SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 11, No. 36, March 11, 2013

PAKISTAN

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Sinking State
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

In a development heavy with irony, on March 7, 2013, Pakistan’s Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani – who effectively oversees all internal and external security dispensations in the country, notwithstanding the visible pretence of a ‘civilian’ and ‘democratically elected’ Government – conveyed the Army’s ‘concerns’ to the President, Asif Ali Zardari, about ‘rapidly deteriorating law and order’ and about ‘improper and inefficient utilisation of civilian law-enforcement agencies by the federal and provincial governments in dealing with terrorism’. While Kayani sought to distance himself from years of military misrule and manipulation, his ‘briefing’ to the President does confirm the rising tide of terrorism and disorders in the country, and growing loss of control that is now being experienced in every sphere of governance.

Through 2012, Pakistan continued to face the brunt of the Islamist extremism and terrorism that it has long produced and exported. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the country recorded a total of at least 6,211 terrorism-related fatalities, including 3,007 civilians, 2,472 militants and 732 Security Forces (SF) personnel in 2012 as against 6,303 fatalities, including 2,738 civilians, 2,800 militants and 765 SF personnel in 2011. [Since media access is heavily restricted in the most disturbed areas of Pakistan, and there is only fitful release of information by Government agencies and media reportage, the actual figures could be much higher]. The first 69 days of 2013, have already witnessed 1,537 fatalities, including 882 civilians, 116 SF personnel and 539 militants.

The marginal decline of 1.45 percent in total fatalities in 2012 over the preceding year is principally the result of Islamabad’s continued approach of going soft on terror. Significantly, while militant and SF fatalities decreased by 11.78 and 4.31 percents, respectively, civilian fatalities witnessed an increase of 9.82 percent over 2011. 2011 had registered the highest civilian fatalities (2,738) since 2003. Indeed, the number of civilian deaths in Pakistan exceeded neighboring and war ravaged Afghanistan (2,754), which many consider is the most volatile and unstable country in South Asia.

Pakistan has already recorded 882 civilian fatalities in 2013, significantly higher than the combined fatalities (655) of SF personnel and terrorists.

October 2012 was also witness to the one attack targeting a civilian victim, which shook the nation and shocked the rest of the world, when fourteen year old children’s rights activist and Pakistan’s first National Peace Prize winner Malala Yusufzai, was attacked while returning from school in Mingora, the headquarters of Swat District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Yusufzai was critically shot in the head, but survived and recovered after intensive treatment in UK.

2012 also saw heightened sectarian violence with at least 507 recorded fatalities in 173 incidents, as against 203 killings in 30 such incidents in 2011. 2012 saw the worst-ever carnage against Shias across Pakistan. SATP data registered at least 396 Shias killed in 113 targeted attacks through the year, as against 136 Shias in 24 incidents in 2011. Regrettably, the Pakistani state is widely believed to be collusive with the perpetrators of these attacks. Ali Dayan Hasan, the head of Human Rights Watch (HRW) in Pakistan, on January 11, 2013, observed,

As Shia community members continue to be slaughtered in cold blood, the callousness and indifference of authorities offers a damning indictment of the state, its military and security agencies. Pakistan’s tolerance for religious extremists is not just destroying lives and alienating entire communities, it is destroying Pakistani society across the board.

Political accusations and counter-accusations confirmed the regime of collusion that continued to back terrorist and sectarian excesses in the country. On February 25, 2013, Federal Minister of the Interior Rehman Malik claimed that the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led Punjab Government was backing Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), as it was in an electoral alliance with the group principally  responsible for sectarian attacks, and asked why a case was not registered against LeJ founder Malik Ishaq when he described the Shias as ‘infidels’. On the other hand, Rana Sanaullah, the Home Minister of Punjab and PML-N leader, alleged that Ishaq and his son Malik Usman were given 14 heavy weapon licenses by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Governments in Sindh and Balochistan.

Ishaq, in an interview with Reuters in October 2012 called Shias the “greatest infidels on earth”, and urged that “the state should declare Shias as non-Muslims on the basis of their beliefs”. After spending 14 years in prison on 34 counts of culpable homicide and terrorism, Ishaq was released in July 2011. Officials had then stated that he was released because the charges could not be proven. The LeJ chief was, however, arrested again on February 22, 2013, in the wake of the February 16, 2013, incident in which 84 Shias were killed and more than 200 were wounded in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan.

