SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 32, February 13, 2012

INDIA

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Odisha: Deep Paralysis
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Four officers of the Border Security Force (BSF) – Commandant Jeevan Ram Khaswan, Deputy Commandant Rajesh Saran, Assistant Sub-Inspector Jitendra Sahu and Subedar Ashok Yadav – were killed in an ambush by Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres near Balimela in Malkangiri District on February 10, 2012. This was the first major attack on the BSF in the area and, indeed, the first major attack (resulting in three or more fatalities) against the BSF in Odisha. The BSF has been among the most successful Forces in anti-Maoist operations, despite the relatively small deployment of the Force in Maoist affected areas.

In the February 10 incident, the BSF officers were going to Chitrakonda from their camp at Balimela to assess security arrangements for the first phase of local bodies’ elections on the next-day [February 11] when the SUV in which they were travelling was hit by a landmine. As they came out of the damaged vehicle, the Maoists fired indiscriminately, killing the officers and injuring two troopers accompanying them. Two civilians were also injured in the crossfire.

Just over a month earlier, on January 5, 2012, three Policemen had fallen victim to a Maoist trap in Kotagarh area in Kandhamal District. The Maoists first triggered a minor blast at Badarpanga village in the area on January 4, and let the message spread that a Maoist had been injured while planting a landmine. As expected, the Police, sent a team to investigate the incident, and the Maoists blew up their vehicle en route, on the Kotagarh-Srirampur Road, killing three Policemen and injuring three others.

The bloody beginning to 2012 came after a year of relatively low Maoist violence in Odisha. According to partial data compiled by the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 75 persons were killed in Maoist related violence in 2011, as against 108 fatalities in 2010; 81 in 2009 and 132 in 2008.

Fatalities in LWE/ CPI-Maoist Violence in Odisha: 2006 - 2012*

An analysis of the fatality figures and the pattern of major incidents [both are crude but important indicators] exposes a startling picture of counter insurgency efforts in the State. Out of the total 23 Maoists killed during 2011, 20 had been killed by February. Only three fatalities occurred through the remaining ten months of the year, giving a clear indication of the paralysis that gripped the State leadership, and consequently, the Security Forces (SFs), after the abduction of the then collector of Malkangiri District, R. Vineel Krishna, on February 15, 2011. That crisis came to an end after the state conceded the Maoist demand for the swap of the abducted Collector against Maoist prisoners Ganti Prasadam, a top Maoist leader from Andhra Pradesh, accused in the case of a landmine blast targeting the then Prakasam SP Mahesh Chandra Laddha in 2005; Padma, wife of the Maoist Central Committee member Ramakrishna alias RK; and Ishwari, Sarita and Gokul, who were accompanying Padma at the time of her arrest. With regard to other demands, the state withdrew three cases against Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (CMAS) leader Nachika Linga and 44 other tribals.  

The listing of major incidents in the State reinforces this impression of paralysis even further. The Maoists suffered significant losses in three out of four major incidents recorded in the State in 2011, with all three incidents occurring in January and February, before the abduction incident. Year 2010 had witnessed eight major incidents. The major incidents of 2011 included:

January 1: At least five CPI-Maoist cadres, including three women, were killed in an encounter with the Police in Jajpur District when Police raided a Maoist camp in the forested area of Jajpur.

January 9: Nine Maoists, including four women, were killed in an encounter with the District Voluntary Force at a Maoist camp in Dabramali village under the Kashipur Police Station limits of Rayagada District.

February 11: At least three cadres of the CPI-Maoist, including an 'area commander', were killed in an encounter with the SFs in Sundargarh District. The exchange of fire took place during a combing operation in the Saranda forest under Bisra Police Station area, bordering Jharkhand. The 'area commander' was identified as Mohammad Musleem operating mainly in Digha and Jareikela areas in Jharkhand.

May 23: Nine Policemen, including the ASP of Gariabandh District [Chhattisgarh], were killed in a landmine blast triggered by the Maoists in Sunabeda forest in Nuapada District. They were part of a 10-member team of Chhattisgarh Police which had crossed the border and moved about 15 kilometres into Odisha following reports of Maoist movement in the area.

