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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 48, June 13, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Punjab: Another
'Module' Implodes
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management
With the arrest of Jagtar Singh Hawara, the Babbar Khalsa
International's (BKI)
'operations chief' in India, on June 8, 2005, the curtain
has rolled down on another chapter of the long saga of Pakistan's
failed attempts to revive Khalistani terrorism in Punjab.
Hawara fell quickly into the net as the leader of the circle
of conspirators who engineered the Delhi Cinema Hall Blasts
on May 22, 2005. The rapidity with which this 'terrorist
module' unravelled is an important index of the state of
the Khalistani movement and of what was once the most feared
terrorist organisation in the Punjab.
Hawara was arrested in the Narela Industrial Area on the
outskirts of Delhi, along with two of the accused in the
May 22 blasts - Jaspal Singh @ Raja, the prime coordinator
in the Cinema Hall bombings - and Vikas Seth. These arrests
came after another five conspirators had been arrested from
hideouts in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. They included
Balwinder Singh, who helped plant the bombs, and Jatinder
Singh who were taken in by a joint team of the Delhi and
Punjab Police at Nawan Shehar in Punjab on May 30; Jagan
Nath, a Hindu originally from a village in the Gorakhpur
district of Uttar Pradesh, who was tracked down in Madipur,
West Delhi on the same day; and Bahadur Singh and Gurdeep
Singh, who were arrested from village Mallpur in Nawan Shehar,
on June 5.
The disruption of a single cell would ordinarily not be
expected to lead to the arrest of the 'operations chief'
of a group such as the BKI - one of the first groups to
take to terrorism in the Punjab in the end-Nineteen Seventies,
and regarded as the most ideologically driven and violent
organisation among the proliferation of gangs that overran
Punjab through the Eighties and early Nineties. The operational
leadership is normally insulated by significant layers and
'circuit breakers', so that the arrest of one of the 'foot
soldiers' cannot lead beyond the immediate cell. Hawara,
who had evaded arrest since his sensational escape from
the Burail Jail in Chandigarh on January 21, 2004, clearly
lacked the organisational depth that could isolate him from
the bottom rung of what are evidently mercenary and most
unreliable operatives. It is significant that none of the
other conspirators in the present case fit the profile of
the traditional and deeply conservative BKI activist. Two
are Hindus, and the others have an evident taste for the
'good life' and a hankering to go abroad - legally or otherwise.
All fit the profile of petty criminals who took to terror
for purely mercenary motives. That Hawara was in direct
contact with, and exposed to, the likes of these indicates
the degree to which the ideologically motivated Khalistani
recruitment base has simply vanished from Punjab.
This is despite frenetic efforts by Pakistan to keep the
'defeated rump of Khalistani terrorist organisations', (as
I have described them elsewhere) alive; and despite significant
flows of funding, support and propaganda from minuscule
and increasingly isolated groups among Non Resident Indian
(NRI) Sikhs. It was precisely this network of support that
had made the Cinema Hall bombings possible. While Hawara
and Jaspal Singh 'masterminded' the operation in India,
they were functioning under the direct control of Wadhawa
Singh, the BKI 'chief', who continues to enjoy Pakistani
hospitality ever since he fled the fighting in Punjab in
the late 1980s. The group was coordinated through Satnam
Singh Satta Mallian, Wadhawa Singh's son-in-law, propped
up by his Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) handlers, who
is currently taking advantage of the laxity of German law
in Stuttgart, to manage the movement and operations of BKI
cadres, who have a presence in several European countries,
including Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland,
Norway and the United Kingdom. BKI is also active in Canada
and USA. It is on the list of terrorist organisations in
both the US and UK.
The Cinema Hall Blasts were, in essence, operations of opportunity,
seeking to capitalize on a passing ferment and power struggle
within the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC,
the administrative body that manages Sikh shrines, and that
has assumed in some measure the character of a 'state within
a state'), which had expressed itself in the controversy
over the 'Bollywood' (Hindi) film, Jo Bole So Nihal.
Since a faction within the SGPC had challenged the decision
of the Akal Takth jathedar (high priest) to allow
screening of the film, and had successfully orchestrated
a few public demonstrations on this 'sensitive issue', the
calculation was that a few well-timed terrorist incidents
may have the potential of catalyzing a wider movement and
'reviving' Khalistani passions (they had, in fact, the opposite
effect, and the occasional and motivated protests died out).
