Almost ten years after the fateful 26/11 Mumbai terror attack, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s Prime Minister at the time of the attack, in an interview on May 18, 2018, clearly acknowledged, for the first time, the presence of militant outfits in Pakistan and their use by Pakistan’s so called ‘deep state’.1
The recently ousted Prime Minister stated,
The fact that the LeT has never attacked a target within Pakistan, indicates that it remains most loyal to the establishment. As noted Pakistani scholar Hussain Haqqani puts it:
in tandem to accelerate their ideological and militant agenda. Indeed, a more realistic assessment of the situation is offered by noted American expert, C. Christine Fair:
With the aim of keeping its focus on Kashmir, and advocating “self-determination for Kashmiris as per UN Resolutions”, the LeT/ JuD leadership decided, in August 2017, to enter politics and form a party with the name of Milli Muslim League (MML). The decision to form a political party was not incidental. C. Christine Fair notes, “rumors about a possible LeT / JuD-tied political party have been floating around for at least the past two years.”19 Thus, MML is to function as a political wing of the banned LeT and JuD, conceived of by terror-master Hafiz Saeed to legitimise his malignant actions, especially in Kashmir, as well as to evade international pressure and sanctions. By forming MML, Hafiz Saeed also intends to mislead the international community into speculating that he is a firm “believer” in the democratic process, apparently a ploy to avoid being labelled as merely a terrorist. On December 24, 2017, Saeed inaugurated the MML office in Lahore’s National Assembly-120 Constituency. During his visit to the Mohni Road area adjacent to the Data Sahib shrine, he listened to the civic problems of people in the area, who welcomed Saeed by showering rose petals on his vehicle. The JuD headquarters in Chauburji also falls under the NA-120 Constituency. Saeed’s visit and opening of the political office in Lahore pointed towards his grand plans to enter politics.20
Since MML was yet to be registered by the Election Commission of Pakistan, the party decided to field Qari Yaqoub Sheikh as an independent candidate against ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s wife Kulsoom Sharif for the Lahore seat, which fell vacant after Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification. Qari Yaqoub Sheikh, a prominent JuD leader, has been a member of LeT’s ‘central advisory committee’, and has also served as a leader in LeT’s foreign affairs department. He has also been associated with JuD and is a leader of the banned FIF, the ‘charity organisation’ and a subsidiary of JuD, which has also been banned.
Soon after the formation of the MML, the party filed for registration with the ECP. Pending registration, the JuD fielded Qari Yaqoub Sheikh, who pledged himself to the ideals of JuD, to contest the 2017 by-election in the NA 120 Constituency, which had fallen vacant after the Supreme Court’s disqualification of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Yaqoub was pitted against Nawaz’s wife, Begum Kulsoom Nawaz of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).24 Although, Yaqoub had contested as an independent candidate, the party campaign urged voters to vote for MML-backed candidate. The Constituency has a large number of Kashmir-origin voters as well.25 Yaqoob Sheikh secured 5,822 votes and stood fourth in the by-election in Lahore’s National Assembly Constituency.26
It is clear that there has been a change in Pakistan’s strategic approach in dealing with this group. It remains difficult to determine if this change has been propelled by domestic considerations or external compulsions. Saeed’s participation in Pakistani politics may indicate the state’s efforts to contain JuD’s jihadist agenda and its domestic implications by offering it another outlet for its energies, possibly as the only way forward to deal with the group.27 This may not, however, necessarily mean that Pakistan intends to terminate the use of the JuD-LeT complex as a tool of its foreign policy. Domestically, Pakistan’s limitations have been evident when it comes to dealing with jihadist groups like JuD and LeT.28 Moreover, these limitations also extend to the state’s inability to counter their violent narratives.29 For the past three decades, the country’s policies have enabled, encouraged, and mainstreamed such practices. Particularly in Punjab, which is a melting pot of different jihadist groups, the limitations related to the state’s counter-terrorism efforts are palpable. Accommodation rather than containment has been devised as the core policy approach. There are other examples from Punjab, where the state’s attempt to co-opt sectarian jihadists into the country’s political fold appear obvious. The recent election of Masroor Nawaz Jhangvi, son of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, to the Punjab Assembly not only highlights the state’s emerging approach to these groups, but also the limitations of this approach. If Saeed is able to gain an electoral foothold in Punjab, it would only further enhance his ideological support base. The state, by allowing Saeed to grow politically, may not only further entrench militant Islamism in Pakistan, but would deepen the country’s counter-terrorism challenges internally.
