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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 25, January 5, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Kashmir: Pakistan Explores a Political
End-Game
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
For years,
Pakistan hasn't needed a political end-game on Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K). Its state-run jihad, most military
and intelligence analysts in Pakistan assumed, would eventually
wear India down and force it to make significant territorial
concessions. Now, however, Pakistan has been pushed into
reining back the jihad on which its entire strategy
in J&K was founded. This winter has been the most peaceful
in years - and Pakistan is now discovering that it needs
the kind of legitimacy commanded by politicians, not the
Kalashnikov. Using the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM)
as its sheep dog, Pakistan is attempting to corral a profoundly
unruly flock. The lambs, apparently, have grown both spines
and brains - and until the dog actually demonstrates the
ability to bite, seem unlikely to fall in line.
At least some elements of Pakistan's new political strategy
can now be discerned. In the build-up to the ongoing South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit
in Islamabad, a three-pronged effort was made to deny India
political space in J&K. First, Pakistan brought intense
pressure to bear on the Jamaat-e-Islami to back hardline
Islamist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who split the All
Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
last year to set up a parallel secessionist organisation.
Second, its intelligence services sought to persuade the
centrist APHC to back out of dialogue with India, which
many observers believe will commence in the coming weeks.
Finally, efforts were made to recruit the services of secessionist
politicians outside the APHC fold, notably Shabbir Shah,
to strengthen the rejectionist APHC faction.
None of these enterprises have met with any success. In
early December 2003, Ashraf Sehrai, the Jamaat-e-Islami's
Naib Amir, or deputy chief, launched a new initiative
to secure the organisation's backing for Geelani. Sehrai
plainly had Pakistan's backing. On November 13, 2003, speaking
at a dinner hosted by Pakistan's High Commissioner to New
Delhi, Aziz Ahmad Khan, Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh
Rashid Ahmad said that his country recognised "only the
Hurriyat led by Geelani and no one else." "After all," he
continued, "Geelani's group has been recognised by the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference." The leaders of the centrist
APHC, he said somewhat cryptically, were simply "Kashmiri
leaders." Soon afterwards, Ghulam Rasool Dar, a member of
the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin's command council, better known by
his nom de guerre Riaz Rasool, visited top Jamaat-e-Islami
leaders with a message from the organisation's supreme commander,
Mohammad Yusuf Shah @ Syed Salahuddin.
Sehrai's efforts to get Jamaat-e-Islami backing for the
rejectionist APHC met with a sharp rebuke. The Naib Amir's
declaration of support for Geelani led to a public put-down
from his organisation. Zahid Ali, the Jamaat-e-Islami's
spokesperson, let it be known that Sehrai did not have the
party's backing, and was "not in favour of toeing somebody's
line." Ali went on to charge Sehrai with failing to promote
the Jamaat-e-Islami's interests. Soon after, on December
27, 2003, Syed Nazir Ahmad Kashani, the Amir-e-Jamaat,
or Jamaat-e-Islami supreme chief, used his executive powers
to sack Sehrai. This, however, provoked a sharp response
from Geelani backers within the APHC, and on December 29,
Kashani was compelled to summon a meeting of the Jamaat-e-Islami's
Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora, or central council, its
highest decision-making body.
On January 1, the Jamaat-e-Islami announced its final position
on the APHC. The Jamaat-e-Islami made clear it did not support
Maulvi Abbas Ansari, the Shia cleric who heads the centrist
faction of the APHC. Ali noted, in particular, that the
"manner in which Ansari had been elected chairman was unacceptable
to us." This was of a piece with several past Jamaat-e-Islami
pronouncements on the centrist APHC, many of whose members
detest Ansari simply because of his Shia religious affiliations.
To placate these hardliners, Kashani part-reinstated Sehrai
as the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami's political wing. At
the same time, however, the Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora made
clear it would not back Geelani "for the time being," and
called for either the implementation of United Nations resolutions
on J&K, or a three-way dialogue between India, Pakistan
and representatives of the State's people. Finally, the
Jamaat-e-Islami committed itself to continue its "democratic
and constitutional struggle" - a signal indication of its
willingness to operate within the four corners of the Indian
political system.
If this would have done little to cheer Inter-Services Intelligence
strategists in Islamabad, their efforts to bring the centrists
themselves in line did little better. Like the Jamaat-e-Islami
moderates, key centrists, notably Srinagar religious leader
Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, are believed to have been 'leaned
on' by the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin. Members of Pakistan-based
Shia organisations affiliated to Ansari are also believed
to have been subjected to considerable arm-twisting. If
the intention of the enterprise was indeed to sabotage the
planned dialogue with India, it failed. A draft invitation
for the Hurriyat centrists to go to New Delhi, source say,
has been prepared, and should be issued in coming weeks.
The centrists are likely to accept the invitation, a brief
missive that contains no pre-defined terms of reference
or conditions for the talks. "No one," Indian intelligence
sources told this writer, "expects rapid results; the idea
is to start talking, and let things take their time."
