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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 14, October 3, 2016
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
|
Paradigm
Shift?
Ajai
Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM & SATP
War,
in our epoch, is not an isolated, capricious phenomenon
which flouts the "normal" peaceful process of history...
the countenance of peace has been as blurred as
that of war."
Robert Strausz-Hupe, Willaim R. Kinlner, James E.
Dougherty & Alvin J. Cottrell, Protracted Conflict
|
In the
wake of the Uri attack on September 18, 2016, in which
20 Indian soldiers lost their lives, strident demands
for retaliation had been matched by arguments that, as
one prominent commentator expressed it, “action limited
to PoK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)... may not be sufficient
to compel the Pakistanis to shut down their jihad
factory.”
In just
four days since the ‘surgical strikes’ there have been
at least six intense ceasefire violations by Pakistan,
one infiltration bid across the Line of Control (LoC)
in Mendhar tehsil (revenue unit) of Poonch District
and another across the International Border (IB) in Gurdaspur,
Punjab, and two lesser terrorist attacks, in which one
civilian lost his life, to be capped by the attack at
Baramulla on the joint camp of the 46th Bn,
Rashtriya Rifles (RR), and 40th Bn, Border
Security Force (BSF). In the last of these, one BSF trooper
has been killed and another injured, while two terrorists
have also been killed. Search operations to locate and
neutralize the remaining terrorists involved in the Baramulla
incident are still ongoing at the time of writing.
The very
day after India's multiple and simultaneous "surgical
strikes" against terrorist launch pads in PoK, there was
an alleged 'infiltration bid', reportedly at Behigam at
Shopian (likely referring to an incident of exchange of
fire at Behi Bagh in Kulgam), to which one writer reacted
by observing:
Today a group of militants attempted to cross over
in Shopian area. This is apple country and a hotbed
of militancy. It shows that the attack of Indian
Army earlier had no effect on the jihadis.
|
These observations,
both before and after the ‘surgical strikes’ expose strategic
unintelligibility and the astonishing expectations that
afflict much of what passes for the ‘strategic community’
in India. The idea that a single strike ‘surgical’ or
otherwise, or any other single initiative – military or
non-military, and including dialogue and any surprise
agreement with Pakistan – is going to magically bring
the over 25-year long (and much longer by some calculations)
Pakistan-backed jihad in India to an abrupt and
final end, reflects an incoherence that borders on folly.
And while
these voices have presently and substantially been marginalized,
advocates of uninterrupted dialogue as a ‘solution’ to
the ‘problem of Kashmir’, despite the experience of at
least the past 25 years of jihad, and nearly 70
years of Pakistan’s relentless hostility, fall into another
category of comparable folly.
While both
perspectives have currently been pushed into the margins
of strident media debates in the wake of the surgical
strikes, they are important, as they reflect the long-established
‘default setting’ of the Indian establishment. As the
triumphalism of the surgical strikes recedes, and as Islamabad
suitably adjusts its postures and projections, they will
tend, inevitably, to reassert themselves. It is, consequently,
crucial to understand the common thread between these
two apparently contradictory positions.
Much of
the discourse on counter-terrorism in India has often
been dismissed by the opposite side as reflecting either
‘pessimism’ or ‘optimism’, and the two exemplars above
fall, respectively, into these categories. But both these
are not categories of strategic assessment; they are mindsets
or belief systems, and both tend to policy paralysis.
The pessimist dismisses all initiatives on the grounds
that the situation cannot be improved; the optimist insists
that things will necessarily improve, so it is best to
choose the path of least resistance, lest we upset the
applecart. It is these opposing attitudes, not
any coherent, reality based strategic calculus, that have
been decisive in India’s responses to the challenge of
Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorism over the past decades.
