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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 42, May 5, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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J&K - Stumbling
out of the Bind
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management
There has
been an enormous burst of activity and accompanying euphoria
since India's Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, visited
Srinagar on April 18 and made an offer of renewed talks
with Pakistan over the vexed Kashmir issue. The move has
been greeted with a crescendo of international approval,
and has drawn enthusiastic responses from the US as well,
with Secretary of State Colin Powell declaring: "All this
is very, very promising at a time when we were beginning
to wonder whether or not we were not going back to the potential
of conflict."
More significant has been the response within Kashmir and
in Pakistan. While there are dissenting voices in the Valley
- there would be reason for suspicion if there were none
- the political response has been largely positive, even
eager. As for Pakistan, the sheer rapidity of the reactions
has been remarkable. There is currently little available
intelligence on the background of Prime Minister Vajpayee's
offer, but the consensus in the popular media appears to
be that this was an off-the-cuff gesture, not a well-thought-out
and planned policy shift. Nevertheless, the character and
velocity of responses from Pakistan, and the speed with
which a graduated peace process appears to be emerging,
suggests that the probabilities of substantial behind-the-scenes
activities preceding these developments cannot be entirely
discounted. This is borne out further by the timing of the
appointment of N.N. Vohra as the Centre's new interlocutor
in Kashmir, and several reports over the past months regarding
the creation of the groundwork for official-level talks
between the two countries.
Whatever be the case on this point, the fact is that the
present process has a far greater probability of success
than any of the preceding attempts, and the reasons for
this are rooted in the radical transformation of the geo-strategic
context of Asia, the impact of the US coalition campaign
in Iraq, and the progressive 'denial of plausible deniability'
by the international community - and specifically the US
- to Pakistan on its role in international and cross-border
terrorism. Among the most significant of these factors has
been the humiliating defeat inflicted on the Saddam Hussein
regime in Iraq. This has sent a very strong message to the
extreme elements of political Islam, and to the rogue states
bound to this ideology and supportive of the terrorist campaigns
inspired by it. It has long been the position of the Institute
for Conflict Management that military defeat is a critical
element in the delegitimisation of the terrorists and their
state sponsors, and the defeat in Iraq has had an inevitable
impact on Pakistan and the Musharraf regime, as well as
on at least a segment of those who had thrown in their lot
with the Islamist extremists in the anticipation of a great
and proximate victory. For Pakistan, this impact has been
multiplied manifold by a number of secondary inputs, including
repeated and strong statements from the highest echelons
of the US leadership that - while they continued to appreciate
the country's assistance in apprehending Al
Qaeda elements operating in the country and 'cooperation
on the war against terror' - had also clearly confirmed
Pakistan's role in supporting terrorism in J&K, and had
emphasized that the Musharraf regime had failed to fulfill
its promises and had not done enough on this count. There
has also been a strong media buildup in the US - fuelling
urgent speculation and apprehensions in the Pakistani media
and policy circles as well - regarding the possibility of
Pakistan becoming the next target of American 'pre-emptive
action', though this has been firmly denied by US authorities.
Subtle signs of a clear shift in the US policy have also
emerged as, for example, in the redrawing of the CIA's map
of Kashmir that earlier showed the entire area - both Pakistan
and Indian controlled Jammu & Kashmir - as a 'disputed territory'.
The recently revised maps - which would have gone through
an extended process of review by various Government Departments,
and would certainly reflect the consensus of the present
Administration - mark out the areas east of the Line of
Control (LoC) as the "Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir",
while the territories to the west are designated "Pakistan-controlled
areas of Kashmir", correctly reflecting the position of
the 1948 UN Resolution that it was, in fact, only the "Pakistan-controlled"
area that was in dispute. The message to Pakistan cannot
have been ignored by the Musharraf regime.
There is, moreover, a growing awareness among Pakistani
commentators that the ongoing terrorist campaign cannot
upset the status quo in Kashmir, and a certain measure
of pragmatism is now clearly replacing the delusional strategic
overreach that has dominated Pakistani military thinking
over the past decades.
