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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments
& Briefings Volume 4, No. 31, February 13, 2006
Data and assessments
from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence
Review of the South Asia Terrorism Portal |
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J&K: Veils and Daggers – The Perils of India’s Secret Search for Peace
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami Deputy Editor and Chief of Bureau, Frontline
Magazine, New Delhi
Late
last year the Lashkar-e-Taiba
leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed held out a dark threat to India: “blood will speak,” he
prophesied, “and Kashmir will be free”. Neither Saeed’s sentiments
nor the proclamation of war were a surprise; despite the fact that the Lashkar-e-Taiba
is proscribed in Pakistan, and its parent political organisation, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa,
claims that it has no links with the terrorist group, the Muridke-based organisation
has spewed venom – and terrorism – against India at regular intervals. What
did surprise observers was the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s choice of chief guest: the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF)
leader, Mohammad Yasin Malik. Ever since the JKLF renounced ‘armed struggle’ a
decade ago, after its decimation at the hands of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
Malik has repeatedly asserted on more than one occasion that he is committed to
the principles of Mahatma Gandhi. Malik has also claimed the JKLF’s struggle is
‘secular’, despite its past involvement in attacks on the Kashmiri Pandit community,
while the Lashkar-e-Taiba makes no secret of its loathing for Hindus, Jews and
other ‘unbelievers’. In recent weeks,
J&K’s political life has been thrown into uproar by another surprise: news
that, just three weeks after the Lashkar rally, Malik also secretly met with the
man India has entrusted with making sure the jihad fails: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
At his February 1, 2006, Press Conference, the
Prime Minister said that he had met with Malik as part of his ongoing dialogue
with secessionist leaders in J&K. When
the JKLF leader responded with an irate denial, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
issued a clarification that Dr. Singh had in fact been referring to meetings held
while he was in the Opposition. For the most
part, Indian newspapers have reported the event as an inconsequential spat over
facts. Bar the entertainment drawn from the PMO’s spin-doctors tying themselves
up in polemical knots, the Malik-Manmohan Singh meeting has been represented as
being of no intrinsic value. In reality, though, the affair illustrates serious
problems in the structure of India’s engagement with secessionist
groups in J&K. Little noticed, New Delhi’s search for peace is being reduced
to a series of covert machinations which could create problems more serious than
those they were intended to solve. Just what might these problems
be? And why should policy-makers in New Delhi and Washington be thinking about them
seriously? Hidden behind
veils of secrecy, India has for several months
been pursuing an energetic secret dialogue on J&K, involving interlocutors
from the state and US-based members of the ethnic-Kashmiri Diaspora. On January 25, The Hindu broke news of these meetings. Malik, who authoritative sources say had been
driven to the PMO under Intelligence Bureau (IB) escort, was the most high-profile
participant so far in a covert peace process being conducted by India’s National Security Advisor
(NSA), the former IB chief M.K. Narayanan. Neither the PMO
nor Malik publicly responded to The Hindu’s
report, although sources say the JKLF leader registered his protest with the NSA
about the leak in no uncertain terms. When Prime Minister Singh was asked by a
journalist about the India-Pakistan détente process at the Press Conference, though,
Singh volunteered the information that Malik had been among those he had met.
According to a Press Trust of India report, Singh said that, “after
coming to office he had interacted with a number of separatist Kashmiri leaders
such as Yasin Malik and Sajjad Lone” [emphasis
added]. Incensed
by this assertion, Malik promptly called a Press Conference in Srinagar. He accepted that he had
met with Singh in 2001 and 2003, but insisted that “talk of our [secret] meeting
circulating in the media is nonsense.” Asked why the Prime Minister had then said
that a meeting had taken place, Malik blamed “New Delhi-based NGOs.” “When we
don’t meet them,” he claimed, “they come up with such things.” Soon after the JKLF leader’s press conference,
the PMO affirmed Malik’s assertion that he had only met with Singh prior to the
Prime Minister assuming office. In the absence
of a transcript, a final assessment of what the Prime Minister said is impossible.
