, across West Asia and North Africa, that is at risk of total destabilization. The countries that have long exploited radical Islamism as an instrument of domestic political management to sustain authoritarian regimes, and have exported extremist ideologies and funded terrorism in other theatres, will inevitably be confronted with a vicious blowback that has the potential to destroy the few superficially stable Governments that still survive in this region. It is significant that over 2,500 fighters are believed to have joined IS from Saudi Arabia; over 3,500 from Tunisia; at least 1,500 from Morocco; and unknown numbers from Egypt, Jordan, the Emirates and Turkey. These numbers are augmenting rapidly, and regimes in these countries are now deeply apprehensive that IS, or elements within it, will soon turn their attention against them.

Crucially, a 2006 study by the Institute for Conflict Management on "Demographic Trends in Asia and India’s Security Futures" had noted that sheer demographic pressures and population profiles, combining with regional political cultures, constituted major and imminent threats to stability across the Arab World, underlining the UNDP Arab Human Development Report's observation, "Arab authorities live in fear of the Arab street." The study had further noted the tension between Shia and Sunni populations and states, to conclude  that this could "provoke movements of covert warfare and terrorism, as well as possible open confrontations in situations of rising disorder in the Arab world."

Much of this has already come to pass, but worse is likely to unfold. It is useful to recall that the entire Government system in India was thrown into disarray by the abduction and captivity of 46 nurses and 39 workers in the ISIS controlled areas of Iraq; we stumbled into some sort of a 'solution' with regard to the first of these, but the workers from Punjab remain untraceable, though current reports indicate that a Saudi mediated resolution to this crisis may also be at hand. With over seven million Indian expatriates working in the region, the direct consequences of a wider destabilization - both in terms of the humanitarian crisis and potential extremist recruitment - would themselves be overwhelming; the indirect impact is difficult even to assess, and it must be abundantly clear that India's systems are utterly inadequate to cope.

Nearly six years after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, despite a flurry of erratic and uncoordinated initiatives, India's vulnerabilities to terrorism remain unchanged.

In the meanwhile, IS has created a whole new level of terrorism, challenging and demolishing well-equipped, Western-trained armies, and fighting along fronts that extend across thousands of kilometres. Its systems of command and control appear to have achieved a high level of efficiency, and its exploitation of contemporary media has been extraordinary. These accomplishments will inevitably filter through to other theatres of terrorism, as will the more virulent ideology and barbaric methods of the IS jihad.

All this is abundantly clear, yet there is little visible recognition within the Indian security establishment of the urgency of preparing a response. Diplomatic symbolism and little storms in teacups about talks or no talks with Pakistan will not prepare India for the next wave of jihadi terrorism. A colossal augmentation of capacities and capabilities in the intelligence-security systems of the country has long been overdue. This is an imperative that can now be deferred only at the risk of India's integrity.

INDIA
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Maoists: Mobile Strategies
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 20, 2014, the Union Cabinet approved the extension of mobile telephonic services to 2,199 locations affected by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The project would be executed by Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL). BSNL has already installed towers at 363 of these locations. The Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF) would fund the capital expenditure and operative expenditure, net of revenue, for five years. The project implementation cost through the open tendering process is approximately INR 35.68 billion. In 2013, the Cabinet had approved just over INR 30 billion for the project. The project was delayed by more than a year, apparently, because of differences over project cost.

The USOF which is administered by Department of Telecom (DoT) was created under the National Telecom Policy of 1999 to help provide telecom services at affordable prices to people in rural areas where no phone facilities are available. While USOF will provide both capital expenditure and operational expenditure components of the proposed mobile rollout for five years, the ownership of the assets to be created is proposed to be vested with BSNL to ensure long-term continuity of services. The network rollout will be monitored by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), as it is aimed at beefing up communications and surveillance operations by national security agencies in these regions.

It is also learnt that UMHA and the Prime Minister's Office want the project to get underway immediately as "it is of national importance with security considerations," and is running a year behind schedule, a top BSNL official told the media. BSNL has already identified a sizeable number of tower sites in consultation with the UMHA. Initially, towers will be erected at places close to security camps and Police stations.