2012 also saw a surge in the beheading of SF personnel by the terrorists, with 34 such killings recorded in the year, as against 18 beheading in 2011. In one such incident, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants executed 22 Levies personnel on December 29, 2012, three days after they were abducted during synchronized attacks on three security checkpoints in Frontier Region Peshawar, FATA.

Meanwhile, other parameters of violence such as the number of suicide attacks, explosions, major incidents remained more or less at the same level as the preceding year. 2012 recorded 39 suicide attacks resulting into 365 deaths, as against 41 such attacks in 2011, though fatalities were at a much higher 628. 451 major incidents (each resulting in three or more fatalities) resulted in 3,396 deaths in 2012, in comparison to 476 such incidents leading to 4,447 deaths, the preceding year. The number of explosions increased from 639 in 2011 to 652 in 2012.

As in 2011, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) remained the worst affected region, in terms of fatalities, followed by Sindh. However, Balochistan, which was ‘ranked’ fourth and KP, which was at the third position in 2011, reversed their respective positions in 2012. The Punjab Province remained at its earlier position, the fifth and least afflicted region of the country.

Not surprisingly, on January 14, 2013, Prime Minister (PM) Raja Pervez Ashraf announced, in principal, the invocation of Article 234 of the Constitution and imposed Governor’s rule in Balochistan. 

The volatile region of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) recorded 42 killings, including 27 civilians, in 2012, as against a total of four fatalities (all civilians) in 2011. The region remained tense all through the year, with at least four attempts to orchestrate sectarian violence in GB. On August 16, 2012, for instance, 25 Shias from Gilgit-Baltistan were killed in a targeted attack at Babusar Top, which connects GB to the rest of the country, in the Naran Valley of Mansehra District of the neighboring KP Province.

Meanwhile, the TTP and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) joined hands to form Ansar-Al- Aseer (supporters of prisoners) on February 6, 2013, proclaiming that its prime mission was to secure the freedom of imprisoned militants by executing jail break operations all over Pakistan. Adnan Rasheed, the mastermind of an assassination attempt on former President General (Retired) Pervez Musharraf, was appointed the ‘chief operational commander’ of the fidayeen (suicide) unit. Adnan himself was freed in an unprecedented jailbreak operation on April 15, 2012, when around 200 TTP militants armed with guns, grenades and rockets attacked the high-security Central Jail in KP’s Bannu District, and released 384 prisoners. Earlier, on December 28, 2012, the chief of TTP Hakimullah Mehsud, while asserting the unity of all Islamist extremist formations in the region, declared, “We are Afghan Taliban and Afghan Taliban are us. We are with them and al Qaeda. We are even willing to get our heads cut off for al Qaeda.”

Disturbed by the rising graph of violence and the spectre of growing unity among terrorist groupings, Islamabad appears to have initiated some measures to confront domestically directed terrorism. On March 8, 2013, the National Assembly unanimously passed the National Counter Terrorism Authority Bill‚ 2013, creating an Authority intended to coordinate counter terrorism and counter extremism efforts in view of the nature and magnitude of terrorists’ threat; and to present strategic policy options to the government for consideration/ implementation by the stakeholders after scientifically studying the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism in historic and professional perspective. The National Counter Terrorism Authority is to play a pivotal role in coordinating with all law enforcement agencies to take effective action against those who carry out acts of terrorism in the country. Meanwhile, January 2013 reports indicate that realizing home-grown terrorism as the "biggest threat" to national security, Pakistan Army has changed its operational priorities. Accordingly, a new chapter, titled 'Sub-Conventional Warfare', has been added to the revised 'Army Doctrine'. Commenting on the development, Defence analyst Lieutenant General (retired) Talat Masood told the BBC, "It's a fact that before the new army doctrine, India was Pakistan's No 1 enemy. All military resources were focused on India. For the first time it has been realized that Pakistan faces the real threat from within…"

Unsurprisingly, however, the Army and the state continued to maintain their dual policy on terrorism, targeting domestically active groups, even as it allowed terrorist leaders such as Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) founder Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) chief and head of United Jihad Council (UJC) Mohammed Yusuf Shah alias Syed Salahuddin, and others, to thrive under implicit state protection. These terrorist groups openly staged several rallies in different parts of the country, issuing threats to various ‘enemies of Islam’, including the US, India and Israel. On February 13, 2013, for instance, these terrorist leaders participated in a conference organized by the UJC at the National Press Club in Islamabad and openly vowed to take "revenge" for the February 9, 2012, execution of Afzal Guru (in New Delhi’s Tihar jail), convicted for the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament, and to step up their jihad in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