SF casualties were relatively low in most of the affected Districts, with the exception of Nuapada, where the Chhattisgarh Police team was ambushed in the May 23 incident. SF fatalities have demonstrated continuously declining trends since 2008, largely as a result of a broad strategy of avoidance of confrontation on both sides, and very limited offensive operations initiated by state Forces. Barring the May 23 incident, there was no major Maoist attack against SFs in 2011, dramatically underlining the significance of the two major attacks that have already occurred in 2012. Indeed, the Maoists attacked just one Police Station (Kotagarh in Kandhamal District on February 11, 2011), as against four attacks on Police Stations in 2010.

Civilian killings by the Maoists were, however, spread across the year, with a hiatus in March, when a ‘ceasefire’ had been negotiated in wake of the abduction of the Malkangiri Collector, Vineel Krishna. A majority of civilian fatalities were reported from Districts previously designated as ‘highly affected’, including Koraput (10), Malkangiri (7), Kandhamal (5) and Rayagada (3). However, fatalities also occurred in Nuapada, Nabarangpur, Bolangir, Kalahandi and Bargarh, where the Maoists intensified their earlier ‘marginal’ operations and influence. 

Fatalities in 2011 were reported from 12 of Odisha’s 30 Districts. The fatalities in the categories of civilian, SF and Maoist, respectively, for each District, in 2011 were: Koraput: 10, 2 and 0; Malkangiri: 7, 1 and 1; Kandhamal: 5, 3 and 0; Nuapada: 4, 9 and 0; Rayagada: 3, 0 and 9; Jajpur: 0, 0 and 5; Sundargarh: 1, 1 and 4; Keonjhar: 0,0 and 3; Bolangir: 2, 0 and 1; Nabarangpur: 2, 0 and 0; Kalahandi: 1, 0 and 0’; and Bargarh: 1, 0 and 0. 

In their efforts to disrupt infrastructure development in the State, the Maoists killed at least four contractors and abducted one in 2011, as against an equal number of killings in 2010. The Maoists made six attacks on construction activity (roads, bridges, etc.), setting afire at least 14 vehicles / machinery used in construction works, against three such attacks in 2010. At least 10 mobile phone towers / battery rooms were set ablaze by the Maoists in 2011. Surprisingly, all ten attacks on the mobile phone infrastructure occurred in December 2011.   

Other data obtained from the State Police indicated apparent improvements in the security situation. Fifty Maoists surrendered in 2011 in comparison to 44 in 2010. Maoists triggered 37 blasts of all kinds, including landmines, in 2010, but the figure came down to just 12 in 2011. As against 47 guns recovered in 2010, 127 were seized in 2011. 77 IEDs were recovered in 2010, with the number rising to the much higher 258 in 2011. Surprisingly, the Police arrested just 146 Maoist cadres in 2011, down from 214 in 2010. Deogarh which is still regarded as highly affected, has not recorded any significant Maoist-related violence over the last two years. Further, the Police claim that the crucial road link from Koraput to Motu has been secured.

Most indicators suggest that the Maoists were lying low due to the increased presence of SFs, particularly the BSF, in the key areas of Malkangiri and Koraput. Nevertheless, their capacity to inflict high casualties on the SFs seem intact, as demonstrated in the quick targeting of the Chhattisgarh Police team on May 23, 2011, as well as the attacks on SF contingents early in 2012. Worse, there are clear indications that the Maoists are using the lull in violence to regroup and to extend and enhance their capacities. The recovery of a huge cache of 'state-of-the-art' Chinese-made communications and other equipment in Koraput District on December 23, 2011, for instance, points to an effort at a significant technological upgrade as well. The consignment was found buried underground at two locations in five sealed plastic drums. It comprised 41 communication sets and a number of sophisticated "war-like" guns and electric detonators. Sources indicate that the communications gadgetry was beyond the existing interception capability of Indian agencies. Though this consignment was discovered before it could be deployed, there is no reason to believe that this was the first of such consignments. Security agencies believe, moreover, that such high-end communication equipment would be difficult to acquire, unless state agencies in the source country were involved in the supply.