This mould
has now been shattered, not only by the scale of the surgical
strikes (which was likely unprecedented, though such cross
LoC operations themselves are not), but more importantly,
by their openness, and their official and global projection,
and also by the visible and dramatic shift in posture
and policy that preceded these. Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s statements on rights’ violations in Balochistan,
on the occasion of India’s Independence Day; the calm
and authoritative response to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s
crass harangue at the United Nations General Assembly,
delivered by Eenam Gambhir, the junior-most diplomat
at India’s Permanent Mission at the UN in New York; the
reiteration of this message by Sushma Swaraj, India’s
Minister of External Affairs, almost as an aside, in a
speech that focused principally on critical human issues
of the environment, poverty, inequality and development;
the mobilisation of regional support at the UN, expressed
in direct criticism of Islamabad as the fountainhead of
terrorism in South Asia, by both Afghanistan and Bangladesh;
and the eventual boycott of the SAARC Summit at Islamabad
by four member-states, in addition to India – Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka; all these were part
of the swelling theme that created the global context
of the surgical strikes.
For decades
now, Pakistan has manipulated international opinions and
perceptions with an aggressive diplomatic campaign, and
Islamabad believed nothing could change this. Sharif’s
speech at the UN General Assembly was evidently based
on precisely such an assessment, relying on all the established
tropes of the Pakistani state, including denial, counter-accusations
and implicit threats, including the threat of nuclear
catastrophe. Far from working, as they had, so often in
the past, these devices only sharpened the focus of global
responses, with every major country in the world, including
many traditional Pakistan supporters among the Organisation
of Islamic Countries (OIC), rejecting the Pakistani position.
Indeed, even China – the “all weather friend” who was
soon to veto the effort at the UN Security Council to
pronounce Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Azahar Masood a UN designated
terrorist – chose to sit on the fence, exhorting India
and Pakistan to resolve their differences through “dialogues”.
As Islamabad’s
rhetoric escalated to include nuclear threats in the wake
of the surgical strikes, moreover, a sharp message, delivered
publicly by Mark Toner, US State Department spokesman,
cautioned Pakistan to “exercise restraint” in talking
about the use of nuclear weapons, observing, “I would
just say nuclear-capable states have a very clear responsibility
to exercise restraint regarding nuclear weapons and missile
capabilities... And that’s my message publicly and that’s
certainly our message directly to the Pakistani authorities."
Worse,
at this juncture, Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton
warned that Islamist terrorists could get access to nuclear
weapons from Pakistan. Significantly, her adversary at
the other end of the political spectrum, Donald Trump
has, in the past, referred repeatedly to Pakistan as a
primary source of Islamist terrorism, and to the need
to “deal with” the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
Pakistan
has threatened the use of its ‘tactical’ nuclear devices
on many occasions, but it must be abundantly clear now,
in the prevailing global scenario, that this will be a
simple act of suicide, not only because of India’s retaliatory
action, but also the inevitable and overwhelming response
of Western nations.
There are
tremendous opportunities for India in the new regional
and global context, but these could easily be squandered
in the absence of coherent and sustained strategic initiatives,
with the will to stay the course as long as needed to
finally neutralize Islamabad’s campaigns of terrorism.
While the seeds of such strategy are making their appearance
in the Government’s actions and pronouncements, the necessary
coherence remains substantially lacking.
The success
of the surgical strike and the dramatically altered international
context in India’s favour has generated a new confidence
and unwanted loquacity in India. There is much talk of
a range of new “strategic paradigms”, including, among
others, the idea of “offensive defence” alluded to by
National Security Advisor Ajit Doval before he assumed
his present avatar; and talk of something called
the “pre-emptive escalation dominance model”, among others.
But these are just slogans unless they are translated
into a consistent and enduring gameplan to be implemented
over the years and possibly decades, backed by a necessary
and condign augmentation of capacities.
