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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 49, June 8, 2015

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT

INDIA
MYANMAR
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Borders of Terror
Giriraj Bhattacharjee
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
M. A. Athul
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On June 4, 2015, 18 Army personnel were killed and another 11 were injured when militants ambushed a convoy of 46 troopers of the 6 Dogra Regiment of the Army, at Moltuk, near the India-Myanmar border, in the Paralong area of the Chandel District of Manipur. The militants first targeted the convoy, which was on a road opening patrol (ROP). Initiating the attack with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the militants subsequently opened fire using Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) and small arms. The Army also claimed to have killed a militant in the retaliatory firing.

In terms of fatalities, this is the worst single attack targeting Security Forces (SFs) in the entire Northeast region since 1982. On February 19, 1982, a convoy carrying soldiers was ambushed by Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) cadres near Namthilok in the Ukhrul District of Manipur, and 20 troopers and one civilian contractor were killed. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, which has tracked insurgency in the region since March 2000, the worst attack to precede the June 4, 2015, massacre, was on August 20, 2002, when National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)-Nayanbashi Jamatiya terrorists killed 20 Tripura State Rifles troopers and injured another four in an ambush at Hirapur in the West Tripura District of Tripura.

The June 4 attack was, nevertheless, the worst ever attack in the India-Myanmar border Districts since March 2000. In another major attack, on May 24, 2002, at least 11 Assam Rifles personnel were killed in an ambush by the cadres of the Isak Muivah faction of NSCN (NSCN-IM) and the Kuki Revolutionary Army in the Sanakeithel area under the Litan Police Station of Manipur's Ukhrul District, though this was far from the border.

Meanwhile, just about a month earlier, on May 3, 2015, twin ambushes by militants resulted in the death of eight SF personnel - seven of them from the ‘C’ company of 23 Assam Rifles (AR) and another from the 164 Naga Territorial Army (TA) Battalion – were engineered by the NSCN’s Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) about three kilometres from Changlangshu village in the Tobu Subdivision, near the India-Myanmar border, in the Mon District of Nagaland. Another nine troopers were injured in the incident.

On April 2, 2015, three Army personnel of 4 Rajput Regiment were killed and another four injured when militants ambushed their vehicle at Tupi village, near the India-Myanmar border in the Tirap District of Arunachal Pradesh.

On February 6, 2015, two civilian porters were killed and nine AR troopers were injured in an IED blast at Monmao village, near the India-Myanmar border, in the Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh. One of the injured AR trooper succumbed to his injuries a day later.

According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, between January 1, 2000 and June, 7 2015, there were at least 642 fatalities, including 116 civilians, 118 SF personnel and 408 militants, in 10 Districts, spread across four Northeast Indian States, along the India-Myanmar border. In terms of such fatalities, Chandel District is the worst affected, accounting for 295 fatalities (52 civilians, 57 SF personnel and 186 militants), followed by Churachandpur with 235 fatalities (60 civilians, 38 SF personnel and 137militants); Ukhrul, with 154 fatalities (39 civilians, 39 SF personnel and 77 militants). The other border Districts which witnessed fatalities include Mon (119), Tirap (72), Tuensang (44), Phek (32), Changlang (22), and Khipre and Longding, two each. There are 15 Districts along the India-Myanmar border in the region, including Phek, Tuensang, Mon and Khipre Districts in Nagaland; Tirap, Changlang, Anjaw and Longding in Arunachal Pradesh; Chandel, Ukhrul and Churachandpur Districts in Manipur; and Champhai, Serchhip, Lunglei and Chhimtuipui in Mizoram. Champhai, Serchhip, Lunglei, Anjaw and Chhimtuipui have not recorded any such fatality so far.

Meanwhile, the June 4 attack was claimed by the NSCN-K, Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) and Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP). In a joint statement released on the day of the attack, these groups stated that the “combined team of Elite Strike Unit of Naga Army [NSCN-K], KYKL and KCP carried out the attack. The joint offensive has been launched in sync with each corresponding assertion for self-determination and sovereignty." According to some other reports, the 'commander-in-chief' of the Independent faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA-I), Paresh Baruah, referring to the attack, called up local television channels saying that the ambush was carried out under orders from S.S. Khaplang, ‘chairman’ of the recently formed United Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLF-WSEA).

NSCN-K had also claimed the May 3 and February 6 attacks. The April 2 attack remains unattributed, though NSCN-K is suspected to have been involved.