The Maoist influence was also reflected in the ongoing Local Bodies’ election process. The five-phase polling commenced on February 11, 2012, and will end on February 19, 2012. Posters have been put up in several areas, warning people not to contest in the polls without consulting the Maoists beforehand. The Maoist influence has been palpable in the Narayanpatna Block of Koraput District, where most of the candidates have already won uncontested. The winning candidates had the ‘support’ of the Maoist-backed Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh (CMAS). The CMAS-Narayanpatna leadership operates under the direct control and protection of the Maoists, as its own armed wing, the Ghenua Vahini, has been disbanded due to Police pressure.

Despite the state’s ‘go slow’ approach, and the apparent lack of will in the political and Police leadership to fight the Maoists, some dogged intelligence operations resulted in significant catches. The most important among these was the arrest of Chenda Bhusanam alias Ghasi, a top leader of the Andhra Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC), who carried a reward of INR 1 million on his head; Prashant alias Shiva Munda alias Lambu, the second in command in the Maoist hierarchy controlling the Saranda Forest in Jharkhand; Girish Mahato, who had been assigned to revive the organisation in the western Odisha Districts of Sambalpur and Deogarh, with a reward of INR 400,000 against him; Rama Mahanta alias Dadhi Mahanta, ‘area commander’ for the Digha and Bhalulata areas; Kunduru Luhar alias Golapa, an 'area commander' in Digha; Pitabas Singh Thakur, who worked with the Daraba Dalam (squad) of Chhattisgarh and was a close associate of Surendra, the Daraba Dalam commander who had allegedly masterminded the killing of 76 SF personnel in Dantewada District on April 6, 2010; Satrughan Biswal alias Mangu alias Mohan, the second-in-command of the Maoist’s Odisha State Committee, who was operating in three Districts, Bargarh, Nuapada and Bolangir; and Deben Marandi, an expert bomb-maker and close aide of Maoist squad leader Jayanta.

Further, the Police killed Chitrakam Reddy alias Sitru, an ‘area commander’, on January 26, 2012, at Badamathur village in Bandhugaon area in Koraput District, in an intelligence-based operation. Sitru was behind recent civilian killings by Maoists in the Bandhugaon area.

Significantly, a BSF camp has been set up at Janbai in the Chitrakonda area of Malkangiri District. The Janbai area remains cut off by the Chitrakonda reservoir, and has been established as a safe haven for the Maoists. All attempts to construct a bridge at Janbai have been repeatedly thwarted by the rebels. Construction work has now commenced under BSF protection. The BSF personnel have also destroyed a large ‘martyrs memorial’ constructed by the Maoists at Janbai and have erected a sentry post on the same platform as a stamp of their authority.

Nevertheless, the Maoists have been successful in opening up new fronts in the State. The hitherto unaffected or marginally affected Districts of Bolangir, Bargarh, Kalahandi, Nuapada and Nabarangpur have come under the increasing sway of the Maoists, creating a near uninterrupted Maoist ‘corridor’ from Abujmaadh in Chhattisgarh to the Saranda Forest in Jharkhand.  

The Maoists in Odisha operate through:

1. The AOBSSZC, headed by Akkiraju Hargopal alias Ramakrishna alias RK.
2. Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee , headed by Kadiri Satya Narayan alias Goppanna
3. Malkangiri Division, headed by Damodar alias Azad alias Bille Narayan Swamy.
4. Srikakulam- Koraput Divisional Committee, headed by Daya alias Chamala Kirshnamurthy
5. Odisha Special Organising Committee, headed by Sabyasachi Panda.
6. Bansadhara Divisional Committee, headed by Nikhil alias Niranjan Rout alias Nigam Rout
7. Kalinganagar Divisional Committee, headed by Putpaka Kumaraswamy alias Ranjith alias Santosh.
8. South Chhotanagpur Zonal Committee, headed by Kundan Pahan alias Bikash Daa