There is
some evidence of the will to pursue such a gameplan, but
its content is far from crystallization. Over the past
weeks since the Uri attack, there has certainly been an
inexorable widening of the spectrum of policies under
consideration. Unfortunately, most of the options being
evaluated have been plucked out of the strident media
debate calling for everything from nuclear war, limited
war and punitive strikes, and a random range of non-military
initiatives prominently including squeezing the river
waters flowing into Pakistan from India, “point to point
competition” on exports, withdrawal of the Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, and banning of commercial
over flights to Pakistani carriers. Very few of the most
voluble advocates on Television appear to have any depth
of understanding of these various proposals and appear
to have picked these up from random and occasional readings
or from seminars and conferences where these ideas may
have been mentioned. These avenues of response have never
before been part of the official spectrum and have largely
been explored on a tiny margin of the better informed
among security commentators who proliferate on mass media.
Even among these, few have written or spoken about protracted
war strategies and there constituent elements of compellence
before the present and abrupt glut of this idea. Nor is
there any clear understanding within Government of these
constituent elements or their broader context.
Nevertheless,
and crucially, the introduction of a new vocabulary within
a given, in the present case long stagnant, discourse,
itself constitutes the creation of a new reality. However,
proposals and assessments of the expanding spectrum of
strategic alternatives need to be driven quietly and firmly
underground, and cannot remain the subject of cacophonous
Television debates. Unfortunately, that would conflict
directly with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s domestic
agenda, which would naturally be focused on crucial elections
in the imminent future, and hence to proclivities to a
jingoistic debate on the many harms that can be inflicted
on Pakistan. As always, the strategic and the political
appear in direct conflict.
There has,
in the past days, also been an overwhelming focus on what
Pakistan will do. This is difficult to answer in specific
terms, but the broad contours of Pakistan’s option are
well known, and have been ‘gamed’ into the Indian Armed
Forces’ perspectives. The crucial question, however, is
what will India do from this point on. Despite the shift
in perspective at Raisina Hill, the fundamental realities
and equations of power remain largely unchanged. While
there is great enthusiasm at present, the momentum can
easily be lost, or the hand, as easily, overplayed.
If sufficient
pressure is generated, moreover, Pakistan is liable to
quickly shift positions and appear to seek accommodation
– preliminary indicators of such an ‘adjustment’ are already
visible. This has been an old ploy, even as the instrumentalities
of terrorism are kept in reserve. Pakistan’s proficiency
in deception and systemic disinformation must be factored
into India’s responses. Islamabad has mastered the art
of being a minimal satisfier, and the avoidance of direct
confrontation has been the hallmark of its strategy of
terrorism in both Afghanistan and India. But this is a
game two can play.
However,
as Pakistan projects a more ‘reasonable’ mien, pressures
in New Delhi – and perhaps internationally – will grow
to revert to the more comfortable paradigm of ‘talks’.
There is no need to believe that these are necessarily
excluded from the policy spectrum – but just as Pakistan
does not dismantle its infrastructure of terrorism when
it comes to the negotiating table, there would be no need
for India to suspend its strategic continuum every time
tactical talks are initiated.
Between
India and Pakistan, over the past at least three decades
and more, there has been a situation best described as
neither war, nor peace. This is the paradigm that must
be mastered by New Delhi.
Pakistan
is trapped on the wrong side of history; and history appears,
now, to be positioning its inexorable correctives. For
far too long, New Delhi has been paralysed by constant
worry about Islamabad’s next move. It is now time to allow
Pakistan to worry about what India will do next.
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Restoring Balance
S.
Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Nepal’s
Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda
in his first foreign trip since resuming office on August
3, 2016 (he was Prime Minister between August 18, 2008,
and May 23, 2009), visited India from September 15-18,
2016, leading a 125-member delegation. He held wide-ranging
talks and sealed three
significant deals with India. Significantly,
Dahal stated, on September 17, 2016, “We will not allow
any activity that is against our neighbouring countries
from our soil.” Dahal now seems to be a changed man and
has recognized the need for cordial relations with India
as a priority. During his previous innings as Prime Minister,
Dahal chose to put relations with China on fast track.