Secondly, the change in Pakistan’s policy regarding Saeed’s role in Pakistan’s domestic politics also has implications regarding the state’s intention to legitimise the group’s branding, by portraying it as more moderate. The current political landscape, which is in turmoil, offers Pakistan’s security establishment an ideal setting to introduce JuD into the country’s political arena. And MML can capitalise on the so called charity work done by its affiliate outfits. Reports suggests that the FIF, an LeT affiliate outfit, runs 35 operations across Pakistan, including hospitals, earthquakerelief, ambulance services, vaccination and so on.30 The result is that, despite US and international bans on all these outfits, they enjoy popular public support within Pakistan. Indeed, the United States has already placed MML on its list of foreign terrorist organisations. The State Department disclosed, in a statement on April 2, 2018, that it had designated MML as a foreign terrorist group because it was operating as fronts for LeT, which is also on the U.S. terrorist list.31
Third, the Pakistan Army is now looking for new political partners. In Pakistan, the Army seems to be least interested in engaging with mainstream parties, i.e., Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N).
Other smaller parties like Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek- e-Insaf (PTI) are not in a position to form a government on their own. As a result, the Army appears to looking for new political partners and MML could, today, be in a grooming stage. Notably, a Pew Institute survey suggests that LeT is more acceptable to Pakistanis as compared to other Islamist groupings, especially Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).32
Fourth, a section of Pakistan’s security establishment still views Saeed and his associates as useful tools in some measures, particularly vis-à-vis India. Moreover, Saeed and a number of other anti-India jihadist groups offer legitimacy and street power to Pakistan’s confrontational policy toward New Delhi. In this context, the impending transition of the JuD from a proscribed organisation to a political party is hardly a result of international pressure.
MML may prima facie not appear to be a direct threat to India as a political outfit, but its emergence should be a cause for concern. As mentioned earlier, MML, JuD and LeT belong to the same family. Their aims and objectives are global, even if these may currently be limited by capacity or focus. The LeT-JuD-MML complex has a distinct ideology that underwrites a program of Islamic revanchism—and justifies collaboration with other terrorist groups. When it comes to Pakistan, LeT not only does not bite the hand that feeds it, it in fact protects its patrons against other domestic adversaries.33 LeT is a Janus-faced entity that is involved in terrorism and social development concurrently— which limits the Pakistani establishment’s ability to target it, even if it were so inclined.
The MML and LeT possess a cohesive and hierarchical organisational structure that is effective at both the conduct of violence and the delivery of social programs. The group uses technology and social media to advance its political and jihadi goals. After a demonstrated terror program against India, MML/LeT will now have a definite political agenda against New Delhi, as a pressure group in the short run. However, if MML is able to form a government or even be part of a coalition which rules Pakistan, this would be a real worry, as it could constitute a direct and long-term nuclear security threat. MML president Saifullah Khalid stated, at a Press Conference on August 7, 2017, that the party would work in coordination with all parties and religious groups that believe Pakistan should lead a Muslim Ummah, declaring that “the fight will continue until the completion of Pakistan (by inclusion of) Kashmir.”34
These stated aims, coupled with nuclear weapons, should alarm Indians and the world at-large. No wonder the world understands the Indian-dilemma. As pointed out on March 12, 2013, in testimony to the US Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of US National Intelligence James Clapper observed: “Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba will continue to be the most multifaceted and problematic of the Pakistani militant groups… The group has the longterm potential to evolve into a permanent and even Hamas/ Hezbollah-like presence in Pakistan.”35