Pakistan Media

For the second time in three days surrender talks between the anti-Taliban forces and the so-called Al-Qaeda fighters holed up in the Tora Bora mountains have broken down and the US warplanes have recommenced bombing their hideouts. The only pre-condition for surrender was the presence of UN representatives or the diplomats of the countries to which these fighters belong. Considering the terrible fate that overtook those who had surrendered in Kabul and then Kunduz and were transported to Qala-e-Jangi, it is hardly surprising that the Tora Bora fighters are not keen to give themselves up to their opponents, Afghan or American. It is not clear, therefore, why UN presence could not be arranged to facilitate the surrender and avoid another bloodbath.

This is particularly surprising since the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has now given indications of accepting the handing over of foreign fighters in Afghanistan to their respective countries under the guarantee of a trial and befitting punishments. Rumsfeld even indicated that he was interested in capture of these fighters to interrogate them. The US is more interested in catching the big fish, an endeavour in which it has not so far achieved any major success. Consequently, speculation in the media is mounting about the whereabouts of the Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama Bin Laden.

There has been far too much human suffering in Afghanistan already and the sooner the unequal military campaign is brought to a close the better it will be for the US-led coalition, Afghanistan's neighbours, the traumatized public opinion in the Muslim world, the relief-agencies and, above all, the wobbly interim Afghan administration which is scheduled to takeover in a week's time. Crafting a modus operandi to encourage the surrender of the Al-Qaeda fighters and the humane management and final disposal of all prisoners taken by the anti-Taliban forces would be a big step towards bringing the hostilities to a close and, ultimately, restoring order in Afghanistan. It should also allow the US to concentrate on locating the elusive Al-Qaeda leadership. It ought, therefore, to be a priority issue.

The obvious way forward seems to be for the UN to take the lead in supervising the surrender and assuring the fighters that they will not be massacred. The US-UK would need to provide logistical support for holding the prisoners until they are identified and categorised and, finally, their respective countries will need to take steps to obtain their custody for a final disposal. Unfortunately, no move in this direction is evident and the US seems content to go back to bombing. The UN as well as the countries whose fighters are said to be involved, appear also to have abdicated the initiative to the US. The onus for providing the lead, therefore, shifts to the US which needs to follow up its recently expressed consent to the transfer of these fighters to their home countries with concrete steps to that end. Otherwise, the world may soon hear of another horrific bloodbath.

-- Editorial, The News, Islamabad, December 15, 2001

The slaying of 37 fleeing Arab fighters by anti-Taliban tribal forces south of Kandahar adds yet another gory chapter to the litany of war crimes in Afghanistan. Travelling in a convoy with their wives and children, the fighters were waylaid by anti-Taliban forces. The men were singled out and shot dead in front of their wives and children.

The surrender of Kandahar was negotiated by none other than Hamid Karzai, the chief of the interim authority, and one would have thought that some semblance of order would have been in place by now. This does not seem to be the case. If the new administration is serious about gaining the trust of the Afghan people and if it wants to present itself as a unifying authority, then it must ensure the rule of law. Mr Karzai must unequivocally speak out against such atrocities and his forces should try to apprehend and punish those who murdered those 37 men.

- Editorial, Dawn, December 15, 2001

Except for the core troika in the Northern Alliance represented by Mr Abdullah Abdullah (foreign minister), Mr Younas Qanooni (interior minister) and General Mohammad Fahim (defense minister), no one in Afghanistan is particularly pleased with the power-sharing formula hammered out in Bonn. The "troika" has hogged all the important posts and is now manipulating internal and external policies with a view to influencing the Loya Jirga when it meets six months down the line to construct a longer-term government. Forget about the majority Pakhtuns who have been given no more than a token representation in the form of the prime minister, Hamid Karzai. Even old NA allies like the Uzbek warlord, General Rashid Dostum, in the north and the former president of Afghanistan, Burhanuddin Rabbani, are grumbling.

It is, of course, the fate of the Afghan Pakhtuns that concerns Pakistan for many reasons. The Pakhtun south is predictably split. If that seems to be an unfortunate Pakhtun characteristic, the contrast in the political behaviour of the other ethnic communities of Afghanistan is quite remarkable. In the old days when everyone was fighting the Russians, the Uzbeks stuck together and General Dostam was able to sway all incoming governments in his favour with his 40,000 strong army. He was available to the communists of the PDPA for "use". Then President Mujaddidi made him his own top general. The Tajiks also stuck together and created the second largest army of Afghanistan under commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. In contrast, the majority Pakhtuns tended to split into separate parties and behaved as if their Pakhtun identity did not really matter. Although this characteristic made them amenable to their ISI and CIA "handlers", this kind of divide and rule strategy yielded no permanent loyalties and everyone knew that everyone was in the game for his own dirty purpose. Indeed, Pakistan may have played it domestically as a holy jehad but it was a cruel dog-eat-dog game on the ground. Therefore when the Taliban entered the arena and united the Pakhtuns in 1996, the situation gradually slipped out of Pakistan’s control and the tail began to wag the dog. Over the years, the heady feeling that Pakistan finally had Afghanistan as its own backyard while no other country could even sustain an embassy in Kabul became a soporific that closed Islamabad’s eyes to the future.

If the fear of a "Pakhtun split" once again is real, nothing else on the ground is what it was when Pakistan went in with the Taliban and thought it had the field to itself. All the foreign embassies are soon going to be back in Kabul. The UN is going to be more influential than in the past as Bonn has demonstrated and its clout will be felt just as soon as British, European and Turkish "boots are on ground". Above all, a lot of international money is going to be spread around, not so much through the biased parties in the Kabul interim government as through international agencies that are likely to concentrate on humanitarianism and social development rather that politics. The hope is that as this money is funnelled to the grassroots, it might lessen the intensity of the potential Pakhtun splits in the south of Afghanistan. In the event, this would contrast sharply with what happened to the money when it was given to the ISI for distribution among the mujahideen during the war against the Soviets.

Pakistan’s bugbear in Afghanistan has been India. But that policy of seeing red every time any Afghan is seen shaking hands with the Indians must be given up and a new non-ISI policy initiated to work on the emerging Tajik leadership on the basis of the transit trade facility that Pakistan can always use as leverage. India will remain marginal even after the end of the war. Its entry in the Afghan arena was a kind of tit-for-tat for the flanking move the ISI was making in Bangladesh, a flawed policy based on the assumption that Mrs Hasina Wajed was pro-India. In fact, India’s role in the new Afghanistan is bound to subside as Kabul will be inclined to act more and more in light of the advice offered by those who fund it. The biggest counter in Pakistan’s favour and against India is that India has exclusively backed the Tajiks while the stage must inevitably be set for the Pakhtun majority to reassert itself through the Loya Jirga next year.

Ironically enough, the fact that Afghanistan has gotten out of Pakistan’s stranglehold should go in favour of Pakistan. A large number of countries contributing to the reconstruction of Afghanistan should prevent it from becoming a battle-field for India and Pakistan. Therefore the sooner Pakistan recognises this reality, the better. It is the consolidation of internal rather than external control that should matter to us. A policy shaped passively on the belligerence of Islamic extremists posing as friends of the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan is a bad policy. India’s undue interference in Afghanistan can best be countered by aligning with the international community whose clout will be focused on keeping Afghanistan away from fundamentalist terrorism.