The June 4 incident was at least the third attack targeting SFs and involving NSCN-K, since March 27, 2015, when this rebel group unilaterally walked out of the 14 year-old ceasefire process.

Meanwhile, reports indicate that, after the ceasefire collapsed, about 400 cadres of NSCN-K have shifted base to Myanmar. Reports had earlier claimed that an estimated 2,000 militants from various groups operating in India’s Northeast were stationed across the frontier in Myanmar. These militants mainly belonged to NSCN-K, ULFA-I, Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the IK Songbijit faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS). Indeed, reports indicated that Paresh Baruah was located in the Sagaing Division of Myanmar after he fled Bangladesh, subsequent to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed’s assumption of power in Bangladesh in 2009. A recent report that an ailing Khaplang was airlifted to Yangon deepened suspicions of official support to these groups.  However, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, asserted that the Myanmar and Bangladesh Government “do not have proper control in their territories, where the militant groups have set up their base camps”. It is useful to note that despite the best effort of Sheikh Hasina Wajed Government in Bangladesh, at least 57 hideouts of these militant outfits still remain intact inside Bangladeshi territory.

The formation of UNLF-WSEA on April 17, 2015, bringing NSCN-K, ULFA-I, KLO and NDFB-IKS under a single banner, can only add to current concerns. Some reports suggest that another five groups, KCP, KYKL, PREPAK, PLA and UNLF, have also joined this new umbrella organisation. It is significant that efforts to unify the fragmented insurgencies of the Northeast date back many years, and the first reference of the newly-floated common platform can be traced back to a statement by Paresh Baruah on December 15, 2013, that, “More than 90 per cent of the work of forming the common platform has been completed and only the name of the platform has to be declared. We are hopeful of announcing the common platform shortly. Though the name of the platform is yet to be announced, the words ‘west-south east Asia’ would be included in the name.”

A similar grouping of six militant outfits - KCP, KYKL, PREPAK, Progressive faction of PREPAK (PREPAK-PRO), PLA and UNLF – called; CorCom (Coordination Committee) has been operational in Manipur  since its formation on July 8, 2011. CorCom as a group has been involved in at least 26 killings – three civilians, 16 SF personnel and seven militants – since its formation.

While the Sheikh Hasina Government’s direct and open support in Bangladesh has helped India bring relative peace to the Northeast, the challenge of sustaining the gains of last few years has grown recently because of the clustering of all surviving Northeast militant formations in Myanmar and the support they receive from non-state groups there, as well as the possibility of some support from official quarters.

India’s management of its borders has been consistently unsatisfactory, though circumstances and fortune have aided it in imposing a measure of rationality and control in some regions. The Indo-Myanmar border, unfortunately is not among these. Despite a boundary agreement dating back to 1967, which clearly delimited the borders, no physical demarcation has yet been established. As with other boundaries in the region, the border cuts through communities, families, villages, and even homes, and past attempts to fence certain sections have met with mass protests on both sides. A Free Movement Regime (FMR) allows resident tribals along the border to move up to 16 kilometres across the boundary without restrictions, and tribals are permitted to carry headloads across the border. These laws, intended to facilitate the natural interface of local communities, have been abused consistently by insurgents and smugglers, transforming this border into one of the major loci of drugs, weapons and human trafficking. The problem has been compounded significantly as a result of a tradition of diplomatic neglect which has left many rankling sores in the relation between Naypyidaw and New Delhi. While joint operations long in the past had secured some excellent results, more recently, Myanmarese authorities tend to look the other way as far as Indian insurgent group activities on their soil are concerned. An operation was purportedly launched by the Myanmar Army against Indian militant groups in March 2013, but the rebels were given ample warning, and nothing but the shells of their camps were located and destroyed. The diplomatic failure in this is incomprehensible, as Naypyidaw is far from hostile to India. Further, Myanmarese authorities exercise dubious control over some of the border regions. Despite a ‘nationwide ceasefire agreement’ between the Government and 16 armed groups, armed clashes continue between Government Forces and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army, creating wide areas of disorder along the border.

