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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 10, September 23, 2002
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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J&K Elections 2002 - Phase 1: Voter
turnout (in %)
Constituency |
2002*
|
1996
|
1987
|
1983
|
1977
|
Karnah |
70.98
|
66.07
|
77.01
|
74.68
|
67.94
|
Kupwara |
54.84
|
25.97
|
69.43
|
64.57
|
62.69
|
Handwara |
50.64
|
34.82
|
82.19
|
76.85
|
83.41
|
Langate |
53.63
|
42.67
|
80.15
|
76.72
|
74.63
|
Uri |
66.56
|
70.74
|
83.42
|
78.08
|
68.17
|
Rafiabad |
52.39
|
44.03
|
77.31
|
77
|
72.21
|
Sopore |
7.83
|
38.36
|
84.74
|
83.57
|
85.89
|
Gurez |
76.7
|
76.14
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
Bandipora |
31.22
|
50.58
|
76.66
|
78.95
|
68.45
|
Sonawari |
55.85
|
60.94
|
76.98
|
78.47
|
84.98
|
Sangrama |
24.75
|
60.26
|
74.5
|
78.16
|
73.88
|
Baramulla |
24.06
|
37.63
|
77.35
|
74.13
|
66.78
|
Gulmarg |
50.18
|
65.56
|
78.95
|
72.53
|
67.2
|
Pattan |
55.92
|
71.38
|
82.03
|
78.52
|
87.36
|
Kargil |
74.89
|
80.54
|
78.64
|
76.8
|
72.86
|
Zanskar |
78.74
|
79.92
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
Nowshera |
58.19
|
62.74
|
68.54
|
65.39
|
60.01
|
Darhal |
46.59
|
55.45
|
75.78
|
68.84
|
46.89
|
Rojouri |
27.16
|
65.47
|
82.74
|
70.64
|
59.61
|
Kalakote |
50.49
|
55.02
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
Surankote |
35
|
74.26
|
80.35
|
71.24
|
68.84
|
Mendhar |
60.65
|
68.59
|
80.64
|
77.51
|
65.23
|
Poonch-Haveli |
65.6
|
67
|
67.84
|
66.22
|
48.26
|
*
Provisional figures, subject to final verification by
the Election Commission of India.
Source: Office of the Chief Electoral Officer,
Srinagar.
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J&K
Elections: Round One to Democracy
Guest Writer:
Praveen Swami, in Srinagar
Chief of Bureau, Mumbai, Frontline
"Respected
President, Sumo [jeep] Service, Bandipora: As-salaam
alaikum. You are hereby informed through this pamphlet
that you have provided vehicles to the contestants for
holding rallies during the so-called elections…. You are
well aware of the sacrifices of the people and are bargaining
with the blood of martyrs. You are therefore warned to
desist from such activities. Obey, [baaz aa jao]
or we or we will blow up both the vehicles and the traitors
in them."
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Bandipora District Commander, Jamaat-ul-Mujaheddin, code-name
'K.K.', August 28, 2002. |
34 political
activists have been murdered in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) in the
four weeks since elections were announced there on August 22,
2002. This macabre roll call builds on the 40 who had been assassinated
within the current year, before that date. 168 civilians have
died in terrorist attacks from the beginning of August to September
22, and another 179 have been injured. The figures continue
to rise day by day, at times, hour upon hour.
And yet, something quite remarkable is underway in Jammu & Kashmir.
Despite sustained assaults by Pakistan-based terrorist groups
of the Islamic Right, continued cross-border terrorism, and
the wholesale intimidation of voters, democracy is managing,
almost miraculously, to flourish. Voter turnout in the first
round of the four-phase elections in the state, held in the
hard-hit districts of north Kashmir and western Jammu, has exceeded
the expectations of even the most incurable optimists. More
important, there is every reason to believe that the Assembly
elected to office in October will be the most widely representative
the State has seen.
Media attention had, prior to the first round of voting, been
obsessively focussed on the twin issues of terrorist coercion,
and alleged state counter-coercion, of voters. The elections
had, sadly, been reduced to something of a cricket match, with
India batting, Pakistan bowling, and the people of Jammu & Kashmir
reduced to obscure figures in the outfield waiting for the ball
to come their way. In fact, the actual election process has
seen a plethora of complex political themes play themselves
out, ranging from purely local concerns of governance and development,
to meta-issues of the State's political future.
