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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 40, April 9, 2012
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Gilgit-Baltistan:
Orchestrated Strife
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
Gilgit-Baltistan
(GB) has been an area of enduring darkness and oppression
since its occupation in 1948, in the wake of India’s bloody
Partition, and is, again, reeling under a renewed cycle
of acute violence. The current troubles commenced with
the killing of 18 Shias in the Kohistan area of neighboring
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on February 28, 2012, and took
an uglier turn on April 3, 2012. At least 24 people have
died and several others have been injured, in incidents
across GB, since the morning of April 3 (till the time
of writing). Unconfirmed reports put the number of dead
at more than 250.
Giving
his account of the escalation, GB Police officer Basharat
Ali noted that the violence within the region commenced
on April 3, when five persons were killed in Gilgit city
in clashes between the Police and protesting cadres and
sympathizers of the recently banned Sunni formation, Ahle
Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), a reincarnation of the banned
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).
The outfit had called for a strike in Gilgit, to press
the Government to release its ‘deputy secretary general’,
Maulana Ataullah Sadiq, who was arrested on March 28,
2012, in connection with firing on a Shia procession on
March 4, 2012. The March 4 procession had been organized
to protest against the February 28, 2012, Kohistan killings.
On April
3, angry protesters burnt tyres and forced shopkeepers
to shut down their shops. Meanwhile, an unidentified person
hurled a grenade at the protesting ASWJ cadres, killing
at least seven protestors. Subsequently, mosques in the
Kashroot area of Gilgit made announcements to retaliate
against the Shias in the Diamer District of GB and the
Kohistan District of KP. Unsurprisingly, 12 Shias were
killed when unidentified assailants opened fire on buses
on Karakoram Highway (KKH) near Gonar Farm in Chilas,
headquarter of Diamer District, on April 3. According
to eye witnesses, miscreants also set ablaze four buses.
In a number of attacks on public transports, some 300
passengers were reported missing, and their whereabouts
are yet to be ascertained. Fresh lashkars (armed
groups) were reported to have embarked from the Chilas,
Diamer and Kohistan areas towards Gilgit and its outskirts,
to take the ‘revenge’ for the grenade attack on the ASWJ
protestors, but were prevented from entering the town
by locals in the outlying villages.
Curfew
was imposed in Gilgit and its adjoining areas on April
3, 2012, and the Army was out on the streets to control
the law and order situation. All transport, including
flights, into GB, have been suspended, already resulting
in an acute shortage of essential commodities, including
food and medicines, in a region that depends overwhelmingly
on supplies from outside.
In related
incidents thereafter, two Shias, Akbar Ali and Ali Raza,
from Gilgit-Baltistan, were shot dead by unidentified
assailants on Mecongi Road in Quetta, the provincial capital
of Balochistan, on April 3, 2102. On April 6, 2012, again,
a Shia student, Ahmer Abbas, hailing from Gilgit, was
shot dead in Karachi.
For once,
the authorities have not blamed their favoured straw man,
the ‘foreign hand’. Indeed, GB Inspector General of Police,
Hussain Asghar, on April 7, 2012, explicitly denied foreign
involvement in renewed cycle of violence in the region,
preferring to blame limited job opportunities and a high
literacy rate among the resident youth for fueling dissatisfaction
that was feeding the rise in sectarianism. He argued,
I
don’t think there is any foreign hand involved in
the sectarian riots. The key thing in my understanding
is the high rate of literacy without employment
opportunities, which allows the frustrated youth
to be easily used by some elements. GB has
among the highest literacy rates in the country,
but few employment opportunities. Such a situation
frustrates the youth.
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There are
others, however, who have blamed “state engineered sectarianism”
for the current conflagration, in line with past cycles.
