Political Pilgrimage
in Search of Security
Guest Writer: S.D. Muni
Professor of South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi
Nepalese Prime Ministers generally prefer to call on New
Delhi for their first foreign visit after assuming office.
The urgency for Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's visit
was, however, accentuated by nearly a week-long effective
blockade of Kathmandu imposed by the Maoist insurgents.
That week exposed the vulnerability of the Deuba Government
and its capacity to govern. India sent strong signals to
assure Kathmandu that it would not allow the Nepalese state
to collapse. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's unusual detour
to Kathmandu Airport, on his way to Myanmar, during the
period of the blockade, appeared to have convinced Deuba
that it was time for a serious discussion with his Indian
counterpart on the Maoist
challenge.
On leaving
Kathmandu for New Delhi, Deuba described his journey as
a 'goodwill visit'. He brought along a large entourage of
66 members drawn from various walks of life, including business
and tourism. The most thinly (or even non-) represented
sections in his delegation were the home and defence ministries
as well as the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), though his core
concern was the Maoist insurgency. Other issues in his agenda
included discussion on projects to harness water resources,
the problem of Bhutanese refugees, and visits to temples
and holy places in India. There was strong criticism of
his visit not only from customary political baiters like
the Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala, but
also from members of his coalition Government and civil
society representatives. He was warned against signing any
major Agreement with India and was even asked to raise some
of the major irritants in relations between Kathmandu and
New Delhi, including the revision of the 1950 Treaty that
define the basis of Indo-Nepal relations, and the question
of alleged border encroachments by India.
India has preferred to treat the five-day tour as a working
visit, and not as a State visit. There were no delegation
level discussions with the Prime Minister, nor any state
banquets or lunches. All the official discussions with the
Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs,
Home and Water Resources were wound up only in a day and
half. In between, Deuba also had time to call on the President
and meet with other Indian leaders, such as Sonia Gandhi,
President of the Congress Party, and L.K. Advani, the Leader
of the Opposition. He also had a private dinner with Indian
intellectuals and sympathizers. Agreements on culture, sports
and exchange of weather information were signed during the
visit.
On the core concern of the Maoist insurgency, Deuba got
all the assurances he was looking for. India described the
Maoists as a "common security concern" and pledged "every
possible help, military or otherwise". India's worries arise
on account of the Maoists' close and growing links with
Left Wing extremist insurgents (referred to as Naxalites)
in India, and the increasingly strident portrayal of India
as an expansionist neighbour by the Nepalese Maoist Chief,
Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, as well as attacks on Indian
business interests in Nepal, along with attacks on enterprises
with Royal and American stakes. Deuba's shopping-list of
military hardware was considered sympathetically in New
Delhi, and transfer of equipment, including Advanced Light
Helicopters (not mounted with guns, but to carry troops)
was confirmed. India has also agreed to train 400 to 500
Nepalese police personnel in counter insurgency operations.
The setting up of a Joint Committee to monitor the security
situation and suggest appropriate measures was 'noted' by
the two sides. India assured Nepal it would take all possible
steps to coordinate legal actions to deal with the terrorist
problem, but ongoing discussions on an Extradition Treaty
could not be concluded. The Nepalese side is keen to ink
an extradition arrangement, as they want to get hold of
some top Maoist leaders under detention in India. Both the
sides agreed that they would not allow their territories
to be used against each other, implying that, while India
would tighten its border security to deter the movement
of Maoists across the border, Nepal would also do every
thing possible to curb the activities of Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) aimed at fuelling cross-border
terrorism against India.
Besides providing security support, India also tried to
impress upon the visiting Nepalese Prime Minister that military
means to address the Maoist challenge were not sufficient,
and that steps would also have to be initiated to seek a
'negotiated political solution' of the problem. This Indian
message was not only communicated in one-to-one meetings
at the higher political level, but was also made public
in the Indian Foreign Secretary's Statement on September
10. The significance of this position lies in the fact that
the RNA and the Nepalese establishment do not favour any
talks with the Maoists at present, for fear that this may
give the impression that the RNA was succumbing to Maoist
pressures, since the rebels clearly have an upper hand at
the moment. In these one-to-one discussions, the Indian
side also appears to have discouraged Deuba from accepting
any third party role in the peace process with the rebels.
The Maoists have favoured international mediation in talking
to the King directly. They have refused to talk to the Deuba
Government as this is 'neither a legitimate nor a credible
Government' from their point of view. Many international
third parties, including the United Nations, have shown
interest in acting as facilitators or mediators for talks
between the Nepalese Government and the rebels. Switzerland
and Norway are the latest candidates volunteering such a
role. India's apprehensions, not without reasons, are that
the third parties will complicate the Nepalese conflict
without having any capacity to discipline either of the
parties from betraying good-faith.