Patterns of voter turnout point to the highly varied processes
that were in operation during the voting on September 16. In
areas like Kupwara and Handwara, where the ruling National Conference
(NC) was confronted by credible opposition figures, turnout
was considerably higher than in 1996 [Table].
This level of voter participation took place, incredibly, despite
the assassination of State Law Minister, Mushtaq Ahmad Lone,
in adjoining Lolab on September 11. On the other hand, Sopore,
with a long history of Jamaat-e-Islami domination, registered
an extremely low voter turnout - a fact that should have made
journalists reporting allegations that the Army was forcing
people to vote bring some scepticism to bear on their informants'
claims. High turnouts were also recorded in one-horse NC pocket
boroughs like Uri and Gurez. A complex of local factors - political
competition, ideological affiliation, and candidate credibility,
thus influenced the decision of voters to participate in the
polling exercise.
Little attention has been paid to the fact that this was a fundamentally
more inclusive election, despite its boycott by secessionist
formations. The participation of candidates covertly-backed
by the secessionist People's Conference has been much noted,
but not, for example, the participation of Jamaat-e-Islami rebels
led by Khaliq Haneef. 18 of 105 candidates in the first phase
were one-time terrorists, individuals believed by the State
police to have current links with terrorist organisations, or
people with past links with terrorists or current secessionist
groups. It is rumoured that Mushtaq Lone's assassination was
itself the consequence of his recruiting the support of a local
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
commander, Asad Malik, which incensed the mainly Pakistan-national
Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Since this kind of participation took place in spite of terrorist
fiat against the election, it would be plausible to suggest
that it was the outcome of grassroots support for participation
in the process of democratic conflict-resolution.
Terrorist activity did, however, succeed in reducing turnout
sharply in some areas, like Rajouri and Poonch. An engagement
between troops and terrorists claimed the lives of five Lashkar-e-Toiba
cadre near Surankote even while voting was underway. Terrorist
groups cordoned off several of the more remote villages of the
region, while 107-milimetre rockets were fired at Thanamandi
and Surankote. Poonch and Rajouri saw some of the worst pre-election
violence, exceeding in scale even the carnage in north Kashmir.
In the week before polling, influential NC leaders Qazi Mohammad
Riaz was shot dead at his home near the Shahdara Sharif shrine
near Thanamandi in Poonch. Another of his party colleagues was
killed at Mendhar, in Rajouri. The worst pre-election attack
came on September 11, when a rally being addressed by All India
Congress Committee (I) general secretary Ambika Soni and State
Congress (I) president Ghulam Nabi Azad was attacked at Surankote
city. Four terrorists in army uniforms opened fire on the rally
from nearby maize-fields, killing ten security personnel and
two civilians, one of them just 14 years old. Two terrorists
were killed and twenty-two persons injured in this incident.
Continuing violence makes it clear that the election process
in itself isn't going to 'solve the Kashmir problem'. It has,
however, opened up space for the people of J&K to address some
of the more enduring problems of the State - of livelihood,
education, health, infrastructure, the nuts-and-bolts issues
of everyday life. Most importantly, if observers are correct,
the election results will signal to Jammu & Kashmir's ruling
party, that poor governance and corruption will be punished
by voters. That too, may secure very real gains for ordinary
people.
Whether or not the next six years will be less bloody than the
last six, however, will depend on the extent to which Pakistan
can be prevailed upon to turn the tap off on cross border terrorism.
Peace
Talks: The Transformation of Terror?
Guest Writer:
Dr. Rohan Gunaratna
Senior Fellow, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence, United Kingdom
The Government
of Sri Lanka-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
peace talks that began in Thailand on September 16, 2002,
are a first step in a process that is expected to culminate
either in the restoration of a permanent peace or two separate
nation-states on the island of Sri Lanka. In the immediate
aftermath of 9-11, the LTTE embarked on a sustained dialogue
for peace to evade further blacklisting as a terrorist group
by governments worldwide. The LTTE has been proscribed,
designated or banned as a terrorist group by a number of
governments - India, Malaysia, USA, Canada, UK, Australia
- countries where the LTTE has significant terrorist infrastructure
for disseminating propaganda, raising funds, procuring and
shipping supplies to support their terrorist campaign in
Sri Lanka.