Several reports, both in the past and the present, have
given ample evidence of Islamabad’s role in fuelling the
sectarian divide in GB. A March 12, 2012, Daily Times
report criticized Islamabad’s reluctance to act, despite
ample warnings that the situation in GB could erupt at
any time, triggering large-scale violence. The report
claimed that large amounts of illegal arms and ammunitions
had reached GB, traversing three-hundred kilometers of
heavily securitized territory, passing through numerous
check posts and pickets set up by the law enforcement
agencies. The report also highlighted that a large number
of locals from various areas of GB had been trained for
militant activities in camps at Diamer and Mansehra. Past
reports have indicated that terrorist training camps have
been established, or have run at different points of time,
in various locations within GB, including Tangir and Darel,
Astore, Darul-Uloom, Juglote, Gilgit, Madrasa Nusratul-Islam,
Konodas, Skardu city, and Ghowadi village near Skardu.
Significantly,
Islamabad has turned Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) –
including both Azad Kashmir and GB – into a hub of Islamist
extremism and terrorism since the 1990s. Militant groups
like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),
and many others have been facilitated in creating bases
and training camps in the region. These terror camps are
‘global in nature’ – including terrorist formations that
have an international agenda. India maintains that “42
terror training camps were very much alive and kicking
in PoK”. On April 6, 2012, China indirectly alleged that
insurgents of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
were trained at camps in PoK. Significantly, a British
court, on February 9, 2012, sentenced nine persons, including
one of Pakistani origin, for plotting to bomb the London
Stock Exchange and build a terrorist training camp in
PoK. Three of these men, Mohammed Shahjahan (27), Usman
Khan (20) and Nazam Hussain (26), had planned to raise
funds for a terrorist camp in PoK and recruit Britons
to attend.
Crucially,
while naturally maintaining a studied silence on the role
of state agencies, Federal Minister of Interior Rehman
Malik, on April 4, 2012, stated that the conflict in GB
was not ‘sectarian’ in nature, and that some “hidden forces
are involved”. Sub-nationalist groupings in GB have alleged,
further, that there were no sectarian tensions among the
‘natives’ in the region, and that local Shia and Sunni
groups had united in their demand for the reinstatement
of the State
Subjects Rule, which offers particular
protection to ‘natives’, on the issue of travel and trade
towards Ladakh (in India), and on the issue of ‘no taxation
without representation’. The current violence, they allege,
has been orchestrated by outsiders acting at the best
of ‘hidden agencies’ who seek to disrupt this local unity,
in order to perpetuate the inequitable conditions that
prevail in the region.
Gilgit-Baltistan
remains the poorest and most backward area in Pakistan,
and is acutely lacking basic development and infrastructure.
Instead of improving the situation, state agencies have
sought to divert public attention from these issues and
the political demands of the local population, by encouraging
a rivalry between sects and political groupings, even
as a concerted effort has been made to alter the demographic
equation in the region by an orchestrated effort to bring
in large numbers of ‘outsiders’ from KP, Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and Punjab.
Ruled under
the Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance)
Order 2009, passed on September 9, 2009, GB is administratively
divided into two divisions, Gilgit and Baltistan. These,
in turn, are divided into seven Districts, including the
five in Gilgit – Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer, Astore, and Hunza-Nagar;
and two in Baltistan – Skardu and Ghanche. Unlike Azad
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), which, along with GB, constitutes
PoK – GB had no legal existence or protection till the
passage of the September 2009 order. It is still excluded
from any constitutional status, despite clear directives
from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, resulting in the denial
of constitutional rights and protection to the population.
It is widely believed that a principal motive of such
discriminatory legal and constitutional treatment arises
out of the fact that GB is Pakistan’s only Shia-dominated
region, unlike AJK, which, like rest of Pakistan, is Sunni
dominated. Though Islamabad has succeeded in substantially
re-engineering the regional demography, Shias, accounting
for 39 percent of the inhabitants, still dominate the
region. Other denominations include 27 per cent Sunni,
18 per cent Ismaili and 16 per cent Nurbakhshi. By January
2001, the old population ratio of 1:4 non-locals to locals
had already been changed to 3:4 non-locals to locals.