On the whole, Deuba has expressed great 'satisfaction' on
the outcome of his India tour. Discerning Nepalese observers,
however, are of the view that, for some military goodies,
political assurances, advice on seeking a 'peaceful solution'
and caution against the role of third parties, their Prime
Minister did not have to travel to New Delhi. All this could
have been obtained through normal diplomatic channels. Their
contention is that the real purpose behind Deuba's visit
was to get political support for his own continuation as
Prime Minister. There were rumours - and rumours have considerable
political significance in Kathmandu - that, following his
Government's failure during the Kathmandu blockade, the
King, while relaxing at his private resort in Pokhara, was
having second thoughts on Deuba's Prime Ministership. Differences
of approach are also crystallizing. Deuba has set up a 'Peace
Secretariat', with American support, but the King and the
Army do not want any dialogue with the Maoists, at least
for the time being. Further, the United Marxist Leninists
(UML) of Nepal are Deuba's coalition partners in the Government,
but they are breathing heavily down the Prime Minister's
neck. Perhaps the political pilgrimage to New Delhi could
help Deuba somewhat in easing his crisis of self-confidence.
There are no signs that Deuba's visit to New Delhi would
deter the Maoists from mounting further pressure on Kathmandu.
Just a couple of days before Deuba's departure, they had
warned 35 business establishments to cease operations. In
the meanwhile, they bombed Malla Hotel in Kathmandu (close
to the Royal Palace) and Fishtail Hotel in Pokhara. And
on the day Deuba concluded his official engagements in New
Delhi, they blasted the American Information Centre complex
in Kathmandu. The Maoists, it seems, are on their 'strategic
offensive', the penultimate stage in their 'peoples' war'
strategy. Their war on the Nepalese state is definitely
being expanded from the rural theatre to urban centres.
Their front organizations are displaying robust competitive
initiatives in destroying the credibility of the monarchical
order by attacking businesses and public structures. The
explosion at the American Centre on the eve of the 9/11
anniversary may alarm terrorism-watchers about the possibilities
of their developing links with Al
Qaeda affiliates.
No matter how well India equips the Nepalese security forces,
they are far away from being capable of dealing with the
Maoists. India's own experience in the northeast and in
Naxalite affected regions is that military methods may,
at best, help, but cannot deliver a solution to internal
revolts and insurgencies. India is now planning a co-ordinated
political strategy for all the insurgency affected States
of the Union. It must, therefore, seriously pursue a similar
approach in Nepal, as indicated during Deuba's visit. Towards
that end, Indian policy will have to break from the legacy
of supporting the Monarchy as the symbol of order and stability
in Nepal. The Monarchy is part of the problem in the Himalayan
Kingdom, it can hardly be a part of the solution to the
present crisis. Indian policy urgently needs to relate itself
to the grass roots and popular forces. Such forces include
the Maoists. India should therefore work with Nepal towards
redefining its political order so as to help the rebels
shed their arms and violent methods for a respectable and
democratic place in the mainstream of Nepali national politics.
Manipur: Mismanaged
Crisis
Guest Writer: Pradip Phanjoubam
Editor, Imphal Free Press
Visiting Manipur on September 5, nearly two months after
the current wave of public unrest in the State following
the killing of Thangjam Manorama by personnel of the Assam
Rifles on July 11, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil, had
little to offer to the aggrieved protestors, nor indeed,
was any coherent solution to promote the restoration of
peace and order in the State apparent during his interactions
there. Throughout his visit, which included a much publicized
and utterly failed round of negotiations with the Apunba
Lup, the umbrella body heading the protests, the Minister
reflected little understanding of the ground situation.
The innocuous statement on September 5, at the end of his
visit, summed up his manifestly modest 'achievements' during
the tour: "The visit to Manipur was helpful, enlightening
and encouraging to understand the issues."
Patil, it
appears, is simply wishing that the problem will go away
with the passage of time. Earlier, the July 20 visit of
his junior colleague, Minister of State Sriprakash Jaiswal,
had also proven a failed venture, as the Minister remained
non-committal on the withdrawal of the controversial Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA),
1958, and offered little else by way of 'resolution'. It
appears, in fact, that the Central political leadership's
approach to the situation has been uniformly unproductive,
not because they have refused to concede to the protestors'
demands, but rather because they have failed miserably to
articulate any alternate plans of action that could help
diffuse the situation.
The whirlwind that has been sweeping the Valley areas of
Manipur for the past two months was always seen as coming
by close observers of the turmoil in the State, at least
over the five months prior to the outbreak of the latest
'troubles'. An apparent shift in the Army's counter insurgency
strategy reportedly resulted in the elimination of 18 militant
suspects after they were arrested. The last among these
included Jamkholet Khongsai, a Kuki village pastor from
Saijang village, found buried on July 10 after being taken
away by personnel of the 28 Assam Rifles on July 8, and
Thangjam Manorama, whisked away by personnel of the 17 Assam
Rifles on July 11, and found shot under controversial circumstance
a few hours later. Of all the 18, only in the case of Manorama
were formal procedures of issuing arrest and seizure memos
observed, and at least two cases, that of K. Tejkumar and
P. Sanajit, involved mistaken identities. Ironically, Tejkumar
was an Army aspirant. The rest of the victims were, almost
without exception, either surrendered or 'retired' underground
cadres, with possibly some links still alive with their
former organizations as a result of the compulsions of their
backgrounds.