-- Editorial, The Friday Times, Lahore, December 14

Kandahar fiefdoms

The newly ‘liberated’ city of Kandahar has been divided into fiefdoms by local rival Pushtun commanders.

Gul Agha Sherzai, a former governor of the city, is in control of the Governor’s House and city hall.

Mulla Naqibullah has taken a cantonment to the north of the city containing major military installations, including the residual Taliban arsenal with tanks and heavy weapons.

Haji Bashar, another local influential, has command of the police and city security facilities.

Factional clashes have taken place, apart from firefights with the remaining armed Taliban in the city.

This tense and dangerous situation reflects the vacuum of power created by the surrender of the Taliban in Kandahar.

The surrender, however, has gone far from smoothly.

Hamid Karzai, the head of the new interim administration, agreed that Naqibullah should take the surrender.

But this annoyed other factions, which has led to criticism of Karzai’s handling of his first major test in managing a post-Taliban dispensation.The only hopeful sign so far is that the rival factions have decided to set up a Shura to try and resolve their differences.

The Shura includes Karzai who is expected to enter the city soon to participate in its deliberations.

If the Pushtuns of Afghanistan want their claims to being adequately represented in the new government to be taken seriously, they will have to demonstrate unity, cohesion and maturity to handle the myriads of problems still being faced by the country and its long suffering people.

It is for the sake of that suffering alone that the different factions will have to modify their ambitions to control ‘their’ territory in favour of power sharing arrangements arrived at through mutual consultations.

The track record of these mujahideen organisations in coming to grips with their country’s needs at various critical junctures does not inspire confidence that they have the ability and understanding to abandon attempts to unilaterally impose their preferences and wishes on all other parties.

Lacking the sense to compromise for the greater good of their ravaged country in the past, the local Pushtun commanders will have to make an extraordinary departure from their history to allow the new order to take shape.

If they fail, the will of the international coalition may well deprive them of even their legitimate share in power.

Karzai has to play a mediatory role and conduct a sensitive balancing act to get these recalcitrant and undisciplined elements on board, if the Pushtun south is to have any chance of negotiating its way into the process of institution building which is about to begin from December 22, when the interim administration is scheduled to take over in Kabul.

Amidst the chaos and confusion that has attended the takeover of Kandahar from the Taliban, large numbers of their fighters, instead of surrendering, fled the city with their weapons.

These fleeing forces have been roundly attacked by the US forces from the air as well as on the ground.

The marines based outside Kandahar have seen such action for the first time since their deployment.

The confusion surrounding the city and its environs includes rumour and counter-rumour about Mulla Omar’s whereabouts.

Some reports say he is still in Kandahar in the ‘safe’ custody of Khalid Pushtoon, another local commander.

Other reports confidently assert he has fled the city before its surrender and taken off in an unknown direction, possibly the mountains of his home province of Uruzgan.

Karzai continues to repeat his instructions to his forces to seek out and arrest Mulla Omar.

Perhaps this situation will be cleared up once the local commanders sort out their own differences and concentrate instead on the task of clearing the city of the remnants of the Taliban.

That cleaning up exercise itself could give some leads as to Mulla Omar’s location.If and when he is captured, in the interest of peace and reconciliation so badly needed in Afghanistan, he must be safely kept in custody in anticipation of being brought to trial, perhaps in an international court of law.

No rough justice can be allowed to continue in a country torn apart by civil war and the vendettas it has spawned.

In the new Afghanistan, no matter how heinous or serious the crime, every citizen must be assured of due process and the safeguarding of his right to a defence.

Let the new rulers of Afghanistan set an example for their country’s entry into the civilised comity of nations.

-- Editorial, Frontier Post, Karachi, December 10, 2001

With Friday's surrender at Kandahar, the Taliban's five-year rule in Afghanistan has passed into history. The surrender at Kandahar, Helmand and Zabul was merely a formality, for the Taliban rule had all but come to an end in most of Afghanistan in the second week of November when Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat and Kabul fell in rapid succession.

Since then, what had been going on in south-eastern Afghanistan was merely a tortuous prolongation of an avoidable agony for Afghan men, women and children caught in crossfire or falling victim to American bombing by the hundreds. Full credit goes to Hamid Karzai, the chosen head of the new Afghan administration, for securing the surrender.

His presence in the battle zone testifies to his courage and sagacity. He and his associates were instrumental in making the Taliban realize that further resistance would merely mean unnecessary bloodshed, for their fate was sealed. That Mulla Omar and other top Taliban commanders were able to realize this truth deserves to be acknowledged. One wishes they had displayed this wisdom much earlier.

There are lots of lessons one can draw from the Taliban's spectacular rise to power and their equally dramatic collapse. There is no doubt they gave a measure of peace to Afghanistan after defeating the anti-Soviet mujahideen, who had thrown the country into a debilitating civil war. However, what alienated them from the world and from their own people was their narrow and obscurantist interpretation of Islam.

Compassion - which is a cardinal principle of Islam - was ignored by them as reflected in the harshness with which they enforced the penal code of Islamic law. Women were treated with special cruelty: they were denied the right to education and work, and in some cases were hit in feet and hands for using nail polish. Besides, all avenues of legitimate entertainment were banned.

Their philosophy had no concept of ethnic and cultural plurality, and their narrow horizons were incapable of visualizing, much less giving, Afghanistan the apparatus of a modern state even in a most rudimentary form. That all this was done in the name of Islam served only to cast Islam itself in a bad light throughout the world.

No wonder barring three countries, including Pakistan, the entire Muslim world turned its back on them. More important, they did nothing to improve their people's lot, to build schools, hospitals and roads or to improve agriculture. Instead, most of their energy was spent on "jihad" against fellow Muslims. The scenes of joy witnessed by millions throughout the world testified to the relief the common man felt over the end of the Taliban's repressive regime.

The Taliban's fate also holds some lessons for Pakistan. While Islamabad has every right to see a friendly government in Kabul, interference in that country's internal affairs has cost Pakistan dearly. By relying - in fact, patronizing - one section of Afghanistan's population, Islamabad earned the ire of the other ethnic and political groups.

Worse, by arming the Taliban and letting them open and run recruiting and training centres in Pakistan, Islamabad helped create Frankenstein's monster. Undoubtedly, religious militancy in Pakistan drew sustenance from the fact that the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan. Gradually, religious parties with armed militias became a state within state and defied Islamabad's authority with contempt.

Now that a new Afghanistan could come into being, Pakistan should extend a helping hand to the new regime - as already pledged by President Musharraf. What Afghanistan needs is lasting peace, internal reconciliation and an era of economic reconstruction. Pakistan and all of Afghanistan's neighbours should help in this.

Yunis Qanooni's highly provocative statement in New Delhi and such other irritants should be ignored by Pakistan in the larger interest of peace in Afghanistan and the region. Instead, Islamabad should coordinate its effort with its friends in the US-led coalition to ensure that the new Afghanistan has a government that is truly neutral and friendly.