The project to install the towers in the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)-affected areas was conceived in 2010 when P. Chidambaram was the Union Home Minister, but there was little progress in the matter since then. After the Maoist attack on the State leadership of the Congress party in Chhattisgarh on May 25, 2013, the Union Cabinet approved the project to install 2,199 mobile towers at a cost of INR 30.46 billion, and June 2014 was set as the deadline for completion of the task. Thus far, however, only 363 towers have been installed. Concerned about the delay, UMHA has been pressuring the Telecom Department to expedite installation of towers. One reminder was sent a week before the March 11, 2014, Maoist attack in Sukma District in Chhattisgarh, in which 15 Security Force (SF) personnel and one civilian were killed. The then Union Home Minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, observed, in a letter dated March 4, 2014, "The poor communication network in the Naxal-affected areas is a matter of serious concern." Stressing the need to have a better communications network in place before the Lok Sabha elections, Shinde emphasised that installation of mobile towers should be expedited, especially in the highly Maoist-affected States such as Jharkhand, Bihar and Odisha, and called for an 'all-out effort' to complete the whole process before the Lok Sabha elections. Shinde's letter noted, further, "The work was awarded to Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) and installation and roll out of mobile towers was targeted to be completed in 12 months."

The difference over project cost, about INR 7.89 billion, between actual requirement and the revised project budget approved by the Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs, in June 2013, was due to an 'arithmetic error', it was claimed. Official sources argued, "There is an arithmetical mistake in annual maintenance contract estimates, omission of certain items that are required for roll out of projects, revision of VSAT bandwidth charges and other. The DoT is studying it." Further, there were technical specification issues, such as whether to go for a solar powered 2G network, and whether to go for 20 watts ‘base transceiver station’ (BTS)/cell phone tower or five watts, that delayed the implementation of the project.

These issues now appear to have been settled, but the implementation of the project may still be headed for a bumpy ride.

First, the tender for the work was initially floated by BSNL in August 2013, but received lukewarm responses, with major global players opting out, and just three Indian players participating. That is unusual in the prevailing economic situation, when companies are struggling to maintain growth and profit margins, and the contract was for approximately of INR 30 billion. In March 2014, the Telecom Commission asked DoT and BSNL to go for retendering, citing the project’s higher costs and poor response. After two months of the re-tendering exercise, however, the two companies – Vihaan Networks Ltd and HFCL – who had earlier qualified in the technical bidding, were again in the fray, as no other company, Indian or foreign, decided to participate. This was despite the extension of the application deadline by a week in May. A BSNL official noted, "During recent pre-bid meetings, global telecom gear suppliers were reluctant to participate in the bidding as they felt that managing and maintaining mobile networks in Naxal-hit regions is risky." A top executive of a leading foreign gear maker conceded that the "additional responsibility of maintaining expensive solar-powered mobile networks in Naxalite hotbeds is fraught with significant business risks". In such a situation, quality is likely to be first casualty.

The second issue is the provision of continuous power supply to the towers. Solar power has its limitations, and even where power supply is not very erratic, BSNL backup batteries start providing insufficient back up, in some cases, within just one year, due to poor maintenance. Solar panels need regular cleaning of the surface, as dust decreases the efficiency of the panels. Further, 24x7 availability (or at least availability at short notice) of trained manpower is needed for maintenance of batteries, to protected against full discharge. Even three or four full discharges severely affect the efficiency of batteries. Further, the restoration time in case of some fault in solar-power towers is unknown, but is likely to be substantial, as local knowhow is limited. Arranging any outside service in LWE-affected areas will create its own and significant problems.

Diesel supplies to run generators are even more erratic, with BSNL managing an inefficient network of its own, whereas private operators generally outsource the service to locals. Media reports indicate that shortages in diesel supplies to mobile towers have long been an issue in existing towers in Maoist-affected areas, with nodal supply points located at long distances from the towers. In a note sent to the Department in 2013, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs observed, "it has come to the notice of MHA that some existing BSNL towers in the LWE-affected areas remain shut for long periods of time ostensibly due to non-availability of diesel to run the generators etc. Hence, sufficient monitoring mechanisms may be put in place to deliver better services." It remains to be seen how these issues will be addressed for the much wider network of towers envisaged in the current project.

The third issue is the identification of relatively secure locations for the mobile towers. Though towers are initially to be set up close to security camps and Police Stations, given the very poor density of such establishments in Maoist affected areas, it will be difficult to find appropriate locations for such a large number of towers. Further, the location of security camps and establishments are based on strategic considerations, which may not coincide with the technical requirements of the location of the towers.

There is, moreover, the BSNL's track record of providing poor service even in areas where there is no threat from Maoists. The organisation's efficiency in Naxalite afflicted regions can only be expected to be poorer.

