|
Ever
Unready
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM &
SATP
In a series
of arrests, at once indicating a major intelligence breakthrough
and the sheer spread of the enduring threat of Pakistan-backed
Islamist extremist terrorism in India, as many as 77 persons
have already been arrested across the country in 2014,
in connection with a string of Islamist terrorist plots
and subversive activities. These prominently include Tehseen
Akhtar alias Monu, who had replaced Yasin Bhatkal
as the Indian Mujahiddeen's (IM’s) ‘India operations chief’,
and was the 'mastermind' of the Bodh
Gaya and Patna
attacks, and who was arrested from Naxalbari in Darjeeling
District of West Bengal [arrest date not disclosed, announcement
made on March 25, 2014], in the eastern corner of the
country. Top IM operative, Pakistani national Zia-ur-Rehman
alias Waqas, was arrested from outside the Ajmer
Railway Station in the Western State of Rajasthan, in
the morning of March 22, 2014. In a continuing series
of arrests, Mohammad Mahruf and Mohammad Waqar Azhar alias
Haneef, were arrested from Jaipur on March 23. On the
same day, Shaquib Ansari alias Khalid, was arrested
from Jodhpur, even as "a huge amount of explosive
materials, detonators, electronic circuits/timers"
was recovered from "the residences of these three
people from Jaipur and Jodhpur". Again, on March
25, another three IM operatives, Barkat Ali, Mohammed
Javed and Mohammed Iqbal, were arrested from Jodhpur,
followed by the arrest of five IM operative - Mohammad
Aquib, Mohammad Sajjad, Mohammad Waqar, Mohammad Umar,
and Mohammad Wahid - from Sikar on March 28, 2014. In
Uttar Pradesh, two IM operatives, Murtaza and Owais, were
arrested from Gorakhpur on March 26, 2014.
These arrests
added to at least 882 persons arrested since 26/11 (the
Mumbai attacks of 2008), according to partial data compiled
by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), in connection
with Islamist extremism and terrorism, and including terrorist
cadres, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agents,
and Bangladeshi, Nepali and Pakistani nationals. 151 of
these arrests were made in 2013, and another 348 in 2012.
These included three top terrorists – Yasin Bhatkal aka
Mohammad Ahmed Siddibappa Zarrar aka Imran aka
Asif aka Shahrukh; Asadullah Akhtar aka
Haddi; and Abdul Karim Tunda – who were arrested from
the Indian State of Bihar along the Indo-Nepal Border
in August 2013. Yasin Bhatkal was thought to be IM's 'operational
chief in India', while Tunda ranked 15th on India's dossier
of most wanted terrorists in Pakistani safe havens.
In Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) at least six persons, including
three militants, two civilians and one soldier were killed
in Kathua District on March 28, 2014, when three Pakistani
terrorists struck at Tarnah bridge at Dayala Chak near
Hiranagar, killing a Bolero driver before striking at
an Army camp at Janglot. An Army soldier and all three
militants were killed while another trooper was
injured.
In the
Sukma District of Chhattisgarh, one of the States worst
afflicted by the Left Wing Extremist insurgency, fifteen
Security Force (SF) personnel were killed in an ambush
by Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
cadres, on March 11, 2014. One civilian, Vikram Nishad,
also died in the crossfire, while three were injured.
The incident occurred in the Jeeram Ghati area, barely
eight kilometres from the location of the May
25, 2013, attack, when CPI-Maoist
cadres killed 28 persons and injured at least 30 (another
three subsequently died of their injuries), including
the top leadership of the Congress Party in the State.
In the
Kokrajhar District of Assam, in India's troubled Northeast,
six persons were killed when suspected militants of the
Ingti Kathar Songbijit faction of the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS) opened fire at a bus on National
Highway (NH) 31, at Serfanguri.
