A Loss of Direction
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management
As the third year since the catastrophic attacks of September
11, 2001, in USA approaches completion, with much of the
world sliding, once again, slowly but steadily into a torpor
of denial, terrorism has once again issued multiple reminders
over the past weeks that liberal democracies everywhere
are under siege.
The worst of shocks were reserved for Russia, where Chechen
terrorists, apparently aided by a number of Arab nationals,
took over 1,200 persons hostage - a majority of them children
- in a school in Beslan. The bloody dénouement of this operation
left 338 dead, including at least 155 children. But this
was only the worst of what Russia had already been subjected
to in the preceding week: two Russian passenger planes were
blown up, apparently by Chechen women suicide bombers, killing
89 persons on August 24. Then, on August 31, another suspected
woman suicide bomber blew herself up, along with 10 commuters,
at a Moscow subway.
In Iraq,
on August 31, terrorists of the Ansar-al-Sunna slaughtered
12 Nepali hostages in cold blood, because they were "working
for Jews and the Christians". A number of other hostages
of various nationalities continue to be under threat in
the custody of a variety of Iraqi groups, including two
French journalists, who they have threatened to execute
if the French Government fails to lift its ban on headscarves
for Muslim schoolgirls.
And so it has been over the past three years, with some
tactical and operational variations. Americans, Spaniards,
the French, Italians, Russians, Indians, Iraqis, Philippinos,
Afghans, even Pakistanis and Saudis - the terrorists' now-ambivalent
allies and supporters - , along with others of various nationalities,
have repeatedly been targeted over the past three years
by Islamist extremists hell-bent on imposing their fantastical
vision of a 'cleansed' and 'Islamised' world order.
The liberal democratic response, however, has been, at best,
tentative and inconsistent. Indeed, the pattern of Islamist
terrorist attacks is itself at least partially responsible
for this. While targets have been attacked across the world,
there has been no attempt to engineer simultaneous attacks
in a wide range of countries. While part of the reason for
this would be purely operational, it is also the case that
this has resulted in a substantial fragmentation of responses.
There is clearly a deliberate, calibrated terrorist strategy,
relying on a systematic exploitation of the ideological
divisions, the historical faultlines and the geopolitical
tensions in the free world - everything, in fact, that creates
obstacles to the emergence of a concerted and coordinated
global counter-terrorism response.
These multiple tensions within the loose global counter-terrorism
coalition remain visible even at moments of the greatest
crisis and tragedy. In the aftermath of the terrible catastrophe
at Beslan, at least some expressions of shock and condolence
- most notably, those emanating from Europe - were qualified
by entirely inappropriate riders seeking 'explanations'
from the Russian Government about how such a tragedy 'was
allowed to happen'. Some commentators dwelt on the 'root
causes' and 'legitimate grievances' of the Chechens at a
time when all such political issues should have been clearly
and unambiguously subordinated to the unqualified condemnation
of the enormity and inhumanity that had far transgressed
any conceivable borders of explicable violence. It is useful,
in this context, to recall that Chechen separatism and terror
continues to receive 'diplomatic support' and 'moral sympathy'
at a number of international, particularly including European,
fora, as well as a substantial measure of material support
from sympathetic state sources that largely remain outside
the ambit of the international condemnation of the 'sponsorship
of terrorism'.
Within this context, it is useful to note that no single
country in the world has, in fact, any concrete idea, policy
or strategy on how it would deal with the kind of mass hostage
situations - particularly those targeting 'sensitive' segments
of the population, such as children, women, or very important
personalities - on the pattern of the Beslan Operation.
For those who believe that it is too soon after Beslan to
expect state institutions to have devised an operational
policy of response, it is useful to recall that this is
far from the first hostage crisis at this scale, and Russia
itself has witnessed several in the past. Among the more
prominent of these, on October 25, 2002, Chechen rebels
took 800 people hostage in a Moscow theatre, demanding the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. All 41 attackers
were shot dead, and 129 hostages also died as a result of
the anaesthetic used to immobilize the terrorists. Earlier,
on January 9, 1996, militants seized as many as 3,000 hostages
in Kizlyar. They were eventually attacked by Russian troops,
and at least 78 persons were killed. On June 14, 1995, rebels
took 2,000 hostages in Budyonnovsk. In this case, Russia
eventually negotiated the release of hostages in exchange
for the rebels' escape, but more than 100 persons were killed
during the crisis.