The incidents also coincided with recent developments within
the Damdami Taksal - the organisation Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale,
the original architect of Khalistani terrorism, was drawn
from - as a result of the installation of a new chief, Baba
Harnam Singh Dhuma, and the formal declaration of Bhindranwale's
death (the Damdami Taksal had, till now, kept the fiction
alive that Bhindranwale had not died in Operation Blue Star
in 1984, and would return to lead the Taksal). Combined
with the protests organised by a particular faction of the
SGPC and some marginal Sikh extremist organisations during
the 'Ghallughara Week' (which commemorates Sikh martyrs),
and the call to raise a memorial to those who were killed
during Operation Blue Star, these events were thought to
create opportunities that could be exploited to kick-start
the spent Khalistan movement.
Such attempts have a continuous history since the comprehensive
defeat of Khalistani terrorism in 1993, with a cycle of
two to four years. Punjab Police sources indicate that over
100 civilians have died in terrorist related violence over
the past decade (1995-2005), overwhelmingly in bomb attacks
on soft targets, such as public transport, markets, cinema
halls, etc. The worst year after the collapse of high intensity
terrorism was 1997, when 56 civilians were killed in a rash
of bomb blasts between March 14 and July 10. The year 2000
saw at least 18 civilians killed; and 2002, five. The past
three years have seen no civilian fatalities in Punjab (the
single fatality in year 2005 was in the Cinema Hall Blasts,
in Delhi), but there has been a continuous pattern of arrests
and seizures of arms and explosives, indicating unrelenting
efforts to resuscitate the terror, stifled, on each occasion,
by the complete absence of public support, and the immensely
improved intelligence capabilities of the Punjab Police.
Over 1,000 kilograms of explosive materials have been recovered
from terrorist cells in the State in this period, along
with a large number of sophisticated weapons including assault
rifles and grenade launchers, as well as other equipment,
and at least 30 Pakistan-backed 'modules' have been neutralized.
These persistent failures can be traced to the fact that
the fundamentalist mindset, which the ISI and Pakistan military
establishment are themselves a product of, cannot understand
the culture and the way of thought that are integral to
the Sikh - and indeed, Indian - way of thought. There is
a graphic and utter failure of understanding on the part
of the Pakistani establishment in this, and, while such
efforts can inflict great personal tragedies on hapless
innocents, they have little potential to help Pakistan secure
its strategic objectives in India.
Past failures and the futility of the enterprise, however,
has not prevented Pakistan from continuing to support the
tattered survivors of the movement in the hope that circumstances
may, eventually change sufficiently to effectively revive
the terror in Punjab. In addition to the BKI, its 'chief',
Wadhawa Singh, and 'deputy chief', Mehal Singh, and an unspecified
number of cadres, Pakistan continues to host the Khalistan
Zindabad Force (KZF) and its 'chief', Ranjit Singh Neeta;
a faction of the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) and its
'chief' Paramjit Singh Panjawar; the International Sikh
Youth Federation - Rode and its 'coordinator', Lakhbir Singh
Rode; the Dal Khalsa International, headed by Gajinder Singh
'Hijacker'; and the Council of Khalistan, led by Balbir
Singh Sandhu.
In addition, a number of Khalistani groups maintain a significant
presence in several Western countries. They include the
BKI, KZF, KCF-Panjwar, Khalistan National Army, Kamagata
Maru Dal of Khalistan, Sikh Youth of Belgium, ISYF,
the Council of Khalistan, Sikh Youth of America, and the
Sikh Affairs Committee. Their efforts are closely coordinated
by the ISI, and though these groups have not engaged in
violence in these countries in recent times, they continue
to provide critical support in terms of funding, propaganda,
logistical coordination and recruitment. Several young men
based in these countries have undergone training in Pakistan
in the handling of sophisticated weapons and explosives,
with the understanding that their 'services' may be called
for at an appropriate time.
