SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 39, April 1, 2013

PAKISTAN

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FATA: The Fall of Tirah
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its local ally Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) finally overran Tirah Valley in the Khyber Agency on March 19, 2013, after nearly two months of intermittent heavy clashes with Ansarul Islam (AI) and the Kamarkhel militia, both pro-Government militant outfits. The deadly turf war, which started on January 23, 2013, ended with TTP and LI entering AI stronghold areas on March 18-19 and AI 'chief' Qari Mehboobul Haq and 'deputy chief' Maulana Izatullah Hamkhayal fleeing the area with just 25 confidants. Nevertheless, two AI supporters blew themselves up on March 19, killing 46 of the raiding TTP terrorists. The first suicide attacker blew himself up when the TTP terrorists entered the main office of the AI in the Bagh area. The other suicide attack was carried when TTP cadres moved into the ammunition depots inside the AI headquarters. Sources in the AI said the two suicide attacks were carried out by ‘commander’ Abdul Ghafar and Kashmir Khan. As the clashes ended, Ehsanullah Ehsan, main ‘spokesman’ for TTP, declared, on March 19, that TTP controlled 95 per cent of the Tirah Valley. He further claimed that no civilian was targeted during the fighting, though those who had become ‘part of the war against the Taliban’ would not be spared.

TTP had been trying to re-establish its dominance over the Valley for the past years. The recent turf war, however, commenced on January 23, 2013, after cadres of TTP’s Tariq Afridi faction, who operate in the Khyber Agency, captured a building belonging to AI. AI re-captured their centre after intense fighting. Around 50 TTP militants then attacked the Narhao area of Bar Qamber Khel and torched 15 AI supporters’ houses. Around 18 fighters on both sides were killed in this clash. Another 30 militants were reportedly killed on January 24, when TTP cadres, after attacking the AI in the Narhao area, advanced towards Maidan Bagh, torching more houses and shops on their way. 

Media reports indicate that skirmishes between the four groups further intensified on January 26, when hundreds of TTP militants came to Tirah from Mamozai in Orakzai Agency, following a Security Forces (SFs) operation, and tried to wrest control from AI. At the same time, in Sipah, Malikdinkhel and Akkakhel areas of Bara, LI militants moved towards Zakhakhel and Takhtakai areas of the Valley and began fighting with the pro-government Kamarkhel militia to seize important check posts. In the subsequent fighting, LI captured all the check posts earlier held by the pro-Government militia, in Takhtakai, Naray Baba, Lakai Sar and Madai, on February 1. Following this, pro-Government volunteers moved towards the mountainous check posts of Tora Lagad and joined AI to repulse LI militants from their areas. On February 12, TTP forces attacked AI check posts in Rocket Sanghar and Kajay areas. However, the AI fought back and managed to retain control. On February 26, a gunfight erupted between AI and TTP fighters for control of the Adam Khel area. AI 'deputy chief' Islam Gul was killed during these clashes. TTP militants then attacked the AI stronghold at Narhao in Bar Qamber Khel on March 13, torched some 15 houses belonging to AI fighters, and killed the ‘area chief’ Haji Samar Gul. On March 18, hundreds of LI and TTP militants attacked AI positions in Malikdinkhel, and the Muhammadi Compound in the Maidan Bagh and Kalavach areas. The AI fighters put up some resistance, though the TTP overcame them to establish their control in the area.

After capturing the entire Valley, TTP and LI militants destroyed its communication systems. Residents hoisted white flags on top of their houses in surrender to the TTP, while tribesmen supporting AI started vacating their houses, moving to the Orakzai Agency. Talking to reporters from an undisclosed location, the ‘deputy head’ of AI, Ezatullah, had stated, on January 25, that the group was still intact and its fighters had dispersed under a strategy, and it would retaliate and capture their stronghold in Tirah Maidan. However, the Mehboobul Haq-led AI has so far failed to expel the LI and TTP fighters from Tirah Maidan. Reports indicate that loyal AI fighters have been confined to a post on the mountaintop towards Orakzai Agency.

After much of the Tirah Valley had fallen to the TTP-LI combine, Sadat Afridi, spokesman of the AI, observed, “We have resisted insurgents for over seven years, but this attack was unusual... There were foreign fighters … Uzbeks, Chechens … almost 3,000 of them... We ran out of ammunition and other supplies.”

During the clashes, the Army did pitch in with aerial bombings in favour of the pro-government AI and Kamarkhel militia, though such support was, at best, sporadic. At least six aerial bombing attacks were recorded in media sources, in which 86 extremists were reportedly killed, out a total of 297 extremists killed during the entire offensive. Some of the major aerial attacks included:

January 29: At least 24 militants were killed when Army warplanes bombed militant positions in Dwa Thoe, Bara Gatt, Wocha Wona and Nakai areas of Tirah valley. Officials said the planes attacked targets where TTP and LI had bases or hideouts.

