It no doubt appears interesting and away from the normal when the Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh says he is ready to talk to the Maoists.
And speaking from an American perspective, Daniel Byman asserts that talking with the insurgents is often a necessary first step toward defeating them or reaching an acceptable compromise. Interestingly, along the lines of what the Colombian government and FARC rebels had been doing, Byman further states30 that these talks must often be gone ahead with even as insurgents shoot at U.S. soldiers and they, in turn, shoot at them. More apposite to this discussion is how Byman cogently concludes:
The author dedicate this piece to the memory of his respected father, Bimal Kumar Mukherjee.
Dr. Uddipan Mukherjee is in Indian Ordnance Factories Service and presently working as Public Relations Officer at Ordnance Factory Board, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He holds a PhD from Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR), Department of Atomic Energy. He has been a TV commentator on Maoist insurgency and published widely in national and international journals/outlets on counter-insurgency, history, physics and foreign policy. He is the author of the book ‘Modern World History' for Civil Services. Views expressed are his own.
Brajendra Nath Singh, “Willing to talk to top Maoist Leadership: Chhattisgarh CM”, The Quint, April 4, 2018, accessed on June 8, 2018, https://www.thequint.com/hot-news-text/willing-to-talk-to-top-maoistleadership-chhattisgarh-cm.
“Maoists area of influence shrinks; 44 districts removed from affected list: Union Home Secy”, The Economic Times, April 15, 2018, accessed on June 08, 2018, https://economictimes.com/news/defence/maoists-area-ofinfluence-shrinks-44-districts-removed-from-affected-list-union-homesecy/articleshow/63769620.cms?.
For an exposition on Naxalism, read Rabindra Ray, The Naxalites and their Ideology, 1987 Oxford University Press, Oxford, and Sumanta Banerjee, In the Wake of Naxalbari, Shishu Sahitya Samsad, Kolkata, 2008.
For details on the terror network of the Maoists in the North-East, see Uddipan Mukherjee, “Maoists, North-East and China- Expanding net of terror”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, December 19, 2011, accessed on June 08, 2018, http://www.claws.in/744/maoists-north-east-and-chinaexpanding-net-of-terror-uddipan-mukherjee.html.
Rahul Tripathi, “The contours of the new Red map”, The Indian Express, April 17, 2018, accessed on June 08, 2018, http://indianexpress.com/ article/explained/naxalism-maoist-attacks-home-minstry-modi-govtnational-policy-and-action-plan-5140028/.
“PM Modi urges Maoists to shun path of violence”, The Times of India, April 14, 2018, accessed on June 8, 2018, https://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/india/pm-modi-urges-maoists-to-shun-path-of-violence/ articleshow/63765933.cms.
The Histogram clearly indicates fall in violence after 2010, when Azad and Kishenji were eliminated by the security forces. Data is taken from Union Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, https://mha.gov.in/sites/ default/files/LWEO300520180945.pdf.
Manolo B. Jara, “Duterte asked to end talks with Red rebels”, The Gulf Today, April 15, 2018, accessed on June 08, 2018, http://www.gulftoday. ae/portal/a2a42fb8-1916-45ee-acb7-514e3b8943f7.aspx.
“Colombian president says Nobel peace prize win helped end civil war”, The Guardian, December 10, 2016, accessed on June 08, 2018, https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/10/colombia-nobel-peace-prizejuan-manuel-santos.
“Cuba, Norway Say Colombia-FARC Peace ‘Living Difficult Moments’”, Telesur TV, April 16, 2018, accessed on June 08, 2018, https://www. telesurtv.net/english/news/Cuba-Norway-Concerned-About-ColombiaPeace-Accord-With-FARC-20180416-0008.html.
Chris Kraul, “Killings of demobilized rebels threaten peace process in Colombia”, Los Angeles Times, June 5, 2018, accessed on June 08, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-colombia-farckillings-20180605-story.html.
For a brief history of the Maoist Civil War in Colombia, see Uddipan Mukherjee, “Fragile Peace in Colombia”, Diplomatic Courier, March 18, 2016, accessed on June 08, 2018, https://www.diplomaticourier.com/ fragile-peace-in-colombia/.