Within a week of oath as Prime Minister then, Dahal had
gone to China in August 2008, to become the first elected
premier to visit China in the history of Nepal.
Earlier,
Dahal’s predecessor, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, during
his visit to India between February 19 to 24, 2016, signed
seven
agreements, prominently including
the utilization of a USD 250 million Grant component of
the Government of India’s Assistance package for post-earthquake
reconstruction assistance. However, just before the visit,
linking his maiden foreign trip to India and the then
ongoing ‘border
blockade’, on January 26, 2016, Oli
noted, “It would not be appropriate for me to visit India
unless the situation returns to normal.” The ‘border
blockade’, which began on September 24, 2015, and was
officially lifted on February 8, 2016, was imposed by
ethnic Madhesis inhabiting the southern plains of Nepal,
who believe that the new Constitution adopted on September
20, 2015, did not give them fair representation in Parliament.
The Government of Nepal accused India of imposing an undeclared
blockade, though India denied the allegation, stating
that supply shortages were imposed by Madhesi demonstrators
within Nepal, and that India had no role in the protests.
The political
violence, in fact, had already begun
on July 1, 2015, when cadres of the United Democratic
Madhesi Front (UDMF), a four party alliance of Madhesi
People's Rights Forum Nepal (MPRF-N), Tarai Madhes Democratic
Party (TMDP), Sadbhavana Party (SP) and National Madhes
Shadbhavana Party (NMSP), burnt copies of the preliminary
draft of the new Constitution in Kathmandu, the Capital
city, because it failed to incorporate their demands.
Despite the protests, the Constituent Assembly (CA) endorsed
“Nepal’s Constitution” by an overwhelming 88.5 per cent
of the 601-member CA, and by over 95 per cent of the Members
present and voting on September 16, 2015. On September
20, 2015, in a historical step, Nepal adopted its first
democratic Constitution.
While the
adoption of the new Constitution was welcomed by most
national and international groups and leaders, a large
segment of the population, particularly the Madhesis and
Tharus, residing in the Tarai region contested its provisions.
The Tarai
region is an area located along Nepal’s
Southern border with India, and covers 23 per cent of
Nepal’s total land area of 147,181 square kilometers.
Approximately 30 to 40 per cent of the population falls
within this region. Out of the country’s 75 Districts,
20 are located in the Terai, including, from east to west,
Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari,
Sarlahi, Rautahat, Bara, Parsa, Chitwan, Nawalparasi,
Rupandehi, Kapilvastu, Dang, Banke, Bardiya, Kalaiya and
Kanchanpur.
For its
part, India tried to delay the promulgation of the Constitution
by sending Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to intervene
at the eleventh hour, but he was rebuffed by the Nepalese
parties. Consequently, for the first time India took a
stand against Nepal at the United Nations Human Rights
Council (UNHRC) on November 5, 2015, during Nepal's Universal
Periodic Review, stating:
The Nepal government should consolidate the Constitution
building and democratization process by accommodating
all sections of Nepal to enable broad-based ownership
and participation. It should ensure effective functioning
of Truth and Reconciliation Commission and full
implementation of its recommendations, including
prosecution of those responsible for violent insurgency.
|
India also
made a reference to Nepal in the European Union (EU)-India
Joint Statement on March 30, 2016:
The need for a lasting and inclusive Constitutional
settlement in Nepal that will address the remaining
Constitutional issues in a time bound manner, and
promote political stability and economic growth.
|
This brought
out a strongly worded rebuke from the Nepalese Foreign
Ministry, who responded by stating:
EU-India Joint Statement not only hurts the sentiments
of the people of Nepal but also defies the fundamental
principle of non-interference in internal affairs
of a country in breach of UN Charter and norms of
international law. The Government of Nepal calls
on all to fully respect the sovereign and democratic
rights of the people of Nepal and refrain from making
uncalled for statements.
|
At this
stage, India-Nepal relations reached their lowest point
since the economic blockade of 1989 by the then Rajiv
Gandhi Government.