- Editorial, Dawn, December 9, 2001

Accord at last

After nine days of exhausting discussions, the four Afghan groups at the Bonn conference arrived at an accord for the future setup in their country.

The agreement stipulates the taking over of power in Kabul on December 22 by an interim administration for six months, to be followed by the convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga, which will appoint a transitional government for 18 months, after which elections will be held.The deal gives the Northern Alliance three key ministries amongst others in the 30-member cabinet, i.e.

Defence, Interior, and Foreign Affairs.

The current incumbents on these posts, General Fahim, Younus Qanooni, and Abdullah Abdullah respectively will continue to hold office.

The interim administration will be led by a chairman, Hamid Karzai, a gesture towards finding the right ethnic balance, Karzai being a Pushtun who is close to the ex-king Zahir Shah and also enjoys the confidence of all the factions at Bonn.

The cabinet includes two women, one of whom has been appointed one of the five vice chairpersons empowered to take cabinet meetings and represent the administration in the absence of the chairman.

Zahir Shah has been given the symbolic role of chairing the Loya Jirga.

A UN Security Council-mandated international security force will be deployed in and around Kabul and other urban centres if required (Kandahar after its fall comes to mind as the next possible location for such a force).

The size, composition and deployment of the force will be decided by the Afghans themselves.

British troop deployment has been turned down, having become redundant after the accord in any case.

The international security force will probably remain deployed until Afghan security forces and a new national army are brought into existence.

Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, admitted in his speech at Bonn that the accord was far from perfect, since the signatories were not fully representative of the Afghan polity.

But perhaps this was the best that could be achieved under the circumstances.

Professor Rabbani seems to have been sidelined, although he may find a role in the bodies to follow the setting up of the cabinet.

Pushtun representation, although taken account of, remains to be adequately provided for.

The agreement was considered crucial for getting billions of dollars of potential reconstruction aid for the country.

Positive signals have been put out by the new chairman Hamid Karzai as well as President General Pervez Musharraf to turn over a new leaf in cordial relations and cooperation between Pakistan and the new dispensation in Afghanistan.

The history of acrimonious relations between Pakistan and the Northern Alliance should now pass into history along with whatever remains of the Taliban.

Karzai has indicated he would be amenable to offering amnesty to any Taliban fighters who lay down their weapons.

This has particular resonance for the fate of the siege of Kandahar, where reports of contacts between Karzai’s forces and the defending Taliban garrison, apparently with Mulla Omar’s blessings, are being received.

This does not, it seems, sit well with the Americans who have expressed their unhappiness at the idea of an amnesty to any of the Taliban.

The text of the accord speaks of it being the first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic, fully representative government.

That implies that there will be room for filling in the Pushtun representation to a satisfactory level in future steps.

The Special Independent Commission of 21 members being set up within one month to convene the Emergency Loya Jirga will be composed of people conversant with international law and traditional practice in Afghanistan.

The accord restores the 1964 Afghan constitution, subject to compatibility with the provisions of the accord itself.

A Supreme Court will be established, and the judicial system put back in place.

An Independent Human Rights Commission will oversee human rights norms and investigate and set up mechanisms to deal with violations.

Although there may well be many a slip yet, given the considerable difficulties still attending the setting up of a unified administrative system in war-torn Afghanistan, the Bonn accord represents a good beginning.

The UN’s success in bringing about this consensus, with hindsight, only became possible after the overthrow of the antediluvian rule of the Taliban.

Afghanistan now has a good chance to emerge into the light of day in the 21st century.

• Editorial, The Frontier Post, Karachi, December 7

The US marines have finally landed at a place near Kandahar to ensure they get a taste of actual action without much loss of life before it ends. One could never be too sure after Vietnam. In any case an American 'fought' war without the Marines would have been a travesty of history. But this time the game was different. With Afghanistan being a land-locked country, their traditional beachhead was left hundreds of miles to the south and they had to do with a landing by air in an already badly battered country and occupy a remote airstrip. The initial force quickly built up to 1200.

The Marines were originally expected to join the conflict, but it was never clear when or in what capacity. Bush administration had never committed itself on an exact role for the US armed forces till the very end and whatever American participation there was, involved special services personnel. Even at present it is not known what the Marines will do because it seems unlikely that they will join in the final assault on Kandahar and suffer heavy casualties, President Bush's declaration that Americans are ready to accept losses notwithstanding. The Northern Alliance had to pay a price after they failed to negotiate an end. There are suggestions that the Marines will help in catching the two most wanted men and Al Qaeda operatives and whatever other persons there are on US list.

But, even running a dragnet along Pakistan border and combing the countryside will be a temporary task which again does not quite answer the question for the Marines' deployment. Their prolonged presence, even if it is meant to provide logistics support for whatever stabilising force is put into place will be a source of concern for the neighbouring states. They could become handy targets for ambitious Afghan political groups to rouse popular emotions. Foreign occupation armies always incite anger, hostility and extremism among locals. More so for the Americans who carry an exceptionally heavy baggage of global animosity. For Pakistan any sort of disturbance across the border in a country still to stabilise will be pregnant with danger. With a large number of Afghan refugees who are unlikely to go back for a long time, there could well be forays across the 'porous' border with dire consequences for Islamabad.

A UN peace force will be a better option to maintain law and order in the country till the Afghans are able to manage their own affairs. The Marines could not possibly contribute much in bringing political stability to Afghanistan without opening a Pandora's box. Their role would end when the last of the troublemakers was rounded up. They should then hand over their duties to the Blue Berets.

-- Editorial, The News, November 28, 2001

While one hopes that the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan will be friendly towards Pakistan, it is difficult to share President Pervez Musharraf's optimism on this score. In his interview with PTV on Monday night, the president said he was not unduly worried over the existence of a Northern Alliance government in Kabul at the moment, because "Pakistan has its own importance with regard to Afghanistan." To a certain extent, one may agree with the chief executive here, because the Northern Alliance government is a temporary phenomenon.

Talks have already begun in Bonn, and sooner or later Kabul will have a multi-ethnic and broad-based government enjoying the confidence of all sections of Afghanistan's population. In fact, the delegates to the Bonn conference have no choice but to work out the modalities for the establishment of a broad-based government. Without such a set-up, they know and the world knows, Afghanistan will again relapse into a new era of anarchy and fratricide.

The big question is whether such a government will be friendly towards Pakistan. The president thinks it will be, but the logic he gives is too simplistic. Afghanistan is a landlocked country, the president said, and thus "whatever government comes into being in Afghanistan will be friendly towards Pakistan." History does not bear this out.

Afghanistan has always been landlocked, but there were quite a few governments in Kabul that were not only not friendly towards Pakistan, they were quite hostile. Notwithstanding the fact that all of Afghanistan's import and export trade goes through Pakistan, Kabul has seldom taken this into account.

In fact, Afghanistan was the only country that cast a negative vote on Pakistan's membership of the United Nations. Side by side, in concert with Moscow and New Delhi, Kabul carried on a virulent campaign against Pakistan on the Pakhtoonistan stunt.