Crucially, it is clear that, after Iraq, the US would like
to see peace in the Palestine-Israel conflict, and the conflict
over Kashmir. The shift in strategy on both these areas
is now visible, and the US is reportedly exerting extraordinary
pressures on Syria and Lebanon to stop covert support to
Palestinian terrorist groups. It is clear that parties in
the conflict are now being forced into isolation from the
networks of their clandestine supporters in order to facilitate
a clear focus on the actual issues in the conflict, with
terror being pushed out of the negotiating equation. This,
precisely, is what the US would seek to secure on Kashmir.
With America's unarguable status as the world's sole superpower,
and the inevitable impact of its policies on the economic
and security future of this region, US interests, perspectives
and responses will certainly weigh in on the decisions of
the South Asian leadership. In any event, Musharraf has
tended to go along with America on all major decisions since
9/11, and though he will be reluctant to be seen as withdrawing
too suddenly from his strident position on Kashmir - "Kashmir
is in our blood", as he put it - it is apparent that, once
the US position is stated clearly, he will fall obediently
in line. He may, of course, use the puppet Mir Zafarullah
Khan Jamali government, and Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood
Kasuri, as a front to make the more distasteful of about-turns,
but compliance would tend to be inevitable.
Lest all this appears to be a matter of course, it is important
to strike a note of extreme caution. The situation remains
complex and immensely uncertain, and there is no surety
that the peace process will last. Indeed, if another madcap
military adventurist emerges on the Pakistani political
scenario, if a few fundamentalists run amuck, or if renegade
terrorists unwilling to comply with the shifts in policy
of their state sponsors in Pakistan engineer a few dramatic
strikes in J&K, the entire process could well be derailed,
yielding another cycle of escalated violence.
The greater danger in the present peace process, however,
is that it fails to address underlying character of the
'enduring rivalry', the 'intractable conflict' between the
two countries. The conflict over Kashmir is not, as is widely
believed, a quarrel over territory; it is, rather, an irreducible
conflict between two fundamentally incompatible ideologies
- a pluralistic democratic ideology, on India's part; and
an authoritarian-fundamentalist-exclusionary Islamist ideology
that asserts that different belief systems cannot coexist
within the same political order. A permanent peace in South
Asia will only result after one or the other of these ideologies
succumbs - and these are crucial to national identity, consciousness,
and even the existence of these two nation states. A permanent
peace is, consequently, contingent on Pakistan abandoning
the ideology of hatred and exclusion that lies at the very
foundations of its creation. Failing this, the only other
option, as I have suggested before, is the de-nuclearisation
and de-militarization of Pakistan, or the creation of a
tremendous military imbalance in the region that makes it
impossible for Pakistan to engage in the military adventurism
that has characterized much of its independent existence.
Cautious Tango
Guest Writer: Hiranmay
Karlekar
Senior Columnist & Consulting Editor, The Pioneer
The advent
of summer seems to have led to a thaw in India-Bangladesh
relations which had come under a freezing chill in winter
following several confrontations along the border, when
India's Border Security Force (BSF) sought to push illegal
Bangladeshi infiltrators back into their own country. The
change is supposed to have been strikingly underlined by
a joint statement issued by the Foreign Secretaries of the
two countries, Kanwal Sibal of India and Shamsher Mobin
Chowdhury of Bangladesh, on April 30, the second day of
the former's two-day visit to Dhaka. It said, "In response
to India's concerns regarding the activities of Indian insurgent
groups, the Bangladeshi side reiterated its commitment not
to allow its territory to be used for any activities inimical
to India." According to the statement, the two sides would
address thorny issues like border demarcation, the exchange
of enclaves and illegal cross-border movement of people
"in a balanced manner."
The meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries also discussed
issues like India's grant of duty-free access to more Bangladeshi
goods, free trade, the establishment of transportation links,
and the signing of an agreement on bilateral investment
protection and another on cooperation in science. Also,
India reportedly also offered help in the Information Technology
sector and cyclonic-tidal-surge-management.
All this sounds impressive and the signing of the joint
statement has been viewed in some quarters as a major achievement.
While, friendly and cordial mutual relations are in the
best interest of both India and Bangladesh, one must ensure
that wishes don't become the mother of thought. Bangladesh's
past conduct shows that there is normally a huge gap between
promise and delivery. The reiteration of "its commitment
not to allow its territory to be used for any activities
inimical to India" leaves one with a feeling of déjà
vu. The "activities inimical to India" refer to the
help in the form of sanctuary, arms and ammunition, training
and funds being given to insurgent groups active in northeastern
India since the time Bangladesh was East Pakistan.