As on May 5, 2011, five battalions of the BSF, seven battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), 50 units of the State Police’s Special Operation Group (SOG), four battalions of the India Reserve Battalions (IRB), and one battalion of the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), had been put into service across the Odisha’s Maoists-affected Districts. While the BSF was deployed in Malkangiri and Koraput, CRPF troopers were posted in Rayagada, Gajapati, Sundergarh, Kandhamal, Mayurbhanj, Deogarh and Keonjhar. Further, in June, the Centre had agreed to send an additional five Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMF) battalions to Chhattisgarh and Odisha, for joint operations, specifically along the inter-State borders. On July 29, 2011, the State Government had also announced its decision to strengthen the elite anti-Naxal SOG by raising another 35 units, in addition to the existing 50. The Government had also decided to fill up 788 vacant posts of Police officers and about 5,200 posts of constables, in 2011. While the target has not been met, the recruitment process is ongoing. Interestingly, the Police Population ratio of State had declined to 106 per 100,000, as on December 31, 2010, against 108 on December 31, 2009. The national average for the Police population ratio was 133, as on December 31, 2010.

In a clear indication of a rising Maoist threat, despite declining violence, the State has demanded the inclusion of another four Districts – Nuapada, Bargarh, Balangir and Kalahandi – under the Security Related Expenditure Scheme (SRE), in addition to the existing 15.

In a long delayed move, the State has also decided to restore direct recruitment of Deputy Superintendents of Police, which have been suspended since 1976, and an entire layer of Police leadership is now absent. Despite this decision, however, little immediate relief is likely, with litigation and bureaucratic obstruction expected to delay the recruitment process for at least another few years.

The state’s capitulation in the wake of the Vineel Krishna abduction, and the abysmal failure of efforts to bridge development deficits underline the glaring absence of political will to address the Maoist challenge at all planes. The present tactical deceleration of Maoist operations cannot be confused with any diminution of, or permanent damage to, their capacities. Weaknesses in the Police leadership and a polarization along ‘insider-outsider’ lines, have further deepened the paralysis within the Odisha Police command, with the top leadership failing to demonstrate the will or vision to overcome parochial divisions. Past efforts at operational escalation have resulted in failure due to poor planning and a failure to reconcile deployments with objectives and the magnitude of the challenge, and have been easily neutralized by the Maoists through a comparable escalation, or through devices such as the abduction of Vineel Krishna. Fresh attacks on the SFs in 2012 can only go further to test the nerves of Odisha’s leadership. Eventually, the decision to fight the Maoists will have to be taken by the Government, or will be forced upon it.

PAKISTAN

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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: The Wages of Duplicity
Tushar Ranjan Mohanty
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

At least eight persons were killed as four suicide bombers attacked the District Police Officer’s (DPO) office in Dera Ismail Khan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) on January 14, 2012. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Inspector General of Police Akbar Hoti disclosed, “Three suicide bombers detonated themselves and one was shot dead by the Army. We have recovered bodies of four militants, they were all wearing suicide vests.” Three civilians and one Police official were also killed, while eight others, including a Policeman, were wounded in the attack. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for the attack.

Late in the night of January 12, 2012, at least seven Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militants and three Security Force (SF) personnel were killed in an attack carried out by an estimated 150 LI cadres on a check post in Sarbanda, a suburb of Peshawar, the provincial capital of KP. Another 13 SF personnel were injured. According to the Police, the LI militants attacked the post after entering the neighbourhood from the Bara area in the Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

These were far from isolated incidents. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 1,206 persons, including 511 civilians, 364 militants and 331 SF personnel, were killed in 242 incidents of killing recorded in 2011, marginally down from 1,212 persons, including 607 civilians, 509 militants and 96 SF personnel killed in 213 such incidents in 2010. Though civilian killings in the Province declined by 18.78 per cent, they remained much higher than the civilian toll in FATA (488), often dubbed the ‘most dangerous place on earth’. The 39.83 per cent drop in terrorist fatalities was, moreover, in conformity with the broad trend in the rest of Pakistan, demonstrating a growing reluctance among Pakistani SFs to engage the extremists on the ground. Worryingly, however, fatalities among SFs have increased almost three-and-a-half fold, an overwhelming proportion of these inflicted in suicide attacks and terrorist initiated engagements, rather than offensive operations by the SFs. The militants appear to have established an upper hand in the region in their fight against the state’s forces.