Zahir Shah's overthrow made no difference to the situation, because governments led by Dawood, Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, and Najibullah continued to maintain a highly inimical posture towards Pakistan. Thus, to assume that the next government would be friendly simply because Afghanistan is a landlocked country and dependent upon Pakistan for essential supplies is to assume too much.

If Islamabad wants friendly relations with Afghanistan, it should let the new government settle down and help it clear the debris of war. Events have proved that Pakistan's policy of getting involved too deeply in Afghanistan's internal matters has backfired.

Relying too heavily on one faction to the exclusion of the others was a short-sighted policy that in no way advanced Pakistan's long-term interest of having a friendly government in Afghanistan. The fall of the Taliban regime and the possibility of a new broad-based government coming into being give Pakistan a chance to start a new relationship with Afghanistan.

While Pakistan's desire to have a friendly government in Kabul is quite legitimate, on no account should Islamabad expect to have a puppet government there. By words and actions, Islamabad should convince Kabul that it has no favourites in Afghanistan and that it believes in a policy of mutual non-interference in each other's affairs. At the same time, Pakistan should join the international community in helping Afghanistan re-build itself. This would also make it possible for the millions of Afghan refugees to go back home. Pakistan and Afghanistan have so much in common. Both can benefit from peace and economic cooperation if the two decide not to repeat mistakes.

-- Editorial, Dawn, Karachi, November 28, 2001

Even as the Afghan war gradually reaches an end, and the element of regular US troops has been added to the theatre, it continues to exact a high toll of human life despite the assurances from the winning players that the vanquished will not be harmed. Reports of US casualties have also surfaced, but strongly denied, though in a war zone, casualties are nothing abnormal. But the killing of hundreds of Taliban prisoners, which included a sizeable number of foreign fighters, in a fort in Mazar-e-Sharif by Rashid Dostum's forces, purportedly as the result of a revolt by the prisoners, shows how fragile assurances can be. The full details of the clash from an independent source are still not known which makes it difficult to knowledgeably comment on the issue, but it appears that either the Uzbek soldiery was trigger-happy or the prisoners made an error of judgment or it was a mixture of both. The result is that hundreds died who did not deserve such an end when they had already experienced the worst of the war and surrendered. The death of a US special forces personnel in the mayhem gives it a sinister twist that was least needed.

The fears that the Northern Alliance and other fronts and groups besting the Taliban will indulge in reprisal killing, particularly of the non-Afghan fighters, to avenge the treatment they allegedly received under Taliban rule, had already been globally voiced. The student militia's period was not without its bloody side when not only human rights but human life itself was not respected. The winners in the war blame the foreigners to a great measure for their miseries and had already voiced their determination to subject them to similar treatment. There have been incidents in the less publicised segments of the conflict when the victors extracted full payment, in kind, for what they had paid. Bamian was identified as the scene of a massacre for the second time. The first time it happened when Taliban occupied the area.

It was wrong to expect that this war would be fought according to the rules of whatever conventions there are on making a war more humane. War essentially is an application of violence designed to kill people, not to merely deprive them of their weapons. Prisoners are relative to the nature of the conflict, their identity being established only by the successful side if it deems it as such. When a battle is fought to the bitter then no prisoners are expected to be taken, even if they are there. The sad truth is that the Afghan war which was given a moral lamination by the United States as a strike against terror, is being fought at the ground level with a strong element of revenge. Mazar-i-Sharif was a reflection of that spirit. Since more surrenders and more killings are almost inevitable, it is imperative that the US and the UN send out a loud and clear message to all the parties to keep the carnage at the bare minimum level.

-- Editorial, The News, November 27, 2001

A fog of confusion still shrouds the mayhem at a fortress holding Taliban prisoners outside Mazar-i-Sharif. According to conflicting reports, the number of prisoners killed in the shootout on Sunday range between 100 and 700. The captives, mainly foreign Taliban fighters, had surrendered to Northern Alliance forces in Kunduz on Saturday following a prolonged siege of what was the last Taliban-held city in northern Afghanistan.

According to Northern Alliance spokesmen, the violence was sparked off by a riot at the fortress controlled by local warlord Abdur Rashid Dostum. According to this version, the instigators were the hard core Chechen, Arab, Uzbek and Pakistani fighters whom the US views as the elite force of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network.

A fierce shoot-out took place when the prisoners managed to disarm the guards and sieze weapons from them. The Pentagon, however, claims that the prisoners had somehow managed to smuggle weapons into the fortress. When the riot could not be quelled, some reports say that US planes were called in to provide support to the Alliance, and heavy bombardment of the prison compound followed. In the ensuing chaos, a large number of prisoners are believed to have died. According to unconfirmed reports, one US advisor was also killed while directing the operation from the ground. Eyewitnesses claim that a number of plain-clothed US personnel were present during the shootout.

After the dust settles on this gruesome episode, a number of important questions are likely to be asked. One fear being voiced is that the massacre may have been deliberately instigated or allowed to go out of control, a charge that the Northern Alliance strongly denies. While no direct evidence is available, the intense hatred among the Alliance for the foreign fighters is more than obvious.

Senior US spokesmen have also maintained that the foreign Taliban were legitimate targets because of their links to al Qaeda. During the siege of Kunduz, it had become clear that the foreign Taliban were not likely to be treated with the kind of magnanimity displayed towards their Afghan counterparts. The foreign fighters expressed reservations about surrendering to the Alliance because they feared for their lives. Many foreigners had earlier been lynched or severely beaten up following the withdrawal of the Taliban from city after city.

Bowing to international pressure, acting president Burhanuddin Rabbani announced in Kabul that foreign Taliban prisoners would not be harmed and would be handed over to the UN. However, in the chaotic conditions prevailing in Afghanistan, what is decreed in the capital need not automatically prevail in other parts of the country held by different warlords.

The Pakistan government, already wary about the intentions of the Alliance and under public pressure to press for the release of its captured nationals, has strongly condemned the massacre and stated that it contravenes UN Security Council resolutons urging respect for the Geneva Convention. The Northern Alliance as well as the US-led coalition must immediately launch an inquiry into the terrible events in Mazar-i-Sharif if they want to restore the victors' credibility in the eyes of the world. With the fall of the last Taliban stronghold of Kandahar imminent, the authorities will have to move swiftly to quell fears for the safety of the thousands of foreign fighters in the city.

Editorial, Dawn, November 27, 2001

With the surrender of at least 2,000 of the Taliban garrison in Kunduz, including some 600 foreign fighters, all but the spiritual capital of Kandahar has been lost to anti-Taliban forces.

Some 2,500 Uzbek troops of General Rashid Dostum are already inside the city, while 2,000 troops of the Tajik forces under General Mohammad Daud east of the city will probably have entered it by the time these lines appear in print.

There will be relief all round that the threatened massacre has been avoided.

Ultimately, the combined air and ground assault on their positions proved too much for the defenders of Kunduz to withstand any longer.

Relief is also being felt at the prospect of the foreign fighters in Kunduz being turned over to the UN, rather than being ‘dealt’ with by the Northern Alliance forces themselves.