Crucially, moreover, the Maoists recognize the threat that an efficient - or even minimally working - cellular network constitutes to their own security and survival, and have systematically attacked isolated mobile towers wherever possible. According the UMHA, at least 245 such attacks are on record just between 2008 and 2013. The penetration of a public communications networks into their areas of operation has been acknowledged by the Maoists to be one of the crucial elements leading to a decline in their operational effectiveness and recruitment potential. In their Social Investigation of North Telengana, in what was then the worst affected region of Andhra Pradesh, the Communist Party of India - Maoist, observed, as far back as in the early 2000s,
Earlier there was the post and telegraph department in the rural area. Branch post offices were set up in the big villages. In addition to these tele communications also came up rapidly... In the big villages with a population of 5 to 7 thousand, there are 70 to 100 telephones. But the facility is not spread over all the villages... Since phone can be obtained with 600 rupees there are 300 applications from one village... Cell phone facility spread to 60 kms up to Janagama, 40 kms towards Mulugu, and near Bhupalapalli.This network exists in almost the whole area of our operation. The cells are mainly established by the medical, fertiliser, big grocery shops and some rich peasants. Small contractors, political leaders and police informers also bought them... The middle class is opposing the blasting of the exchanges. The increased communication network facilitated the enemy to receive our information soon... Now if a squad member goes to the village for food and it is exposed, the police from the near by station can encircle us within one hour. We are unable to identify who leaded the information...

Attack on Telephone Exchange / tower by Maoists: 2008-2013

State

2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total

Andhra Pradesh

1
0
4
2
2
0
9

Bihar

14
24
14
25
10
4
91

Maharashtra

2
1
1
2
1
0
7

Chhattisgarh

15
10
2
3
0
0
30

Jharkhand

10
14
6
8
3
1
42

Odisha

4
18
17
11
7
7
64

West Bengal

0
0
1
0
0
0
1

Madhya Pradesh

0
0
0
0
1
0
1

Total*

46
67
45
51
24
12
245
Source: MHA

Clearly, the Maoist efforts to impede the extension of the cellular network can only intensify.

At present, Security Forces are being given satellite phones in areas outside the mobile network footprint. According to a June 19, 2014, media report, over 3,500 satellite phones are to be provided to troops undertaking anti-Maoist and anti-insurgency operations in the dense forests of the Maoist belt and in the border areas of the North East region, to provide them swift connectivity. These satellite phones or Digital Satellite Phone Terminals (DSPTs) are being provided by the state-run BSNL, after the Union Home Ministry made a request in this regard to the Telecom Ministry.

The criticality of mobile network coverage in Maoist affected areas can hardly be overstated. It will help SFs to communicate necessary information to their base locations, better organise logistics and operations, and enormously extend their intelligence capabilities, opening up numberless sources of information among the general public, many of whom are now exhausted and frustrated by unending and counter-productive Maoist violence. Significantly, in Jammu and Kashmir, the introduction on mobile network was initially resisted by the State administration, as it was feared that the Paksitan-backed Islamist terrorists there would use cellular communications to plan attacks. Experience, however, indicates that the expansion of the communications networks helped SFs far more than the terrorists.

The mobile phone network would not only provide the means to secure an operational advantage for the SFs operating in Maoist-affected areas, but would also extend the instrumentalities for improving the very poor governance in these regions. In Chhattisgarh, a small experiment by a non-Governmental organisation (NGO) CGNet-Swara, provides numerous examples of how mobile phones can be an empowering tool for the Adivasis (tribals) in remote areas. Tribal villagers and activists in remote parts of Chhattisgarh call up the 'news service' using mobile phones, and their observations and complaints are recorded, uploaded on the CGNet-Swaras website, and communicated to authorities. This has put pressure on Government officials to act on grievances.

The extension of the mobile phone network is a crucial counter-insurgency and administrative tool, and has quantifiable impact on the perceived well-being of the general population in coverage areas. The present project will, naturally, meet with tremendous resistance from the rebels, and will require enormous determination, not only on the part of the implementing agencies, but of the SFs and the Government on the whole, to ensure its success. It remains to be seen whether such determination is better available under the current regime than was evident in its predecessor.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
August 25-31, 2014

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

 

Islamist Terrorism

1
0
0
1

Left-wing Extremism

0
0
1
1

Total (BANGLADESH)

1
0
1
2

INDIA

 

Assam

2
0
2
4

Jammu and Kashmir

0
1
0
1

Manipur

0
2
0
2

Meghalaya

0
0
4
4

Left-wing Extremism

 

Chhattisgarh

0
0
1
1

Jharkhand

3
0
0
3

Odisha

1
0
0
1

Total (INDIA)

6
3
7
16

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

11
1
12
24

FATA

2
1
33
36

KP

1
0
1
2

Punjab

3
0
0
3

Sindh

15
6
8
29

Total (PAKISTAN)

32
8
54
94
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

'Declassify all data about the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman', urges President of CPB Mujahidul Islam Selim: Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) President Mujahidul Islam Selim on August 29 urged the intelligence agencies - Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) of America, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) of India, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh to declassify all data about the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He stated this during a discussion on the 1975 and 2004 August massacres in Dhaka city. Daily Star, August 30, 2014.