No estimates of the current ratio are available, but it
is expected to have been altered further to the disadvantage
of the locals.
Ethnic
ties and tribal loyalties conventionally surpassed sectarian
identities in GB, with people engaging in many inter-ethnic
and inter-tribe marriages. Indeed, GB remained immune
to any manifestation of sectarianism till 1974, when Islamabad
initiated a number of divisive measures to create a wedge
between various denominations. In one such measure, Islamabad
banned the annual Muharram procession in Gilgit in 1974,
expecting sectarian clashes and a resultant divide. Clashes
did occur, and were the beginning of repeated cycle of
sectarian
strife in the region. An extended
controversy over the alteration of school curricula,
with increasing emphasis on Sunni practices, provoked
one of the longest periods of violence in GB. Despite
this sustained, state-orchestrated, mischief, however,
no permanent
sectarian divide between local communities
has resulted. Contrary to frequent official projections,
there is no tension between local Shias and Sunnis, but
rather a deliberate effort from the outside, part of a
long-drawn campaign, to sustain tensions in the region.
Violence
has, consequently, been predictable and recurrent in the
region. According to a May 2011 Pakistan Institute
of Legislature and Transparency report “since 1998
to December 2010, 117 sectarian cases (of murder) have
been registered, 74 were challaned, 15 cancelled, 10 remained
untraced, and 15 are pending investigation. This tally
does not include attempted murder which has so far numbered
170. Perhaps a thousand people were killed during the
1990s.” Other reports suggest that there have been more
than 600 killings over last five years. One unofficial
estimate earlier suggested that over 30,000 Gilgit residents
have fled the city and its suburbs since 2000, in the
wake of orchestrated incidents of sectarian strife, followed
by discriminatory and repressive action by the state Forces.
Aziz Ali Dad, in an article on December 22, 2011, observed
that Gilgit city and its suburbs were experiencing a new
element of violence in the shape of target killings, which
have virtually turned Gilgit into a ‘no go’ area. Every
week, Dad claimed, several people fell prey to target
killings.
A devastating
report by the European Union Rapporteur, Baroness Emma
Nicholson, adopted by the European Union on May 24, 2007,
deplored “documented human rights violations by Pakistan”,
and declared, unambiguously, that “the people of Gilgit
and Baltistan are under the direct rule of the military
and enjoy no democracy”. Nicholson’s report was scathing
on the sheer oppression of the people, on the complete
absence of legal and human rights and a constitutional
status, as well as on the enveloping backwardness that
had evidently been engineered as a matter of state
policy in the region.
Any voice
of dissent in GB is routinely and brutally suppressed.
Abdul Hamid Khan, chairman of the Balawaristan National
Front (BNF), a nationalist political party in the region,
in his statement in United Nations Human Rights Council’s
(UNHRC) 13th Session in Geneva on March 16,
2010, noted:
Human
rights abuses are widespread and common in Gilgit
Baltistan for many decades, but (the) unfortunately
absence of local media (and) independent judiciary,
(and the) misrepresentation and distortion of facts,
have helped Islamabad to hide its illicit practices,
normally carried out in the disguise of political
authority. Large population faces severe human rights
abuses that encompass political, religious, gender,
ethnic and economic (dimensions). Area faces serious
and widespread discrimination in the form of economic,
social and political spheres (sic). More
than 200 political activists and leaders of this
land, including me, are facing death sentence in
sedition charges, because we dared to protest against
Pakistani occupation in peaceful public gathering
(sic).
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More recently,
Mumtaz Khan, Executive Director, Centre for Peace &
Democracy, has noted “that challenges to human rights
lie in the nature of control Pakistan exercise on Muzaffarabad
(Azad Kashmir) and Gilgit Baltistan, that includes constitutional
and extra-constitutional, and direct and indirect (control)
over political, financial and cultural affairs of these
Areas.” Noted Author Tarek Fateh has stressed, further,
that “a country that discriminated (among) its own citizens
based on color, language and ethnicity has no moral, political
and legal claim on any part of Kashmir.”