Earlier,
in a historic visit, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi
made the first Indian Prime Ministerial visit to Nepal
in 17 years, from November 25 to 27, 2014, and signed
16
agreements and MoUs, including the
Line of Credit for USD One billion to the Government of
Nepal, to utilize for hydropower, irrigation and infrastructural
development projects. On touching down in Nepal, Modi
had stated, "I request all political stakeholders
to draft the Constitution by early next year as committed
through consensus, which will reflect aspirations of all
communities, including Madhesis, Pahadis and Maoists ...
failing to do so can cause difficulties to Nepal and your
difficulty despite our expertise to help you in this field
is a matter of sadness."
In the
meantime, then-Prime Minister Oli made a week-long official
visit to China from March 21 to 27, 2016, sealing 10 separate
agreements and MoUs on using the northern neighbor’s sea
port facility, building a regional international airport
in Pokhara, exploring the possibilities of signing a bilateral
free trade agreement and finding oil and gas reserves
in Nepal, among others. Clarifying the motivation behind
these moves, Rajan Bhattarai, a Member of Parliament (MP)
from the ruling Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist
Leninist (CPN-UML) on March 23, 2016, observed, “We have
been an India-locked country. We are now developing a
strong partner in China and opening up new transit routes.”
Dahal’s
visit suggests a shift from this stance, and appears to
have irked Beijing. The official media in China has accused
India of ‘interfering’ in its relations with Nepal and
'pressuring' Prime Minister Dahal to move away from Beijing.
Writing in the Global Times, one of the publications
of the People’s Daily establishment, Xu Liang,
Executive Director of the Indian Studies Center at Beijing
International Studies University, observed, "It looks
like the bilateral relationship between China and Nepal
has suddenly turned fragile and sensitive."
There are,
no doubt, various domestic issues in Nepal, including
the most important among these, the amendment of the Constitution,
as promised in the Three-Point Agreement signed on August
2, 2016, by the then-ruling coalition of the Communist
Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN- Maoist Centre) and
Nepali Congress (NC), with the UDMF, to secure the support
of the Madhesi parties. According to the agreement, the
Government would implement the Madhesi Front’s demands,
including acknowledging those killed during the Madhes
agitation as ‘martyrs’, providing free treatment to the
injured, and amending the Constitution to redraw provincial
boundary. Significantly, the first two points have been
fulfilled, but the issue of the Constitutional amendment
remains thorny. The Constitutional Amendment Bill must
be passed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, that
is, at least 397 lawmakers have to vote in its. However,
the present ruling coalition has about 370 lawmakers on
its side.
Another
big question facing Nepal is the holding of three elections
– local, provincial and federal – by December 2017, as
envisaged in the new Constitution. In a proposed roadmap,
the Government plans to hold the local body elections
by December 2016, state assembly elections by May 2017
and elections to the federal parliament by December 2017.
Holding these crucial elections within the stipulated
time is the key to implementing the new Constitution.
But Election Commission (EC) officials said that holding
elections by the end of 2016 is fraught with huge challenges
as the Commission would need at least 3-4 months for technical
preparations. The last time local elections were held
in Nepal was some 19 years ago, in 1997. Since then, the
local bodies – Village Development Committees (VDCs),
municipalities, District Development Committees (DDCs),
metropolitan councils – have been without people’s representatives.