Pakistan aided the rebel Naga leader, Zapu Phizo, who announced
the formation of a Republican Government of Free Nagaland
on September 18, 1954. Laldenga, the President of the Mizo
National Front had led a group of followers through then
East Pakistan for arms and training in West Pakistan in
late 1963. Insurgency exploded in Mizoram on February 28,
1966, and the Army and Air Force had to be used to restore
order. Meitei insurgents of Manipur began receiving aid
from the beginning of 1970 and conducted guerrilla raids
in Cachar and Tripura during the India-Pakistan war of 1971,
which was the decisive factor in East Pakistan's emergence
into freedom as Bangladesh. Aid to northeastern insurgents
stopped after Bangladesh's liberation in December, 1971,
but was resumed after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's assassination
in 1975. The process ran parallel to a planned policy of
Islamisation of Bangladesh and patronization of fundamentalist
Islamic elements, which had collaborated with Pakistan during
the liberation war, by President Ziaur Rahman (1975-81),
the present Prime Minister, Begum Khaleda Zia's late husband,
and President H.M. Ershad (1981-1990).
Sheikh Hasina closed down some of these camps after becoming
Prime Minister, but soon called a halt to this process and
it was once again business as usual. Things have become
worse since Begum Khaleda Zia's return to power in October
2001, as the Prime Minister in a coalition government formed
by her party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and
fundamentalist Islamist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami.
This is hardly surprising because Begum Zia, who was earlier
Prime Minister from 1991 to 1996, and who is known for her
pro-Pakistan disposition, had, during her spell as the Leader
of the Opposition between 1996 and 2001, described insurgents
active in north-eastern India as 'freedom fighters' and
said that Bangladesh should help them, instead of curbing
their activities.
At present, Bangladesh's Directorate-General of Forces'
Intelligence (DGFI) assists and nurtures, in collaboration
with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate,
insurgent groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA),
the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
of Manipur, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT),
the National-Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM)
of Nagaland.
India has repeatedly taken up the matter with Bangladesh.
During Begum Khaleda Zia's first tenure as Prime Minister,
the then Chief Minister of Assam, Hiteshwar Saikia, had
produced evidence to show that top ULFA leaders not only
moved about freely in Bangladesh but also operated bank
accounts in Dhaka. The Bangladesh Government had said that
it had no knowledge of their presence. New Delhi had, at
the last meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint Working Group
(JWG), handed over to Dhaka the names of 88 insurgents,
including Sanjit Dev Barman of the All Tripura Tiger Force
(ATTF)
and Anup Chetia and Paresh Barua of ULFA, who are in Bangladesh
and whom it wants returned. Not one of them has been handed
over so far.
The joint statement's reiteration of Bangladesh's "commitment
not to allow its territory to be used for any activities
inimical to India" can, therefore, by no means be taken
at face value. New Delhi must wait for results. This is
all the more so because Bangladesh has not only been assisting
and training these organizations but has allowed the ISI
to operate freely on its soil and use it as a base for its
operations against India.
The target is not just India. This was dramatically brought
to light in January 1999, when the Delhi Police arrested
Syed Abu Nasir, a Bangladeshi who had crossed over from
Bangladesh to bomb the US embassy in Delhi and the US consulate
general in Chennai. He revealed during interrogation that
he and his team of nine had gathered in Calcutta in December
1998. From there, the three Indian members had been sent
to Siliguri to establish a support base in collaboration
with ISI agents stationed there, while the six 'Afghans'
- a generic term used to signify Afghans as well as various
Arab and other terrorists trained in Afghanistan by the
Al Qaeda - went to Chennai. The three Indians who went to
Siliguri were subsequently arrested while the six 'Afghans'
managed to disappear.