The present
volatile situation in GB appears to be part of Islamabad’s
continuing design to undermine any unity among the people
of this region, and to perpetuate its ‘divide and rule’
policy. This stratagem has worked well for decades, but
is becoming, on the one hand, increasingly transparent
and, on the other, progressively intertwined with wider
terrorist movements in Pakistan, at least some strains
within which are beginning to escape the control of their
progenitors and handlers in the Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI). While these trends presage untold and greater future
suffering for the people of GB, they constitute an imminent
existential threat to Pakistan itself.
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Terror
by Abduction
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
Terrorist
and extremist outfits in Pakistan have deepened their
involvement in organised crimes, particularly including
abduction-for-ransom and extortion, both to increase revenues
and to push various illegitimate demands. A rampage of
both high and low profile abductions across the country
has provided the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban
and al
Qaeda, along with their various affiliates,
with new ‘resources’ to fuel their politically and religiously
motivated ‘jihad’, both within the country, and against
the West and other ‘infidel’ states. According to information
retrieved from slain al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden’s
Abbottabad compound, for instance, al Qaeda in Pakistan
had turned to abduction-for-ransom to offset dwindling
cash reserves.
Reports
indicate that all of Pakistan’s provinces are now under
attack from armed abductors, with women and children,
becoming the easiest targets. A report published by the
Human Rights Commission South Asia (HRCSA) on February
19, 2012, estimated that some 7,000 children had been
abducted in 2011 and, of this total, the largest number
belonged to Karachi (Sindh). The report noted that kidnappings
noticeably increased in 2011.
The Citizens
Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has suggested military
operations in militant strongholds have a trickledown
effect, spurring abductions and extortion in other parts
of the country, with particular focus on Karachi, one
of Pakistan’s most volatile cities, owing to the sophisticated
network of jihadi and criminal gangs in the country’s
commercial capital. Similarly, Pakistan Institute of
Peace Studies (PIPS) Director Amir Rana argues that
Pakistan’s ‘military successes’ in tribal areas have “probably
led to resources becoming closed for TTP, and smaller
groups that affiliate themselves with the TTP and al Qaeda
might be responsible for raising resources in cities across
Pakistan, including Karachi.”
The problem,
however, goes way beyond Karachi. A March 22, 2012, media
report indicated a swift rise in the number of abductions-for-ransom
in the Lahore District of Punjab Province. According to
the figures available in the report, at least 400 cases
of abduction had been registered in the District in 2012,
till March 20. Some 2,954 abductions were reported in
2011, while 2010 saw 2,831 abductions. The CPLC categorised
the abduction gangs in Lahore into two groups – those
operating from southern Punjab and affiliated with various
terrorist outfits and others gangs operating principally
on criminal-financial motives.
Similarly,
a fact finding report compiled by the Balochistan National
Party-Awami (BNP-Awami), highlighting the plight of the
Baloch people, released on March 22, 2012, alleged that
as many as 1,047 people had been abducted in the Province
over the preceding four years. Provincial Agriculture
Minister Asadullah Baloch of BNP-Awami observed, “Abduction
for ransom has become a lucrative business in Balochistan
and people are joining this business en masse as
Police and Law Enforcement Agencies have failed to book
a single culprit.” There are also strong charges of political
and establishment collusion in this rash of abductions
and, on March 20, 2012, during the Balochistan Assembly
session, provincial Ministers demanded that Home Minister
Mir Zafarullah Zehri and the law enforcement agencies
disclose the names of Ministers allegedly involved in
abductions in the Province.
According
to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal
(SATP), at least 664 persons were abducted between January
1, 2010, and April 8, 2012. 2010 recorded 242 abductions,
2011 and 2012 witnessed 328 and 94 respectively. During
this period, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
witnessed the highest number of abductions (251) followed
by Balochistan (183), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (179), Sindh
(43) and Punjab (8). These figures are likely to be a
sever under-estimate, as lesser incidents of abduction,
involving low profile individuals and small numbers, have
become quotidian occurrences, and often go unreported.