Fatalities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 2005- 2012

Suicide attacks remained rampant in the Province, with as many as 411 persons killed and 705 injured through 2011, in 23 such attacks. 26 suicide attacks were recorded in 2010, inflicting a total of 489 fatalities and injuring another 767. Meanwhile, the number of other bomb blasts in the Province increased from 137 in 2010 to 198 in 2011, though resultant fatalities fell from 611 to 554. In addition, the Bomb Disposal Squad (BDS) managed to foil several bomb blasts by recovering and diffusing the explosive devices. KP Additional Inspector General, BDS, Shafqat Malik had disclosed, on June 2, 2011, that at least 25 per cent of terror attempts had been prevented in Peshawar by diffusing bombs, suicide jackets, fuses and other explosive materials. He revealed, further, that the BDS had diffused five suicide jackets, two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 63 timed devices, 25 remote-controlled IEDs, 105 grenade IEDs and 114 rocket IEDs, in the year, till that date.

The Province accounted for 96 major incidents (resulting in three or more fatalities) in 2011, as against 86 in 2010. The most prominent among these were:

September 15: A suicide bomber blew himself up during funeral prayers in the Jandol town of Lower Dir District, killing 45 persons and injuring 63.

August 27: 31 soldiers and 20 militants were killed when some 200 to 300 Afghanistan-based militants attacked seven paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) checkposts in Chitral District. The military claimed that both TTP and the Afghan Taliban were involved in the attack.

June 5: 19 persons were killed and 45 were injured when a suicide bomber attacked an Army-run bakery on the Mall Road in the Nowshera Cantonment area, Nowshera District.

June 2: At least 30 SF personnel and three civilians were killed as TTP terrorists attacked the Shaltalo Security Post in the Upper Dir District. 45 militants were also killed in the clashes that followed. Three civilians were killed in the crossfire. Press reports, quoting the local Police chief, claimed that about 500 militants were involved in the clashes.

May 26: A suicide bomber blew up a car laden with explosives at a checkpoint close to the Hangu Police Station and Hangu DPO Office, killing 32 persons and injuring 60.

May 17: 15 militants and two SF personnel were killed during a clash when a group of 100 militants attacked a security check post in the Sangu Mera area north of Peshawar.

May 13: 90 people, including 73 paramilitary force personnel and 17 civilians, were killed when twin suicide bombers attacked a Frontier Corps (FC) unit as it was about to leave a training centre in the Shabqadar tehsil (revenue unit) in Charsadda District.

March 9: A suicide bomber killed 43 persons and injured another 52 in an attack on a funeral meeting for the wife of a volunteer of the Qaumi Lashkar (community tribal militia) in Adezai village on the outskirt of Peshawar.

February 10: A suicide bomber at an Army recruitment centre in Mardan District killed 31 persons.

January 12: At least 20 persons were killed and 16 were injured when a suicide bomber rammed his explosives-laden car into Miryan Police Station in the Bannu town of Bannu District.

All 25 Districts of KP were variously affected by terrorism, but Peshawar, the provincial capital, was worst affected, recording at least 120 incidents in 2011, as compared to 94 in 2010. The city accounted for at least 232 fatalities in 56 incidents of killing in 2011, as compared to 135 fatalities in 35 incidents of killing in 2010.

Tribal militia and elders, who have been supporting the Government since 2008, continued to be systematically targeted by the terrorists. At least 12 tribal elders were killed in 2011, though the number fell from 40 in 2010, while an unspecified number of tribal militia members were also targeted. In the worst single attack on tribal militia, 43 persons were killed and another 52 sustained injuries, in the March 9 incident in Adezai village. Immediately after attack, on March 10, 2011, Haji Dilawar Khan, the leader of the Qaumi Lashkar, warned that the Lashkar would end cooperation with the authorities if they were not provided adequate material and financial support by the Government ‘within two days’. He stated, further, that the Government’s apathy had been demonstrated when KP Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, Bashir Ahmad Bilour, had reportedly told the media that the militia were no longer useful. Earlier, on March 3, 2011, Haji Khan had argued that the Government was pursuing "an ambiguous policy" towards the TTP, and accused local legislators of supporting the terrorist formation. Again on August 18, 2011, he claimed that extremists would be further strengthened in the suburban areas of Peshawar, because the Government had intentionally stopped supporting the Lashkar volunteers, leaving them at the mercy of the terrorists.

