South Asia Terrorism Portal
Naga Peace Overtures Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management The meeting of the leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak- Muivah (NSCN-IM) with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at New Delhi on December 7, 2004, and their subsequent 'homecoming' in Nagaland after a self-imposed exile of 37 years, are, at a psychological level, significant movements in the ponderous pace of the Naga peace process - which commenced with a declaration of ceasefire by the rebel group and the Government of India seven years ago. NSCN-IM leaders Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah had earlier visited Delhi to meet the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January 2003, and it is a measure of the elephantine gait of the negotiations that nothing much has changed since. Each such 'round' of high-level meetings is, nevertheless, greeted with great enthusiasm by the media and by those involved in the 'peace process'. This time round, though the first encounter between Prime Minister Singh and the Naga leaders was more about atmospherics than 'substantive' discussions, there is reason to believe that the process may, in fact, soon be pushed forward. For one thing, Muivah and Swu are not in India just for this meeting, but as part of an extended programme of 'three or four months' that takes them back to Nagaland for Christmas and New Year, and then returns them to New Delhi for a 'substantive' phase of negotiations. At the end of this extended programme, there would be some erosion of the credibility of the 'peace process', were it not to yield any visible results. However, it remains altogether unlikely that the current round of talks would abruptly 'resolve' the 'Naga problem' that has plagued India for 53 years. In his meeting with Swu and Muivah, on December 7, the Prime Minister promised a "mutually acceptable and honourable solution that can ensure that the Naga people live a life of peace with dignity and self-respect." This is, of course, unimpeachable, but it remains far from clear whether the situation in Nagaland and the NSCN-IM's vision and agenda will lend themselves to any easy resolution. Nor, indeed, has the mistrust between the negotiating parties been entirely purged. In fact, the Naga leaders were originally scheduled to arrive in Delhi in late November, but the visit was aborted with allegations by the NSCN-IM that Central intelligence agencies and the Nagaland Government were supporting and arming a 'rival' Naga group, the Naga National Council (NNC) in a gambit to 'divide the Naga people'. Another suspicion was that the Government of India (GoI) was engaged in secret negotiations with the NSCN's rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) as well, a charge the Government denied. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil also reportedly advised Chief Minister Rio to 'rein in' his minister who was accused of providing support to the NNC. On the other hand, the Government has repeatedly accused the NSCN-IM of violating the 'ground rules' of the ceasefire, particularly for the movement of armed rebel cadres outside their designated camps and for administering an extensive regime of extortion. These, however, are just pinpricks in the expansive minefield of talks. The real obstacles relate to the 'sovereignty' issue and, most crucially, the demand for a 'greater Nagalim', comprehending 'all Naga areas'. The 'sovereignty' demand has gradually, though only implicitly - in their public statements the NSCN-IM leaders remain committed to an independent Nagaland, separate from India - been transformed into a claim for 'greater autonomy'. On the Nagalim issue, however, the rebels have remained clear and unrelenting: they are not demanding a 'greater' or a 'lesser' Nagaland; they are only demanding that all Naga 'homelands' be brought under one political unit. The problem, however, is that these claimed areas are spread over the geographical territories of the Indian States of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, as well as in parts of western Myanmar. While the Myanmarese territories cannot be part of any 'settlement' between the Indian Government and the rebels, there are compelling Constitutional constraints on the transfer of the territories of any Indian State without the consent of the States so affected. Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur have all fairly clearly rejected the inclusion of any of their territories in the "so-called Nagalim". In an additional obstruction, Prime Minister Singh's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government is committed to a Common Minimum Programme (CMP) that has specifically rejected the redrawing of boundaries in the Northeast. The rebels are, moreover, claiming wide areas where the Naga presence is, at best, nominal. In Assam, for instance, the districts of Cachar, the North Cachar and Karbi Anglong, have been proclaimed as parts of the projected Nagalim. But the population of Nagas (according to the 1991 Census) was just about 5 per cent in the North Cachar Hills, as little as 0.37 per cent in Karbi Anglong and 0 per cent