New Delhi needs to be all the more careful about Bangladesh's
intentions because of the Khaleda Zia Government's sustained
promotion of pro-Pakistan, fundamentalist Islamist and anti-India
forces, and the relentless persecution of secular and liberal
intellectuals like Shahriyar Kabir and Professor Muntasir
Mamun. That the message is that intellectuals like them
who oppose violent and fundamentalist political Islam need
to watch out, becomes even clearer if one considers the
terrorization of the cultural world by fundamentalist Islamists
led by the Jamaat-e-Islami. They have been targeting members
of modern cultural troupes and stopping the showing of films,
staging of plays and the holding of musical performances,
they consider objectionable. They stopped the screening
of Tanvir Moqammel's Lal Salu (Red Cloth), which shows how
mullahs cheat the laity, in Sylhet. Directors and scriptwriters
of plays like Kath Krishna Kali have been arrested
and tortured at their behest without even the framing of
proper charges against them. The Bangladesh Film Censor
Board had released for public viewing the much acclaimed
film Maatir Molina (Clay Bird), which had been selected
for an Oscar nomination and has received two international
awards, only after the deletions of parts considered 'highly
objectionable' by the Jamaat. The latter's ire against the
film arose not only from its stark portrayal of Bangladesh's
reactionary madrassa system of education, but also
the fact that its director, Tareq Masood, had made a much-acclaimed
documentary on the Songs of the Liberation War - which the
Jamaat had actively opposed as a collaborator with Pakistan's
savage genocide in its Eastern wing just before the emergence
of Bangladesh.
The ruling coalition has also sought to clip the wings of
the non-government organisations, which have played a major
role in empowering and educating women in the countryside.
On the other hand, Al
Qaeda and Taliban
escapees, who have arrived in Bangladesh since the collapse
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan last year, move about
freely. The continuing and brutal countrywide military crackdown
on crime, which has prompted a reminder from the US State
Department that the Army should observe human rights, has
touched neither the Islami Chhatra Shibir, the violent student
arm of the Jamaat, which has a huge cache of arms, nor the
15,000-strong and heavily-armed Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami
(HuJI),
a terrorist organization with close links with the Al Qaeda
and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate.
Clearly, New Delhi needs to be careful. If Dhaka now appears
to be in an accommodating mood, it is because India's strong
response to the border confrontations last winter has clearly
conveyed to it that this country means business. Also, post
9/11 the global climate is increasingly hostile to fundamentalist
Islamist terrorism of which, as borne out by reports in
the Western media, Bangladesh has become a new and fertile
breeding ground. It has no doubt been trying to reach out
towards the north to China, and east to Myanmar and Thailand.
It can, however, expect little help from any of these countries,
should it go for a confrontation with India. Of them, the
most important is doubtless China. But not only have India-China
ties been improving rapidly - a process that received a
massive boost during Defence Minister George Fernandes'
recent visit to Beijing - but China can also not be indifferent
to the rise of fundamentalist Islamist terrorism in Bangladesh
and the growing presence of elements of the Al Qaeda and
Taliban there.
New Delhi must demand not only an end to assistance to insurgents
operating in its Northeast, but also the curbing of the
ISI's activities in Bangladesh and a meaningful effort to
stanch the flow of illegal migrants across the porous India-Bangladesh
borders. Further concessions on the economic front must
wait. India has conceded quite a lot already, the latest
clutch including the grant of duty free access to Bangladeshi
products bracketed in 39 tariff categories, having been
extended during Commerce Secretary level talks between the
two countries in Delhi on March 24 and 25. On the other
hand, Begum Khaleda Zia and the BNP have always resolutely
opposed New Delhi's plea for the grant of transit facilities
for goods to India's Northeast through Bangladesh and the
sale of Bangladeshi natural gas to India. During Sheikh
Hasina's tenure as Prime Minister, Bangladesh had also opposed
the purchase of electricity from India by her country, which
was then facing an acute power shortage. And, soon after
Begum Zia became Prime Minister, Bangladesh stopped importing
cotton yarn from India causing this country a revenue loss
of $ 250 million annually.
In principle, there is everything to be said for a big country
bending over backwards to accommodate a small neighbour,
but not when the latter has been as cussed as Bangladesh.