Meanwhile, TTP continued to target educational institutions. At least 55 schools were blown up in 2011, adding to the 35 destroyed in 2010. According to a March 18, 2011, media report by Shadab Younas, 721,392 students had been deprived of education in KP as a result of extremist violence, across the six Districts of the Province, including 371,604 girls. Significantly, the insurgents overwhelmingly target girls’ schools, ordering both women teachers and girl students to stay inside their homes in conformity with their peculiar version of Islamic teachings, with a threat of grave violence for non compliance. The Government’s response towards protecting the educational response remains entirely apathetic. According to an October 14, 2011, news report the Federal Government refused the funds that President Asif Ali Zardari had promised two years earlier, for the construction of 1,000 primary schools, most of them in the militancy-hit Districts of KP. Called the Crash Programme for Establishment of One Thousand Primary Schools, the project was mentioned in the Federal Government’s Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for fiscal year 2009-10. 

Attacks on principal NATO supply lines to Afghanistan, which pass through the Torkham border checkpost close to Peshawar, rose significantly. Partial data compiled by SATP recorded 11 attacks in KP in 2011, on oil tankers and trucks ferrying NATO supplies, up from 8 in 2010. Meanwhile, the loss of lives in these attacks rose substantially from one person in 2010 to at least 10 in 2011. While just three persons were injured in NATO related attacks in 2010, the number went up to at least 35 in 2011. The November 28, 2011, NATO aerial attacks on the two border checkposts in the Mohammad Agency resulted in the suspension of the NATO supply lines through KP.

Meanwhile, though the SFs offensive operations against the militants have substantially stalled, a significant number of arrests continue to be reported. According to SATP data, as many as 237 ‘top militants’ were arrested in 2011, albeit, down from 469 in 2010. Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik, on August 3, 2011, informed the National Assembly that, out of a total of 3,143 alleged terrorists arrested in the country, KP alone accounted for 2,103 (nearly 67 percent). However, the there is a comprehensive failure to secure any convictions in the terrorism cases in the Province. A March 24, 2011, media report indicated that, during an internal security assessment in February 2011, the KP Government was informed that, of 1,443 militants arrested, 695 had been bailed out, mostly by appellate courts, while 48 others had been acquitted by Anti-terrorism Courts (ATCs). On March 7, 2011, KP Minister for Information Mian Iftikhar Hussain observed that 98 percent terrorists, arrested after hectic efforts and sacrifices by law enforcement agencies, were released by the judiciary owing to lack of evidence. He appealed to the courts to award capital punishment to all arrested terrorists, as they became even more dangerous to society after their release. Indeed, Mustafa Nawaz Khokhar, an adviser to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, after his visit to a jail in Haripur District, KP, on June 8, 2011, stated that jails had become breeding grounds for extremism, because outfits like the TTP and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) had taken their “ideological campaign” into prisons. 

On some parameters, the situation in KP is even worse than initial estimates may suggest. For instance, according to Shakeel Qadir Khan, Director General Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA, KP), the PDMA carried out a survey in September and October 2011 after realising that the figure of 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in KP, used by international organisations for planning purposes, was not a true representation of situation on ground. According to the survey results, the number of IDPs stood at 4.4 million (in a total population of about 22 million).

Unless the scale of violence in KP is brought down dramatically, it is unlikely that the people will secure any enduring relief. Unfortunately, this objective is unlikely to be met, as long as Pakistan continues to pursue its offensive strategies in Afghanistan, supporting a range of terrorist proxies that are ideologically indistinguishable from the terrorist formations that now target Pakistan as well. The state’s agencies have also consistently used terrorist proxies for the management of internal dissent and various political crises, as well as for the state sanctioned repression of minorities. Given the identity of interests and ideologies among the entire spectrum of Islamist terrorist groups operating in and out of Pakistan, it is unlikely that selective Government initiatives will meet with any enduring success in containing anti-state terrorist formations, as long as the state continues to create and maintain spaces for the free operation of its own terrorist proxies.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Extremism

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Meghalaya

Nagaland

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)