Finally, efforts by Islamabad to get Geelani the backing
of minor secessionist figures have also gone nowhere. Shabbir
Shah was asked to mediate a compromise between both APHC
factions, which would give Geelani greater leverage. Sources
indicate that Shah dithered for several weeks, pointing
to the fact that the Kashmir Bar Association (KBA) was attempting
to secure a rapprochement. The dithering served its purpose,
since the KBA's efforts led to nothing, and Shah managed
to keep out of the imbroglio. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF)
leader Yasin Malik, for his part, has kept a studied distance
from the centrists, but has stopped short of announcing
support for Geelani. As things stand, Geelani has the support
of several minor Islamist leaders, all of whom would have
trouble winning municipality elections, let alone have a
credible chance of building a valley-wide mass base.
What does all this point to? The fact is that Pakistan's
sheep-dogs have, for a variety of reasons, been muzzled.
Jihadi ranks within J&K have been depleted by ongoing
Indian military operations, and a sharp reduction in cross-border
infiltration has meant that there has been no replenishment.
Come this spring, Pakistan will have to decide whether it
wants to let go its jihad, or once again remove the
muzzles. That decision will, most certainly, shape the course
of political life in J&K over the months and years to come.
The Taliban: Seeking Soft Targets
Guest Writer: Syed Saleem Shahzad
Correspondent, Asia Times
Finally the
abduction drama of Indian highway technicians ended with
both workers being released in exchange for 48 Taliban
prisoners. The two Indians working on the Kabul-Kandahar
highway, who had been abducted on December 6, 2003, from
a village near Shahjoy, 280 kilometers southwest of Kabul,
in the heart of the Zabul province, were freed on December
24, 2003. Sources close to the Taliban maintained that the
strategy to target Indian interests in Afghanistan was evidently
successful, and prevailed over the nerves of the Northern
Alliance-dominated Kabul Government, which has very special
relations with India.
The kidnapping was a very different kind of operation that
took place in the South Eastern Afghan province of Zabul.
Though Taliban spokesmen had called several news organizations
claiming responsibility, Afghanistan's Interior Minister
Ali Ahmed Jalali's claim that the kidnappers had no connection
to the Taliban movement and that they were local people,
was partly correct.
Sources across the Pak-Afghan borders maintained that local
tribes, whose members were arrested by the Karzai administration,
were the real element behind the abduction, which was intended
to get their own relatives released. During and after the
abduction, the local Zabul administration did not display
any significant resistance, as it is itself heavily penetrated
by sympathizers of the former Taliban regime.
The kidnappers were not members of the Taliban force, but
local residents who conducted the operation to get their
fellow tribesmen, who happened to be Taliban cadres, released.
However, in later days they shifted their captives to the
Taliban's safe sanctuaries in Zabul's mountainous terrain.
Zabul is, in fact, an ideal place for such abduction operations.
The overwhelming majority in the province comprises Taliban
sympathizers, including many in the local administration.
The province is surrounded by the most difficult mountainous
terrain and there is a network of Taliban safe havens as
well as a widespread support base among local tribes. The
support of the local tribesmen was critical in eventually
ensuring that the 48 Taliban cadres were set free by the
Afghan administration.
Strategically speaking, the Zabul province is the birthplace
of the Taliban. It was the first province to be occupied
by the student militia when they emerged against the warlordism
of different Jehadi factions in the early 1990s. Even after
the US toppled the Taliban Government, this is the place
that has been occupied by the Taliban several times over
the past weeks. Before any attack, the Taliban leaders send
warning messages to the administration not to resist, and
this is taken seriously, with most administration officials
fleeing before the Taliban arrive, and others offering little
resistance. The Taliban then take over the offices for a
few hours, hoist their white flag and then leave notes on
the wall, declaring that they can take over Afghanistan
'any time'.
In most of the South Eastern Afghan belt, the Taliban resistance
enjoys widespread support, since many of the Taliban leaders
come from South Eastern areas of Zabul, Hilmand, Kandahar
and Oruzgan provinces. According to tribal traditions, moreover,
their safety is guaranteed by their tribes. If they seek
refuge after a guerilla operation, they are given shelter;
and if US troops come after them and conduct house-to-house
search operation, they are easily transported over the mountainous
terrain into neighboring Pakistan, where they hide until
the danger is over.
At this point in time, the resistance against the US presence
in Afghanistan and against the rule of Northern Alliance
is in search of Kabul's vulnerable underbelly and soft targets.
Besides western targets, including aid workers currently
operating in the country, Indian interests are widely believed
to be easy targets that can force concessions from the Afghan
Government. Indeed, a strategy to target Indian interests
in general has been widely developed among the resistance
forces, for a number of specific reasons. Most significantly,
the Pakistani propaganda machinery has very effectively
spread the information that 'all Indian outfits', whether
NGOs or commercial organizations, are part and parcel of
the Indian 'strategic community' which aims to help strengthen
the Northern Alliance rule in Afghanistan. Most of the Northern
Alliance leadership has very special and personal relations
with New Delhi. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, General Fahim, and
several other ministers and leaders have had long periods
of residence in Delhi. So if Indians are targeted it is
natural that the Northern Alliance leadership would take
this seriously and would try its level best to rescue them.