INDIA

AuT posts online tribute for the slain Indian IS jihadist, says report: Two days after reports of killing of Kalyan youth Arif Ejaz Majeed while fighting alongside the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, the Indian jihadist group Ansar ul-Tawhid (AuT) on August 28 has issued an online tribute to him, hailing his "martyrdom". In the Ansar al-Tawhid eulogy, addressed to "those who are searching for paradise", Arif is shown dressed in an Arab kaffiyeh, holding an assault rifle. The image, the first of Arif from the battlefield, was posted online on Twitter accounts and online fora linked to the Ansar ul-Tawhid. Financial Express, August 30, 2014.

IS recruiting poor Muslims in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra and J&K, says report: Several central security agencies in India have indicated that that the Islamic State (IS) might be spreading its tentacles in India. Sources said that the terror outfit, which has already killed thousands in Iraq and Syria in a deadly pursuit to establish an Islamic Caliphate, is recruiting poor Muslims in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Indian Republic, August 27, 2014.

IM and SIMI turning Chhattisgarh into terror hub, reveals NIA report: Investigation into the blasts at Narendra Modi's election rally in Patna (Bihar) on October 27, 2013, have revealed that Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) are trying to turn communally peaceful states such as Chhattisgarh into new hubs of terror activities. Chhattisgarh figures prominently in the charge sheet filed by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) in connection with the Patna bomb blasts. First Post, August 25, 2014.

First such prolonged standoff on IB after 1971 war, says Director General of BSF D. K. Pathak: The Border Security Force (BSF) on August 26 said that this was for the first time after 1971 Indo-Pak war that hostilities between the two countries along the International Border have entered such a prolonged spell and blamed Pakistan for not cooperating with them in defusing tension. "This is for the first time since 1971 war between the two neighbours that hostilities have prolonged to more than 45 days since first sniper shot was fired by Pakistan on the BSF post on July 16," said Director General of BSF, D. K. Pathak. Daily Excelsior, August 22, 2014.

Assam lost 157 lives in four decades in Assam-Nagaland border row, says Forest Minister Rockybul Hussain: A total of 157 people of Assam have died and 166 have been injured in incidents of violence in and around the areas of the State bordering Nagaland in the last 40 years. Only two Nagas have died during these incidents. The Golaghat District has borne the brunt of the violence, accounting for 131 deaths in nine clashes during 1977-2014. The Sivasagar District accounted for the maximum number of incidents of violence - 96 (from March 1972 to June 2014) resulting in 19 deaths. Assam Tribune, August 29, 2014.

77 civilians killed in violence in Assam in the first six months of current year, says Government report: The Centre has said that Assam has witnessed the maximum number of civilian casualties in violence in the past six months of current year. The State has witnessed the killing of as many as 77 civilians, which is the highest in the entire north-eastern region during the period. 43 extremists were also killed in violent incidents between January and June 2014. At least four security force personnel have also lost their lives during the period. Sentinel Assam, August 28, 2014.

India hands over list of 71 insurgent camps operating out of Bangladesh: India has handed over to Bangladesh a list of 71 camps of the Indian insurgent groups that still exists in the neighboring country. "We have handed over a list of 71 Indian insurgent camps which are still operating from the Bangladesh soil," said Director General of Border Security Force (BSF) DK Pathak after a four-day Border Coordination Conference with the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) which concludes on August 24. Sentinel Assam, August 26, 2014.

Several militant groups using NSCN-K facilities in Myanmar, says report: According to reports available to security agencies several militant groups, including the Independent faction of United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I), are using the facilities of the Khaplang faction of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) in the Taga area of Myanmar.