In addition to the BKI, among the relatively active of these
groups in recent times has been Ranjit Singh Neeta's KZF,
which has been responsible for several incidents of explosions
in Delhi, Haryana, Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). One
of the active modules of the KZF was neutralized towards
the end of 2004 in district Gurdaspur, leading to a massive
recovery of weapons and explosives. The module included
two Pakistani nationals - Mohammad Hanif and Abdul Hamid
- who had been given Sikh identities.
The ISI has exploited these various groups for a range of
other subversive activities as well, including the provision
of active assistance to narcotics smuggling and narcotics
transportation to various destinations; the distribution
of fake currency; and espionage. There have been repeated
attempts to forge alliances with Islamist militants active
in J&K, but these have, at worst, met with very limited
and transient success.
It is abundantly clear that, despite the abject failure
of the Khalistan movement, Pakistan continues to maintain
and support these various groups in the expectation of future
opportunities that may arise out of political circumstances
in Punjab, or from predicaments that arise out of transient
exigencies, as was the case in the Cinema Hall Blasts in
Delhi, which sought to exploit momentary passions whipped
up over the film, Jo Bole So Nihal. While the prevailing
circumstances in Punjab make any significant revival of
the Khalistani terror an extraordinarily remote possibility,
a residual capacity to cause local disruption survives,
and dovetails with Pakistan's long-term intent in India.
As with the many other terrorist, insurgent and subversive
movements and groups across India, the Khalistanis can rely
on Pakistani support as long as they retain this residual
capacity, and as long as Pakistan's dominant political forces
remain relentlessly tied to the country's roots in the ideology
of religious exclusion, theocratic authoritarianism, communal
hatred, and Islamist extremism - ideas in irreducible conflict
with India's defining ideologies of secularism, liberalism
and democracy.
ULFA Wants to Talk
- Or Does it?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
wants to talk or at least that's what many people in the
State of Assam and outside appear to believe. A chain of
events, which started with the issue of a formal letter
of invitation by the Prime Minister's office on December
7, 2004, however, has seen little beyond a huge number of
press statements by the involved parties reiterating their
commitment to the peace process. The anticipation of a 'peace
process' has, however, impacted directly on military operations
against the rebel group, with a general reduction of pressure
following a request to this effect by the negotiator, writer
Indira Goswami. Reports suggest, however, that ULFA has
found it convenient to use this period of relief to build
up its arsenal and extend its activities.
ULFA 'commander-in-chief'
Paresh Baruah has reportedly endorsed the negotiation process
initiated by Goswami, but his statements to the media remain
mired in histrionics and follow an escalatory trajectory.
There has been a great deal of formalism regarding the character
of the formal invitation from the Government, with ULFA
insisting that it would not consider an offer of talks unless
it received a letter "with official seal and signature".
Six months later, after receiving the scanned version of
the letter provided by the National Security Advisor M.K.
Narayanan to mediator Indira Goswami by e-mail on May 24,
Baruah said that a letter "sent through the internet" would
not suffice, insisting, "The original has not come as yet.
We want a letter in the format in which we had sent our
offer to the Centre," a position that was reiterated on
June 10 by ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa.
Quickly thereafter, ULFA has demanded the release of the
group's arrested 'central committee' members on the grounds
that a 'quorum' needs to be completed to discuss the Union
Government's invitation. Four of ULFA's top leaders, including
'vice chairman' Pradip Gogoi, 'advisor' Bhimkanta Buragohain,
'cultural secretary' Pranati Deka and 'publicity secretary'
Mithinga Daimari are presently behind bars.
And while ULFA continues to drag out the preliminaries to
the negotiation process, it has never stopped doing what
put it on the United States' list of 'Other Selected Terrorist
Organisations'. Since December 7, 2004, when the PMO handed
over the first letter of invitation to Indira Goswami, the
outfit has detonated 50 explosions across the State. The
most recent of these, on June 4, targeted a microwave tower
in Guwahati city. Even as the mediator asked the security
forces (SFs) to stop operations against the group and wrote
to the Defence Minister on the same lines, ULFA continued
to target civilians and security force personnel. On May
26, two bicycle borne ULFA terrorists killed a leader of
the Congress party at the Dhekorgorah Block office in Jorhat
district. On May 20, an Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel
was killed and four others sustained injuries, when ULFA
ambushed a bus transporting the SF personnel, at Borhat
in Sibsagar district.