All in all, a satisfactory denouement from all accounts.It must be conceded that the Northern Alliance leadership has confounded all its critics by behaving extremely responsibly.

Their past record, which had been trotted out repeatedly in recent days to underline the threat of a humanitarian disaster in Kunduz, may have helped persuade them that this is not 1992.

They have managed to rise to the occasion and shown unexpected political maturity.

This is a good omen for a new beginning in Afghanistan.

Horrendous reports of mass graves of massacred opposition fighters in areas held until recently by the Taliban have been coming in.

In Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat (the Shindand airbase) and elsewhere, a pattern of summary executions is discernible.

Many of the bodies showed sign of torture before they were executed.

It is interesting that since the tide of battle began to turn, a whole panoply of international humanitarian and human rights organisations have been expressing concern about the possibility of massacres by the Northern Alliance troops of captured Taliban prisoners.

Remarkably, there has only been the odd case, in Kabul after its fall for example.

The undeniable proof of Taliban mass atrocities on the other hand, does raise questions about where these keepers of the world’s conscience were when the Taliban were up to these horrendous acts.

One wonders whether the perpetrators of these crimes against humanity will ever be brought to book.

In the last remaining Taliban redoubt of Kandahar, reports that Takhtapul on the Kandahar-Spin Boldak road to the border with Pakistan has been taken by forces under a local tribal chief have been strenuously denied by the Taliban.

In strategic terms, it is hardly of any consequence.

The Taliban are clearly on their last conventional military legs.

How much strength they have left to resist in unconventional ways, remains to be seen.

As anticipated in these columns, heroin has started flooding into the European (and perhaps other?) market through, it is alleged, Pakistan.

If the Taliban are to have any chance of fighting a protracted guerrilla war, given their internal and international isolation, it was almost inevitable that they would restart the heroin trade to finance their resistance.

Necessity, they say, is the mother of invention.

In this case, it is rumoured that the much vaunted ban on poppy cultivation by the Taliban when they were in power, had less to do with a moral edict and more with the reported glut in the international heroin market, which had caused the street price to fall.

The Taliban are said to have enormous stores of heroin, perhaps for just such ‘emergencies’.

One dead giveaway of their intent would be if poppy cultivation emerges again in the countryside of Afghanistan, most likely in the southern areas still nominally under their control.

This would be easy to detect by the US’s technological intelligence gathering capacity.

Now that the Taliban rule is drawing to a close, it is time to take stock of the human rights violations by the fanatical Taliban regime.

If the perpetrators can be identified and are in captivity, a mechanism to bring them to justice must be set up under international supervision.

And if they intend to finance their continuing resistance through the heroin trade, that only lends more ammunition to their critics and throws them open to deserved retribution.

- Editorial, Frontier Post, November 26

The families of hundreds of Pakistanis missing or trapped inside Afghanistan are understandably worried about what is in store for their near and dear ones. In Kunduz alone, according to reports, there are several hundred Pakistanis and other foreigners, mostly Arabs, Chechens and some Indonesians.

While the Northern Alliance's warlords have hinted at offering amnesty to the Afghan Taliban, they have not shown the same degree of compassion towards the Taliban's foreign comrades. Astonishing as it may appear, the Pakistan Foreign Office has done little to stir itself on the matter.

Obviously, Islamabad has no line of communication with the Alliance leadership. Which is a sad commentary on its Afghan policy: its total support to Taliban in the latter part of the last decade gave it enemy status with the Northern leadership. For this reason, worried Pakistanis are using satellite telephones or sometimes venturing to go into Afghanistan themselves to rescue, or to know the fate of, their relations.

More important, the issue has domestic political implications for Pakistan, since some tribal groups have hinted that they would take non-Pakhtoon Afghan refugees hostage. This is a grim scenario and could lead to a bloodbath if the Alliance leadership shows recklessness in dealing with foreign volunteers, including Pakistanis.

Unfortunately, the US has not shown the kind of responsibility that was expected of it. Perhaps, it would be more fruitful if Pakistan got in touch with Tehran and Ankara because of their contacts with the Northern leadership.

Understandably, Kofi Annan, too, has not displayed any zeal to save the lives of non-Afghan Taliban because of American indifference. It is time Pakistan informed all permanent members of the Security Council of the gravity of the situation and used its clout with Beijing and western capitals to avert a bloodbath.

-- Editorial, Dawn, November 25, 2001

THAT Professor Rabbani and General Dostum have contacted President Musharraf is to be considered a welcome development by all. Even more welcome is the assurance by both that they do not want to establish a Northern Alliance administration in Kabul, but were committed to a multi-ethnic and broad-based government. That the initiative for establishing contact should have come from the Alliance is a reflection on the mindset of Pakistan's Foreign Office, which is characterized by lack of initiative and drive. It should now avail itself of the opportunity to improve relations between the two sides which have deteriorated seriously during the last six years.

That Pakistan has legitimate interests in Afghanistan has been recognized by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi also. This requires Islamabad to enjoy at least some goodwill among all significant Afghan political forces. Two factors have stood in the way so far. First were the efforts made by certain countries jockeying for influence in Kabul, particularly Russia and India, which have all along tried to encourage anti-Pakistan sentiment among various political forces and sections of Afghan society. Second came inflexibility and lack of imagination on the part of our policymakers who have over the years put all their eggs in one basket. One can only hope that both countries would be wiser after having burnt their fingers. What is needed in the meanwhile is a more dynamic approach by the Foreign Office. Of all outside parties, Pakistan has the greatest interest in a stable government in its neighbourhood. Whatever the outcome of the Bonn process, and whatever shape the Pushtoon representation takes, Pakistan has to accept that Professor Rabbani and General Dostum, no matter how devious the former, and how thuggish the latter, will play leading roles in Afghanistan's immediate future. Therefore, any improvement in relations with these two is sensible, and also provides an opportunity to Pakistan to rectify its past Pushtoon tilt. Pakistan will always have greater affinity to Pushtoons because of the crossborder tribes, but that does not mean the other ethnicities must continue to be ignored.

Stability in Afghanistan can only be guaranteed by a truly broad-based and multi-ethnic government. Further, the interim set-up being visualized in the Bonn process needs to be bolstered by a multinational force. This is required for three purposes: to establish the writ of the new government, to discourage infighting among rival groups, and to demilitarize Kabul. Professor Rabbani and General Dostum need to understand that unless Kabul is demilitarized, doubts about Alliance intentions, created by recent statements by some of its leaders, will remain. The best way to inspire confidence among all groups is to request OIC members to contribute a joint force.

When dialogue goes on with the Alliance, it must be made to understand that Pakistan has got to take into account Pushtoon sensitivities. Pakistan should also persuade the Alliance leadership, particularly General Dostum, that a humanitarian approach to the Pakistani members of the besieged Taliban garrison in Kunduz will strengthen attempts at creating goodwill.

-- Editorial, The Nation, Lahore, November 24, 2001

The world seems to be more interested in the fate of Kunduz than in what happens after the Taliban surrender. While the dateline for the Taliban to surrender has been changing, concern is mounting about those who will surrender. The Taliban garrison defending Kunduz consists of both the native (predominantly Pakhtoon) Afghans and foreign volunteers - mostly Pakistanis, Arabs, Chechens and some Indonesians.