S K Gurung, “SAMADHAN: Rajnath Singh coins an acronym to wipe out left-wing terror”, The Economic Times, May 8, 2017, accessed on June 09, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politicsand-nation/rajnath-singh-calls-for-unity-of-purpose-to-tackle-naxals/ articleshow/58571588.cms.
For detailed discussions, see Paul W. Staeheli, “Collapsing insurgent organizations through leadership decapitation: a Comparison of targeted killing and Targeted incarceration in insurgent Organizations”, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School March 2010, file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/10Mar_ Staeheli.pdf and Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 3, Issue 1, 1991, pp 69-87.
Joseph John, “Won’t shy from talks with Naxals”, MSN News, February 13, 2011, accessed on February 22, 2011, http://news.in.msn.com/national/ article.aspx?cp-documentid=4915485. 16
Anuj Chopra, “India’s Maoist rebels spurn government offer of talks”, The National, May 19, 2010, accessed on June 9, 2018, https://www.thenational.ae/ world/asia/india-s-maoist-rebels-spurn-government-offer-of-talks-1.556371.
Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, “How Insurgencies End”, RAND Corporation, 2010, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG965.html.
In a Strategic Defence state, the insurgents retain their militia status and being weaker than the security forces, primarily depend on guerrilla warfare. However in a Strategic Offence phase, the ultras form a conventional people’s liberation force and take on the government forces in a head-on war.
Amit Bhaduri, “Peace That is More Dangerous Than War, In Peoples’ War As Strategy and Peace Talks as Taktics, in Biswajit Roy ed., War and Peace in Junglemahal, Setu Prakashani, 2012, Kolkata, pp. 18-19.
Sujato Bhadro, “Peace-talk Process in Junglemahal: A Brief Review”, in Biswajit Roy ed., War and Peace in Junglemahal, 2012, Setu Prakashani, Kolkata, p. 62.
Chhoton Das, “Why the Talks Failed?”, in Biswajit Roy ed., War and Peace in Junglemahal, 2012, Setu Prakashani, Kolkata, pp. 73-74.
Ibid.
Kunal Chattopadhyay, “Maoists and the Indian State: Is Peace Possible?”, in People’s War as Strategy and Peace Talks as Tactics, in Biswajit Roy ed., War and Peace in Junglemahal, 2012, Setu Prakashani, Kolkata, p. 179.
Uddipan Mukherjee, “The Bad War: Analysing Dantewada”, Boloji, ,April 27, 2010, http://www.boloji.com/articles/9341/the-bad-war-analysing-dantewada and “The Bad War”, Newsline, April, 2010, http://newslinemagazine.com/ magazine/the-bad-war/.
Uddipan Mukherjee, “Caught in the Crossfire”, Newsline, February 2010, https://newslinemagazine.com/magazine/caught-in-the-crossfire/.
“Interview with Comrade Ganapathy, the General Secretary of Communist Party of India (Maoist)”, People’s March, November 19, 2010, https:// ajadhind.wordpress.com/tag/ganapathy/.
Peter C. Sederberg, “Conciliation as Counter-Terrorist Strategy”, Journal of Peace Research, Volume 32, Number 2, 1995, pp. 295-312.
Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International Security, Volume 22, Number 2, 1997, pp.5-53.
Daniel Byman, “Talking with Insurgents: A guide for the Perplexed”, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 32, Number 2, 2009, pp. 125-137.
Vijaita Singh, “Rajnath Draws Hard Line on Maoists”, The Indian Express, June 28, 2014, accessed on October 7, 2014, http://indianexpress.com/ article/india/politics/rajnath-draws-hard-line-on-maoists-no-talks-attackswill-get-befitting-reply/.
John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq, 2005, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance”, Foreign Affairs, July/Aug 1999, p. 36, https://peacelearner.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/edwardluttwak-give-war-a-chance1 pdf.
A 3-month ceasefire commenced in Andhra Pradesh in June 2004. The discussions ended without any agreement and the guerillas went back to their hideouts. Maoists did not agree to put down their arms. Clashes with police and security forces resumed in January 2005. The intensity of Maoist violence increased after the failed talks with the merger of the Maoist Communist Centre based in Bihar-Jharkhand and the People’s War Group of Andhra.