It may be difficult for people in the metropolii to understand
this, but such affiliations are known to everybody in a
traditional society with very strong grassroots civil society
bodies, as represented by the Meira Paibis and local youth
clubs. Because of these bodies, every locality, except perhaps
in the commercial core of Imphal, would have an unwritten
database of the background of everybody in that locality.
So when any youth makes an unexplained disappearance, everybody
in the locality soon knows why, how and where he or she
has gone. Whether they join any particular underground organization,
or whether they belong to the lumpenised groups in the 'trouble
maker' category or were the 'idealistic type', holding promise
even in mainstream pursuits. This is also why, when known
active underground cadres are killed, people have been known
to join the mourning, but seldom have these resulted in
anger of the kind currently being witnessed. It was inevitable
that the blatant and systematic fashion in which society's
'prodigal sons and daughters' were being picked up and eliminated,
would evoke a backlash. The killing of Manorama, also a
retired cadre of the PLA,
a virgin till shortly before the time of her violent death,
according to the post mortem report, was the last straw
that snapped the public's patience.
A more sympathetic understanding of this mass psychology
would certainly have saved lives. A paranoid establishment
has generally inclined to the view that people are 'partial'
to the insurgents, and that is the 'cause' of the present
agitation, but this is far from the case. While protests
against the state attract maximum coverage, the truth is,
the insurgents' atrocities have also resulted in demonstrations
of public outrage in the past. The protests over the killing
of the Satya Book House proprietor because of a failure
to meet extortion demands, or of cloth retailer Manoj Sethi,
or the Lilong bus bomb blast, or the mistaken gunning down
of ten passengers of a Tata Sumo near Jiribam, all by insurgents,
are testimony to the people's anger against lawless violence.
Unfortunately, since there is a multiplicity of such insurgent
groups in the State, and no mechanism exists to address
such outrage, public protests are more in the nature of
punching the air.
Given the circumstance, the official interpretation of the
agitation for the repeal of the AFSPA, following the Manorama
killing, as being entirely 'sponsored' by underground organizations,
is simplistic, though expected. Past records testify to
this attitude, and any complex issue defying easy official
comprehension or handling has always been treated in this
way. Not long ago, the convenient cover was the unseen 'foreign
hand'. Today, it is 'underground instigation'. Underground
organizations are obviously eager to take advantage of the
situation and to instigate trouble, but the claim that this
was the sole cause of the passions that have recently erupted
amounts to gross distortion and a total failure of understanding
of popular sentiments. All kinds of vested interests - including
the political opposition in the State - have naturally sought
to exploit the situation to the extent possible, but the
circumstances are not of their creation. The danger is,
a wrong diagnosis appears to be leading to persistently
wrong prescriptions.
The theory that the entire episode is an orchestrated, stage-managed
street show, entirely undermines the integrity of the civil
population in the State. Every mass protest is, in some
measure, 'organised', but this is not the same as it being
'stage managed'. Public apprehensions and indignation have
been very real, and it has been the failure of leadership
at every level - both within the military and political
establishment - that has allowed the situation to snowball
to its current and disturbing dimensions. Simple official
initiatives at the early stages could have contained public
passions. Excesses and aberrant action by members of security
forces when handled correctly even at the local level, have
seldom led to the kind of disorders noticed in Manipur over
the past months. It is useful, in this context, to recall
the recent case in the Kokrajhar district of Assam, where
a tribal woman was raped by two soldiers on June 30 this
year. Immediate action by the Army, a quick court martial
and a sentence of 10 years imprisonment for the two accused
soldiers by August 13 - far more swift and well in excess
of anything that could conceivably have resulted in India's
ailing criminal courts - ensured that justice was both done
and seen to be done. Earlier, in 1998, the rape of a Bodo
woman, in the Nalbari district, also in Assam, by two soldiers,
threatened to bring public anger to a boil, but immediate
action by the Corps Commander, the District Police Chief
and the Administration, in the form of a personal apology
to the girl and her family, along with assurances of that
the culprits would be dealt with severely, helped diffuse
the situation. The two soldiers were subsequently found
guilty on charges of assault and rape, and were sentenced
to 12 years in prison.
By contrast, the response, both of the military and political
leadership in the present case, has been tardy, ambivalent
and unconscionable. A flurry of contradictory statements
and of actions that fall into the 'too little too late'
category - including the belated and fruitless visit by
Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil last week - have kept
the State on a boil for two months. Principled action can
still help restore the situation, but the Centre appears
to have decided that the 'problem will take time to solve'.
As Patil expressed it rather abstractedly, "All dialogues
are useful. We will solve the problem but all of it may
not be solved in one go... But we can go ahead in the right
direction".
It is useful to remember, however, that time is not always
a healer; situations most often worsen in neglect.