What is worrying is the attitude of the Northern Alliance's military leadership. From what has appeared in the press, it seems the NA generals are making a difference between Afghan and non-Afghan defenders of Kunduz. While they have said nothing specific about how the Afghan Taliban would be treated, they have dropped dark hints about the fate of non-Afghan fighters.

Prisoners of war in modern times are treated according to the Geneva conventions. Taken prisoner whether during the fighting or after a formal surrender, the PoW is entitled to certain privileges. These include humane treatment, proper food, adequate medical treatment, the right to receive letters and gifts from his home and international relief agencies, and safe return home after the war is over.

The only exceptions are those PoWs who are held guilty of war crimes or crimes against humanity: they are tried, given the right to defend themselves and ultimately punished or set free according to norms of justice. However, reports coming out of Afghanistan portray a dark picture, for certain elements in the Northern Alliance militia seem to discriminate between Afghan Taliban and non-Afghan combatants.

Shocking as it may appear, the US, which normally would uphold Geneva conventions in other cases, is ominously silent on the fate of non-Afghan Taliban. In fact, some of Donald Rumsfeld's statements on the issue are highly disturbing, for the US defence secretary has avoided coming out categorically in favour of adhering to the Geneva conventions. While the US has every right to pursue its war aims in Afghanistan, it has to do so in a responsible manner, without allowing the process to be vitiated by a spirit of vengeance or spite and without any discrimination between one group of adversaries and another. In fact, as the leader of the world coalition against terrorism, Washington has to use its influence with the anti-Taliban Alliance to prevent the massacre of non-Afghan volunteers after the Taliban holed up in Kunduz give up arms.

Pakistan has to realize the gravity of the situation. Immediately after the war began, thousands of Pakistanis crossed over into Afghanistan. That Islamabad did not wish them to do so or was unable to stop them is beside the point. Those who went to join what they believed to be their sacred duty included not only tribesmen but many other groups of Taliban enthusiasts. In Kunduz alone, the number of foreign volunteers varies from 1,000 to as high as 10,000. Clearly, when the hostilities end, they are as much entitled to a safe passage as native Afghans.

One hopes Pakistan will take up the issue of safe passage of the non-Taliban elements in Kunduz with the US and Britain and ensure that they remain unharmed. The safe return of foreign volunteers in no way runs counter to the world coalition's aim of punishing the terrorists involved in the Sept 11 carnage. While those against whom there are specific charges should be dealt with accordingly, other combatants must be treated according to the Geneva conventions and allowed to return home safely.

The race is on for Kabul. Mr Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Jamiat-e-Islami leader recognised by the UN as the legitimate president of Afghanistan but debunked by Pakistan, is back in the capital, pruning himself for re-anointment. He is a Tajik. Mr Zahir Shah, the deposed king of Afghanistan long spurned by Pakistan and now baited by the West, is waiting for a nod from the Unites States to stake a claim to the throne. He is a Pashtun. Meanwhile, Moscow, an old Indian ally which despises Pakistan, has thrown its weight behind Mr Rabbani. Not to be left behind, India is straining at the leash to play a significant role in Afghanistan now that the Taliban are gone and the Northern Alliance which it partly funded and trained is back in the saddle. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are supporting the NA Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum and Iran’s NA protégé is the Persian-speaking Gen Ismail Khan. Pakistan is unfortunately nowhere in the scene with its proclaimed band of loyal Pashtuns.

Next Monday, the UN will herd into Berlin nearly 40 military commanders and politicians claiming to represent one segment or another of the people of Afghanistan. Their job is to agree on a special governing committee to oversee the transition to an interim government approved by a loya jirga or tribal assembly until general elections are held in a couple of years in Afghanistan. This moot follows an implicit US warning to the NA that it won’t be allowed to fly solo, not least because its control over most of Afghan territory following the rout of the Taliban is due largely to US military might but also because it doesn’t represent the dominant Pashtun community of the country.

The UN, prodded by the US, wants to move fast in order to stop the country from sliding into another bloody round of civil war. Despite its high sounding name, the triumphant NA is riven with ethnic and military rivalries which make it volatile. The three generals who captured Mazhar i Sharif — Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek; Atta Mohammad, a Tajik; and Ustad Mohaqqik, a Haraza — are at loggerheads. Gen Ismail Khan, who has established control over Herat and the western territories, has serious differences with the NA group holding Kabul. In Jalalabad, the Pashtun commander Haji Abdul Kadeer, (brother of commander Abdul Haq who was executed by the Taliban) has become governor and is pushing Pashtun interests. In Kabul itself, even as the pro-Russia and pro-Iran Rabbani bills himself as president, effective power remains in the hands of Tajiks like Younus Qanuni (interior minister), Dr Abdullah Abdullah (foreign minister) and Gen Mohammad Fahim (army chief) who are all inclined to look to the US just as much as to Russia and Iran. The internal challenges within the NA also come from the Shia Hazara fighters of the Hizbe Wahadat party that is demanding a stake in governing Kabul because of a strong Hazara presence in the city.

Worse from the point of view of a quick peace plan, the deal between the NA and Zahir Shah, struck with some fanfare last month, is all but off. Former Taliban commanders in the south of the country have bolted from Kabul-Kandahar’s central command and become Pashtun chieftains bent upon staking and exercising control over large swathes of territory in their own right. And renegade, armed groups and roaming bandits are once again the order of the day. With no one in a commanding position in Afghanistan, the potential for internal strife has increased alarmingly. In this difficult and unsure situation, what should Pakistan do? How can it protect its national interests?

Some analysts think that continuing political and military chaos may not be such a bad thing after all from Pakistan’s point of view. If every major player turns out to be a loser and a vacuum persists, Pakistan might be able to exercise some leverage in the southern and eastern Pashtun belts by default. The geographic contiguity that has condemned Pakistan to embrace Afghanistan might, it is argued, also give it the advantage of re-engaging Afghanistan after the other players have thrown up their hands in despair or exhaustion. Thus this line of thinking suggests that Islamabad should bide its time while ironing out its differences with Iran, another country geographically placed to play a long-term role in Afghanistan.

Alternatively, and more realistically, Pakistan could become pro-active and reach out to Zahir Shah, who has full Western support, may be eventually acceptable to the power-brokers in the NA and is potentially the least objectionable or undesirable person to temporarily lead and represent the Pashtuns. In fact, Pakistan’s interest lies not only in an Afghan state that is friendly and sufficiently Pashtun-led but one that is united and stable. Continuing chaos could lead to the Balkanisation of Afghanistan along ethnic lines which would eventually spill over into Pakistan by rousing its Pashtuns into violent sub-nationalism and separatism. The worst policy, of course, would be one of sulking indifference to key players and regional developments or brash confidence in one’s own indispensability in the order of things, which has unfortunately been the case so far.