Worse, India’s approach to its own borders remains primitive, relying overwhelmingly on rudimentary and severely undermanned patrolling. On the Myanmar border, this occurs deep inside Indian Territory, leaving vast, unfenced spaces in dense forests entirely uncovered. In Manipur, roughly 46 battalions of the Assam Rifles are charged with both Counter Insurgency (CI) and border management – and less than 15 battalions are dedicated to the latter task along a topographically challenging 1,624 kilometer border. The policy framework has never ventured beyond crude Force management, and the development of local Forces and intelligence networks has been grossly neglected. There is little intelligence penetration and surveillance, and no directive to the overmanned local Police to monitor activities, beyond standard and deeply compromised crime control measures. According to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data for 2013, Manipur has the highest Police Population Ratio, at 1,020 policemen per 100,000 population, as compared to an all India average of just 141. Virtually no attention has been directed to the demographic, social, political and administrative management of borders and the development of a permanent and intensive intelligence network.

The Army is now mounting a retaliatory operation against the perpetrator groups of the June 4 massacre. Crucially, the focus needs to be on a narrowly targeted intelligence based operation. Very recently such a targeted operation in Assam yielded good results in the aftermath of the December 2014 massacre of Adivasis, when the Army launched a major crackdown against NDFB-IKS. After suffering major losses, the NDFB-IKS, the most violent group in Assam, has not carried out a single attack since the launch of the operation. It is, consequently, necessary to initiate sustained operations in Manipur, and carry these to a logical end. Unfortunately, in the past, such operations have invariably been suspended well before the capacities of the rebel groups have been destroyed, resulting in repeated cycles of resurgence.

Insurgents in India’s Northeast had several safe havens in the neighbourhood in the past; they now have sanctuary only in Myanmar. The Government there is not unfriendly – though there is a burden of resentments and grievances as a result of past diplomatic failures. Joint operations between Indian and Myanmarese Forces, launched in good faith, would benefit both India and Myanmar – bringing far greater order to both sides of their poorly governed border areas. This is the task to which the Indian policy establishment must urgently commit itself.

PAKISTAN
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Balochistan: Sanguinary Faultlines
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

In another act of targeting settlers from outside Balochistan, Baloch insurgents shot dead 22 Pashtuns on May 29, 2015, all of them daily wagers and labourers, who were travelling in two passenger buses en route to Karachi (Sindh) from Pishin District (Balochistan), in the Khad Kucha area of Mastung District. At least 15 to 20 militants, wearing Security Forces’ (SF) uniforms, came in three pickup trucks and abducted some 35 passengers. The militants subsequently killed 22, and set free another five. The fate of the remaining eight is unknown.

Lamenting the Mastung carnage, Qaumi Watan Party (QWP) Chairperson Aftab Ahmad Sherpao expressed his anxiety over ethnic violence and observed that the miscreants wanted to create ethnic chaos in the Province, as they killed 22 Pashtuns, and let the non-Pashtun cleaners off the buses after checking their identity cards.

The United Baloch Army (UBA), a Baloch separatist group, claimed responsibility for the killings. Mureed Baloch, UBA 'spokesman', declared on May 30, “It is a revenge for killing of militants in Mastung and Kalat areas by Security Forces.”

On May 17, 2015, SFs had killed at least 20 militants, including nine 'commanders', during an operation in Kalat District.  In another such operation on March 29, 2015, SFs had killed five militants and injured another six in Mastung District.

Meanwhile, in retaliations to the May 29 attack, the Frontier Corps (FC) claimed to have killed 16 alleged UBA militants during two different search operations. At least seven UBA militants were killed on May 30, in the same area where the 22 Pashtuns had been killed. Again, on June 1, at least nine UBA militants were killed in the Morgan Harboi area of Kalat District. Balochistan Home Minister Mir Sarfaraz Bugti confirmed the retaliatory action that killed the militants, adding that around 500 personnel of FC, Police and Levies Force took part in the operation. Four helicopters provided by the Federal Government were also deployed during the operation.   

In a similar act of ethnic carnage, on April 10, 2015, militants of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), another Baloch separatist outfit, shot dead at least 20 Punjabi and Sindhi construction labourers at their camp in the Gagdan area of Turbat District. Out of the 20 deceased labourers, 16 were Punjabis, and four were from the Hyderabad District in Sindh. A senior administration official, Akbar Hussain Durrani, disclosed that the militants had lined the labourers up and shot them at point blank range after confirming their identity. BLF 'spokesman' Goran Baloch had claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting, “We will continue our fight against Pakistani occupation until (the) liberation of Balochistan.”