Stating that it will damage the on-going peace process,
LTTE propagandists have been urging the European governments
and New Zealand not to include them in their terrorist lists.
As the LTTE operates through community organisations and
also apply pressure on host politicians using significant
constituency pressure, some governments have responded to
the LTTE plea. After getting the LTTE de-proscribed in Sri
Lanka, the current LTTE strategy is to get the foreign governments
to take them off their terrorist lists as well. This is
partly why the most prominent members of the LTTE peace
delegation are from overseas - Anne and Anton Stanislaus
Balasingham from the UK; V. Rudrakumaran from the US and
Jay Maheswaran from Australia, all heads and deputy heads,
if not prominent office bearers of the LTTE, in countries
where the LTTE has been blacklisted.
The LTTE is one of the most successful terrorist groups
in the world. The LTTE leadership, headed by Velupillai
Prabhakaran, is confident that it is only a question of
time before it achieves a military victory against the Sri
Lankan security forces in the northeast. However, the LTTE
is aware that it desperately needs to restore the international
legitimacy it has lost in over a quarter of a century of
unbridled terrorism since Prabhakaran killed Alfred Duraiappah,
the then Tamil mayor of Jaffna, in 1975. The LTTE has consequently
been exerting efforts to move away from terrorism (targeting
civilians) and building guerrilla capabilities (targeting
security force personnel), especially after it suicide-bombed
Sri Lanka's World Trade Centre twin towers in January 1996.
Even its leader 'Chairman Prabhakaran', also self-styled
as 'the national leader of the Eelam Tamils', has changed
his macho appearances in Army fatigues, holding a firearm,
into a statesmanlike figure in a safari suit. In trying
to change their leader's image of a 'ruthless megalomaniac'
or as 'Asia's master of terror' into a Sri Lankan Nelson
Mandela, the LTTE web sites quotes Nelson Mandella and Mahatma
Gandhi.
The LTTE realises that India still holds the key to a durable
peace in Sri Lanka, and India was the LTTE's first choice
of the venue for the peace talks. The LTTE requested Norwegian
mediators to lobby New Delhi to lift its proscription against
the group, and sought to re-establish a strategic support
base in Tamil Nadu. The Indian government, however, saw
through the LTTE intention and opposed the re-use of Indian
soil by the LTTE. Today, New Delhi holds the LTTE leadership
responsible for the suicide assassination of former Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the death of 1,555, and injury
of some 3,000 Indian peacekeepers in Sri Lanka between 1987
and 1990. Having aided the LTTE from 1983-1987 and subsequently
burnt its fingers, India is also aware that the LTTE has
not truly changed its spots. India's vast intelligence community
has been monitoring the LTTE at the same level that it monitors
other terrorist groups that threaten India. Unlike the Sri
Lankan intelligence service that was politicised after Mrs.
Chandrika Kumaratunge took to office in 1994, both India's
foreign and domestic security services have been monitoring
the LTTE's banking, procurement and shipping network. LTTE's
pronouncements that it wishes to abandon violence and enter
mainstream politics are inconsistent with the findings of
the Indian services that the LTTE is continuing to build
a significant military capability.