The state’s
negligence and complicity have led the entrenchment of
major criminal- militant combines and their lesser affiliates.
A January 2012 report by journalist Zia-ur-Rehman
noted that the enforcement agencies in Karachi had discovered
that several previously unknown militant outfits operating
in the city were linked to TTP, and these provided access
to local level logistics and manpower support to Pakistan’s
major domestic terrorism combine. The head of Karachi’s
Anti-Extremism Cell (AEC) Chowdhry Aslam, disclosed that
one such group, al Mukhtar, basically a splinter cell
of TTP's Badar Mansoor group, was specially deployed in
Karachi to collect extortion funds, carry out bank heists
and abductions-for-ransom, as well as for terrorist activities
and attacks. Sources in CPLC noted that abduction for
ransom had become an easiest way to collect large sums
of money.
The terrorists
have also found their targets among foreigners in the
country, as well as across international borders, in Afghanistan.
A huge ransom was paid in Pakistan, for instance, for
the release of two French journalists, Herve Ghesquiere
and Stephane Taponier, who were abducted on December 30,
2009, by the Qari Baryal Afghan Taliban faction in Afghanistan’s
Kapisa Province. An Afghan Taliban militant close to the
group’s central command revealed, on condition of anonymity,
“A ransom was paid — an enormous amount — millions of
dollars. The money was handed over in Pakistan.” Significantly,
the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban work in close
collaboration with TTP, both to launch terror attacks
and in activities like abduction-for-ransom.
Similarly,
on July 1, 2011, TTP abducted a Swiss couple, Olivier
David Och and Daniela Widmar, coming from Dera Ghazi Khan
District in Punjab towards Quetta, Balochistan’s provincial
capital, in the Killi Nigah area in Loralai District.
The couple was taken to the neighbouring South Waziristan
Agency of FATA. TTP ‘deputy chief’ Waliur Rehman demanded
they be exchanged for Pakistani scientist, Aafia Siddiqui,
jailed in the US. On March 15, 2012, the Swiss couple
was reported to have ‘escaped’ from captivity. However,
a March 30, 2012, media report claimed that a massive
ransom of PKR 1 billion was paid to the abductors for
the release of the two Swiss tourists.
Several
cases involving foreigners, moreover, remain currently
unresolved. The most significant among these include:
January
19, 2012: Two Europeans, identified as Giovanni and Bernd,
working with the Welthungerhilfe, a German International
Non-Governmental Organisation for food rehabilitation,
were abducted from Western Fort Colony of Qasim Bela area
in Multan District of Punjab while returning from Kot
Addu tehsil of Muzaffargarh District. The TTP claimed
responsibility for the abduction and said that the two
were being kept hostage near the Afghan border. Punjab
Police Inspector General (IG) Javed Iqbal claimed that
the aid workers were being held for ransom.
January
5, 2012: Unidentified militants abducted a British official
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
identified as Doctor Khalil Ahmed Dale, from the Chaman
Housing Society in Quetta. Later, the Police arrested
up to 50 suspects for questioning in connection to the
abduction, but to no avail.
August
13, 2011: An American aid expert, identified as Warren
Weinstein, was abducted after unidentified assailants
stormed through the backdoor of his house in the Model
Town area of Lahore and overpowered his guards. On March
16, 2012, al Qaeda chief Ayman Al Zawahiri declared, “He
(Weinstein) will not return to his family, by the will
of Allah, until our demands are met, which include the
release of Aafia Siddiqui, Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, the
family of Shaikh Osama bin Laden, and every single person
arrested on allegations of links with al Qaeda and Taliban.”
Currently
unresolved cases of abduction include two prominent Pakistanis
as well.