Reports indicate that Pakistan still remains a major destination for radicalised Muslims committed to jihadi terrorism. The number of foreign recruits smuggled into the north western tribal belt is believed to be increasing, with recruits coming in from a multiplicity of countries. Estimates indicate that there could be around 2,000 to 3,500 foreign fighters in Pakistan’s border areas, drawn from some 30 countries. These terrorists, presently operating principally in Afghanistan, continue to support the Inter-Services Intelligence’s (ISI) strategy of backing Afghan militant formations in their fight against the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

Significantly, the Afghan National Security Council (ANSC) on March 3, 2013, strongly demanded that Pakistan’s ISI should be declared a terrorist entity. Rehmatullah Nabil, Afghanistan's Deputy National Security Adviser (NSA) declared, in a direct reference to the ISI, “The interesting question is why is a terrorist blacklisted but the person who issues the Fatwa for them [to act] or who provides havens to them not blacklisted? Against these people, organisations at a global scale should unite.” He went on to add:

People of Afghanistan and the Government of Afghanistan will continue their voice of peace, but unfortunately there is not much hope from Pakistan's side and therefore we should rely more on the inside and be more united, more mobilised, and not be deceived by them. The Government of Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan have endeavoured to their last breath to have a good relationship with the Government of Pakistan based on a virtue of neighbourliness. However in return, what did we see from Pakistan? They fire rockets, they send terrorists to our soil, they destroy our jihadi leaders, clerics, influencers, our mihrabs (religious places), our tribe, our mothers, sisters, brothers, students, children, soldiers and police.

Earlier, the chief of the Pakistan Ulema Council Tahir Mehmood Ashrafi had declared that the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan was "legitimate".

According to the South Asia Media Commission’s (SAMC) Media Monitor 2012 report, Pakistan remained the most dangerous country for journalists in South Asia. 25 journalists were killed in South Asia in the line of duty in 2012, with Pakistan registering the killing of 13 journalists, followed by India (five), Bangladesh (three) and Nepal and Afghanistan (two each). Out of 17 journalists killed in the region in 2011, Pakistan accounted for 12, followed by India (three) and Afghanistan (two).

Amidst continued violence, Pakistan also experienced a major political upheaval, when the country’s Supreme Court, on June 19, 2012, disqualified then Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani “from being a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in terms of Article 63(1) (g) of the Constitution on and from the date and time of pronouncement of the judgement of this Court dated 26.04.2012 [April 26, 2012] with all consequences, that is, he has also ceased to be the Prime Minister (PM) of Pakistan with effect from the said date and the office of the Prime Minister shall be deemed to be vacant accordingly.” Through its April 26 judgement and the subsequent detailed reasons released on May 8, 2012, the Apex Court had found Gilani guilty of contempt of court, as he had declined to follow the Court’s instructions to pursue corruption allegations against President Asif Ali Zardari. Since no appeal was filed against the judgement, the conviction attained finality. Raja Pervez Ashraf, who succeeded Gilani, took oath on June 22, 2012. Recently, on January 15, 2013, the Supreme Court ordered the arrest of incumbent PM Ashraf and 15 others over allegations of corruption. However, no further development has taken place so far in this regard.

Meanwhile, the founder of the Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT), Doctor Tahirul Qadri, on December 20, 2012, returned to Pakistan to pursue what he termed as a "democratic revolution”, taking the nation by storm. On December 23, 2012, he staged a rally in Lahore, the provincial capital of Punjab, which attracted hundreds of thousands of people. Later, on January 13, 2013, he launched a “long march”, from Lahore to Islamabad, and finally succeeded in forcing the Government to sign the Islamabad Long March Declaration, on January 17, 2013, which states that “the National Assembly shall be dissolved at any time before March 16, 2013, (due date), so that the elections may take place within 90 days”. The agreement further declares that “the treasury benches in complete consensus with Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) will propose names of two honest and impartial persons for appointment as Caretaker Prime Minister”. The implementation of undefined ‘electoral reforms’ was also agreed upon.

Reports indicate that former President Pervez Musharraf, who has been living in self-imposed exile in Dubai for the last four years, has decided to return to Pakistan on March 17, 2013, to participate in the elections.

Rampant corruption continues to afflict Pakistan, ranked 134^th (out of 183 countries) on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2011 (CPI). In the 2012 Index, Pakistan’s position dropped to 139^th (out of 174 countries). A volatile political scenario, approaching elections, sharp sectarian and political polarization, growing institutional confrontation between various branches of Government, and Islamabad’s reluctance to end the export of terror, suggest that there is no proximate end to Pakistan’s ongoing march towards its own devastation.