Arunachal Pradesh:
Law-makers Booked Under Anti-crime Act
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
In August
last year, Tongpong Wangham, a cabinet minister in the Northeast
Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, bordering Myanmar and
China's Tibet region, and T.L.Rajkumar, a legislator, joined
fellow law makers belonging to the ruling Congress party
to push through a rather harsh Anti-crime Bill in the State
Legislature. The Bill was easily passed in the 60-member
House, where the Congress, led by Chief Minister Mukut Mithi,
commands a strength of as many as 59 members. With the State
Governor's assent on October 3, the Arunachal Pradesh Control
of Organised Crime Act, 2002 (APCOCA),
became law. Chief Minister Mithi had stated that the new
piece of legislation would help tackle organized crime and
insurgency in his State, where as many as 14 armed groups
were operating, most of them propped up or backed by one
or the other faction of the National Socialist Council of
Nagalim (NSCN).
Less than a year later, on April 30, the Arunachal Pradesh
Police arrested Wangham and Rajkumar under APCOCA on charges
of having 'links' with the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN,
though they were freed on bail just hours later. Another
Congress legislator, Lowangcha Wanglat, is also sought by
the Police on similar charges, but is said to be outside
the country.
While the authorities themselves were tight-lipped on the
arrests, both Wangham and Rajkumar, contacted by this writer
over telephone in the State capital, Itanagar, admitted
they were arrested under APCOCA for their alleged links
with the NSCN-IM,
a charge they vehemently deny. The two veteran Congress
leaders (Rajkumar has been representing his Khonsa East
Assembly constituency in Tirap district for the past 24
years) said their names were among several other names that
figured in the diaries of two NSCN-IM cadres arrested from
Itanagar in August last year. Stating that simply finding
their names in documents recovered from the possession of
any insurgent cadre cannot be regarded as proof of their
links with that group, the two legislators repeatedly sought
to emphasise that the area they belong to (Tirap and Changlang
districts, bordering Myanmar) was in the grip of insurgents,
and that lot of things can happen due to the 'threat factor'
under the prevailing situation.
The duo were said to have been booked under Section 3 of
APCOCA, on charges of harbouring insurgent cadres. What
Wangham and Rajkumar told the special magistrate (the executive
doubles up as the judiciary in Arunachal Pradesh), who is
the Deputy Commissioner of the Papum Pare district under
which capital Itanagar falls, is not known. But what Wangham
told this writer is both interesting and significant. He
said: "I come from an insurgency affected area. We often
get written notices from the rebels as well as threatening
telephone calls. At times, we need to reply to certain notices
sent by them (rebels). On certain occasions, we being public
leaders, need to meet certain people to find out whether
those who have sent a particular notice are genuine rebels
of that particular group or not. We keep the authorities
informed of such things most of the time. Now, it is unfair
and incorrect to term these actions on our part as evidence
of links with insurgents. After all, the ground situation
needs to be understood and taken into account." Provided
a special 'Z' category security cover by the State Government,
Wangham admitted that insurgency is continuing in the two
districts despite counter-insurgency operations by security
forces, and despite the operation of laws such as the Disturbed
Areas Act and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in the
area.
If the arrests of a cabinet minister and a ruling party
legislator itself was an unprecedented development in the
annals of Indian democracy, their immediate release on bail,
and their continuance in their respective positions - particularly
Wangham continuing in his post as the minister for rural
works - is equally, if not more, intriguing. Within hours
after a Deputy Inspector General and a Superintendent of
Police arrived at Wangham's official residence in Itanagar,
completed the formality of the arrest, and asked him to
accompany them to the court, he returned after securing
bail. So did Rajkumar. "The magistrate was convinced that
we have no links with the insurgent group," Rajkumar claimed
later. Several questions need to be answered by the authorities
here: If there was evidence of Wangham's links with the
NSCN, why did Chief Minister Mithi not drop him from his
ministry as a first move before approving his arrest? How
could a district magistrate be expected to stick to the
rulebook when he or she has to double up as a judicial magistrate
and examine a cabinet minister in the State of his/her posting?
Since the minister has actually been booked under the anti-crime
law, why has he been allowed to continue as a cabinet minister?
Would it not have been proper for the Chief Minister to
drop Wangham from the ministry until he was formally given
a clean chit by the investigating authorities?
This would have been the expected course of action that
should have been followed, though this is not intended to
suggest that Wangham or Rajkumar actually do have links
with the militants. The whole episode is peculiar in the
sense that when APCOCA was brought about, human rights and
student groups in the State opposed it, saying the Congress
has put the Act in place to silence its rivals. Now we see
a Congress government picking up two of its own party legislators
under the Act. Is it possible that Chief Minister Mithi
was using the Act to quell possible dissidence within his
party? The facts are far from clear, but Mithi has to share
equally in the blame if it is eventually proved that his
party colleagues were hand-in-glove with the militants.