- Editorial, The Friday Times, Lahore, November 23

President Pervez Musharraf has assured his cabinet, and through it the rest of the country, that Pakistan's stand on the future Afghan government has been adopted by the rest of the world. "Everyone now talks of a multi-ethnic and broad-based representative government," the President said expressing a large measure of satisfaction. Is this satisfaction justified is another question because the reality is that everyone seems to be giving a different meaning to the same set of words. Worries and uncertainties are multiplying over many things. The UN-convened conference in Bonn is a case in point: are the groups invited to it really representative of all Afghan ethnicities? Who precisely and how many are going to represent the largest Pashtun largest group of Afghans? What will be the UN's own role in Afghanistan. The experience for Pakistan so far has not been very encouraging. Pakistan first desired that Northern Alliance (NA) troops should not enter Kabul City. That did not happen. It also wanted this capital city to be demilitarised and be run presumably by the UN itself. Nobody paid any attention to this suggestion. On the contrary, all of Islamabad's fears came true when NA troops entered Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat; the atrocities committed by NA are likely to be remembered long. These have besmirched America's name for so many.

Pakistan government has now made representation to the UN that it should ensure that humanitarian law is not violated by those besieging Kunduz where a great tragedy is about to unfold. The possibility of a mass slaughter of Taliban and their foreign supporters looms large, although some signs are now visible that the Afghan Taliban may be allowed safe passage but thousands of foreigners, including Pakistanis, will have to perish there or be taken prisoners, that is if the NA took that trouble. Except for one uncertain voice of a NA commander, there has been no indication that those who would surrender, or be taken prisoner, would be treated like prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention on the subject. Northern Alliance has so far been insistent that its amnesty offer would not apply to non-Afghans. What would be the future of thousands of Pakistanis and Arabs holed up in horribly bombed city? Although no one would sympathise with what these armed goons did to Afghanistan and the world community for years, yet they are human beings and the civilised world is expected not to behave like these criminals.

Other uncertainties include the composition of the envisaged new Afghan government. The fact of the matter is that many interested powers are jousting for influencing judgment of the US administration on the question. What they actually aim at is the inclusion of their favourites in the government-to-be. Those keenly interested in the matter include Russia, Iran and India. Some of them are quite obstreperous. Clearly, Northern Alliance is the general favourite of all and even former Taliban are going to be kept out. In terms of hard facts of life, after being defeated in war it shall have no place in the next government. It is understandable. But that should not mean that the entire Pashtun community should be excluded. It is possible that some lightweight Pashtun non-entities may be taken in as show boys in the new set up. Up to a point, this is true for all ethnic entities. But the chosen Pashtun men have to have some standing and gravitas even for conferences. It could be asked as to which Afghans attended the US-convened conference in Washington that was intended to draw up the sketch of the brave new Afghanistan that the international Coalition wants to build.

Pakistan had been given many assurances that its 'valid' concerns about the future Afghan government will be respected. This was specifically conceded by the British prime minister Tony Blair who otherwise acts as a peripatetic Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Bush Administration. Americans too have been giving assurances to Pakistan of all manner. Yet the questions that need to be asked now are: Is anyone listening to Islamabad? Were any of the assurances honoured? The US decision-makers did what they had planned from the beginning or what the logic of the situation demanded. Keeping Pakistan's interests in mind or to redeem the implied or explicit pledges has remained elusive so far.

As for Islamabad ruler's self-satisfaction over having been vindicated in their formulations, it should be seen for what it is. It is a merely verbal acceptance of a vague, undefined, generic formula. Every power that feels concerned can produce a distinctive 'broad-based, multi-ethnic and representative' government of all major ethnic groups, but will others accept it. What is Pakistan's bottom line to accept any such formula? Will we be happy if a couple of Pashtun names are included in the list of ministers and given portfolios of say sports or tourism? Let us not make premature declarations of satisfaction. Pakistan's role cannot be minimised in the new set of things and we must keep our goals and direction sharply focused.

-- Editorial, The News, Islamabad, November 23, 2001

President Pervez Musharraf is right when he says that images in the western media of extremists protesting in the streets of Pakistani cities do not represent an accurate picture of the public opinion. The president wants the silent majority - those who do not support the extremists - to make its voice heard. However, this is easier said than done. The best way to do this would be to hold rallies, and some have been held, albeit with relatively low turnouts. But it is not as simple as that.

The extremists, who spew fire and venom, see things in black and white: America represents evil, the Taliban are good, and, thus, an attack on Afghanistan becomes an attack on Islam. However, those who oppose the extremists do not necessarily read the situation through a black-or-white lens. For them, opposition to the extremists does not necessarily mean support for the government stand, primarily because the latter would involve condoning the bombing and the civilian deaths.

Having said that: even if the moderate and tolerant were to come out in the streets or decide, as the president put it, to stand up to a mosque preacher who spreads hate, will the law be there to protect them if matters get out of hand? Unfortunately, experience has shown that past governments, and perhaps slightly less so this one, have often gone out of their way to appease extremist elements. And when it came to protecting those from the silent majority who would like to stand up, the government was hardly ever there.

Since Sept 11 and after the bombing, the government has given considerable leeway to the organizers of the Pakistan-Afghan Defence Council to hold rallies, knowing what their street power is. However, the same sort of flexibility was not forthcoming when it came to allowing citizens' groups to hold rallies - rallies that would have attracted far fewer people, no doubt, but would have served to restore some balance to media coverage. If the president wants the silent majority to speak up, the least he could do is to send an appropriate message to elements in the state apparatus who tend to look at civil society with suspicion and derision.

- Editorial, Dawn, Karachi, November 19, 2001

Amid conflicting reports about the fate of Kandahar, the headquarters of the Taliban movement and the last important city still in their control, the need for diplomatic moves to install a broad-based government in Afghanistan has acquired even greater urgency. With the Taliban exodus to the hills beginning in the south and pro-Taliban forces hopelessly outnumbered and surrounded by hostile forces in Kunduz to the north, the writing is very much there on the wall for the Taliban.

The beleagured Taliban are soon likely to be left with no territory of any worth in Afghanistan. Given this backdrop, it is gratifying to know that Pakistan is getting positive signals from all sides with regard to the formation of a broad-based post-Taliban government. A number of diplomatic moves are afoot and, though a consensus has not yet emerged, the diplomats, mercifully, are not working at cross-purposes.

On Thursday, America's special envoy, James Dobbins, met President Musharraf and others to discuss the government-making issue in Afghanistan. He has already met exiled former king Zahir Shah in Rome. Also on Thursday, Iranian Interior Minister Mousavi-Lari met the president and apprised him of his government's view on the Afghan situation.

Earlier in the week, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal had unveiled a joint Saudi-Pakistan peace plan for a broad-based government in Kabul. Meanwhile, on Friday President Musharraf had a telephone conversation with the Chinese President who also supported the moves to set up a multi-ethnic government in Afghanistan. Significantly, the Russians, too, seem to have softened their support for the Northern Alliance, with a senior diplomat stating that Pukhtoons should play a prominent role in any future government. All these plans do not go against, but seem in harmony with, the Security Council resolution passed on Wednesday.