Most Governments across the world would respond to comparable
crises with hysteria, despair and confusion, adding to the
natural risks attending such calamities. It is, consequently,
imperative that hard answers now be defined for the many
questions of morality, policy and tactics raised by such
horrific possible scenarios. A clear, detailed, unequivocal
and unremitting policy for dealing with hostage situations
needs to be defined at the earliest, and this must secure
the sanction, if not of the entire 'international community',
at least of those within it who are committed to the 'war
against terrorism'. Regrettably, the struggle against terrorism
needs an ideological commitment far beyond the opportunism
and political expediency that currently dominates the policies
of most countries.
It is imperative, moreover, to revaluate our understanding
of the 'war on terror'. This struggle cannot simply be conceptualised
as a military operation, and has far deeper and more complex
dimensions, which require inputs across a wide range of
non-military parameters. Unfortunately, the world has substantially
failed to recognize these parameters, and existing institutional
responses, sanctions and penalties are simply not enough.
The reasons for this failure are not, by any means, rooted
in the impossibility of the task. Indeed, responses are
not all that difficult to work out. The tragedy is, most
of the 'experts' currently working in this field are mere
academics, desk officers, policy makers and politicians,
most of whom have little real experience of the field, and
who jealously guard their 'turf' against hard practitioners
of counter-terrorism strategy and tactics. The examples
of the miscalculations and misadventures of these doctrinaire
'experts' are too numerous to be listed and can, indeed,
be multiplied ad infinitum. What is needed, however,
is to evolve systems within and between countries that will
optimize coordinated responses on a day-to-day operational
basis. It is critical to realize, today, that we are in
fact confronted with the challenge of policing a menace
that is dispersed across the globe, and the formalism of
international treaties, bilateral agreements, and the joint
working group mechanisms that have been hammered out between
some countries, remain mired in legal and diplomatic formalism,
and are simply not working. Unless we develop instrumentalities
beyond these paper exercises, we will only see horrifying
events like 9/11 and the Beslan tragedy multiply in ever-widening
areas of the world. Any country that believes that it is
safe, or that it can exempt itself through policies designed
to appease or conciliate the terrorists is simply deluding
itself.
J&K: The Bus to
Peace Remains Stalled
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline magazine, and
also writes for its sister publication, The Hindu
The bus to peace in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) may be headed
to that alternate destination its passengers know so well:
a place called 'impasse'.
Last month, Pakistan helped restore Islamist leader Syed
Ali Shah Geelani to the centre-stage in J&K politics, giving
both Islamabad and the jihadi groups it backs a voice
in Srinagar. Now, Islamabad seems to be considering what
message it wishes to deliver from its newly-acquired pulpit.
In New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart, Pakistan's
Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, summoned the rival
secessionist leaders from J&K for a parallel stream of negotiations.
Nothing is known of what transpired between Geelani and
Kasuri at the two meetings they held on September 5, 2004.
Geelani's centrist rival, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, told journalists
he emphasised the need for softer borders and re-uniting
divided families; on Kasuri's response, the Srinagar religious
leader was silent.
Secessionist
politicians in Srinagar expect that Kasuri will have placed
considerable pressure on Mirwaiz Farooq to temper his opposition
to the Islamist faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC)
led by Geelani, and backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)
- and to reduce the visibility of the pro-dialogue, centrist
factions he heads. Hit by the assassination of several close
relatives and aides, frightened by the burning down of his
seminary, under threat from both the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin
(HM)
and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
and without an heir to carry on his clerical legacy, Mirwaiz
Farooq may well choose the second option. Yet, the stakes
for the centrists he represents are also high. Should they
fail to shape a political agenda in coming weeks, Geelani's
position will consolidate - and hopes that centrists will
be able to directly negotiate a peace with New Delhi would
receive a potentially fatal blow.
In recent weeks, Geelani has had considerable success in
drawing in fringe groupings from among J&K secessionists
into the ranks of his party. On August 30, the People's
League chairman Sheikh Abdul Aziz formally joined the Geelani
faction of the APHC. Mirwaiz Farooq's APHC, he claimed,
had "deviated from the Hurriyat constitution and entered
into talks [with the Indian government]", which he described
as "a futile exercise". Aziz said his organisation would
only participate in three-way talks between India, Pakistan
and representatives of the people of J&K, a formulation
New Delhi has traditionally rejected. APHC centrists had
begun to abandon this formulation in the wake of the Kargil
war, instead pushing for direct dialogue with New Delhi.
Days later, on September 3, the chairman of Mahaz-e-Azadi,
Azam Inqilabi, urged non-aligned secessionist groups, notably
Yasin Malik's Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
and Shabbir Shah's Democratic Freedom Party, to join Geelani.