Thailand has been a safe haven for the LTTE after its head
of banking, procurement and shipping, Tharmalingam Shanmugam
Kumaran alias Kumaran Pathmanathan, moved out of neighbouring
Malaysia after the Malaysian Special Branch detected and
seized an LTTE ship in 1990. In addition to setting up a
number of lucrative businesses, the LTTE established a state-of-the-art
boatyard that manufactured a dozen different boats, including
a mini-submarine for debussing divers. As LTTE attack crafts
and suicide boats were getting hit in surface battles with
the navy that had managed to procure fast craft and long
range guns, the LTTE wished to improve their capability
by sneaking in divers armed with explosive devices into
Sri Lankan ports. The Thai authorities detected the LTTE
operation in Pukhet, but since it was not an offence to
build a submarine in Thailand, the Thai authorities released
the head of the boatyard, a Sri Lankan Tamil refugee, who
then returned to Norway. For a long time, both the Indian
and Sri Lankan intelligence communities have been aware
of LTTE activities in Thailand especially its procurement
and shipping activities. For instance, the LTTE ship Horizon
(Julex Comex 3) detected and destroyed in a joint Indian
Sri Lankan operation originated from Thailand. Similarly,
Cholakeri, a ship with a wooden hull transporting weapons
to Sri Lanka, sank off the coast of Thailand due to excessive
weight. Foreign intelligence services have reported that
the LTTE works with corrupt politicians and military officers
in the service of the Thai government who protect its operations.
The choice of Thailand as the venue for talks, consequently,
was no surprise.
What is important is for Norway, Sri Lanka, and other governments
with an interest in peace in Sri Lanka, is to grasp this
opportunity to facilitate LTTE's entry into the political
mainstream. If sufficient political, military and economic
pressure is applied on the LTTE, it can be made to abandon
its avowed goal of an independent mono-ethnic Tamil State.
Since early 2002, there has been a failure on the part of
Norway and others to move the LTTE in the direction of peace.
On the contrary, the LTTE has strengthened itself militarily,
consolidated itself politically and is planning to harness
the economic aid that is likely to come its way in the next
few months.
As long as a terrorist group is unwilling to compromise
on fundamental issues, a peace process would prove waste
of time and energy, unless the government itself needs time
to rebuilt its economy and its security forces. In the current
Sri Lankan context, there is no evidence of the government
restructuring, reorienting or strengthening its military.
On the contrary, there is evidence of a military build-up
by the LTTE, not only in terms of continuous recruitment
(including forcible recruitment), procurement of supplies
overseas, and training of cadres and fund raising (even
by extortion), but also of a bid to go high-tech, procuring
the services of a computer engineer to develop a computer
guided integrated air defence system and underwater weapons
to deter and cripple the Sri Lanka navy.
Sri Lanka's capability not only to fight terrorism but also
to defend itself against the terrorist threat has suffered
gravely in the recent past. In their attempts to survive,
most Sri Lankan leaders have made the ethnic conflict a
political football. Instead of strengthening the hand of,
and working together with, the six Tamils groups that joined
the political process in 1987, they looked to the LTTE that
remained committed to establishing an independent mono-ethnic
Tamil state.
By politicising the military and the intelligence community,
past governments emasculated these national institutions
and rendered them impotent. They dispatched the best military
generals as ambassadors and high commissioners, retaining
weak yes-men around them. Appointments and promotions were
not on merit, ability and performance, but on personal and
party loyalty. Sri Lanka must build a professional military
with at least 40 per cent elite troops (commandos, special
forces, etc.), as its regular soldiers with six months training
cannot fight the LTTE effectively. In addition to inducting
fresh blood and training, Sri Lanka has no option but to
professionalise its intelligence services - the eyes and
ears of the state. A well-trained (and retrained) and well-led
military is a credible threat to the LTTE, as opposed to
a numerically large military. Similarly, an intelligence
community that can penetrate the terrorist group and know
its inner workings is an asset, both in war and peace. Sri
Lanka cannot be an exception to how other governments with
similar threats manage their business.
The current international climate is likely to restrain
the LTTE from returning to violence in the short term. Since
9-11, along with several other groups, the international
spotlight has been on the LTTE, one of the world's most
ruthless terrorist groups. The threat of further international
isolation especially the likelihood of the US and other
countries stepping up assistance to the Sri Lankan government
in the event the group returns to violence, is understood
by the LTTE. The post-9-11 policy response of the international
community to criminalise and prosecute terrorist groups
has placed all terrorist front, cover and sympathetic organisations,
including the LTTE, under significant pressure worldwide.