It is, after all, plausible that several reporters who filed similar accounts
misunderstood what he said. What hasn’t been denied, though, is that secret meetings
have in fact been taking place. In January 2006, for example,
Narayanan met with Farooq Kathwari, a US national who is a significant
contributor to Islamist organisations, to the Asia Society and to mainstream political
groups. Prime Minister Singh himself held a meeting with the US-based Kashmiri
Pandit leader, Vijay Sazawal. Other signs of
energetic back-channel movement aren’t hard to come by. In December 2005, for
example, the Union Government reversed
years of policy and issued travel documents to the hardline Islamist leader Syed
Ali Shah Geelani. With the foreknowledge of India’s covert services, Geelani used
the cover of the Haj pilgrimage to hold extended discussions with the HM’s Pakistan-based
leader, Mohammad Yusuf Shah aka Syed Salahuddin, as well as the US-based
Islamist leader, Ghulam Nabi Fai. Most observers believe the HM hopes to use Geelani
as its representative in future talks with India. But
why, it can reasonably be asked, are these secret meetings a problem – particularly
since their aim is to bring about reconciliation between apparently implacable
enemies? It is well known that covert services worldwide conduct negotiations
where the political principals find it impossible. Israel’s long-running secret
talks with the Palestine Liberation Organisation, or the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Cold War dialogue with the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security,
the KGB, are often cited as successful examples. India’s former spymaster, A.K.
Verma, and the Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, Hamid
Gul, are also known to have held moderately-successful negotiations to restrict
urban terrorism in the course of the Khalistan movement in Punjab. In
the course of the conflict in J&K, India’s covert services have maintained
secret contacts with both political secessionists and members of terrorist groups.
Indeed, one of the first exercises conducted by Narayanan after he took office as N.S.A. was
to audit expenditure on India’s covert contacts in J&K, and prepare an inventory
of what had been achieved – a long overdue stock-taking exercise. In some senses,
the ongoing dialogue in Jammu and Kashmir is the fruit of these contacts, although
they have sometimes appeared a waste of both energy and hard cash. What
has now happened, though, is a conflation of political and covert processes, both
of which are contained in the body of the NSA. While critics of the NSA have claimed
that Narayanan’s conception of his role is overweening, this critique is misdirected.
The real problem lies in India’s leadership vacuum.
Where the present Union Human Resource Development Minister Arjun Singh
presided over the execution of the policy objectives in Punjab, or the late Rajesh
Pilot engaged secessionists in J&K, the ruling United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) has no-one who seems interested in playing a similar role today. Instead,
New Delhi’s conflation of covert dialogue and political intervention holds out
serious risks for policy-making on J&K. India’s
spies have thus stepped in where its politicians have failed. Malik’s case, though,
provides excellent illustration of kinds of consequences this can have. The JKLF
leader’s decision to share a platform with the Lashkar, a move intended to protect
his person, violated Indian law on association with terrorist groups. In the interests
of enabling his secret meeting, however, no action was taken. As a result, others
under credible threat, like the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, have been gifted an excuse to appease Pakistan and the terror
groups it chooses to patronise. Second,
and more important, these moves undermine the credibility of the legal framework
against terrorism. While covert contacts with figures across the political spectrum
might indeed be useful, the decision not to prosecute Malik signals that the Indian
state is willing to bargain away its commitments to punish terrorism. Third, and
most important, contact at the level of the PMO leaves no room for failure. If dialogue involving the Prime Minister of
India fails, New Delhi will be left with no alternative medium through which negotiations
with secessionists in J&K might credibly be conducted. Washington
needs to be paying close attention to these facts, for the covert dialogue is
principally intended for audiences in the US. Discussions with figures like Kathwari
are intended to meet demands from the US that New Delhi help President Pervez
Musharraf demonstrate that he is making progress in J&K – put bluntly, payback
for the US pressure on Pakistan to de-escalate violence. As President George Bush’s
visit to New Delhi draws closer, the pressure on New Delhi will, most likely,
intensify. Just
why such pressures are misguided is well-illustrated by the decision to engage
with Kathwari, whose organisation, the Kashmir Study Group, has advocated a communal
division of J&K. Until 1999, when the intervention of then Research and Analyis
Wing Chief A.S. Dulat enabled him to meet with several key politicians, Kathwari’s
Islamist affiliations had even led to his being denied permission to visit India.