Strikes on Indian targets could also force Indian investors
to pack their bags and go back home. This would create a
serious mess in current development projects and efforts,
and could ultimately make the situation more and more chaotic.
Such chaos and anarchy helps the Taliban carry the resistance
forward. The inevitable conclusion is that Indian interests
in Afghanistan are the soft underbelly that the Taliban
seeks out and, if these interests are systematically targeted,
the results most desired by them may be achieved.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
December 29, 2003
- January 4, 2004
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
8
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
9
|
Bihar
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
4
|
8
|
16
|
28
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
Manipur
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
Tripura
|
1
|
5
|
4
|
10
|
West
Bengal
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
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Total (INDIA)
|
11
|
15
|
32
|
58
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
10
|
25
|
37
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Crackdown
launched
on
terrorists
in
border
areas
of
Chittagong
Hill
Tracts:
The
Government
is
reported
to
have
launched
a
crackdown
on
terrorists,
irrespective
of
their
nationality,
in
the
border
areas
of
Chittagong
Hill
Tracts
(CHT)
and
greater
Sylhet
district
on
January
3,
2004.
Operations
are
also
reportedly
underway
in
the
Bandarban
district
of
CHT
following
the
seizure
of
a
large
cache
of
arms
and
ammunition
on
January
1.
Meanwhile,
State
Minister
for
Home
Lutfuzzaman
Babar
denied
reports
that
the
crackdown
had
been
launched
at
India's
request.
He
was
quoted
as
saying
that
"It
is
not
that
we
will
launch
operations
if
there
is
a
request
and
refrain
from
doing
so
if
there
is
no
request.
It
is
our
Government's
own
stand.
It
is
not
for
the
first
time
that
such
operation
has
been
launched."
He
also
said
that
operations
against
insurgents
along
the
frontier
with
India
would
continue.
"If
Indian
insurgents
are
held
during
this
operation
they
will
be
tried
according
to
the
law
of
the
land,"
added
Babar.
Independent
Bangladesh,
January
3,
2004.
Five
terrorists
killed
in
attack
on
ATTF
camp
in
Dhaka:
A
rocket-propelled
grenade
fired
by
an
unidentified
gunman
at
an
All
Tripura
Tiger
Force
(ATTF)
hideout
in
the
Bangladeshi
capital
Dhaka
on
January
2,
2004,
is
reported
to
have
killed
at
least
five
ATTF
terrorists
and
injured
eight
others.
The
ATTF
chief
Ranjit
Debbarma
is
reported
to
be
among
those
injured.
Assam
Tribune,
January
3,
2004.
Large
cache
of
arms
and
ammunition
seized
in
Chittagong
Hill
Tracts:
Bangladesh
Rifles
(BDR)
personnel
seized
a
large
cache
of
weapons,
including
32
anti-tank
mines,
six
rocket
launchers,
10
rocket
launcher
cell
chargers
and
equipment
for
14
rocket
launcher
cells,
after
an
encounter
with
some
terrorists
at
Lemuchhari
in
the
Bandarban
district
of
Chittagong
Hill
Tracts
(CHT)
on
January
1,
2004.
The
terrorists,
with
suspected
links
to
Arakanese
rebels
in
Myanmar,
are
reported
to
have
escaped
into
the
adjoining
forest
area
following
firing
by
the
BDR
personnel.
The
Daily
Star,
January
2,
2004.
BHUTAN
Royal
Bhutan
Army
burns
down
last
ULFA
camp
at
Goburkonda:
Unnamed
Royal
Bhutan
Army
(RBA)
sources
were
quoted
as
saying
that
the
last
of
the
30
camps
that
were
established
on
Bhutanese
soil
by
the
three
terrorist
groups
from
India
has
been
destroyed.
The
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
camp
at
Goburkonda
in
lower
Zhemgang
was
captured
by
the
RBA
on
December
31,
2003,
and
destroyed
on
January
2,
2004.
The
RBA
has
reportedly
also
destroyed
35
observation
posts
besides
the
30
camps.
Kuensel
Online,
January
3,
2004.
INDIA
Four
soldiers
killed
and
15
persons
injured
in
Fidayeen
attack
at
Jammu
Railway
Station:
A
day
ahead
of
Prime
Minister
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee's
visit
to
Pakistan
to
attend
the
South
Asian
Association
for
Regional
Cooperation
(SAARC)
Summit,
two
fidayeen
(suicide
squad)
terrorists
attacked
the
Jammu
Railway
Station
on
January
2,
2004,
killing
four
security
force
(SF)
personnel
and
injuring
fifteen
others,
including
six
civilians.
Both
the
terrorists
were
subsequently
killed
by
the
SF
personnel.
Hundreds
of
passengers,
mostly
pilgrims
of
the
Mata
Vaishnodevi
shrine,
were
reportedly
at
the
station
when
the
attack
occurred.
Daily
Excelsior,
January
3,
2004.
PAKISTAN
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