Nonetheless, all terrorist groups are creating new front,
cover and sympathetic organisations periodically, in order
to disseminate propaganda, raise funds, procure and ship
supplies. The international community needs to move a step
further and develop updated secondary lists that identify,
name, and act against individuals and organisations supporting
terrorism and terrorist groups. This is a labour intensive
task requiring close cooperation and coordination between
host and parent states. As a learning organisation, the
LTTE has adapted to the international threat by seeking
to operate below the intelligence radar screen and becoming
more invisible. For instance, its procurement cells are
time-sensitive where it would establish a cell in Europe
for a few weeks, procure supplies and then dissolve the
cell. Similarly, LTTE today prefers to use trawlers that
hug the coast, rather than large cargo ships it used in
the 1980s and 1990s.
Like Al
Qaeda, the LTTE is an international organisation.
When responding to an international organisation, an international
response is essential. It was US-UK cooperation against
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) raising funds
and procuring technologies from the US that finally forced
PIRA to abandon violence and enter the political mainstream
in the UK. Likewise, close cooperation between Sri Lankan
and other host security and intelligence agencies aimed
at disrupting LTTE banking, procurement and shipping networks
are likely to pressurise the LTTE to accept a negotiated
political settlement. The only way the LTTE can be made
to commit to a permanent peace is by making it realise that
they have no option but to go down this road. If continuous
international and domestic pressure is not applied on the
LTTE to dismantle their terrorist support infrastructure,
the group is likely to mark time until the international
focus shift away from the LTTE, and then recommence its
campaign.
There are other issues that must be addressed principally
in the peace process. The most important is the core problems
of linking devolution to decommissioning, and not the peripheral
problems of development aid. As in the past, the LTTE is
likely to use development aid to strengthen itself politically,
economically and militarily, and to resume the fighting
in time. Sri Lankan and Norwegian leaders must develop a
long-range view of the problem - otherwise they are likely
to be entrapped by the LTTE. What is happening today is
consistent with the past LTTE model of political behaviour,
with the LTTE extracting the maximum by deception and deceit.
Relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction are important,
but unless core issues are not resolved, the patterns of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are likely to repeat themselves
in Sri Lanka. At the moment, all the actors are wallowing
on the periphery, leaving the centre untouched.
As a facilitator, Norway wishes well for the people of Sri
Lanka. However, if permanent peace is to return, Norway
must create a strategic umbrella of states that will guarantee
the peace process. Norway itself has no political, economic
or military strength to reinforce an agreement between the
government and the LTTE. India, USA, and Europe - countries
that have significant influence in Sri Lanka both with the
government and the LTTE - must be part of this strategic
umbrella. As the Norway-brokered Israeli-Palestinian Oslo
Accords demonstrate, even if a strategic umbrella is created,
it is no guarantee that peace will prevail. That, unfortunately,
is the best one can hope for within the context of current
attempts to establish a permanent peace in Sri Lanka.
Militant
Camps: Ending a Foreign Scourge
Guest
Writer: Palden Tshering
Web Editor, KUENSEL Online
What
has been the result of the agreement between the Royal
Government of Bhutan and the United Liberation Front
of Asom (ULFA)
leaders last year for a phased removal of militant
camps from Bhutanese soil? If the militants had kept
their word, it would indicate the wisdom of the strategy
of dialogue. But if the ULFA had failed to close down
the four camps as agreed, and reduced their strength
in the remaining five camps, the time for peaceful
negotiations is over.
There are disturbing indications that promises may
not have been kept. Between February 18 and 22, 2002,
10 heavily armed ULFA militants had entered Dagana
through the jungles of Sarpang and Tsirang, followed
by groups of four and 16 militants a few weeks later.
The presence of armed militants was also reported
in Tsirang, between February 16 and April 29, 2002.
Does this mean that the militants had betrayed their
written agreement with the government?
Compounding the issue, reports have also come in from
Chukha that the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)
and Bodo militants (the National Democratic Front
of Boroland, NDFB)
have been seen moving in areas under Chukha Dzongkhag,
posing a serious threat to the national power projects.
Although the Government has long been aware of the
close links between the ULFA and the KLO, it came
to know of the existence of KLO camps within Bhutanese
territory only recently.