These developments
and widely dispersed incidents come as sobering reminders
of the enduring threat of extremist violence across India,
despite broadly positive trends in fatalities and armed
violence in a multiplicity of theatres. Crucially, total
terrorism and insurgency related fatalities collapsed
from a peak of 5,839 in 2001, to just 885 in 2013, according
to the SATP database. The most dramatic drop
has been in J&K, from 4,507 killed in 2001, to just
181 in 2013. Maoist violence, which peaked in 2010, with
1,080 fatalities, also registered a sharp
contraction, with a total of 421 killed
in 2013. In the multiple insurgencies across India's Northeast,
fatalities
collapsed from a peak of 1,317 in 2001, to a total of
251 in 2013. Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist attacks
outside J&K, which resulted in 364 fatalities in 2008,
saw 29 killed in 2013. Significantly, on November 21,
2013, Syed Asif Ibrahim, Director, Intelligence Bureau,
observed: "The LeT (Lashkar-e-Toiba) and IM have
enlarged their network and developed capabilities to carry
out acts of terror at short notice in various parts of
the country... Evidence gathered from various cases indicates
Pakistan continues to nurture terrorist groups..."
Demonstrating
the fragility of these gains, however, J&K registered
a rise in fatalities, from 117 in 2012, to 181 in 2013.
This was compounded by an escalating campaign of cease
fire violations by Pakistan's Army with at least 195 violations
recorded through 2013, resulting in 10 SF fatalities,
as against 93 such violations in 2012, resulting in three
SF fatalities. In the Maoist belt, fatalities rose from
367 to 421 between 2012 and 2013; Islamist terrorist attacks
outside J&K accounted for one fatality in 2012, and
29 in 2013. In the Northeast, at least two States registered
an increase in total fatalities between 2012 and 2013:
Assam, from 91 to 101; and Meghalaya, from 48 to 60. India's
peculiar vulnerabilities, the sheer weakness of governance
and of the internal security apparatus, and the mercurial
geopolitical environment, leaves no room whatsoever for
complacency.
205 of
the country’s 640 Districts continued to be afflicted
by varying intensities of chronic subversive, insurgent
and terrorist activity in 2013, including 120 Districts
where the Maoists remained active; 20 Districts in J&K
afflicted by Pakistan-backed Islamist separatist terrorism;
and 65 Districts in six Northeastern States where numerous
ethnicity based terrorist and insurgent formations operate.
This is, of course, down from a peak of 310 Districts
so listed in 2010, principally as a result of the abrupt
contraction of the Maoist rampage which had escalated
enormously in the 2009-10 period. In 2012, the number
of afflicted Districts stood at 252.
The divergent
trends and their causal dynamic in different States and
theatres have been analysed
in detail elsewhere, and need not detain us here. It needs
to be emphasised that a wide range of extraneous factors,
often unrelated to state policy or strategy, have influenced
these trends, and grave dangers of reversal - including
the impact of developments in Afghanistan and a creeping
implosion in Pakistan - exist. Crucially, India's own
vulnerabilities and deficits in its security and intelligence
apparatus remain glaring, and there is much reason to
be sceptical of the claim made by Union Minister of Home
Affairs, Sushilkumar Shinde, that "The Government
will deal with iron fist (sic) when it comes to
terrorism." Indeed, the lackadaisical, often corruption-led
approach to India's security is everywhere in evidence,
with crucial projects, acquisitions and plans delayed
beyond measure, or implemented in a fitful manner that
destroys the very possibility of their efficacy in securing
intended ends. A brief review of the status of some of
the most urgent measures illustrates the sheer incoherence
of approach, despite massive increases in expenditure
on internal security. The annual budgetary allocation
for the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), for instance,
has escalated dramatically since 26/11, more than doubling,
from INR 254.39 billion in 2008-09, to 592.41 billion
in 2013-14. A detailed breakdown of this expenditure is
not available, nor is any detailed assessment of its components
possible here. It is useful, however, to take an overview
of some of the most pressing heads and commitments made
post-26/11, to see the sheer magnitude of implementation
failure. More than five years after the debacle in Mumbai,
and the many political declarations of determination and
intent, capacity augmentation has been no more than marginal,
and most state agencies continue to struggle with manpower,
technology and resource deficits that are little different
from the situation in 2008.