February: 20 Nine militants were killed and several others injured in shelling and bombing by military jets in Tirah Valley. Security sources said that three suspected militant hideouts were bombarded. A cache of arms and ammunition was also destroyed in the operation.

February 22: 15 militants and two security personnel were killed in shelling by warplanes on TTP positions, and during an encounter between the LI and SFs in Tirah Valley.

March 8: At least 20 militants were killed when fighter jets bombed TTP hideouts in various areas of the Tirah Valley. Three hideouts of militants were destroyed in the military offensive.

The remote Tirah Valley has key strategic significance for militant groups. The Valley is a mountainous region of the Khyber Agency, bordering the Orakzai and Kurram Agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and provides easy access to Afghanistan. On the other side, it leads to the plains of Bara, which connect the Agency to the outskirts of Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The Tirah Valley gives access to the settled areas beyond FATA and even threatens Peshawar. Khyber also links several Agencies to each other, serving as a north-south route within FATA. It is also important as a conduit linking Khyber Agency to the neighbouring Orakzai Agency and Afghanistan. The region has long been fought over by a mix of militant organisations, including the TTP, LI, Tawheed-e-Islam (TI), AI, Haji Namdar group and the Abdullah Azzam Brigade.  

Tirah Valley is inhabited by Malik Din Khel, Shalobar, Adam Khel, Qambarkhel and Zakhakhel sub-tribes of the larger Afridi tribe. The area where these tribes are settled is called Maidan, which is surrounded by hills from all sides. In the north of Maidan lies the area of the Kukikhel Afridi tribe, which has been controlled by TTP for the past few years. In the south it borders with the upper Orakzai Agency; to its west is the Kurram Agency and to the east are the Sipah and Kamarkhel Afridi tribes living under LI 'chief' Mangal Bagh’s rule for the past six years.

Historically, inhabitants of the Tirah Valley move to Bara in the Khyber Agency during the winters, to escape harsh weather. Bara tehsil (revenue unit) has been ruled by LI . LI was founded in 2004 by Mufti Munir Shakir. As a reaction, locals in the Tirah Valley formed AI to defend their area against the LI. AI included volunteers from almost all parts of the Tirah Valley and was organised as a defensive tribal lashkar. It was also considered pro-Government and did not bar Government employees, including the polio teams, from functioning. AI has consistently resisted the LI, which is considered to be close to the TTP.

Since the beginning of clash in Tirah Valley on January 23, 297 militants, 24 civilians and two SF personnel have been killed in the violence, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database. Actual fatalities may be significantly higher, as direct access of the media to the region is restricted. With all the seven Agencies facing the brunt of militancy, the Khyber Agency, for the second consecutive year, has recorded the highest number of acts of violence. The Agency recorded a total of 767 fatalities in the year 2012, and the first three months of 2013 have already seen at least 367 killings.

Clashes between TTP and AI had already forced a large number of civilians to leave the area for safer places in Orakzai and Kurram Agencies (FATA), Peshawar, Hangu and Kohat Districts (KP). The Government has made no arrangements for the internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the people of host areas have been providing assistance to the affected families. The chief of the Khyber Agency ‘affectees’ (affected persons) movement, Sobat Khan Afridi, noted, on March 21, that the ongoing crisis in Khyber Agency had affected over 50,000 families and the Government was providing no relief whatsoever.

Meanwhile, the misfortune continues to follow the IDPs wherever they go. On March 21, a car bomb explosion killed at least 17 persons and injured another 34 in the Jalozai Camp of IDPs in Nowshera District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The explosion, which occurred near a food distribution centre, was "triggered by explosives loaded into a vehicle," Nowshera Deputy Commissioner Ghulam Qadir disclosed. The TTP disassociated itself from the attack, but there is high likelihood of TTP-LI involvement, as the IDPs in the camp are from the Tirah Valley, and are thought to be supporters of AI.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) postponed the registration of IDPs at Jalozai camp on March 22. UNHCR spokesperson in Pakistan, Dunya Aslam Khan, noted, “After the blast in Jalozai camp, we have suspended the registration of displaced persons and have decided not to start it till a new security plan is chalked out”. Arshad Khan, Director of the FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) stated, further, “The number of displaced families was 4,290 – including 6,436 men, 10,872 women and 15,608 children – who are being assisted by the FDMA with its limited resources.”