Home Minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho, confirmed
that, as of December 31, 2001, the ULFA had indeed
closed down the four camps it had agreed to: Gobarkonda,
Nangri, Deori and the Military Training Centre in
Martshala Geog. The campsites had been subsequently
visited by Bhutanese military and civil authorities
and all the camps were burnt down to ensure that they
would not be used again.
"The closure of the four ULFA camps as per the agreed
minutes of June, 2001, without firing a single shot
and without the loss of a single life, is a small
step towards a peaceful solution of the presence of
these armed foreign militants in our territory," the
Home Minister said.
Although only five camps should be left, it was later
discovered that the ULFA had opened a new camp on
a mountain ridge above the Samdrup Jongkhar - Trashigang
highway. As a result, the ULFA currently has six camps
within Bhutan.
The Home Minister also indicated that it was difficult
to confirm whether militants from the camps that had
closed down had left Bhutan. He stated that the ULFA
leaders themselves had conceded that most of the men
and materials could not be taken out of Bhutan in
time because the Indian Army had sealed the Indo-Bhutan
border. Thus, he added, "there is also every possibility
that the ULFA may not have complied with the second
clause of the agreed minutes, to reduce the strength
of their cadres in their remaining five camps."
Meanwhile, the NDFB had established three main camps
and four mobile camps between Lhamoizingkha and Daifam,
even as the new group from the Indian State of West
Bengal, the KLO, had set up two camps, one under Bhangtar
Dungkhag and another near Piping under Lhamoizingkha
Dungkhag.
Assamese militants are known to have first infiltrated
into Bhutan in 1990 and 1991, after the Indian army
launched a major military offensive against them in
Assam.
With nowhere to turn to, they found the 266-kilometre
Bhutan border convenient, because of its proximity
with Assam; the dense forests and rugged hills were
ideal for guerrilla warfare.
Initially, Bhutanese villagers and foresters mistook
them for poachers and timber smugglers. It was only
in 1994 that the government came to know that militants
had set up camps in Bhutan.
Bhutan is faced with the dilemma of strained relations
with a good neighbour and the rising Indian pressure
urging the Bhutanese government to flush out the militants.
On the other hand, there are strong apprehensions
that if the Bhutanese forces attempted to purge the
camps through military means and failed, the repercussions
would be immense, eventually leading to a lengthy
and destabilizing conflict. After all, for how long
have the battle-hardened Indian forces been fighting
the ULFA and other militant groups in the Northeast,
with no end in sight?
When the ULFA camps were discovered by Bhutan, the
country did not even have a single Army camp along
the Assam-Bhutan border. Bhutanese have also been
targeted by what is thought to be militant violence.
In 1997, a police station in Nganglam, well inside
the border town of Bhutan, was attacked and four policemen
were killed. In 1998, a senior army officer and his
convoy was ambushed in Patshala in Assam. Again, in
December 2000, 15 people were brutally murdered and
many more injured; and in August 2002, five Bhutanese
were killed, all of them along the Assam highway.
There was no provocation or armed response from the
Bhutanese side to these terrorist attacks; the identity
of the terrorists is still in question.
There was a strong feeling in the public mind that
India's role in these incidents had to be questioned.
While Bhutanese vehicles had been attacked and innocent
travellers killed, there had not been a single militant
attack on buses operated on the same route by Indian
operators, although many Bhutanese travellers were
using these buses. The people of Bhutan wanted answers
but the government was unable to respond, indicating
that it was unable to identify whether the incidents
were executed by Assamese militants, or by other parties
interested in provoking a response from Bhutan.
The Bhutanese people and the National Assembly, two
years ago, were in agreement that steps had to be
taken to address the problem of the militant camps.
A four-pronged approach was agreed upon: Peaceful
dialogue; Cutting off ration supplies to camps; Prosecuting
and punishing people assisting militants; Military
action. After exhausting the first three options,
military action was left; for the first time in a
century, the people and their government were willing
to shed blood. But a breakthrough occurred, and a
comprehensive strategy was announced for the ULFA
and Bodo militants in 2001, after the Home Minister,
on the directives of His Majesty the King, had held
five rounds of talks with the militant leaders in
1998,1999, 2000 and 2001. An agreement was eventually
signed in June 2001, between the Government and the
militants on three points:
-
The
ULFA will remove four of their nine camps in Bhutan
by December 2001.