Thus, on
March 12, 2013, in a written statement to the Lok Sabha,
Minister of State of Home Affairs, R.P.N Singh disclosed,
“As against a sanctioned strength of 26,867 personnel
in IB (Intelligence Bureau), at present 18,795 personnel
are available with a total of 8,072 vacancies (30%).”
Improvements in the manpower-strapped IB have been conceived
of as critical to the country's counter-terrorism (CT)
and counter-insurgency (CI) responses, and this single
datum, manifesting an manpower at best marginally different
from the situation in 2008, is itself a comprehensive
indictment of the state's approach.
Similarly,
the Government informed the Rajya Sabha on August 22,
2013, that Indian Police Service (IPS) officers 'in position'
as per the 2013 civil list stood at 3,637, some 1,093
short of the total authorized strength of 4,730 IPS officers,
a deficit of 23.1 per cent, as compared to the situation
in 2008, when a deficit of 14.42 per cent existed against
a lesser sanctioned strength of 3,903. The actual addition
to this cadre has been just 297 officers over five years.
The sanctioned strength, moreover, remains well below
the estimated requirement of Police leadership in the
country.
The
police-population ratio has risen from 128 per 100,000
in 2008, to no more than 138 per 100,000 in 2012, as against
a general norm of 220 per 100,000 for 'peacetime policing',
with some Western countries maintaining ratios
over and above 220 per 100,000. There is, moreover, no
evidence whatsoever of any significant change in the very
poor manpower profile of the Police Forces, or in their
training and capabilities. Despite the creation of the
'elite' Force 10, Mumbai, today, has the same general
policing capabilities that so dramatically failed to protect
the city against the 26/11 attacks. The State Police across
much of the country, with occasional exception, is measurably
worse in terms of resources, capacities and capabilities.
The Central
Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), the stopgap responders for
every emergency in the country, including the chronic
crises generated by enduring movements of terrorism and
insurgency, have seen some increase in manpower. The sanctioned
strength of CAPFs at end-2008 stood at 838,893, and actual
strength at 777,743 (a deficit of 7.28 per cent). By January
2013, according to Bureau of Police Research and Development
data, these numbers had been raised to 984,781 sanctioned,
and 883,581 actual (a deficit of 10.2 per cent). Actual
strength has, thus, seen an improvement of 105,838 personnel,
which is significant, but far from adequate to meet the
augmenting challenges of a progressively widening mandate
and the geographically dispersed threats across the country.
While these
numbers may suggest some qualified gains in the CAPFs,
the scandalous pace of capacity development is illustrated
by a March 22, 2014, news report regarding the status
of protective headgear for the Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF), the designated 'lead agency' for CT-CI operations.
Jugal Purohit discloses, in India Today, that,
against an authorisation of 109,000 protective headgear
in two categories - helmets and patkas - the current
availability is an abysmal 762 helmets and under 1,100
patkas. Tortuous and dilatory bureaucratic processes
continue to obstruct necessary acquisitions, placing SF
personnel at unacceptable risk in counter-insurgency deployments
across India. Significantly, at least 226 CRPF personnel
have been killed in the course of their duties between
2010 and 2012.
Shortly
after 26/11, a 'modernization plan' for the CAPFs was
announced, with a total allocation of INR 41.85 billion,
to acquire the latest weapons, surveillance and communication
equipment, vehicles, body protection gear, etc. But only
a fraction of these financial commitments have actually
been met. Thus, the CAPFs sought INR 23.60 billion for
2013 for their CT-CI and border control acquisitions;
the UMHA released just INR 900 million. The CRPF had raised
a demand of INR 8.73 billion, but was sanctioned just
INR 200 million. The Border Security Force (BSF) sought
INR 6.94 billion, but received just INR 200 million.