New Delhi
appears to have repaired relationships with Kathmandu
for the time being, and might have more say with the new
CPN-Maoist Centre – NC Government, but it has a long way
to go to regain the popular adulation that was visible
during Prime Minister Modi's first visit to Nepal in 2014,
and during India's humanitarian response following the
April 2015 earthquake. Moreover, amending the Constitution
to address Madhesi demands to redraw boundaries of federal
provinces, is a domestic affair and needs to be addressed
internally. Nevertheless, the change of Government is
an opportunity to recalibrate what has for some time now
been a fraught relationship, and restore the special bonds
of common culture and enduring shared interests that have
long existed between these two peoples and states.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major
Conflicts in South Asia
September
26 -October 2, 2016
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
1
|
3
|
2
|
6
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Left-Wing
Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
Chhattisgarh
|
3
|
1
|
11
|
15
|
Jharkhand
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Odisha
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
10
|
5
|
14
|
29
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
7
|
1
|
1
|
9
|
FATA
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
KP
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Sindh
|
0
|
2
|
5
|
7
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
|
|
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Parliament
adopts
resolution
to
confiscate
all
assets
of
convicted
killers
of
Father
of
the
Nation
and
war
criminals:
Parliament
on
September
29
unanimously
adopted
a
resolution
to
confiscate
all
movable
and
immovable
assets
of
the
convicted
killers
of
the
Father
of
the
Nation
Sheikh
Mujibur
Rahman
and
the
war
criminals.
The
resolution
was
passed
unanimously
by
a
voice
vote
after
Deputy
Speaker
Fazle
Rabbi
Miah,
who
was
in
the
chair,
placed
it
for
vote.
The
Daily
Star,
September
30,
2016.
Those
who
patronize
militancy
in
the
country
by
supplying
money
and
giving
order
must
face
trial,
says
Prime
Minister
Sheikh
Hasina:
Prime
Minister
Sheikh
Hasina
on
September
28
said
that
those
who
patronize
militancy
in
the
country
by
supplying
money
and
giving
order
must
face
trial.
She
said
the
persons
who
are
guilty
must
be
punished.
Those
who
nurtured
offenders,
made
war
criminals
Ministers
should
also
face
trial.
New
Age,
September
29,
2016.
INDIA
Threat
to
capital
from
JeM
and
its
splinter
group,
says
report:
According
to
Police
sources,
chances
of
attacks
by
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
or
Hizbul
Mujahideen
(HM)
in
Delhi
is
minimal
and
the
capital
faces
maximum
threat
from
cadres
of
Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
led
by
Masood
Azhar
and
Maulana
Abdur
Rehman
(codenamed
MAR).
While
Azhar's
group,
based
in
Pakistan,
focuses
on
Kashmir
and
Punjab,
MAR's
outfit
is
India-centric
and
headquartered
in
Afghanistan.
MAR,
which
had
played
a
key
role
in
the
Kandahar
hijack
of
IC-814,
parted
ways
with
Azhar
years
ago
and
formed
a
new
outfit,
Jaishul-Haq
Tanzeem..
Times
of
India
October
1
,
2016.
Hafiz
Saeed
pressuring
Pakistan
government
to
retaliate,
according
to
Indian
Intelligence
alert:
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT)
founder
Hafiz
Saeed
has
put
pressure
on
the
Pakistan
government
to
retaliate,
following
strike
by
Indian
Army
or
to
carry
out
attacks
by
terror
outfits,
according
to
an
alert
by
the
Indian
intelligence
agencies.
Sources
in
the
Intelligence
Bureau
(IB)
said
that
security
around
vital
defence
installations
across
Jammu
and
Kashmir,
Punjab
and
Himachal
Pradesh
have
been
asked
to
be
increased.
AN
unnamed
top
official
said
that
Hafiz,
after
his
Friday
prayers,
told
a
gathering
in
Faisalabad,
Pakistan,
that
"he
has
asked
the
Pakistan
government
to
reply
to
the
Indian
Army
attacks
in
parts
of
Azaad
Kashmir
(PoK)".
Times
of
India,
October
1,
2016.