-
They
will also reduce the strength of their cadres
in the remaining five camps.
-
Following
the implementation of this agreement within December
2001, the government and the ULFA will meet again
to find a solution to the five remaining ULFA
camps in Bhutan.
Although the ULFA
has reduced the number of its camps, its strength
in Bhutan in terms of men and material is difficult
to assess. Meanwhile, after two rounds of meetings
with the NDFB, in October 2000, and May 2001, including
talks with its president D. R. Nabla @ Ranjan Daimary,
no more negotiations could be held with this militant
group. However, the NDFB
militants had also been told to remove their camps
from Bhutanese territory as soon as possible. The
discovery of the third militant outfit, the KLO
from West Bengal, further complicates the whole
issue of the presence of armed foreign militants
in Bhutan. Their continued operation from Bhutanese
soil constitutes a grave threat to Bhutan's national
security and sovereignty.
The Government has now articulated a new three-pronged
strategy to address the problem:
-
To hold talks with the chairman and the military
commander of ULFA together because, in the past,
it was on the pretext of the absence of one or
the other that no final decisions could be taken
during the meetings.
-
The
government would not agree to any more meetings
on the reduction of camps but would only discuss
the closure of the main camp, which served as
their headquarters. ·
-
If
the leaders of the ULFA refused to relocate their
headquarters, then it will be clear to the government
and people of Bhutan that the ULFA has no intention
of leaving Bhutanese territory and therefore there
would be no other option but to evict them physically.
The
country now awaits a meeting with the ULFA chairman
and military commander. What will be the result? Will
an armed response be necessary? Or will the hopes
of the people become a reality: that a peaceful solution,
though dialogue, goodwill and mutual respect, will
end the activity of foreign militants in the Land
of the Thunder Dragon.
|
Weekly Fatalities:
Major conflicts in South Asia
September 16-22,
2002
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA |
17
|
41
|
58
|
116
|
Assam |
1
|
3
|
7
|
11
|
Jammu & Kashmir |
14
|
27
|
44
|
85
|
Left-wing extremism |
2
|
11
|
4
|
17
|
Tripura |
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
BANGLADESH |
4
|
0
|
3
|
7
|
NEPAL |
3
|
10
|
66
|
79
|
PAKISTAN |
0
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Left-wing extremists kill four
police personnel in Sirajganj district:
In an attack on a police camp under Belkuchi Upazila (sub-division),
Sirajganj district, approximately 40 left-wing extremists of the
outlawed Purba Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), commonly known
as Sarbahara Party, killed at least four police personnel and
injured nine others on September 16, 2002. They also looted 12
firearms and an unspecified quantity of ammunition. Dailystar
News, September 17, 2002.
INDIA
Mafia don Abu
Salem arrested in Portugal: Abu Salem, one of India's most
wanted criminals and an accused in the 1993-Mumbai serial bomb
blasts case, was arrested in the Portuguese capital of Lisbon
by the Interpol on September 18, 2002. Wanted in several cases
of murder, extortion and abduction, Salem was arrested along with
his associate Monica Bedi. He has been detained because of an
Interpol notice in connection with the 1993 Mumbai serial bomb
blasts. Salem was being trailed by the FBI and is believed to
be linked with Al Qaeda's financial operations. The
Hindu, September 23, 2002; Hindustan
Times, September 21, 2002.
MCC Naxalites kill six persons in Jharkhand: Left-wing
extremists - Naxalites - of the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)
killed six persons and injured many others in a forest between
Asnachua and Bokhra villages in Hazaribagh district, Jharkhand,
on September 20, 2002. Outlook,
September 21, 2002.
First phase of J&K elections positive, says US Ambassador Blackwill:
The United States Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, said
on September 19, 2002, that the first phase of Assembly elections
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) had been 'very positive' and the 48
per cent turnout was 'remarkable'. Condemning terrorist violence
in J&K, Blackwill reportedly said that infiltration across the
Line of Control (LoC) was down in June and July, but since the
end of July it had increased and had been up in August and September.