Coastal
security was identified as one of the priority areas of
security reform after 26/11, with its utter and comprehensive
vulnerability demonstrated in the Mumbai attacks. That
India's coastline remain just as vulnerable, was dramatically
demonstrated with the discovery of the 390 tonne Seaman
Guard Ohio, owned by a private US firm, AdvanFort, which
its commander admitted had been functioning undetected
as an illegal 'floating armoury' for merchant vessels
in Indian territorial waters for 45 days prior to its
detention 10 nautical miles off Tuticorin along the Tamil
Nadu coastline, on October 12, 2013. 35 weapons, including
34 rifles, one pistol and ammunition were recovered from
the vessel. The vessel was supposedly checked and found
clean when it had berthed on August 23, 2013, at Kochi
in Kerala, suggesting, either, that the inspection was
far from thorough, or that the arms had been acquired
in Indian waters before the vessel reached the point of
its interception. Clearly, a terrorist attempt to pass
through Indian waters to a target port would take considerably
less than 45 days of undetected movement.
Even more
startling was the evident and continuing vulnerability
of the Mumbai coast demonstrated by three
incidents in 2011, when three massive
vessels simply drifted into Mumbai, completely unnoticed
by the numerous Coastal Police Stations, check-posts,
outposts, and sea and land patrols that had been established
after 26/11.
With tens
of thousands of vessels, large and small, at sea along
India's vast coastline each day, it is impossible, irrespective
of the intensity of patrolling, to identify the interloper
or deviant, unless there is a GPS tagging system to identify
those whose presence is legitimate. The rudiments of such
a system are yet to be created.
Substantial
expenditure has certainly been incurred on various initiatives
intended to secure India's coastline, but the systems
are far from functional and effective. A Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) report released in July 2013 noted:
“72 per cent of the fast patrol vessels (FPVs)/inshore
patrol vessels (IPVs), 47 per cent of the advanced offshore
patrol vessels (AOPVs) and 37 interceptor boats were either
on extended life or their extended life had expired..."
Many of the coastal Police Stations and Posts sanctioned
had not been established. Sea patrolling was a fraction
of the prescribed frequency, and there had been no night
flying. "Out of the 50 CCPs [Coastal check-posts]
and COPs [Costal outposts] completed, 36 remained non-operational
as police personnel were not deployed…"
Unsurprisingly,
National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, observed,
on November 21, 2013, “Coastal areas in southern states
of India can be potential targets for terrorists to infiltrate
into the country.”
Vulnerabilities
along the country's land borders also persist. Home
Minister Shinde noted on December 20, 2013, that “anti-national”
elements were taking advantage of “friendly borders”,
and described the task of guarding open and friendly borders
with countries like Nepal and Bhutan as a “big challenge”.
The problem along borders with not-so-friendly countries
is obviously greater. According to partial data compiled
by SATP, at least 43 attempts at infiltration were made
from across the International Border and Line of Control
in J&K in 2013. The movement of terrorists and subversive
from Pakistan into India, through friendly countries such
as Nepal and Bangladesh has also been frequently documented,
and remains a persistent threat to internal security.
The multi-agency
centre (MAC), which coordinates all intelligence generated
by various central intelligence agencies, prominently
including the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), National
Technical Research Organisation, Military Intelligence,
among others, as well as the Intelligence Bureau’s (IB's)
Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus (SIBs) in the State, became
active sometime in May-June, 2012. This has resulted in
significant improvements in the acquisition, coordination
and dissemination of available intelligence, but falls
considerably short of creating a national database on
terrorist and insurgency activities - an objective that
can only come to fruition with the creation of the Crime
and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) project,
which is intended to link up all Police Stations in the
country, and which received sanction on June 19, 2009.