Pakistan
buries
slain
terrorists
to
hide
evidence
and
asks
JeM
'chief'
Masood
Azhar
to
maintain
'low
profile':
Even
though
Pakistan
has
staunchly
denied
that
Indian
Special
Forces
carried
out
a
surgical
strike
in
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK),
intelligence
inputs
suggested
on
September
30,
that
Pakistani
forces
are
hurriedly
burying
bodies
of
slain
terrorists
to
erase
evidence.
The
number
of
slain
militants
(as
per
different
estimates)
varies
from
a
minimum
of
30
to
as
high
as
70
-
are
being
buried
in
areas
near
to
the
scene
of
the
operation.
Intel
inputs
added
that
Pakistan
has
asked
Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
'chief'
Maulana
Masood
Azhar
to
keep
a
'low
profile'.
Zee News,
October
1,
2016.
Terror
training
camps
now
shifted
to
crowded
Pakistani
towns,
according
to
UMHA
report:
An
internal
report
of
the
Union
Ministry
of
Home
Affairs
(UMHA)
suggests
that
terror
training
camps
in
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK)
have
been
moved
deeper
inside
Pakistan
territory.
The
development
comes
a
day
after
India
announced
that
it
had
carried
out
surgical
strikes
across
the
Line
of
Control
(LoC)
and
destroyed
seven
terrorist
launch
pads.
Central
security
agencies
have
informed
UMHA
that
at
least
12
terror
camps
belonging
to
the
Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT),
Hizbul
Mujahideen
(HM)
and
Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
have
been
shifted
from
Muzaffarabad
in
PoK
to
various
areas
like
Mansehra
(Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa),
Naushehra
and
Jhelum
(both
in
Pakistan's
Punjab).
These
camps
house
around
500
armed
militants.
The Hindu,
October
1,
2016.
IS
'India
chief'
using
10
different
names
to
recruit,
states
NIA:
The
suspected
Islamic
State
(IS)
'Indian
operations
chief'
Shafi
Armar,
who
is
operating
from
Syria,
is
using
at
least
10
different
names
while
luring
local
recruiters
from
India,
especially
from
Hyderabad,
into
activities
of
Islamic
State,
the
National
Investigation
Agency
(NIA)
officials
said.
"The
list
of
names,
this
most
wanted
terror
suspect
Armar
christened
himself
are-
Chotta
Mulla,
Ahmed
Ali,
Anjan
Bhai,
Naukua,
Yusuf-Al-Hindi,
Gumnam,
Shafi
and
many
more,''
both
Telangana
and
NIA
officials
told.
Times
of
India,
September
29,
2016.
ULFA-I
exposes
its
soft
corner
to
China:
The
close
proximity
between
the
Paresh
Baruah-led
Independent
faction
of
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA-I)
and
China
came
to
the
fore
again
on
September
26
when
the
faction
asked
the
Hindu
Yuva
Chhatra
Parishad
(HYCP)
to
withdraw
its
appeal
to
ban
Chinese
products
in
the
State.
The
ULFA-I
in
a
statement
emailed
to
the
media
stated
that
the
neighbouring
China
had
been
maintaining
a
historic
and
friendly
relations
with
the
people
of
Assam
and
would
continue
maintain
the
good
relations
in
future
too.
The Shillong
Times,
September
27,
2016.
NEPAL
Prime
Minister
urges
media
and
journalists
to
play
constructive
role
in
promoting
wider
acceptance
of
Constitution:
Prime
Minister
Pushpa
Kamal
Dahal
speaking
during
the
first
General
Convention
of
Press
Center
on
September
29
urged
the
media
and
journalists
to
play
a
constructive
role
in
promoting
wider
acceptance
of
the
Constitution.
"Role
of
the
press
is
always
vital
in
a
country
like
ours.
I
have
not
forgotten
the
positive
role
played
by
the
press
either
during
the
conflict
or
after
the
conflict.
We
have
accepted
diversity.
There
might
be
diversity
in
views
and
political
beliefs
but
there
can't
be
diversity
on
issues
of
national
unity,
freedom
and
sovereignty,"
said
the
Prime
Minister.