While the whole country readies itself for the forthcoming General Election of May 11, 2013, the fall of Tirah Valley to the TTP-LI extremists has created fear in the minds, not only of the people of Khyber Agency, but much wider adjacent areas. The return of the extremists has also put enormous pressure on political candidates. Candidates for the National Assembly seat in Bara tehsil have demanded the postponement of General Elections in the NA-46 constituency owing to threats from terrorist groups and the inability of the political administration to devise a foolproof security plan for electioneering. Although the election campaign has not yet been launched in the Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency, LI has threatened that it would target all the people who try to take part in the elections.

The Awami National Party candidate Imran Afridi has declared that it was not possible to hold elections in Bara, as most of its parts were still inaccessible. Besides, he argued, fresh displacement of people from Tirah Valley made it difficult for the candidates to run a smooth and peaceful election campaign.

The fall of Tirah Valley to the TTP, despite the Army’s aerial support to AI, is an indication of the strategic failure of the state. Pakistan has outsourced its war against the extremists to the tribal militias who, despite all efforts, are outclassed by TTP. With the fall of Tirah Valley, the cross-border movement of extremists, which is a major bone of contention between Pakistan and Afghanistan, is likely to escalate. Tirah’s strategic location will give more leverage to the terrorists in their campaigns towards Peshawar as well. The fall of the Tirah Valley bodes ill for other areas across FATA and KP. 

INDIA

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Manipur: PLA - Creating Subversive Synergy
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

In the morning of March 22, 2013, a trooper of the Assam Rifles (AR) was killed while another was injured in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast triggered along the road side at Leirongthel Lamkhai under Yairipok Police Station in the Thoubal District of Manipur.

A week earlier on March 15, one AR trooper was killed and another three personnel were injured when two powerful IEDs exploded simultaneously near Kundong Leirembi under Moreh Police Station in Chandel District.

Another IED attack on February 26 in Churachandpur District killed one Army trooper and a mine detector dog, and left three persons injured. The IED had been planted on the roadside at a place located between Khiang Zang and Tollen villages.

In all the three attacks, the Revolutionary Peoples’ Front (RPF – the political wing of Peoples’ Liberation Army – PLA) claimed responsibility, claiming these were the handiwork of the ‘Special Warfare Group’ of its armed wing, PLA.

Other incidents carried out by PLA against the Central Security Forces (SFs) in 2013 include:

February 22, 2013: An encounter took place between PLA cadres and AR troops near Saibom village under Tengnoupal Police Station in Chandel District. However, there was no report of any casualty on either side.

February 15, 2013: PLA militants attacked AR personnel by exploding a powerful IED near the main road along the Uripok Kangchup Road, also known as Salam Pandol, at Heibongpokpi under the Lamsang Police Station in Imphal West District. No AR personnel sustained injuries as the IED exploded after the AR transport had passed. Claiming responsibility, the PLA declared in a Press Release that it would not tire in its struggle to expel non-Manipuri soldiers from Manipur.

While the SFs appeared to have established their dominance in operation against the PLA in the past, incipient indications of a reversal of this trend have appeared in the early part of 2013. The PLA’s ‘successes’ commenced in September 2012, after a lull of two and a half years.

On September 9, 2012, a powerful bomb planted by PLA cadres at Kangshoibi Thong along the Moirang-Kumbi Road in Bishnupur District exploded, killing one AR trooper and injuring another 10. The last incident in which an AR trooper had been killed by the outfit prior to the September 2012 incident, was on March 8, 2010. Through 2011, the SFs had killed five PLA cadres in four incidents, while no SFs were killed by the outfit during the year.

The PLA, meanwhile, has been avoiding any direct confrontation with local (Manipur State) Forces. However, in an ‘unintentional’ attack on September 12, 2009, four personnel of the 6^th India Reserve Battalion (IRB) – a State Paramilitary Force – were killed and another four were wounded, in an ambush carried out by the PLA at Ngakha Hill in Imphal East District. The RPF however clarified that the ambush was intended to target a Central SF team, which was expected there, and not personnel of the 6th IRB. The outfit clarified that its principle of not targeting State Forces had not changed. Since its inception in 1978, the PLA, whose revolutionary agenda is an ‘independent socialist state’ of Manipur, has been waging a low-level guerrilla war against the Indian military establishment, targeting the Indian Army, Central paramilitary forces as well as Manipur's State Police. However, in a policy shift in the late 1990s, the PLA declared a unilateral decision not to target the Manipur Police or other State Forces.