August
26, 2011: Shahbaz Taseer, son of assassinated Punjab Governor
Salmaan
Taseer, was kidnapped in broad daylight
by armed abductors from Lahore District. Accusing TTP
of being behind the crime, his brother Sheryar Taseer
told the media a day after the abduction, “Our family
has been receiving threats from the Taliban and extremist
groups.” On October 17, 2011, Interior Minister Rehman
Malik said that the abductors were keeping Shahbaz Taseer
in areas near the Pak-Afghan border and that he was alive.
No demand letter has been received and his whereabouts
are still not known. It is believed that Shahbaz Taseer
is being held to force the family to accept a token financial
compensation under Pakistan’s (Islamic) Diyyat
law, so that the death sentence against his father's assassin,
Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, is not executed.
September
7, 2010: Doctor Ajmal Khan, the Vice Chancellor (VC) of
the University of Peshawar, was abducted by TTP. Several
videos have been released over the long period of one
and half years, including footage of the VC making appeals
for an acceptance of Taliban demands for his release,
the latest of which was released on March 7, 2012. In
response, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Information Minister Mian
Iftikhar Hussain stated that the Government was ready
to concede the “just demands” of the TTP, but could not
accept “unjust demands”, adding that conceding at this
point would only encourage abductors to ‘lift’ more people
for ransom, or for the fulfillment of other demands.
Abduction
with the motive of fulfilling demands, other than the
payment of ransom, is another facet of the rising current
trend. In one of the most prominent incidents of this
nature, the TTP faction led by Maulana Faqir Muhammad
abducted 30 children, on September 1, 2011, from the Mamoond
tehsil of Bajaur Agency in FATA. The children were
held against demands which included the release of women
and children languishing in various Pakistani prisons,
ending state instigation of tribesmen to form anti-TTP
lashkars (tribal militia), and the disbanding of
such lashkars and ‘peace committees’ in the Bajaur
Agency of FATA. On October 30, 2011, two boys, identified
as Amanullah and Abdullah, managed to escape and returned
home more than 40 days after being abducted. Subsequently,
after holding them captive for another three months, on
January 4, 2012, TTP released 17 boys. Bajaur Administration
official Islam Zeb noted, “Today, Taliban has released
17 of them; some 8-10 are yet in their custody.”
More worryingly,
children have been abducted to create ‘a trained breed
of jihadis’, and to serve as ‘live bombs’.
The US State Department report, Trafficking in Persons,
dated June 27, 2011, also noted that militant groups in
Pakistan used children to act as spies, to fight and to
carry out suicide bombings: “Non-state militant groups
abduct children or coerce parents with fraudulent promises
into giving away children as young as 12, to spy, fight,
or die as suicide bombers in Pakistan and Afghanistan.”
The report also noted that militants often sexually and
physically abuse the children and use psychological coercion
to convince them that the acts they commit are justified.
In one such case, on June 20, 2011, Police said that terrorists
abducted a nine-year-old girl, Sohana Jawed, on her way
to school and forced her to wear a suicide bomb vest.
Quoting the rescued girl, the Police claimed that she
managed to escape her captors when they directed her to
attack a paramilitary checkpoint in Timergarah town of
Lower Dir District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Abductions
have also overlapped sectarian faultlines in Pakistan,
and on March 25, 2011, for instance, at least 33 Shias
belonging to the Turi tribe were abducted by TTP militants
in an attack on a convoy of passenger vehicles in the
Kurram Agency of FATA. Later on April 25, 2011, one of
the abducted tribesmen, Haji Asghar Hussain Turi, was
released after the militants received PKR 5.4 million
as ransom. Three months later, on June 22, 2011, another
22 were released after paying a ransom of PKR 30 million.
According to media
reports, the remaining 10, who were in the custody of
a local TTP commander ‘Noor’, had been killed and buried
somewhere near the Pak-Afghan border. Their coffins, with
the names of the dead inscribed on them, were sent to
Parachinar two months later.