At the same time, ULFA is reorganising its units in its
traditional strongholds, forming new 'battalions', and moving
into hitherto unexplored territories, both within Assam
and in adjoining States. On April 20, the Police demolished
a well-equipped camp of ULFA's newly-formed '27th battalion'
in Karbi Anglong district, an area where the organisation's
traditional influence has been low. The camp was established
in the first week of April and was led by a middle level
cadre, Dandi Bora. On April 21, six ULFA leaders, including
a woman 'sergeant major', were arrested by the Army at Sesupani
in Tinsukia District as they descended into Assam from their
Changlang camp in neighbouring Arunachal Pradesh. Movements
of ULFA cadres drawn from its '28th battalion' have been
noticed in the Jonai area of upper Assam's Dhemaji District
and also in the Poba reserve forest area spread over a 100
square kilometres along the borders with Arunachal Pradesh.
Each of these is a territory that has remained untouched
by the group's terror and extortion in the past. Meanwhile,
ULFA cadres continue to use the neighbouring State of Meghalaya's
Garo Hills area for transit and as an arms dump. On May
14, Police recovered two universal machine guns, three magazines
and 60 rounds from an ULFA hideout at Masuk in West Garo
Hills district. An estimated 75-100 cadres are reported
to be stationed in the District spread over 3,714 square
kilometres.
Intelligence sources indicate that several of ULFA's 'commanders',
including Lal Deka, 'commander' of the '109th Battalion',
and Biju Chakraborty 'Lieutenant' of the '709th Battalion',
are moving about their assigned areas in upper Assam, as
well as in traditional strongholds like Nalbari and Guwahati
city. Movements of several of the outfit's hit-men, including
Hira Sarania, Drishti Rajkhowa, Prabhat Roy and Madhav Roy,
have been reported from different parts of the State.
To compound the situation, ULFA has called for a plebiscite
in Assam through a Press Statement of November 27, 2004;
for international intervention on December 13, 2004; and
for US mediation to 'end Indian military repression', on
June 2, 2005. The ULFA leadership's commitment to the dialogue
process is far from clear. This was clearly confirmed by
State Governor, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Ajai Singh, who stated,
on May 20, "There is a question mark on the genuineness
of the ULFA leadership for a dialogue because earlier, whenever
it spoke about talks, it did so for buying time to regroup."
Obviously, Governor Singh does not have any of Chief Minister
Tarun Gogoi's political compulsions. Gogoi, on the other
hand, has been insisting that talks with ULFA be initiated
on the same lines as those with the National Socialist Council
of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM),
and was, in fact, deeply critical of the US decision to
put ULFA on its list of terrorists, arguing that such steps
were not conducive to the negotiating process.
Negotiating with the ULFA is an issue with huge political
ramifications in Assam where insurgency has claimed 5,445
lives between 1992 and June 10, 2005. With the State going
to the polls in 2006, any movement in this direction would
be politically rewarding for the ruling Congress party and
for Chief Minister Gogoi. That explains Gogoi's eagerness
to push forward any kind of process, his willingness to
consider releasing the arrested ULFA leaders, and his trips
to New Delhi to convince the Prime Minister on the utility
of these actions. Indeed, he has made little attempt to
hide his game plan, and declared, on June 9, "We do not
want to stand between the ULFA and the Centre. We just want
to sort out all the issues relating to the State before
the Assembly elections."
Apparent movement on the talks with ULFA is, consequently,
crucial if the Congress is to cement its prospects in the
impending elections. In a State where development and governance
have taken a severe beating, gains on the insurgency front
are the only 'achievement' the incumbent party can take
to the people if it is to seek another term in power. In
this, Gogoi has already garnered some advantage, since ceasefire
agreements have now been signed with all the significant
groups in the State other than ULFA. The United People's
Democratic Solidarity (UPDS),
the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD),
the Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF) and most recently National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
have all been brought to the negotiating table. If ULFA
can be brought into any kind of negotiation process, the
people's hopes for peace would soar. Gogoi's political compulsions
are, consequently, obvious.