The
Hindu, September 20, 2002.
Six SF personnel among 13 persons killed in Manjakote, J&K:
Six security force (SF) personnel, three terrorists and four civilians
were killed at Katarmal village in Manjakote block, on September
18, 2002. Reports indicated that a group of 20 to 25 infiltrators
had initially taken shelter in three houses, but later escaped
to the Katarmal forests after SFs commenced cordon and search
operations. As the SFs headed for Katarmal forests, they were
attacked by the terrorists, and in the ensuing encounter two terrorists
and an SF person were killed. Later, in a resumed encounter, five
more SF personnel including, a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO),
and a terrorist were killed. While two SF personnel were injured
in this encounter, four civilians are reported to have been killed
in the cross fire. Daily
Excelsior, September 19, 2002.
Higher voter turnout expected in remaining phases of J&K poll,
says Premier Vajpayee: Speaking to the media in New Delhi
on September 17, 2002, on his return after a week-long visit to
the United States, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said the
first phase of Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) were
according to "our expectations". He expressed confidence that
voter turnout would increase in the remaining three phases. He
said, "It is a big thing… It is clear the people of Jammu and
Kashmir want peace and are keen to live in harmony". Times
of India, September 18, 2002.
Pakistan's comments on J&K elections false, says External Affairs
Ministry: India, on September 18, 2002, dismissed as false,
Pakistan's charges that the first phase of State Assembly elections
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) was a 'sham', saying it showed how
'completely isolated' Pakistan has become on the issue. The External
Affairs Ministry spokesperson added that the whole world has welcomed
the manner in which the first phase has been conducted, and that
the very satisfactory voter-turnout was an expression of faith
in the democratic process and the rejection by the people of J&K
of terrorism, violence and intimidation. Press
Trust of India, September 18, 2002.
PAKISTAN
9/11 suspect
Ramzi Binalshibh's associate identified as Daniel Pearl's killer:
An Al Qaeda terrorist arrested along with 9/11 suspect Ramzi
Binalshibh has been identified as one of the killers of US journalist
Daniel Pearl, an unnamed senior police official said in Karachi
on September 17, 2002. The identification was reportedly made
by Fazal Karim, a Pakistani, detained but not charged in the abduction-cum-murder
of Pearl. The official refused to identify the alleged Pearl-killer
by name, but added that he was not among the five persons, including
Binalshibh, who were handed over to US authorities on September
16 and flown out of Pakistan. Jang,
September 18, 2002.
9/11 suspect Ramzi Binalshibh and four others flown out of
Pakistan: Pakistan, on September 16, 2002, handed over 9/11
suspect and key Al Qaeda terrorist Ramzi Binalshibh and four others
to US custody and they have been flown out of the country. "Five
people have been handed over to US custody, Ramzi [is] amongst
them… I have no information on where they were taken," Major-General
Rashid Qureshi, military regime spokesperson said. Binalshibh
was reportedly arrested after an encounter in Karachi on September
11. Jang,
September 17, 2002.
SRI LANKA
Government-LTTE
talks conclude; More rounds to follow: The Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) announced on September 18, 2002, at the
now concluded first round of peace talks with the Sri Lankan government,
at Sattahip, Thailand, that it was not demanding a separate state
- Eelam. In a statement approved by the government and the LTTE
and released by Norwegian facilitators, LTTE chief negotiator
Anton Balasingham said homeland and self-determination do not
mean a separate state but "self determination involves substantial
autonomy in the historical areas where we live". The government
delegation head and Cabinet Minister G.L. Peiris, commenting on
the LTTE-stand, said, "their aspirations can be fulfilled within
one country if we set about it in the proper way." The LTTE, however,
stated that it would not disarm its cadres. Both the parties resolved
to constitute two joint-committees to further strengthen the permanent
truce arrived at in February 2002, and to implement humanitarian
and reconstruction activities. Furthermore, they agreed to hold
three more rounds of talks between October 31 and November 3,
2002; December 2 and December 5, 2002; and January 6 and January
9, 2003. (Official
website of the Secretariat for Coordination of Peace Process,
Government of Sri Lanka, Colombo).
|
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