Whatever status and influence the millionaire businessman’s wealth lends him,
a meeting in the PMO – as opposed, say, in a discreet hotel room in New York –
sends out the appalling signal that his ideas are open for discussion. Put
simply, Washington is ill-advised if it believes that it can sustain a distinction
between ‘authorised Islamists’, and those that wage war against the US and India.
Indeed, part of the reason why secessionists in J&K, as well as groups like
the Hizb ul-Mujahideen are so reluctant to bring serious proposals the table is
that they believe that US pressure on India will let them secure a better deal
in the future. New Delhi, for its part, is equally ill-advised if it believes
that secret deal-making is a substitute for real dialogue.
Either way, a process intended to help prepare the ground for peace is
actually stalling it, by shifting focus away from the principals – the people
of J&K and those they have chosen to represent them through the electoral
process. Is
there a way out? Yes – but only in the
unlikely event that the hidebound, dissent-allergic intellectual establishment
that informs policy on J&K demonstrates will and vision. Even as it allows
covert processes to proceed, the Union Government could, for example, give N.N.
Vohra, its chosen official interlocutor, a mandate and agenda for the consultations
he has been holding in J&K. It could also ask Union Water Resources Minister
Saifuddin Soz to begin a state-level dialogue on autonomy with all major groups.
The US could, for its part, make clear to Pakistan that no level of support for terrorism is acceptable;
that it must let go the strings that let it guide the course of the jihad
in J&K. For
this to happen, though, both New Delhi and Washington D.C. will have to abandon
their evident conviction that history can be manufactured behind closed doors,
and at a tempo laid down by bureaucrats. Covert processes do have an invaluable
and necessary role in policy execution,
but cannot be a substitute for political policy-making.
One of the things the troubled history of Jammu and Kashmir teaches us, after
all, is that secret deals are of only so much value outside of the rooms where
they are sealed. The
'Clouds of Pessimism' Darken Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Municipal
Elections held on February 8, 2006, in the shadow of Maoist attacks and a boycott by political parties, painted a dismal
picture of the Royal regime, even as it further shrunk King Gyanendra’s options. The third such local election (the first
and second local elections were conducted in 1992 and 1997) saw an average voter
turn out of under 20 per cent. According to the Election Commission (EC), nationwide,
out of 1,443,310 voters, only 284,225 cast their votes. The capital city of Kathmandu
– the King’s ‘stronghold’ – witnessed a mere 14 percent voter turnout, while the
surrounding municipalities, the Lalitpur sub-metropolitan
city, Madhyapur Thimi Municipality and
Kirtipur Municipality registered 18, 13 and 33 per cent voting, respectively.
The voter turnout was the highest, at 71 per cent, in the Gaur Municipality of
Rautahat District, and lowest at Lekhnath
Municipality of Kaski district, at just one per cent.
The previous two elections had witnessed a creditable 60 per cent turnout. The
run-up to the elections was far from smooth, with the Maoists
calling for a bandh (general shutdown)
from February 5 to 11, “to actively disrupt the municipal polls”. The seven main
political parties had already announced a boycott of the polls on January 17.
Doubts
on the efficacy of the exercise had emerged even before the polling date, when
the EC announced on January 29 that, out of the 58 municipalities scheduled to
go for polls, there would be no elections in 22, as the candidates in these Municipalities
had ‘won’ unopposed. For the total of 4,146 seats in the 58 municipalities, only
3,654 persons had filed their nominations. In the Kathmandu Valley alone, 50 candidates, including two mayoral
and six deputy mayoral candidates, withdrew their nominations. Officials were
elected unopposed in Ilam, Damak, Bhimeshwar, Bhaktapur, Banepa, Panauti, Dhulikhel, Ratnanagar, Prithvi Narayan, Byas, Waling, Tansen, Ramgram, Butwal, Kapilvastu, Baglung, Birendra Nagar, Nepalgunj, Gulariya, Dipayal, Dasharathchand and Amargadhi municipalities.