INDIA

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Maoists: Tactical Retreat
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) shocked the country in the beginning of 2013, first, by surgically inserting Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in the abdomens of troopers killed in the Latehar encounter on January 7, 2013, and again by shooting at an IAF chopper on a rescue mission, forcing it to crash land in the Sukma District on January 18, 2013.

Nevertheless, the intensity of Maoist violence declined sharply in 2012, consolidating the trend established in 2011. Data released by Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) as well as open source data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) clearly confirm this trend. According to SATP, a total of 367 fatalities - 146 civilians, 104 Security Force personnel (SFs) and 117 Left Wing Extremists – were reported in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) related violence in 2012 as against 602 fatalities – 275 civilians, 128 SFs and 199 Left Wing Extremists – in 2011.

The number of major incidents [each involving three or more fatalities] fell to 22 in 2012, as against 47 in 2011.

The decline in fatalities and acts of violence has variously been explained in terms of either a ‘tactical retreat’ by Maoists, or as the result of the destruction of the Maoists’ power to perpetrate violence. The problem is that each of these the possibilities demands different policy and strategic responses from the state and its agencies.

Interestingly, MHA data on the geographical spread of the Maoist violence gives a somewhat different picture. MHA clarifies that “the influence of Maoists in LWE affected areas is assessed on the basis of both overground activities by Front Organizations and violent activities by Underground Cadres. The profile of both these activities keeps changing in different Districts at different times.” MHA data (above) indicates that, while the total number of affected Districts gives the impression of a substantive decline, the decline in the number of violence affected Districts has not been comparable. Evidently, the core areas of Maoist activity remain intact. 

According to MHA estimates, moreover, the CPI-Maoist had 7,200 armed cadres in 2006. Fresh estimates of the current strength of CPI-Maoist by the MHA put the ‘hard core strength’ at 8,600. In addition, there are 38,000 ‘jan (people’s) militia’, armed with rudimentary weapons, who provide logistical support to the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), and at least occasionally participate in swarming attacks.

It is significant that, despite the continuous and sustained depletion in ranks due to killing, arrest or surrender, the Maoists have not only been able to replenish losses, but appear to have increased their strength.

Where have the Maoists gone? It is clear that a strategic shift has occurred. After the merger of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in September 2004, the newly formed CPI-Maoist had embarked on an ambitious programme to “extend the people’s war throughout the country”, a misadventure that exposed their leadership and top cadres to penetration and exposure. The result was the neutralization of a large number of leaders and cadres in areas far afield from the ‘Red Corridor’ heartland areas, particularly in urban centres. There is now evidence that this ill-conceived and hasty enterprise has been rolled back. A document recovered by the Police in Hyderabad on July 8, 2011, indicated that the top CPI-Maoist leaders had moved into the forest areas to keep off the Police radar. Further, in the absence of data on ‘quality catches’, it would be safe to assume that bulk of the Maoists killed/arrested/surrendered are less significant cadres/sympathizers.    

Available data suggests that the Maoists have been able to limit the loss of cadres in 2012 to the 2008-09 level – the stage prior to the escalation provoked by the Centre’s disastrous ‘clear, hold and develop’ campaigns in the Maoist heartland. The bulk of CPI-Maoist leadership losses according to SATP data, moreover, occurred in the 2007-11 period, while 2012 recorded the neutralization of just two central level leaders, Sadanala Ramakrishna alias RK and Mohan Vishwakarma, who were arrested last year. RK’s arrest was a major setback for the Maoists as it blew the lid off their weapons, especially rocket launcher, manufacture/procurement programme.

The Maoists have suffered dramatic reverses in Andhra Pradesh, and they have conceded their mistakes and vulnerabilities in what was once their fountainhead and heartland region. Their failure to consolidate the political and insurgent spaces that had opened up in West Bengal is also manifest. Their hold over other States in the ‘Red Corridor’ areas – Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Odisha and Maharashtra – however, remains firm. The expulsion of Sabyasachi Panda, ‘secretary’ of the CPI-Maoist Odisha State Organizing Committee, from the party, and Panda’s decision to form the of Odisha Maobadi Party, has, no doubt, been a setback in Odisha, but it is already appearing to be less damaging than was initially expected.