The CCTNS project is yet to take off, with several States
failing even to initiate first steps. The National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB), which has been charged with the
implementation of the process, is yet to finalize an MoU
between itself and the software developing agency that
is to take the project forward. The project received approval
of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) on
June 19, 2009. Crucially, the CCTNS project is a reinvention
of the PolNet (Police Network) project, which was sanctioned
as far back as 1996, with the same objective of linking
the Police Stations across the country. INR 2.76 billion
was allocated for the CCTNS project in 2013-14, but most
observers believe it will take years before the network
is ready.
Similarly,
the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) project, which
was intended to integrate 21 existing databases - including
banking, finance, and transportation databases - and which
the Government claimed would help 'fight terrorism', has
also failed to take off. Nevertheless, the foundation
laying day of the NATGRID data centre in New Delhi was
observed on December 19, 2013. The NATGRID data centre
and other administrative infrastructure are intended to
be completed over the succeeding 30 months, inside a CRPF
campus in south Delhi, will cost INR 2.34 billion. NATGRID's
potential impact on terrorism is, moreover, debatable,
and its efficacy has been questioned even by within the
intelligence community. Crucially, sources indicate that
the project is "several months to several years"
away from providing any useful inputs to the security
establishment.
The National
Investigation Agency (NIA), which was hurriedly established
in the immediate wake of the 26/11 attacks, has expectedly
failed to impact significantly on the trajectory of terrorism,
despite occasional successes. The total cases registered
by NIA currently stand at just 72, in a country where
thousands of terrorist offences are committed every year.
Charge Sheets have, thus far, been filed in only 33 cases.
Convictions have been obtained in seven cases. The number
of persons convicted stands at 11, with one of these,
Samir Ahmed, convicted in two cases. Interestingly, NIA
has failed to obtain a conviction in any major case of
terrorist attack. Significantly, many of the investigations
'taken over' by the NIA had already been at least partially
completed by State agencies. The cumulative CT impact
of the NIA - if at all measurable - would at best be negligible.
It is useful to note that the total strength of all Crime
Investigation Departments (CID) in the State Police across
the country stood at 11,729 personnel in 2011; with as
many as 6,252,729 offences registered that year, yielding
a ratio of 533.09 cases per officer (it is no surprise
that most of these cases go uninvestigated). NIA has a
sanctioned strength of 650 officers and 72 cases - yielding
an investigative caseload that can only be the envy of
agencies in the States.
The Government
quickly implemented the decision to establish 'hubs' of
the elite National Security Guard (NSG) in four major
metropolitan centres, but the utility of this move has
always been in question. Moreover, the hubs continue to
function under acute limitations for training and readiness
of the units, even as the NSG suffers from a critical
leadership shortfall, with a deficit of over 22 per cent
against its sanctioned strength of officers.
Despite
numerous, sometimes dramatic, successes by India's resource
strapped security and intelligence agencies, both at the
Centre and in the States, the reality is that India's
internal security apparatus continues to suffer from gaping
vulnerabilities. While we may celebrate the relief that
declining overall trends in terrorism and insurgency related
fatalities offer, the truth is, these trends are overwhelmingly
a consequence of factors other than measurable improvements
in state capacities and capabilities. This is unsurprising.
According to NCRB data for 2012, India's per capita expenditure
on State Police, for instance, works out to a pitiable
Rs. 1.25 per day - a fraction of what a cup of tea would
cost at a roadside stall. Only the blind and congenitally
stupid could expect an effective policing and internal
security system at this kind of cost.
India's
internal security apparatus continues to suffer extreme
susceptibility under the control of an ignorant, deeply
compromised and corrupt political executive. The system
lacks the capacities even to deal with current challenges
and transient emergencies, and will certainly and comprehensively
fail if a generational shift in terrorist capabilities
or intent - to include catastrophic or chemical-biological-radiological
and nuclear terrorism (CBRN) - occurs.
|