Women participation in the elections was also very poor with only 310 nominations
filed for the 806 posts reserved for women across the country.
Out of the 72 parties registered at the Election Commission, only 22 participated
in the elections. Even
as Maoist leaders claimed that their bandh was a ‘historic success’ and had completely ‘sabotaged’
the Municipal Elections, the regime claimed a ‘victory’. Home Minister Kamal Thapa, understandably thrilled
that his faction of the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party had grabbed a majority of the Mayoral seats,
declared, “despite the Maoists and the Alliance call for active boycott of polls,
the people have cast their votes with an enthusiastic zeal.” Such
zeal little in evidence, even though the regime used all its force to create it.
February 8 was declared a holiday nationwide; traffic was banned in Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur on polling day for fear of attacks by the Maoists;
all mobile telephone services were discontinued from the evening of February 7
till further notice, including the wireless phone services with limited mobility
provided by Indian joint venture United Telecom Ltd.; all Government employees
were ordered to cast their vote. In
contrast to the persistent silliness of the regime, the Maoists have demonstrated
considerable tact, guile and ingenuity in securing the upper hand. In an interview
to an Indian daily, Maoist ‘Chairman’ Pushpa Kamal
Dahal aka Prachanda conceded that his
group had agreed to engage in “multi-party democracy” in an “anti-feudal, anti-imperialist
constitutional framework”, and even offered talks with the King, though with conditions
attached. At the same time, there has been a continuous military and strategic
consolidation in the areas of Maoist dominance, as also a systematic escalation
of activities across the country after the withdrawal of the unilateral Maoist
cease fire after January 2, 2006. With
the countryside firmly in their grip, the Maoists have now increased attacks in
the cities and urban centres across the country, giving
reality to the Maoist slogan: “Dhand ma tekera touku ma hanne” – “Climb on the spine to strike at the head”; the
‘spine’, in this metaphor, is Nepal’s highways and supply routes; the head, Kathmandu
and other city centres. To add teeth to their urban
operations, the Maoists have restructured their command setup, as an International
Crisis Group report notes: “The Maoists (have) also restructured their military
and operational methods. Alongside the Eastern and Western Commands, they have
established a Special Central Command. Formation of the latter, which covers Kathmandu and the surrounding area and consists of four regional
bureaus, reflects the increased priority they are giving to the base of central
state power.” The
strategy saw an operational demonstration on January 14, 2006, when Maoists drove
into a Police post in the Thankot area in the capital
and shot dead 11 police personnel. On the same day, they attacked another Police
post in Bhaktapur in the Kathmandu Valley, injuring seven personnel and looting 26
rifles. Interestingly, the attacks came even though the Police, in an internal
report, had warned of Maoist attacks in and around the capital. Violence
across the country in the first month of 2006 had already claimed 172 fatalities
(8 civilians, 56 security forces, 108 Maoists). Urban centres
such as Nepalgunj, Biratnagar
and Pokhara have been subjected to unrelenting Maoist
pressure in the form of bomb blasts and attacks. January alone, according to the
Institute for Conflict Management’s
data, recorded at least 17 bomb blasts of varying intensities in these three cities.
Among these, Nepalgunj has been particularly targeted,
and witnessed three major attacks among a rash of lesser incidents: ·
January 5: Three police personnel were killed and two injured
in a Maoist attack on an Armed Police Force (APF) security checkpost at Ranjha chowk in Nepalgunj ·
January 20: Six
police personnel were killed and four others injured when Maoists launched simultaneous
attacks on the BP Chowk security check post, Jamunaha
Police Post and the Customs Office in Nepalgunj. ·
January 24: Two
security personnel, one Maoist and a civilian were killed when Maoists launched
simultaneous attacks on the district police office, the regional police training
centre, Nepal Rastra Bank, the Municipal Police office,
the Royal Nepalese Army’s No. 4 Company, the District Prison, the Zonal Police
Office and the District Administration office in Nepalgunj. These
developments sit ill with King Gyanendra’s claims, on
the completion of one year of ‘direct rule’ on February 1, 2006, of “Arresting
a situation that was slipping into anarchy and reactivating a stalled democratic
process”, and that “the Nepalese people have experienced the nation grow in confidence
and the self-respect of the Nepalese people (has been) restored within a short
span of one year, with the cloud of pessimism dissipating.” The
King apparently presumes that Nepal continues to live in an earlier age; to the
extent that its people seek to oppose his anachronistic regime, he has sought
to prop up his delusions through repression and increasing isolation. Reporters Without Borders has recorded
at least 273 cases of arrests of journalists and 569 cases of censorship in 2005
in Nepal, accounting for half of the total cases of censorship reported worldwide.