More than this, the near immediate grant of bail to the
duo also interesting. APCOCA is supposed to be quite a stringent
piece of legislation, widely described as a 'draconian law'
by rights groups in the State. The Act has no easy provision
for anticipatory bail, or for automatic enlargement on bail,
has punishments laid down that include three years in jail
to life imprisonment, and fines ranging from Rs 100,000
to Rs 500,000. But, by far the most controversial provision
is the modification of Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure
Code (CrPC) in terms of which an accused can be kept in
police remand for up to 30 days (from the normal 14 days
under CrPC) and in judicial remand for 90 to 180 days (from
the usual 60 days under CrPC). The Act empowers the police
to intercept telephones and other modes of communication
used by a suspect. Under the circumstances, Chief Minister
Mithi will have to do a lot of explaining regarding the
circumstances leading to the arrest of two of his colleagues
and their subsequent release on bail. Else, speculations
on the motive behind this drama will fly thick and fast,
and these can only erode the credibility of the Act itself
in the long run.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
April 28-May 4,
2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
7
|
7
|
42
|
56
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
0
|
9
|
13
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
13
|
7
|
54
|
74
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Government
assures India of curbing terrorist activities
on its soil: Bangladesh has assured
India that it would contain anti-India
activities emanating from its soil.
The assurance was reportedly given during
the Foreign Secretary-level consultations
in Dhaka on April 29, 2003, held after
a gap of nearly two-and-a-half years.
India has been asking Bangladesh to
help contain activities of terrorist
outfits operating in the North East,
including United Liberation Front of
Asom (ULFA).
Both countries have also agreed to revive
the Joint Boundary Working Groups for
speedy resolution of border demarcation
and related issues. A joint statement
issued on May 1 said, "It was also agreed
to strengthen and fully implement the
agreed procedures to stop cross-border
illegal movement of people". Regarding
the existence of terrorist camps in
Bangladesh, the statement said, "in
response to Indian concerns regarding
the activities of Indian insurgent groups
in Bangladesh, the Bangladesh side reaffirmed
the commitment not to allow its territory
to be used for any activities inimical
to the interests of India". Indian
Express, April 30, 2003;
The
Hindu, May 1, 2003.
INDIA
Prime
Minister Vajpayee announces restoration of diplomatic
ties with Pakistan on reciprocal basis: Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced on May
2, 2003, the appointment of a High Commissioner
to Pakistan on a reciprocal basis. Making a
statement in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the
Indian Parliament), he also said that civil
aviation links with Pakistan would be restored.
Later, speaking in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House),
Vajpayee stressed that this would be his third
and final effort at improving bilateral relations
with Pakistan. He said, "After two experiences,
the third round of talks will be decisive. At
least in my lifetime, this will be the last."
Elaborating on the peace offer, the premier
said, "Now this is a new beginning. We should
not forget the past but at the same time, we
should not be a slave to the past. The past
should give us inspiration and encourage us
to move forward and it should not act as shackles
to move forward. That's why we should also learn
a lesson from Lahore". He also assured the Parliament
that the unity and integrity of India would
not be compromised. "I am confident I will succeed",
he said, adding, " "Though terrorism persists
we must give peace one more chance, this bloodbath
should come to an end. Times
of India, May 3, 2003.
1200 civilians and 503 SF personnel killed
in J&K during January 2002 to March 2003:
Approximately 1,200 civilians and 503 security
force (SF) personnel were killed in terrorist
attacks in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) during January
2002 to March 2003. The Union Minister of State
for Home, Harin Pathak, stated this during Question
Hour in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of Indian
Parliament) on April 30, 2003. Besides, 1,973
terrorists were killed in the State during the
period as per information available from the
State Government, added Pathak. Indian
Express, April 30, 2003.