Adding
to the growing threat of terrorism is the state’s negligence,
collusion and consequent impunity with which the terrorists
act. In one prominent case, a key al Qaeda operative and
former Pakistan Army commando, Major Haroon Ashiq, accused
in several cases of murder and of abduction-for-ransom,
was set free from Rawalpindi Jail on March 21, 2012 because
witnesses withdrew their testimonies for fear of reprisals,
and the prosecution failed to furnish any further material
evidence. According to media reports, Haroon is a close
associate of Illyas Kashmiri, the founder of Brigade 313,
later an operational arm of al Qaeda, and a member of
the jihadist outfit Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI).
With such coloured action, and the visible impotence or
collusion of state agencies to act effectively against
the perpetrators of the current and rising epidemic of
abductions, as well as against the wider acts of terrorism
that create its context, it is unlikely that the people
of Pakistan – across all Provinces – will secure any early
relief from this scourge.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
April 2-8,
2012
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
|
Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
4
|
5
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Jharkhand
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
Maharashtra
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
Odisha
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total
(INDIA)
|
4
|
3
|
11
|
18
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
10
|
7
|
2
|
19
|
FATA
|
9
|
6
|
24
|
39
|
Gilgit-Baltistan
|
25
|
0
|
0
|
25
|
Sindh
|
37
|
4
|
2
|
43
|
Total
(PAKISTAN)
|
81
|
17
|
28
|
126
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Pakistan
has enough evidence to detain
Hafiz Saeed, says Union Home
Minister P. Chidambaram:
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram
on April 3 said that Pakistan
has enough evidence to detain
26/11 mastermind and Jama'at
ud Dawa (JuD) chief Hafiz Muhammad
Saeed. Chidambaram said that
India had handed over a complete
dossier on Saeed, including
compact discs containing his
anti-India speeches and sought
his voice samples. Zee
News,
April 7, 2012.
Terrorists
still operating from Bangladesh,
says Prime Minister's special
envoy: The Prime Minister's
special envoy, Satinder K Lamba,
said some of the terrorist groups
and their associated agencies
continue to have their hideouts
and the network of fake Indian
currency notes (FICN) in Bangladesh.
He added that while India appreciated
the efforts of the Bangladesh
Government of taking actions
against the elements inimical
to India, there was a need to
do more, including finalizing
the extradition treaty.
DNA,
April 6, 2012.
Pakistan
routing FICN through Southeast
Asian countries, says report:
The recent arrest of a Vietnamese
woman in possession of fake
Indian currency notes (FICN)
worth INR 9.8 in Kathmandu (Nepal)
on April 3 has become a cause
for concern for Indian intelligence
agencies, revealing that Pakistan
is pumping in FICN through Southeast
Asian countries like Vietnam,
Malaysia and Indonesia rather
than the traditional routes
of Bangladesh and Dubai. As
part of the tactical switch,
Pakistan is also using nationals
of the South-east Asian countries
to avoid detection.
Times
of India,
April 6, 2012.
Several
ANVC cadres had skipped Government's
attention at the time of signing
of CFA in July 2004, admits
Meghalaya Chief Minister Mukul
Sangma: Chief Minister Mukul
Sangma on April 3 admitted that
several Achik National Volunteer
Council (ANVC) cadres had skipped
the attention of the then Government
when the ceasefire agreement
(cfa) was signed with the outfit
in July 2004. Referring to the
reported split in the ANVC,
Sangma said, "There were deficiencies
and the ceasefire process was
not done properly."
Shilong
Times,
April 4, 2012.
PAKISTAN
37
civilians and four SFs among
43 persons killed during the
week in Sindh: At least
11 more persons were killed
in Karachi on April 7.
Six
persons were killed in Karachi
on April 6.
A
suicide bomber targeted a senior
Police Officer, Superintendent
of Police (SP) Anwar Ahmed Khan,
said to be a leading name in
the crackdown on militants,
killing four passers-by and
injuring 17 others in the Malir
area of Karachi on April 5.
Earlier in a pre-dawn attack,
three Policemen were shot dead
in PIB Colony. Four more people
were killed in different parts
of Karachi.