At that time as well, FC retaliated by killing at least 13 alleged BLF militants in a raid on April 13, 2015, including one key militant 'commander' Hayat Bewas, in the same area.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 181 ‘outsiders’ have been killed in Balochistan since the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe and President of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), on August 26, 2006, in a military operation in the Chalgri area of the Bhamboor Hills in Dera Bugti District. The killings of settlers started only after the Bugti killing, when Baloch militant organizations such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), BLF and Baloch Republican Army (BRA), among others, began to voice anti-Punjabi sentiments. Akbar Bugti’s killing led to a series of attacks on Punjabi and other non-Baloch settlers in Balochistan, as well as to massive destruction of national infrastructure.

While most of the 181 ‘outsiders’ killed were from Punjab, other ethnic groups, including Urdu-speaking people from Karachi and Hindko-speaking settlers from Haripur District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), have also been singled out in acts of ethnic violence. A media report published on June 28, 2011, had noted, “Almost all non-Baloch are on their hit-list.” According to the SATP database, however, the May 29, 2015, attack was the first against Pashtun settlers. Nevertheless, apprehensions regarding ethnic imbalances and consequent tensions had been raised way back in 1993, when Tahir Amin, Director, National Institute of Pakistan Studies (NIPS), had observed,
Today with a large number of Afghan refugees not having gone back, the demographic profile in Balochistan has changed. If the refugees decide to stay permanently, the traditional ethnic balance between the Baloch and Pashtun population will shift in favour of Pashtuns.

The latest attack on Pashtun settlers is claimed as retaliation by the Baloch people against the Pakistani establishment’s deliberate attempt to ignore the genuine grievances of the Baloch people, which include the outsourcing of labour from other Provinces, deliberately keeping the local Baloch away from development work in the Province and depriving them of their own resources.

While Baloch separatist depredations escalate, there is no let up in Islamabad’s continued policy of engineering ‘disappearances’ and carrying out extrajudicial killings in the name of neutralizing the militant threat. Indeed, Abdul Qadeer Baloch, also known as Mama Qadeer, leader of the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) referring to the FC claim of having killed at least 13 BLF militants in a raid on April 13, 2015, following the April 10 attack, asserted that five of the 13 suspects killed had been missing for some time. The claim left the incident shrouded in controversy. As SAIR has noted repeatedly in the past, extrajudicial killings by state agencies have become a recurring problem in the Province.

Of the 3,418 civilian fatalities recorded in Balochistan since 2004 [data till June 7, 2015], at least 859 civilian killings are attributable to one or other militant outfit. Of these, 347 civilian killings (202 in the South and 145 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations while the Islamist and sectarian extremist formations, primarily Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of India), claimed responsibility for another 512 civilian killings, 506 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta) and six in the South. The remaining 2,559 civilian fatalities - 1,547 in the South and 1,012 in the North - remain ‘unattributed’. A large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities, particularly in the Southern region, are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by security and intelligence agencies, particularly including the FC and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). The large number of unattributed civilian fatalities strengthens the widespread conviction that the Security Agencies are busy with “kill and dump” operations against local Baloch dissidents, a reality that Pakistan’s Supreme Court clearly recognized on July 26, 2012, while hearing the case of enforced disappearances and missing persons.

Significantly, the May 29, 2015, attack came just two days after the decision to launch targeted operations in provincial capital Quetta and the surrounding areas. Balochistan Home Minister Mir Sarfaraz Bugti, on May 27, announced that the Government had decided to launch a "grand targeted operation" to curb terrorism. He said that FC, Police, Levies and other intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies would take part in the operation. "Nobody would be spared, strict action would be taken against terrorists", he asserted. This declaration had been preceded by the revelation by unnamed official sources, that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during his meeting with Army Chief General Raheel Sharif on April 15, 2015, had decided to expand the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb to Balochistan, to target the Baloch insurgents. The Army had launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb against the TTP and associated Islamist terrorist formations in the North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on June 15, 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on the Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, on June 8-9, 2014.