13 Hizb-ul-Mujahideen terrorists and six
SF personnel killed in Doda, J&K: In an
encounter at village Nalla in the Bharat area
of Doda district on April 29, 13 terrorists,
including nine foreign mercenaries, as well
as six security force (SF) personnel and a civilian
were killed, while three SF personnel and four
members of a family were injured. According
to official sources, SF personnel launched a
search operation in Nalla after securing information
that a large group of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
terrorists were holding a meeting in four houses
in the area in connection with the 'handing
over of charge' by Hizb 'area commander' Majid
Hussain, who had completed his two year 'tenure'
in the district. As the SFs were in the process
of surrounding the houses, the terrorists commenced
firing with Rocket Projectile Guns (RPG) and
AK-47 rifles. In the ensuing encounter, all
13 terrorists, including the 'area commander'
were killed. Daily
Excelsior, April 30, 2003.
External forces responsible for internal
security problems, says Union Home Ministry
annual report: The annual report of the
Union Home Ministry for the year 2002-2003,
which was released on April 28, 2003, has indicated
that the country was overwhelmed with internal
security problems generated from outside. The
report also pointed out that terrorism in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) and in the northeast as well
as violence by left-wing extremists in the States
of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Madhya Pradesh and Orissa were the areas of
concern. It also further stated that approximately
60 to 70 per cent of terrorists operating in
J&K are from outside, "under the direct control
of Inter Service Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's
external intelligence agency'' with local people
"playing the role of porters and guides.'' The
report also pointed out that Pakistan was "making
efforts to revive terrorism in Punjab in a big
way and the ISI has assured its commitment to
the revival of Khalistan movement.'' The
Hindu, April 29, 2003.
NEPAL
USA
designates Maoist insurgents as terrorists:
The United States on April 30, 2003, listed
the Nepal Communist Party-Maoist, (NCP-M)
among the 38 groups categorised as "other terrorist
organisations". According to the US Administration,
Nepal is being used as a transit point by terrorists
who take advantage of its poor economic status
and the weak security arrangements along its
porous border. The
Hindu, May 2, 2003.
PAKISTAN
USA designates
Al Badr, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba
as terrorist organisations: The United States on April 30,
2003, added 11 Islamist organizations to its lists of "terrorist
groups". The new second tier list of 38 "other terrorist organisations"
issued by the State Department acts as a watch list for the
first-tier list of "foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs)"
on which the United States imposes sanctions. Among those included
in the new list were Al
Badr, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM),
which are active in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP),
a Sunni sectarian group in Pakistan. Daily
Times, May 1, 2003.
11 Al Qaeda suspects arrested in Karachi: 11 Al
Qaeda suspects, including three Arabs, were arrested
from different parts of Karachi on April 30, 2003. An unnamed
official was quoted as saying that the arrested men were reportedly
planning to attack the US Consulate, American establishments
and government installations. Meanwhile, an Interior Ministry
statement issued from Islamabad said "six suspects have been
arrested which include Waleed Muhammad Bin Attash alias Khalid
Al-Attash, a Yemeni national, who is suspected to be involved
in the US Ship Cole incident." According to the statement, some
200 detonators, one wrist watch timer switch, five touch switches,
capacitors of various types, 20 diodes, 46 transmitters, 20
variable controls, Kalashnikovs, hand grenades, pistols, ammunition
and a truck load of sulphur, gunpowder and urea bags were recovered.
Jang,
May 1, 2003.
Prime Minister Jamali offers to visit India for dialogue:
Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali on April 28, 2003,
telephoned Indian Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee and offered to
visit India for holding a dialogue. During his conversation
with his Indian counterpart, Jamali reportedly expressed his
desire for holding a meaningful dialogue with New Delhi at any
level. Both the premiers also reportedly exchanged views on
exploring ways and means with regard to economic, cultural and
sports arenas. Prime Minister Jamali also extended an invitation
to Vajpayee to visit Pakistan at the latter's convenience. Jang,
April 29, 2003.
SRI LANKA
LTTE has not
renounced terrorism, says US State Department: The US State
Department's report on Global Terrorism released on April 30,
2003, has stated that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
has not renounced terrorism and continues to smuggle weapons
and indulge in forcible recruitment, including the recruitment
of children. The report further said that the group's recent
statements, however, give reason to hope that it intends to
transform itself into a 'legitimate' political entity. The US
also continues to designate the LTTE as a "foreign terrorist
organisation", the report added. Daily
News, May 2, 2003.
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The South
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