In September 1978, a few Manipuri youths led by N. Bisheshwar Singh had travelled to China through Myanmar, been indoctrinated into Chinese communism, and had returned to form the PLA, a name directly borrowed from the Chinese Army. This narrative has more recently been supplemented by the recorded confession of a PLA militant ‘sergeant’ Ronny alias Robindo alias Roger, who was arrested by the Manipur Police and the Army in August 2009, and claimed to have close relations with its (PLA’s) ‘president’, Irengbam Chaoren. In his confession, he stated, "China’s PLA remains in contact with Manipur’s PLA. 16 platoons of militants have come back to India after getting trained in China… The training of PLA militants also goes on continuously in Burma (Myanmar). There are many temporary camps in Manipur as well, such as Soibolkuki and Singhat. We train with big guns."

The links between militant groups in India’s Northeast, and China, came to the fore yet again in February 2011, when Indian security agencies came to know about a meeting between leaders of various Northeastern insurgencies and officials of the Government of China, in April, 2010. Sources in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) disclosed that leaders of formations including the United Nation Liberation Front (UNLF) and PLA of Manipur; the ‘chairman’ of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K), S. S. Khaplang; and the ‘commander in chief’ of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Paresh Baruah, were among others who attended the meeting held in Ruili in Yunan Province, China.

On its ‘independence demand day’ on February 25, 2013, Irengbam Chaoren declared, "Our enemies which we must overcome, are the vast multitude of the Indian military and the highly sectarian policies and strategies of the Indian political leaders”. To defeat the ‘colonial forces’, Chaoren asserted, there was no ‘pragmatic option’ other than an armed liberation movement. Earlier, on its 34th ‘foundation day’ on September 25, 2012, Chaoren had also stated that no negotiated agreement under the Indian Constitution could settle the ‘sovereignty issues’ of the region. In a message, he asked all groups involved in the present peace process to return and once again join the struggle against ‘colonial rule’.

In March 2010, while describing all those who entered Manipur after 1949 (when the erstwhile princely state was ‘forcibly’ merged with the Indian Union) as "non-Manipuris", the PLA had also asked them to leave the State. In May 2010, rather interestingly, it also urged the ‘non-local working class’ in Manipur to join the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist).

The PLA is a member of the Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF), an umbrella organization of three Valley-based outfits, also including UNLF and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK).  Chaoren is also the ‘convenor’ of CorCom [a Coordination Committee of seven – now six, after the United People’s Party of Kangleipak (UPPK) was expelled – Valley based militant Groups] which was formed in 2011 to bring unity among revolutionary groups in order to free Manipur from India’s ‘colonial regime’.

The Army had crushed the PLA in the 1980s, with the death of some of its top leaders in combat, including its ‘president’ Thoudam Kunjabehari in 1982, and the arrest of others, such as its founder N. Bisheshwar Singh, arrested in 1981. Three decades later, the PLA has not only regrouped but has emerged as a key player in training and supplying weapons to the CPI-Maoist, creating a complex threat to the tentative stability of India’s troubled northeast.

It was in October 2008 that some of the top echelons of the CPI-Maoist met PLA leaders in Myanmar and signed a Joint Declaration for unified actions for waging war against India. The meeting was presided over by Irengbam Chaoren. In July 2010, the PLA emphasized the necessity of creating an effective nexus with the CPI-Maoist, and various insurgent groups of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Northeast, unveiling their vision of establishing a joint militant group, to be evolved as 'United Front'. Intelligence Bureau (IB) reports had also revealed that China had been encouraging the Maoists and militant groups from J&K and the Northeast region to unite to form a single war-fighting machine against the Indian State.

The National Investigation Agency’s (NIA) 2011 investigation of the PLA-Maoist link established that, around June 2006, the PLA leadership met top CPI-Maoist leaders, with several other meetings between the two during the years 2006 to 2008, resulting in the establishment of a PLA office in Kolkata (West Bengal) towards the end of 2006. The Kolkata office started coordinating the activities of these outfits for the procurement of arms, ammunition and communication devices. However, in a setback to these operations, on April 2, 2012, NIA arrested a PLA 'captain', identified as Arnold Singh aka Beckon, the key man running the Kolkata office, from Siliguri in West Bengal. Arnold Singh was also a member of PLA's 'external affairs' wing and was the leader of a four-member team that had provided arms training to CPI-Maoist cadres in the Saranda Forest in Jharkhand between September 11 and November 20, 2010.

Other significant arrests that hobbled the growing nexus between the two outfits through 2012, included:

June 3, 2012: The ‘chief coordinator’ for the Maoists in Assam, Pallab Borbora alias Profull, was arrested by the NIA from Golaghat District in connection with its probe into the nexus between the Naxals (Maoists) and PLA. Borbora allegedly played a vital role in establishing contact with the PLA in 2006, and opened talks for providing training and supply of arms and explosives.