Meanwhile, promising all possible support to India's fight against terrorism, Myanmar has said it will bust training camps of North East militant groups on its soil if India provides specific inputs about their existence. Asserting that his country will never allow any terror outfit to use its soil against India, Myanmar's Information Minister U Ye Htut said his government will cooperate "fully" with the new Indian government in cracking down on militant bases, if there was any. Sentinel Assam, August 29, 2014; Sangai Express, August 27, 2014

HM spent INR 800 million in last 8 years on terror acts, says report: The Enforcement Directorate (ED, which has registered a case under provisions of the money laundering Act against Syed Salahuddin, chief of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), has found that HM spent INR 800 million in the last eight years for carrying out terror activities in the country. The case was earlier being investigated by the Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) unit of the agency, has now been transferred to the ED headquarters in Delhi for further probe. Asian Age, August 28, 2014.


NEPAL

17 CA members nominated: Seven months after the first sitting of the Constitution Assembly (CA), the government on August 29, nominated 17 of the 26 members to the House, according to Minendra Rijal, Cabinet spokesperson. The Nepali Congress (NC) named eight of the nine lawmakers as per share calculated on the basis of its seats in the assembly. The Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) nominated all eight and the pro-monarchy Rastriya Prajatantra Party- Nepal (RPP-N) its sole member under the nomination quota. The Hindu, August 30, 2014.


PAKISTAN

32 militants killed in Army operation in FATA: At least 32 militants were killed on August 30 when Security Forces (SF) targeted the suspected hideouts of militants as a part of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan Agency Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The ISPR spokesman said that at least 32 terrorists were reportedly killed while three of their hideouts were razed to ground. 23 explosives-laden vehicles and four ammunition dumps of the militants were also dismantled in the action. Daily Times, September 1, 2014.

TTP 'chief' Maulana Fazlullah says his men too could lay siege to Islamabad: The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 'chief' Maulana Fazlullah on August 31 said that launching an attack on Islamabad won't be a difficult task for his fighters after having observed how unarmed protestors were able to lay siege to the seat of power in the federal capital and paralyse the Government. "About 30,000 people have besieged the capital of Pakistan for the last two weeks and the Government is unable to deal with them," he said in an audio clip received by The News. He said, "Taliban fighters could easily seize the Parliament House as our numbers are far bigger than these people and we are well-equipped with sophisticated arms." The News , September 1, 2014.

Pakistan continues to be a safe haven for terrorists, says Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby: The Pentagon has said Pakistan continues to be a safe haven for terrorists. "Extremists and the safe haven pose a challenge and the sanctuary that they continue to enjoy in Pakistan," Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby said. He, however, added that "the Pakistani military has taken action against some of those extremist threats inside their own country. They've conducted operations not too long ago, just this summer." The Hindu, August 27, 2014.

Army steps in to revive Government's talks with protesters: Army on August 29 stepped into the political crisis by talking to two protesting organizations but delivered a snub to the beleaguered Government which had claimed that it had not sought military's mediation. Army Chief General Raheel Sharif talked to Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan and cleric Tahir-ul- Qadri of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) in the presence of Federal Minister of Interior Chaudhry Nisar. Times of India, August 30, 2014.

I won't resign, says Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif: Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif said on August 31 that he would not in any case resign from the position of the chief executive of the country. PM Nawaz Sharif said he would not succumb to the pressure of a few thousand people who have made the capital hostage. The premier ignored the advice of close aides to remain at his residence in Lahore in view of the increased tension in Islamabad's Red Zone and returned to the capital on August 31 afternoon to take stock of the developing situation. Daily Times, September 1, 2014.

TTP 'commanders' form new splinter group TTP-Jama'at-ul-Ahrar: Key 'commanders' belonging to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on August 26 announced the formation of a new group by the name of TTP-Jama'at-ul-Ahrar, with Maulana Qasim Khurasani as the new ameer (chief) and also comprising of other 'commanders'. Former TTP 'spokesperson' Ehsanullah Ehsan, who has been nominated as the 'spokesman' for the splinter group, mostly comprising cadres from the Mohmand Agency of TTP Chapter said that the new group was not willing to take sides in the current political tussle in Islamabad as they only wanted the Shari'ah (Islamic Law) system to prevail in the country. Dawn, August 27, 2014.


SRI LANKA

TNA ready to resume talks with the Government, says TNA leader M A Sumanthiran: The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Parliamentarian M. A. Sumanthiran said on August 28 that TNA was ready to resume talks with the Government in search of a lasting solution to the ethnic crisis based on power devolution within a united Sri Lanka. He said, "The Government is now saying it cannot hold talks with the TNA because we are representatives of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Government is trying to evade resolving the Tamil issue citing these false claims. We do not have any hidden agenda." Daily Mirror, August 29, 2014.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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