in Cachar. In recent years, there have been deliberate and concentrated efforts by various Naga organizations to alter the demographics of many of these areas, with efforts to settle a Naga population along the border areas inside Assam, with places like Mariani in Jorhat and Merapani in Golaghat district acquiring significant Naga settlements. There have also been efforts to 'cleanse' Naga dominated areas in Manipur of non-Naga concentrations. The Kuki Movement for Human Rights (KMHR), for instance, has alleged that the NSCN-IM militants had, on November 23, served a 'quit notice' to Kuki villagers in Tamenglong district of Manipur, demanding that the Kukis vacate these areas before Christmas. In Arunachal Pradesh, the NSCN-IM has been involved in concerted proselytizing activities among the tribals in the Tirap and Changlang districts in an attempt to project them as a part and parcel of the anticipated 'Nagaland for Christ'. Many analysts have, moreover, noted that the Naga identity is synthetic, and of relatively recent origin. The NSCN-IM is dominated by the Tangkhul tribe - largely concentrated in the hill districts of Manipur - to which Muivah belongs, and, in lesser measure, by the Semas, represented by the nominal head of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu. Other tribes have often chafed under this domination, and many of the fratricidal clashes between various Naga factions - particularly the NSCN-K and, more recently, the NNC - are manifestations of divided tribal loyalties. Two influential tribal organizations, the Ao Senden and the Sumi Hoho (the apex bodies of the Ao and Sumi tribes), have, further, decided to boycott the reception organized for Muivah and Swu at Dimapur on December 14. Indeed, among the imperatives that impel the NSCN-IM's demand for an 'integrated Nagalim' is the fact that leaders like Muivah and 'Home Minister' Rh. Raising would have very little tribal following in a 'Nagalim' that excluded the hill districts of Manipur. Any meddling with State territories in the Northeast, however, would be highly disruptive, as was clearly demonstrated by the violent reaction in Manipur after the ill-advised extension of ceasefire 'without territorial limits' in June 2001 - which had been interpreted as a covert recognition of the 'Greater Nagalim' idea. Several militant non-Naga tribal groups - including, most recently, the Kuki National Army, have threatened a 'bloodbath' in the event of any territorial reorganization that affects their respective 'traditional' lands. Each of these streams of opposition have long and complex histories that would obstruct any easy settlement between the Centre and the NSCN-IM, and many more political entities - including the elected Governments of the affected States of the Northeast, the most consistently ignored parties in the 'search for peace' in Nagaland - would have to be taken into confidence before any sustainable advances can be made. Nevertheless, advances are, in fact, now a distinct possibility. During their current tour of Nagaland, the rebel leaders would be interacting with a wide spectrum of the local leadership - including the Naga Hoho, the traditional umbrella organization uniting over 30 Naga tribes - to gauge 'popular sentiment'. They would certainly hear many and impassioned pleas for peace, and at least some complaints against the misconduct and extortion by NSCN-IM cadres. Muivah and Swu have been deprived of such direct feedback for nearly the entire period of their almost four-decade exile, though they had made a clandestine visit to Dimapur in May 1999 - crossing over from Thailand. During that visit, they had consulted with their cadres in an effort to hammer out a 'solution' short of the 'independence formula', but failed to arrive at a consensus. While the NSCN-IM is anything but a democratic entity, its leadership is not, and cannot be, entirely indifferent to the transformed mood of the people in Nagaland who are exhausted by the unending and fratricidal violence, and their own exclusion from the opportunities of development and the fruits of modernity. Significantly, moreover, both Muivah and Swu are now feeling the burden of age, and there are many who believe that they would be eager to arrive at an early settlement, fearing a dissipation of the movement in the event of their demise. Hammering out an 'honourable' agreement, however, remains a challenge, though not one that is insurmountable. Much of what the NSCN-IM demands by way of 'greater autonomy' already exists within, or can be created by minor amendments to, the Indian Constitution. As regards 'Greater Nagalim' the Centre can be expected to offer a process, rather than a solution, one that would involve the gradual enlargement of dialogue and conciliation between all concerned parties and States; one that would certainly be protracted but which could, eventually, yield an outcome untainted by the bloodshed and exclusionary hatred that has long afflicted the conflicting contentions of tribal groups in India's Northeast. If the Indian state is to engage in negotiations based on questionable principles with armed insurgent groups, this is, perhaps, the best that can be hoped for.