Five
people, including an activist
of Awami National Party (ANP),
were killed in separate acts
of target killing in Karachi
on April 4.
As
many as six persons lost their
lives and another 28 were injured
on April 2 during a daylong
clash between protesters and
Police in Lyari area of Karachi.
Dawn;
Daily
Times;
The
News;
Tribune,
April 3-9, 2012.
24
militants and nine civilians
among 39 persons killed during
the week in FATA: Army gunship
helicopters pounded militant
positions in Mamozai area of
Orakzai Agency in Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
on April 8 and killed 14 militants.
Seven
people were killed and three
others injured when a passenger
van was blown up in a roadside
bomb blast at Shah Kas area
in Jamrud tehsil (revenue
unit) of Khyber Agency on April
4.
Five
Security Force (SF) personnel
were killed when a group of
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
militants from across the Afghanistan
border attacked a security post
at Olai checkpoint in Mohmand
Agency on April 2. At least
eight militants died when Security
Forces (SFs) retaliated.
Dawn;
Daily
Times;
The
News;
Tribune,
April 3-9, 2012.
24
persons killed in the sectarian
violence in Gilgit-Baltistan:
As many as 24 people lost their
lives and another 55 were injured
in a fresh wave of sectarian
violence across Gilgit-Baltistan,
which erupted after clashes
between Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat
(ASWJ) and Police in which five
persons were killed in Gilgit
city on April 3. Dawn;
Daily
Times;
The
News;
Tribune,
April 3-9, 2012.
No
difference between human being
and animal in Balochistan, says
Supreme Court: The Supreme
Court (said on April 6 there
was no difference between a
human being and animals in Balochistan
where mutilated bodies were
found on a daily basis. Following
the chief justice's directive,
Quetta Police produced four
of seven 'missing' people of
the Marri tribe in the court.
Daily Times,
April 7, 2012.
Hafiz
Saeed helping de-radicalise
militants, claims Pakistani
official: An unnamed Pakistani
counter-terrorism official said
that Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD) chief
Hafiz Saeed has been helping
Pakistan de-radicalise militants
under efforts to stabilise the
strategic US ally. "Hafiz Saeed
has agreed with the Punjab Government
programme of de-radicalisation
and rehabilitation of former
jihadis and extended full cooperation,"
the official said under the
condition of anonymity. Times
of India,
April 7, 2012.
We
are serious about Hafiz Saeed
but need evidence, says Prime
Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani:
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani
on April 8 acknowledged that
the case of Jama'at-ud-Dawa
(JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed was
an "issue" between Pakistan
and India but said Islamabad
needs "substantial" evidence
against him to try him in a
court of law. "We are serious
on the issue of Saeed but the
question is how to proceed against
him without evidence. Courts
here are independent and we
need substantial evidence against
him," Gilani said. Indian
Express,
April 9, 2012.
FATA
origin of half of terrorism-related
stories, says report: Half
of the terrorism-related stories
published in the country's key
national newspapers originate
from the border region in Pakistan's
northwest, says a new study
released by a local media development
organisation on April 5. "Almost
50 percent of terrorism stories
come from Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP)," says the
study. Daily
Times,
April 6, 2012.
ISI
should have no role in Pakistan's
politics, says Prime Minister
Yousuf Raza Gilani: Prime
Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani
on April 8 said the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) should have
no role in country's politics.
"The ISI should have no role
in the country's politics,"
he said. Times
of India,
April 8, 2012.
20
million Pakistani children not
in school, says UNICEF:
Around 20 million children in
Pakistan, including an estimated
7.3 million of primary school
age, are not in school, said
a statement issued by United
Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) on April
6. "Investing in children and
their education is vital due
to the positive impacts it has
on so many socio-economic dimensions.
It is therefore imperative that
all children in Pakistan, both
boys and girls, have the opportunity
to attend and complete their
schooling," the statement said.
Daily
Times,
April 7, 2012.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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