The Council resolution reaffirmed that the UN should play a "central role" in establishing a transitional council that should pave the way for a broader government acceptable to all sections of Afghanistan's population. Earlier, press reports said Pakistan had received positive signals even from the Northern Alliance through Islamabad's friends in Ankara and Tehran.

This means virtually all sides agree on the need for moving with speed to ensure a UN presence in Kabul. In fact, by the time these lines appear in print, some peacekeeping troops might already have moved into Kabul. This peacekeeping force has the world body's blessings, though it will not be wearing the UN's blue helmet.

Indications are that it will be replaced by a UN force consisting of troops drawn from some Muslim countries. There is a need now for calling a meeting of different Afghan factions at the earliest. There are hints that Qatar, as the current chairman of the Organization of Islamic Conference, might be willing to host such a meeting. Given the consensus that appears on all sides, one hopes the Afghan factions and diplomats from Afghanistan's neighbours and other members of the US-led coalition will get the process going. The aim should obviously be to ensure an honest implementation of the UN plan that visualizes giving Afghanistan a government that would truly reflect its ethnic and cultural mosaic.

-- Editorial, Dawn, Karachi, November 18

Political situation that is resulting from the American war on Taliban with its ugly fallout is dangerous. All the polarisations that characterised Pakistan's political life are so much more threatening today. The most serious one remains the one between the modernists and pro-Taliban Islamicists. This is an old one the history of which can be traced back to earliest years of Pakistan. None of the other polarities has gone away either. Indeed they are so much more intense. There was and is a major controversy between strong centre wallahs and regional nationalists who swear by true federalism. There was also the wide gulf between the rich and the poor. It is wider today. A subsidiary to the former division between modernists and hard Islamicists is, in addition to the older leftists versus rightwingers, the one between those who support the military regime and those who want undiluted democracy.

As the pressures from the US to cooperate with it on its own terms are growing, it is matched by Indian growls of hot pursuit of cross-border terrorists in Kashmir. The Indian intentions cannot be assessed as good by anyone. It is also a time when the feeling is growing in the country that the US and its close allies are perhaps deliberately neglecting their moral duty to stabilise and strengthen Pakistan's balance of payments even as the economic situation is growing worse.

It is obvious that, irrespective of what the military regime thinks it can do, the situation is clearly beyond its capacity to tackle all problems alone. All political parties have to join their heads and hands to cope with the multifarious challenges that are staring Pakistan in the face. PML is now in so many bits and pieces that its effectiveness is under serious doubt; in any case what its leaders' capacity is for producing alternative solutions produces even greater uncertainty. PPP leaders appear to be mainly interested in the release of Asif Ali Zardari and guarantees for the safe return of Benazir Bhutto; actual solutions to the pressing problems are not engaging their immediate attention. Much the same can be said for the MQM, the third largest party. And so on. One suspects that most parties think that since a military regime has taken over, which wants to go it alone in all things, we'll let it solve all the problems as best as it can.

This, unfortunately is not patriotism. The delusion of the military that it has the panacea for every trouble has to be seen for what it is. But Pakistan comes first. It is time for all the parties to sit together and see whether they can produce alternatives required amidst a heap of failed policies. It is a challenge all Pakistanis have to meet.

-- Editorial, The News, Islamabad, November 16, 2001

Pakistan has done well to ask the UN to ensure the observance of human rights in Afghanistan following the entry of Northern Alliance troops in Kabul and elsewhere. Islamabad's fear of a possible deterioration of the human rights situation is justified, given Afghanistan's history of the last more than a decade.

When the victorious Mujahideen entered Kabul to oust Najibullah's government, there were mass executions, besides widespread looting and plunder. Later, when the Taliban assumed power in most of Afghanistan, human rights were violated under the cover of religion. Whole villages were razed, orchards were destroyed, political enemies were summarily executed, and a new code of conduct, especially harsh on women, was enforced. The fall of Kabul has been welcomed by the populace. But there are reports of grave human rights violations and summary executions in Kabul, while in Mazar-i-Sharif, 200 Taliban soldiers who had surrendered were slaughtered.

Obviously, the Northern Alliance forces are there by courtesy of the US-led military forces which facilitated their advance west and southward by destroying the military power and by putting them on the run on the northern frontlines. However, now that their occupation of Kabul and some other cities is a fact, there is need to remind them that their role is temporary. What the world expects of them is to maintain peace and security till a UN peacekeeping force takes over.

Once this force assumes control, the UN's five-point plan can be put into operation. The key elements of this plan envisage a meeting of the representatives of all Afghan factions, the formation of a provisional council, the convening of a Loya Jirga and, finally, the induction of a broad-based government. Any deviation from this course is full of hazards. Mercifully, indications from the Northern Alliance quarters are that they are aware of the need for a government in which all communities will have a representation. One hopes that, till such time as a UN force moves in, NA commanders in areas under their control will ensure that no human rights violations take place and that they uphold human rights during the interim period.

-- Editorial, Dawn, Karachi, November 16, 2001

AFTER 20 years of high-cost Pakistani involvement in Afghanistan, it must have grieved every Pakistani to watch TV footage showing Kabulis raising anti-Pakistan slogans and bodies of reportedly Pakistani volunteers lying in the streets. It is also ironic to see policymakers eating crow by courting ex-King Zahir Shah or anxiously seeking the formation of a broadbased government, on the need for which they had failed to persuade the Taliban when Kabul was under their control. The strategic depth pipedream has vanished into thin air, as all illusions are ultimately bound to. It must have been equally embarrassing for policymakers, both civilian and military, to find they have no working relationship with Kabul’s new masters, the Northern Alliance, let alone a semblance of leverage.

With every passing day, the Alliance attitude is hardening. Its interior minister Younis Qanooni has started believing that the Taliban had retreated not because of the US bombing but the courage of his forces, and that Professor Rabbani is still President. While the entry into Kabul had earlier been justified on the ground that the Alliance wanted to ensure law and order in the abandoned city. Alliance ministers have started occupying government offices, implying they intend to administer the country. How the Alliance conceives of the shape of things to come can be gauged from its Foreign Minister’s proposals. A broadbased interim administration will be set up, he says, after the Taliban are sorted out, which might take months or even longer. He sees a role for the UN only after the Afghan groups have reached an understanding between themselves, implying that the exercise would be conducted under Alliance auspices. The interim administration would then hold countrywide elections after two years. While the US gives priority to getting Osama and Al-Qaida, forming a government under Professor Rabbani seems the principal Alliance goal. Meanwhile the media is reporting killings and looting in Alliance-controlled areas. UNICEF relief convoys have been confiscated by Alliance commanders and Pushtun drivers killed. In the Pushtun South and East, chaotic conditions are being created by warlords trying to take over. The longer the situation is fluid, the greater the difficulties of those deciding, rather belatedly, to undertake nation-building.

One hopes General Musharraf will deal with the situation with realism and urgency. Continuing to harbour the illusions which have characterized our Afghan policy will be extremely harmful. Pakistan must resist the temptation to take sides in another country’s domestic politics, even if opportunities are available. The government has to interact with the US to make the latter fulfill its promise to keep Kabul demilitarized until a broadbased government is in plac