The Maoists have successfully defended their base in Abujhmaad in Chhattisgarh against the joint operations initiated by the Centre and Chhattishgarh in 2009-10. The ‘massive and coordinated operations’ more popularly known as ‘Operation Green Hunt’ were successfully countered by the Maoists with their Tactical Counter Offensive Campaigns (TCOC), which culminated in the Chintalnar massacre of 75 CRPF troopers. Crucially, the salwa judum movement has been completely defeated both militarily and morally, with the Supreme Court lashing out repeatedly against the State Government for its support to this misadventure.

The Maoists have also been quick to adapt to new technological innovations introduced into the conflict by the state. The shield provided by Mine Proof Vehicles (MPVs) was quickly demolished, as the Maoists applied increasing quantities of explosives to blow up the MPVs. With repeated Maoist successes against the MPVs, the then CRPF director general Vijay Kumar, on October 11, 2011, indicated that the paramilitary force was looking for better ways to counter hidden IEDs, as the MPVs had become "coffin on wheels" in Naxal-hit states. Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) require all units in Naxal-affected areas to patrol on foot, and to use MPVs only in very rare instances. In the absence of any technology that reliably and rapidly detects IEDs, the Maoists have created sufficient doubt in the minds of SF leaders to slow down the movement of troops. 

The Maoists have also demonstrated their capacity to target helicopters used in rescue operation. The recent downing of an Indian Air Force (IAF) chopper in Sukma is testimony to Maoist preparations for “self-defence against air attacks”.

Meanwhile, it remains uncertain whether state institutions have, in fact, absorbed the lessons of past experience, particularly the much talked about, and much misunderstood, ‘Andhra Pradesh model’. The MHA is now placing greater emphasis on this ‘model’, but it is not clear that its priorities are right. A proposal for the four worst Maoist-affected States – Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and Bihar – will raise specialised Forces and acquire modern arms on the lines of Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh, has been cleared by the Centre, with funds earmarked under its Scheme for Special Infrastructure. An internal note of the MHA thus specified,

The Special Force of the State concerned has to be upgraded as per the approved guidelines of Greyhounds. Even if a Special Force has been raised in some form in the State concerned, they are required to be reoriented through the entire process mentioned in the guidelines.... The State will strictly adhere to these guidelines. Only States providing such an undertaking will be considered for funding under the scheme…

It appears that the Centre – and much of India’s internal security establishment – is yet to understand that the ‘Andhra Pradesh model’ and ‘Greyhounds’ are not synonymous; that what was achieved in Andhra was the consequence of the comprehensive reinvention of the Police and intelligence system in the State, in which the Greyhounds certainly played a part, but, at best, an important, not a definitive role. The idea that Special Forces are all that is needed for an effective rejoinder to the Maoists is counter-productive in the extreme, and unless the role of the General Police Force and the Special Intelligence Branch (SIB) in Andhra Pradesh is better understood, the Centre’s current paradigm can only yield further failures.

Earlier, on May 9, 2012, the MHA had disclosed that the Government had approved 21 Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism Schools (CIATs) in the Eleventh Five Year Plan Period, in Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura. 17 CIAT Schools are already functional – three in Assam, three in Bihar, four in Chhattisgarh, two in Jharkhand, three in Odisha, and one each in West Bengal and Tripura. Roughly 18,389 police personnel had been trained in these new schools till April, 2012. However, there is paucity of data regarding the deployment of the trained personnel and their impact on counter insurgency operations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a large proportion of this trained manpower is misallocated to duties other than counter-insurgency.

The Maoist gameplan to ‘expand the people’s war across the country’ has obviously failed, and a course correction appears to have been initiated. A statement issued by Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee of the CPI-Maoist, on July 5, 2012, notes, “a change must occur in our work methods in accordance with the material conditions, level of the movement and our tasks….…(We must) guard against losing manpower by amending flaws that have crept into the outfit.” The Maoists are currently in a phase of tactical retreat, focusing on a reconsolidation of strengths, the enhancement of recruitment to the PLGA, the construction of alternative communication channels to prevent leakage of information, the intensification of propaganda through mass contacts, and escalating overground activities and protests.

The state must not mistake the decline in intensity of violence as a destruction of capacity of the Maoists to engage in violence. The present and relative hiatus needs to be exploited to create intelligence and response capabilities, particularly within State Police Forces, that will serve to neutralize the next, and imminent, wave of escalating Maoist violence.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Extremism

Left Wing Extremism

Total (BANGLADESH)

INDIA

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Left-wing Extremism

Odisha

Chhattisgarh

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)