While the government boasts of its painfully modest attainments over the past decade, the reality is that our responses can only be measured by general police and intelligence capabilities and capacities – not by the theatre of small special units strutting about, all menacingly dressed in black, but arriving on the scene of an attack hours after it has been initiated.
The problem with counter-terrorism (CT) in India is the glacial pace of an early 20th century structure of governance trying to cope with an exponentially accelerating 21st century problem. Much has been done in the wake of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks of 2008 – but all that has been done falls way short of what was envisaged; and what was envisaged was a mere shadow of what was needed. Crucially, where the prevailing politics of fear and polarisation enormously emphasises the threat of terrorism despite a dramatic diminution in its manifestations within India, there is little willingness to invest in the security apparatus at a scale commensurate even with realistic projections of the existing and potential threat.
The manifestation of the terrorist threat has been moderated by a range of factors – both external and internal – but India’s vulnerabilities remain undiminished. Indeed, given the rapid proliferation of a range of lethal and dual-use technologies, these vulnerabilities are rapidly augmenting without any corresponding expansion of capacities. The attacks on a police station in Gurdaspur (2015) and an air force station in Pathankot (2016) demonstrate persistent conventional vulnerabilities. Worse, in view of the fact that the 26/11 attacks came from the sea, it is useful to note that at least four unauthorised large vessels have floated in or docked, unhindered, on Mumbai’s coastline since 2011, with all ‘augmented’ security systems failing to respond till well after the events. The last of these incidents was on April 9, 2017, when a Russian yacht dropped anchor near the iconic Gateway of India.
It is not possible to document the innumerable gaps in the CT system here, but a few highlights are useful. At the most basic level, the police population ratio has crept up from 128 per 100,000 in 2008 to 137 in 2015, and 151 in 2016, and is yet nowhere near what is thought to be an acceptable figure even for effective ‘peacetime’ policing.
The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS) hardware and software configurations are now approaching obsolescence, but the system is yet to provide field units the real-time access to its still incomplete databases that was the project’s essential mandate, and that would have brought it to a functional level that had been established in the United States in 1967. The Natgrid project, which was to link 21 existing and critical databases, has stalled.
As in the past, there have been several significant CT intelligence successes, and there have been fitful increments in technical capabilities and capacities, particularly including the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and its network of State MACs, as well as the National Technical Research Organisation. However, the manpower at the Research & Analysis Wing remains stagnant at an estimated under 10,000; and at the Intelligence Bureau at about 19,000, not significantly higher than the levels that prevailed in 2008, despite urgent and felt needs for a dramatic augmentation.
There has been significant investment – overwhelmingly by the Centre – in augmenting the coastal security infrastructure. But, for effective impact, it is necessary to install transponders on every single vessel in Indian waters and to monitor these in real time, 24/7. By June 2018, however, just around 1,000 transponders had been fitted on vessels in Tamil Nadu, Puducherry and Gujarat, on a pilot basis. An estimated 50,000 vessels are present just along the Gujarat-Maharashtra coast at any time. All other measures for improvement in coastal security are meaningless absent a comprehensive system of tracking all vessels in Indian waters.
While the government boasts of its painfully modest attainments over the past decade, the reality is that our responses can only be measured by general police and intelligence capabilities and capacities – not by the theatre of small special units strutting about, all menacingly dressed in black, but arriving on the scene of an attack hours after it has been initiated. The ‘first responder’ is the cliché of all security and CT discussions, but this remains the most neglected element of the system.
It cannot be that women are not safe in the streets; that the whims of religious charlatans can lead to the collapse of entire state systems; that lynch mobs act with impunity; that 36% of legislators in Parliament and state legislatures have a total of 3,045 criminal cases pending against them; but that India will be secure against the depredations of terrorists. Security is indivisible. We will either have an intelligence, enforcement and justice system that adequately secures us from all crime; or we will remain exposed to the machinations of terrorists and their state sponsors.
The author is the executive director of Institute for Conflict Management & South Asia Terrorism Portal
(Published: Hindustan Times Nov 22, 2018)