The
Himalayan
Times,
September
30,
2016.
Government
was
committed
towards
meaningful
enforcement
of
constitution,
says
Prime
Minister
Pushpa
Kamal
Dahal:
Prime
Minister
Pushpa
Kamal
Dahal
on
September
28
said
that
the
Government
was
committed
towards
the
meaningful
enforcement
of
the
constitution.
He
said,
"The
main
priority
of
the
government
is
to
implement
the
constitution."
He
also
said
that
the
elections
of
all
three
tiers
would
take
place
on
time
on
the
basis
of
a
national
consensus.
Republica,
September
29,
2016.
PAKISTAN
HRW
urges
Pakistan
to
halt
torture,
killings
by
Police':
Human
Rights
Watch
(HRW)
on
September
26
accused
Pakistan's
Police
of
routinely
carrying
out
extra-judicial
killings,
torture
and
arbitrary
arrests,
and
called
on
Islamabad
to
implement
urgent
reforms
of
its
under-resourced
forces.
The
findings
were
contained
in
a
new
report
based
on
interviews
with
more
than
30
Police
Officers
and
50
victims
or
witnesses
of
abuse
across
three
of
the
country´s
four
provinces.
The News ,
September
27,
2016
SAARC
Summit
scrapped
until
further
notice:After
six
nations
pulled
out
of
the
SAARC
Summit,
Pakistan
on
September
30
released
a
statement
officially
postponing
the
19th
summit
to
be
held
at
Islamabad
on
November
9-10,
2016
until
further
notice.
"A
new
set
of
dates
for
holding
of
the
19th
SAARC
Summit
at
Islamabad
will
be
announced
soon,
through
the
Chair
of
SAARC
(Nepal).
Accordingly,
we
have
conveyed
the
same
to
the
Prime
Minister
of
Nepal,
the
current
Chair
of
SAARC,"
the
statement
from
the
Pakistan
said.
Besides
India,
5
other
SAARC
members
-
Bangladesh,
Bhutan,
Afghanistan,
Sri
Lanka
and
Maldives
-
pulled
out
of
the
summit,
indirectly
blaming
Pakistan
for
creating
an
environment
which
is
not
conducive
enough
for
the
successful
holding
of
the
meet.
Meanwhile,
Nepal,
which
is
the
current
chair
of
SAARC,
on
October
2
urged
SAARC
member
states
to
ensure
that
their
territories
are
not
used
by
terrorists
for
cross-border
terrorism
as
it
announced
the
postponement
of
the
Summit.
"To
achieve
peace
and
stability
in
the
region,
SAARC
member
states
must,
among
others,
ensure
that
their
respective
territories
are
not
used
by
terrorists
for
cross
border
terrorism,"
Nepal
said,
without
naming
Pakistan.
Times Now ,
September
30,
2016.
Times
of
India,
October
2,
2016.
SRI
LANKA
New
Constitution
will
not
divide
the
country,
says
Minister
of
City
Planning
&
Water
Supply
Rauf
Hakeem:
Minister
of
City
Planning
&
Water
Supply
Rauf
Hakeem
on
September
29
said
that
the
new
Constitution
will
not
divide
the
country.
"Government
will
not
leave
any
room
to
harm
the
unity,
territorial
integrity
and
sovereignty
of
the
country
and
the
proposed
new
constitution
will
not
create
division,"
Minister
Rauf
Hakeem
asserted.
Minister
Hakeem
stressed
that
there
is
no
truth
to
some
reports
that
the
Sri
Lanka
Muslim
Congress
(SLMC)
has
agreed
to
merge
the
Northern
Province
with
the
Eastern
Province
and
assured
his
party
will
ever
agree
to
merge
the
North
and
East.
He
said
the
SLMC
always
stands
for
a
united
country.
Colombo Page
,
September
30,
2016.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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