In November 2005, the Government also issued a ‘Code of Conduct for Social Organizations’,
prohibiting any activity ‘endangering social harmony’, and barring the staff of
non-governmental organizations (NGO) from all political affiliations, thus excluding
politically active persons from NGO work. The
King’s attempts at “arresting the situation” have, moreover, had little apparent
impact on the nation’s economy. Even as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) points
out that annual economic growth has dropped from a healthy annual average of 4.9
per cent in the 1990s, to an average of 1.9 per cent between 2002 and 2004, figures
for the last six months reflect a widening mismatch between expenditure and revenue.
Revenue collection has grown by a nominal 5.8 per cent (with inflation at 8.5
per cent) while total expenditure has soared by 15.6 percent. The ‘royal coup’
brought about a sharp dip in foreign aid mobilization (both loans and grants)
and, according to Ministry of Finance sources, the foreign aid flow fell
to Rs. 14.28 billion in 2005, as against Rs 23 billion in 2004. The
King had sought to cement his power through the Municipal elections. Instead,
they have left his regime even more fragile. Despite his glowing rhetoric about
how “all popularly elected bodies will be active in ensuring a bright future for
the Nepalese people through a dedicated exercise in democracy so as to create
a welfare society”, the harsh reality is that any resolution of the conflict in
Nepal will now substantially be dictated and engineered by the Maoists.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
January 06-12, 2006
  | Civilian |
Security Force
Personnel |
Terrorist |
Total |
BANGLADESH
| 0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
INDIA
| Assam
| 8 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
Jammu
& Kashmir | 4 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
Left-wing Extremism
| 0 |
21 |
9 |
30 |
Manipur
| 2 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
Meghalaya |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
Nagaland |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
Tripura |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
Total (INDIA) | 15 |
26 |
21 |
62 |
NEPAL | 5 |
32 |
14 |
51 |
PAKISTAN | 52 |
3 |
0 |
55 |
SRI LANKA | 0 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
INDIA
Nine
persons killed in police firing in Assam: On February 10, 2006, eight civilians
and a security force (SF) personnel were killed during clashes that erupted between
the villagers and SFs following the alleged custodial death of a suspected United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
militant at Kakopathar in upper Assam's Tinsukia district. The ULFA cadre, whom
the villagers described as a civilian, was reportedly detained by the Army on
February 6 and his dead body was subsequently recovered. Villagers protesting
against the killing blocked the national highway and were marching to attack the
police station at Lajum when the police personnel opened fire killing eight civilians.
The State Government has imposed curfew in Kakopathar and Makum. The
Hindu, February 11, 2006. Maoists
kill 21 police personnel in Chhattisgarh: Maoists
killed 21 police personnel in three separate attacks in Chhattisgarh on February
6 and 9, 2006, "Ten NAP [Nagaland Armed Police] personnel were killed and eight
others were injured [February 6] when a powerful landmine was set off as their
vehicle was moving through a forest in Dantewada district [480 km south of State
capital Raipur]," Inspector General of Police (Bastar range) M.W. Ansari said.
Earlier, the Maoists shot dead three police personnel and injured five others
in an attack on a police station in the Jashpur district. Both attacks were blamed
on the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist).
An NAP battalion comprising 850 police personnel was deployed in the Bastar region,
a stronghold of the Maoists, in June 2005. Eight
Central Industrial Security Force personnel were killed and several others injured
when a large group of Maoists attacked the National Mineral Development Corporation
store in the Hirauli area of Dantewada district on February 9-night. Mining officials
fear that about 50 tonnes of explosives were looted. The
Times of India, February 10, 2006; Hindustan
Times, February 7, 2006.