May 28, 2012: Asem Ibotombi Singh alias Angou, ‘secretary’ of PLA's ‘external affairs wing’ was arrested from Gopalpur in the Maoist afflicted Ganjam District of Odisha.

April 21, 2012: Ajay Chanda alias Indranil Chanda alias Raj, in charge of expanding the Maoist base in Assam, was arrested in Kolkata. An official source said Chanda had connections with senior PLA leaders and was instrumental in the transshipment of arms from PLA hideouts in Manipur to the Maoist strongholds in West Bengal, Jharkhand and Odisha.

According to a December 18, 2012, report, a supplementary charge sheet filed by the NIA in the CPI-Maoist-PLA nexus case against the two arrested Maoist leaders and PLA’s Angou revealed that the CPI-Maoist had been procuring Chinese arms and communication equipment from PLA via Myanmar, and routing these to Kolkata (West Bengal) through Guwahati (Assam) between 2006 and 2011.

The major setback to the PLA, which first exposed its nexus with the Maoists, occurred on October 1, 2011, when two of its top leaders, identified as N. Dilip Singh aka Wangba, a ‘lieutenant’ in the PLA, and his associate Arun Kumar, who worked in the outfit's ‘external affairs wing’, were arrested from a hotel at Paharganj in New Delhi. The two had been instrumental in the PLA’s training of Maoist cadres in the jungles of Odisha and Jharkhand in 2009 and 2010. Arun was also reportedly running a travel and tour office in Pune (Maharashtra) since 2008, and was trying to set up a safe hideout for Maoists. Their interrogation also revealed that the PLA leader, Irengbam Chaoren, was hiding in China.

In a significant development, a meeting of the heads of the Police Forces of the States of India’s Northeast, convened by the MHA, which concluded in Gangtok (Sikkim) on February 20, 2013, decided to launch coordinated efforts to check the Maoist rebels from establishing their roots in the region. The meeting observed that, though regional militant groups had weakened through 2011 and 2012, the level of violence had gone up, raising serious concerns.

Another problem remains the funding of the PLA by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In 2011, officials had claimed that ISI was funding the group for supplying arms and ammunition to the Maoists, and a "Strategic United Front" was being created to carry out attacks in India, particularly on SFs in the Naxal-affected areas. An official source claimed, "ISI and PLA are in touch and supplying Maoists with arms. They are supposedly using China as the alternative route." Much earlier in October 2007, Intelligence agencies had reportedly confirmed a nexus between the PLA and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), as part of a wider ISI plot to create trouble across India. The nexus was revealed by a LeT militant identified as Mohammed Sadeeq, from Manipur, who had initially worked for the PLA, during sustained interrogation by Police from Dudu in the Udhampur District of J&K. This was independently confirmed by the two PLA leaders arrested in October 2011, who disclosed that PLA was planning to liaise with terrorist outfits based in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), including LeT and with separatist groups of J&K and the Northeast.

The PLA’s activities in neighboring countries are another source of concern. A November 2012 report suggested that PLA was still operating from seven camps in Bangladesh, out of the 51 surviving camps of nine Northeast militant groups. The PLA along with other regional outfits, also had a ‘unified camp’ in Myanmar.

Another report, on November 6, 2012, indicated that the PLA/RPF enjoyed considerable political patronage, and this had forced inhibited security agencies from acting effectively against it. Bangladesh's Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and the ISI had both kept an eye on this group to further their agenda on Indian soil. According to sources in the NIA, the outfit earlier received financial support from both the ISI and the DGFI, and such support still continued from the ISI. An NIA official was reported to state, "We need to break the political links of the group and block their finances. We also have to look into the diplomatic issues involved in this case. The job will require at least a year since we need to first draw out a map of their operations and then get cracking on the case."

The PLA has registered significant ‘successes’ against Central SFs in early 2013. With its hardening stance and efforts to create a unity of extremist formations within the region and beyond, particularly the growing nexus with the CPI-Maoist, as well as its linkages abroad, the PLA constitutes a major potential threat to the security and stability of Manipur and the wider Northeastern region. The security scenario in Manipur had been registering gradual improvements, but the abrupt deterioration in 2012, with fatalities rising to 110, from 65 in 2011, particularly after the formation of CorCom of which PLA is an active member, are a warning sign against any proclivities to complacence that may afflict the state’s responses.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Extremism

INDIA

Jammu and Kashmir

Assam

Left-wing Extremism

Jharkhand

Maharashtra

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Punjab

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)