It appears that the ULFA leadership is aware of these vulnerabilities,
and intends to exploit them.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
June
6-12, 2005
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
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INDIA
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
8
|
5
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38
|
51
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
5
|
1
|
1
|
7
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
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Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
4
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Total (INDIA)
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19
|
6
|
39
|
64
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NEPAL
|
46
|
25
|
26
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97
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SRI LANKA
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2
|
1
|
4
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7
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BHUTAN
Maoists have infiltrated
into Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal, says Foreign
Minister: While
responding to queries in the National Assembly, Bhutanese
Foreign Minister, Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk, is reported
to have said that the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
have infiltrated the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal
and added, "The Maoists are intent on spreading their
'revolution' to other parts of the region. We feel that
such a (Maoist) regime would almost certainly threaten
stability in the region." Further, he told the Assembly
that allowing the highly politicised camp people to
return to Bhutan would mean importing ready-made radical
political parties and terrorists to duplicate the violence,
terror, and instability the Maoists had unleashed in
Nepal. Some of the main radical parties were the Bhutan
Communist Party (Marxist Leninist, Maoist), the Bhutan
Gorkha Liberation Front, and Bhutan Revolutionary Students
Union, he added. Kuensel
Online, June 8, 2005.
INDIA
Babbar Khalsa International
'operations chief' Jagtar Singh Hawara arrested in Delhi:
Jagtar Singh Hawara, 'operations chief' of the Babbar Khalsa
International (BKI)
in India, who was one of the four inmates who had escaped from
Burail Jail in Chandigarh on January 21, 2004, was arrested
along with two other accused in the May 22, 2005, theatre blasts
from the G.T. Karnal Road of New Delhi on June 8, 2005. Delhi
Police Commissioner, K.K. Paul, stated that the arrests followed
an encounter with the Inter-State Cell of the Delhi Police and
the two other accused were identified as Jaspal aka Raja and
Vikas Sehgal. Police also recovered 10.35 kilograms of RDX,
four pistols of foreign make, 207 live cartridges, three remote-controlled
explosive devices and a hand grenade from the vehicle in which
they were traveling. Paul added that "the accused said the BKI
was trying to revive militancy in the country, especially in
Punjab." The
Hindu, June 9, 2005.
473 Naxalites surrendered in Andhra Pradesh in 2005, says
Andhra Pradesh Police chief: On June 7, 2005, the Andhra
Pradesh Director General of Police, Swaranjit Sen, stated that
in 2005, 473 left-wing extremists (also known as Naxalites)
belonging to different outfits had surrendered, as against 396
in 2004 and 1035 in 2003. He said 349 Naxalites were arrested
this year till date, as against 4,000 in 2004 and 2,000 in 2003.
Further, Sen said, this year 69 encounters had taken place and
76 Naxalites had been killed, as against 73 encounters and 52
Naxalites in 2004 and 173 encounters and 175 Naxalites in 2003.
He said 14 police personnel had died this year. Further, Sen
said, "at least one third of the police stations in the State
are unarmed and vulnerable to attacks." Out of 1,585 police
stations, 500 do not have weapons and are not armed, according
to the police chief. New
Indian Press, June 8, 2005.
NEPAL
Landmine
blast kills 36 civilians in Chitwan district: At least 36
civilians and three security force personnel were killed and
72 people sustained injuries when a passenger bus hit a landmine
at Mudhekhola in the Chitwan district on June 6, 2005. In a
statement e-mailed to media organisations on June 7, the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist)
chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, owned responsibility
and expressed apology for the landmine explosion. He said the
attack was targeted against security personnel and called the
loss of civilian lives a "grave mistake." Prachanda added that
his party had immediately suspended the cadres responsible for
the attack. Nepal
News, June 7, 2005.
PAKISTAN
President
Musharraf meets APHC leaders in Islamabad: President Pervez
Musharraf met the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
leaders in Islamabad on June 7, 2005, and reportedly stated that
a permanent settlement of the decades-old Jammu and Kashmir dispute
is only possible if it takes into account wishes and aspirations
of the Kashmiri people. The APHC leaders who met him were Mirwaiz
Umar Farooq, Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat, Maulana Abbas Ansari,
Muhammad Abdullah Tari, Bilal Ghani Lone, Fazal-e-Haq Qureshi
and Yasin Malik. Gen. Musharraf also said that the status quo
was unacceptable to Pakistan and there has to be forward movement
so that the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmiri people are
realised. Dawn,
June 8, 2005.
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