NEPAL 20
per cent voter turnout reported in municipal elections:
The municipal elections held on February 8, 2006, saw an average voter turn out
of 20 percent. According to the Election Commission, only 14 percent of the voters
cast their ballots in Kathmandu Metropolitan City, while among its three municipalities,
Lalitpur sub-metropolitan city, Madhyapur Thimi municipality and Kirtipur municipality
registered 18, 13 and 33 percent voter turnout respectively. Nationwide, out of
1,443,310 voters, only 284,225 cast their votes. While voter turnout was the highest
- 71 per cent - in Gaur Municipality of Rautahat district, the lowest – one per
cent - was recorded in Lekhnath Municipality of Kaski district. Nepal
News, February 9, 2006. Maoists
committed to multi-party democracy under 'new constitutional framework', says
Prachanda: In an interview with The Hindu, Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda
said that the Maoists were fully committed to multi-party democracy so long as
it was under a "new constitutional framework." "If the King says that I was wrong
to have done what I did last year, now come on, let us sit across the table, and
then he talks of a free and fair election to a constitutional assembly, then we
will be ready to take part," Prachanda said. "Our minimum, bottom line is the
election of a Constitutional Assembly, that too under international supervision...
and whatever the peoples' verdict, we are ready to accept that. This is our bottom
line," he added. Prachanda also asked the Indian Government to abandon its "two-pillar
theory" and choose the one pillar of multi-party democracy over the "so-called
monarchy". The Maoist leader stressed that when elections for the Constitutional
Assembly are held the party would accept whatever verdict emerged democratically.
"We are convinced people will choose a democratic republic. But if people choose
a ceremonial or constitutional monarchy, we are ready to accept that too." The
Hindu, February 8, 2006.
PAKISTAN 40
persons killed in suspected suicide attack on Muharram procession in NWFP:
At least 40 people were killed and 50 others wounded in a suspected suicide attack
on a Muharram procession of Shia Muslims in the Hangu town of North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) on February 9, 2006, A series of explosions occurred through the
procession in the main bazaar of Hangu town, some 200 kilometers northwest of
Islamabad, between 9.30 am and 9.40 am local time. PTV reported that at least
23 people were killed and 50 injured in the three bomb explosions. Four people
died when gunmen fired on a minibus in Saidan Banda near Hangu and four truck
drivers were shot dead after a mob torched their vehicles in the nearby Ibrahimzai
area. In the ensuing riots, angry worshippers set ablaze shops and vehicles prompting
authorities to impose curfew. NWFP Chief Minister Akram Durrani said a preliminary
investigation showed the attack was a suicide bombing. Dawn,
February 11, 2006.
SRI LANKA 5,464
cases of cease-fire violations committed by LTTE: The
Sri Lanka Information Minister, Anura Priyadharshana Yapa, revealed on February
9, 2006 that there had been 5,464 cases of cease-fire violations committed by
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
from February 22, 2002 to February 4, 2006, According to details revealed by the
Minister at the weekly Cabinet press briefing, 562 killings have been reported
during this period. There had been reports of 117 attempted murders and 2,199
cases of conscriptions during this period. The list of violations also includes
injuries to 433 soldiers and 442 civilians. The number of extortion cases reported
within this period is 106. Daily
News, February 10, 2006. Peace
talks in Geneva on February 22-23:
The Government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
will meet in Geneva on February 22 and 23 for a dialogue, peace facilitator Norway
announced on February 6, 2006, "The parties to the conflict in Sri Lanka, the
Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, have asked Norway to facilitate talks in
Geneva, Switzerland, from February 22 to 23," the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Ministry
said in a statement. The talks will focus on strengthening the Ceasefire Agreement,
signed by the two parties on February 22, 2002, "The parties will discuss how
they can improve the implementation of the CeaseFire Agreement. This is the first
time in three years that the parties meet face-to-face at such a high level,"
the Norwegian statement said. Peace talks were suspended in April 2003 after six
rounds, but the truce continued. Daily
News, February 7, 2006.
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South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular
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