Speaking to journalists in Srinagar on September 3, Inqilabi
used a formulation similar to that of Aziz, asserting that
future dialogue needed to involve not just India and Pakistan,
but representatives of Kashmir. Although both Malik and
Shah have stayed away from the centrist APHC's dialogue
with New Delhi, and sought for some time to reconcile the
warring faction's, these secessionist leaders have so far
resisted being corralled into Geelani's formation.
Geelani, interestingly, has adopted a position of opposition
to any dialogue - including the ongoing process between
India and Pakistan. A recent statement issued by his APHC
faction said that confidence building measures like the
opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route, "or sticking
to the ego for menial interests" would not help solve the
conflict in J&K. The press release had opposed the scheduled
meeting between Kasuri and India's Foreign Minister, Natwar
Singh, arguing that that bilateral talks had historically
failed to produce workable solutions to the problem. "These
talks are doomed to fail until the people of Jammu & Kashmir
are associated with the process", the statement read. Geelani
reiterated this position after speaking to Kasuri, declaring,
"bilateral dialogue has no effect on ground situation in
J&K. Until the contentious issue of J&K is resolved, nothing
will be achieved. All efforts are in vain."
This rejectionist polemic was provoked by the killing of
the HM's 'intelligence chief', Abdul Rashid Dar, on the
eve of the Kasuri-Singh meeting. Operating under the alias
Tariq Aziz, Dar had served over the past eight years as
the HM's 'Deputy District Commander' and 'District Commander'
in Pulwama, before assuming charge of its 'intelligence
wing'. Indian forces have not taken responsibility for Dar's
killing, but the Geelani faction of the Hurriyat said he
had been "martyred". Representatives of the group later
visited Dar's family. Significantly, the HM itself said
nothing on Dar's killing - a sign of how similar Geelani's
activities now are to those of a political wing of the grouping.
At least some believe Geelani's rejectionist position could
have Pakistan's tacit support, as a means of slowing down
the dialogue and confidence-building measures until major
political concessions by India are forthcoming. Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking before the talks began,
made it clear that further political progress would depend
on an end to cross-border terrorism, something Pakistan
has repeatedly promised in the past. Within Pakistan's Kashmir-policy
establishment, however, there seems to be considerable confusion
on the issue, with some arguing that an end to violence
will strip that country of the sole leverage it has to extract
concessions from India.
Desperate for some face-saving measures which would give
a resumption of dialogue with New Delhi political saleability
among their constituency, the centrist APHC leadership is
finding the political climate inhospitable. On August 31,
the centrist APHC - like the Islamist APHC - attacked the
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government's handling
of J&K, criticising it for placing "conditions and pre-conditions"
for dialogue. The grouping, which had held two rounds of
dialogue with the earlier National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
Government, said that both India and Pakistan had at that
time realised the futility of rigid positions, and had decided
to move ahead. However, it argued, the coming to power of
the UPA Government had meant that the situation had "returned
to square one".
What isn't clear is just what New Delhi can do to bring
the centrists back on board. Proposals like a phased reduction
in troop strength in J&K, or a unilateral ceasefire, are
simply unworkable as long as terrorist violence continues.
Nor can the centrists deliver anything to New Delhi in return,
most notably a reduction in levels of violence. Islamists
like Geelani, for their part, have no real reason to allow
dialogue to go ahead as long as India is unwilling to make
the kinds of significant territorial concessions that would
be acceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, has brought
about a phased reduction in levels of support to terror
since 2002, but seems unwilling to go further until Indian
concessions are made. India cannot make those concessions,
because of their implications for its sovereignty and domestic
political opinion.
So what might happen next? Almost unnoticed by observers,
Kasuri held out a threat. Kashmiri groups, he said on September
5, had "complained that human rights violations had increased
since November." Its hard to see just what factual basis
Kasuri's claim has - both killings of terrorists and of
civilians by Indian forces are at record lows this year
- but infiltration had fallen sharply from December 2003,
as part of a calibrated Pakistani response to open up the
way for talks with New Delhi. Read through this prism, Kasuri
could be signalling that in the absence of a breakthrough,
or at least a reduction in Indian military presence in J&K,
cross-border terrorism will be unleashed at full-scale levels
again. With 17 Brigades tied down in Wana, the Pakistan
Army may be feeling insecure about its eastern flanks and
wish to ensure that Indian forces are occupied.
The fact is, since the peace process began in 2000, the
fundamentals of the problem in J&K have not changed - and
seem unlikely to do so any time soon.