Amidst disappearances, torture and indiscriminate artillery attacks, the Baloch stand hardened in their separatist resolve. As the Government decides to further entrench militarization by launching its "grand operation", the ethnic problem in Balochistan is bound to worsen. The butchery in Mastung suggests that ethnic minorities are now at risk across the Province. Such proclivities are likely to intensify with the continuation of Islamabad’s enduring policy of economic marginalisation, exploitation and deprivation of the Baloch people, the deepening sense of alienation, and the wrongs inflicted by the Punjabi-dominated Federal Government. Numerous ‘packages’ have been announced to provide relief to the Baloch people, but the only policy that is implemented on the ground is a continuation of past strategies of repression by military force and marginalization through demographic engineering.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
June 1-7, 2015

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

 

Jammu and Kashmir

1
0
3
4

Manipur

0
18
1
19

Left-wing Extremism

 

Chhattisgarh

0
0
3
3

Odisha

0
1
0
1

Total (INDIA)

1
19
7
27

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

5
4
23
32

FATA

5
1
48
54

Punjab

0
0
2
2

Sindh

7
1
6
14

PAKISTAN (Total)

17
6
79
102
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

ABT threatens to kill seven people including State Minister for Home Affairs Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal: Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) in a letter threatened to kill seven people, including State Minister for Home Affairs Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal. Apart from the State Minister for Home Affairs, Abu Mohamad Delwar Hossain, Abu Musa M Masuduzzaman Zakaria, Dr AK Azad Chowdhury, Shomi Kaiser, Dr Mohamad Akhtaruzzaman and Dhaka University (DU) proctor Prof AM Amzad received the death threats. News Bangladesh, June 2, 2015.


INDIA

18 Army men killed in ambush in Manipur: On June 4, militants ambushed a convoy of 6 Dogra Regiment of the Indian Army killing at least 18 Army personnel and injuring another 11 at a place between Paralong and Charong villages in Chandel District. The militants used Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and automatic weapons in the attack. The Shillong Times, June 5, 2015.

Dawood Ibrahim shifted somewhere near Afghanistan-Pakistan border, says report: Latest intelligence inputs suggest that Dawood Ibrahim was shifted somewhere near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border about a fortnight ago. "He was in the port city of Karachi about 15 days ago, but has since been shifted to the Af-Pak region. There are at least five-six locations that we have identified, where he is shifted on a regular basis with the help of Pakistan authorities. He is never kept at one location for more than a month," said an unnamed Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) official. He added that Dawood also travelled frequently outside Pakistan, especially to Central Asian countries. Indian Express, June 5, 2015.

Maharashtra Government sets up 'Unified Command' to tackle Maoist issues: The Home Department of Maharashtra Government in an effort to tackle the challenge posed by the Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist) has set up a 'unified command' under Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis, which includes officials from the state Police and intelligence, comprising central intelligence, and defence. The command will also have officials from department such as forest, Finance, public works and planning. Hindustan Times, June 3, 2015.


NEPAL

NC and CPN-UML 'to accept' 60-40 poll model if federalism row is sorted: The ruling Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) said that they would accept Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) proposal of a mixed model electoral system-60 percent direct and 40 percent proportional-provided they reach consensus on federalism. During a four-party meeting on June 2, the UCPN-M proposed to elect 40 percent representatives through the proportional system and the rest under the first-past-the-post. Kantipur Online, June 3, 2015.


PAKISTAN

Sindh Government to initiate crackdown of 48 madrassas involved in suspicious activities: Sindh Information Minister Sharjeel Inam Memon on June 4 said that 48 madrassas (seminaries) have been found involved in 'suspicious activities'. He said that the meeting of the Apex Committee held under the chairmanship of Sindh Chief Minister Qaim Ali Shah in Karachi decided to initiate a crackdown on 48 seminaries which have been found to be promoting terrorism in the country in general and in the province in particular. The News, June 5, 2015.


SRI LANKA

New Tamil political alliance formed in Sri Lanka: A new Tamil political formation, Tamil Progressive Alliance (TPA), was formally launched on June 3 to highlight issues and problems of Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka. The TPA comprises Democratic People's Front (DPF) of Mano Ganesan, Up Country People's Front (UCPF) of V. S. Radhakrishnan, and the National Union of Workers (NUW) of Palany Thigambaram. The three leaders asserted that the Alliance was formed not meant for the polls but out of the realization that a "unified and cohesive force" would ensure the accomplishment of more concessions and rights for the Indian Tamils.

Meanwhile, the TPA has decided to support the government party, United National Party (UNP). TPA has also decided to contest the elections under the elephant symbol of the UNP. The Hindu, June 4, 2015; Colombo Page, June 5, 2015.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

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Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


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