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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 52, July 11, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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The Jihad
Runs Deep
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
The reminders are as relentless as our efforts to deny,
to forget. So, again, a little over a month after the Delhi
cinema hall blasts of May 22, 2005, sought to inflame Sikh
passions, a fidayeen (suicide squad) attack on the
disputed Ramjanmabhoomi Site at Ayodhya in the State of
Uttar Pradesh was engineered to polarize Hindus and Muslims
across the country. Both incidents failed to provoke the
wider backlash they were intended to trigger, but the intent,
the purpose, the efforts, remain unwavering, and evidence
of the enormous supportive infrastructure based in Pakistan,
and an expanding network of subversive cells in India, adds
up continuously.
It is premature to speak authoritatively of the identity
and affiliations of the individuals involved in the July
5 Ayodhya attack, but some indicators bear notice. Cell
phone records traced back from one of the instruments recovered
from the terrorists have helped track their movements back
to Lucknow and Akbarpur in Uttar Pradesh, and calls to Pakistan
have also confirmed their linkages with handlers or associates
in that country. Significantly, Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh chose the aftermath of the Ayodhya incident to reiterate
that the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan was yet to
be dismantled and stated, further, that incidents like Ayodhya
could impact adversely on the peace process. It is a different
matter, of course, that he was contradicted in this latter
claim by his own Home Minister, who was quick to state that
Ayodhya would have 'no impact' on the Indo-Pak talks. The
apparent contradiction is, perhaps, explicable in terms
of the different time frames within which the two leaders
were speaking, the Prime Minister focusing on the long term
impact of continued Pakistan-backed subversion and terror,
the Home Minister speaking of the direct impact of this
specific incident; or it could be explained in terms of
the habitual muddle-headedness that afflicts India's top
policy echelons.
Despite the efforts of a sensationalist media and opportunistic
elements within the Hindu far-right to milk the Ayodhya
incident, it is abundantly clear that this failed attack
was just another and abortive attempt to polarize communities
within the country. Once the dust has settled, its abject
failure will relegate it to a long list of minor terrorist
attacks in the country. But Ayodhya is no more than the
tip of the iceberg.
The enormity of Pakistan's subversive enterprise in India
can be gauged from the fact that, since mid-1998, a single
Central intelligence unit charged with monitoring Pakistan
backed Islamist terrorist and subversive activities outside
Jammu & Kashmir has identified and neutralized as many
as 222 terrorist and espionage cells across the country.
641 persons were arrested (39 of these were Pakistani nationals)
and another 51 (30 Pakistanis) were killed during these
operations. In addition, while consolidated data on this
is unavailable, there has been a significant number of arrests
carried out by various State Police units. No region and
virtually no State in the country has remained unaffected
by the activities of these cells. While a comprehensive
listing of all these cells, their activities and their affiliations
is not possible here, it is useful to look at a sample of
the more important modules
detected and neutralized in the current
year.
-
January
16, 2005: The Delhi Police arrested a Pakistan trained
terrorist, Aijaz Ahmed Farash of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
(HM)
at Karol Bagh.
-
February
12, 2005: The Delhi Police arrested a Pakistani agent,
Mohammed Ahsun Untoo, from Church road in the Cantonment
area.
-
March
7, 2005: A Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
cadre, Iftikar Ehsan Malik, was arrested from Dehradun,
Uttranchal.
-
March
10, 2005: Khalil Husain Shah, a suspected Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) agent, arrested at Lalkurti, Uttar
Pradesh.
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March
19, 2005: Eyaz Mohammad, a member of the Al Badr, arrested
at Kaliachak in Malda, West Bengal.
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April
28, 2005: Abdul Rezzak, a suspected ISI agent, arrested
in Mumbai, Maharashtra, for running a fake currency
racket.
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May
11, 2005: Mohammad Aish-ur-Rahman, a citizen of Nepal
suspected to be linked with the ISI, arrested from the
New Delhi Railway Station with high quality heroin worth
INR 10 million and fake currency of INR 195,000.
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May
12, 2005: Harun Rashid, a resident of Siwan, Bihar,
working with the LeT, arrested at the Indira Gandhi
International Airport, New Delhi.
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May
15, 2005: Mohammed Hasifuddin, working for the ISI,
arrested at Minkrie Village, Khliehriat Police Station,
Meghalaya, with 400 gelatine sticks. He is believed
to have supplied explosives for the August 15, 2004,
blasts in the Dhemaji town of Assam.
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May
30, 2005: ISI agent Mohammad Mehmood @ Sahil @ Aplu
arrested from a hotel in Ajmer, Rajasthan.
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June
10, 2005: An HM cadre, Ali Mohammed, arrested with RDX
at the Inter-State Bus Terminus, New Delhi. He transported
explosives to supply to a module of the organisation
in Delhi.
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July
1, 2005: Four terrorists, Masood, Zahid, Bashir and
Nazir, are arrested from the South-West Delhi area.
Recoveries included arms, ammunition and a map of the
Indira Gandhi International Airport.
In addition
to these, the Pakistan backed Sikh terrorist module involved
in the Delhi cinema hall blasts was also uncovered:
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June
1, 2005: Jaspal Singh arrested at Inderpuri in Delhi
with 1 kilogram of RDX, a timer, detonator, rifle, ammunition
and several fake driving licenses.
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June
5, 2005: Two Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)
activists, Bahadur Singh and Gurdip Singh, arrested
from Nawanshahar, Punjab. A kilogram of RDX, 11 detonators
and cordex wires were recovered from them.
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June
8, 2005: Jagtar Singh Hawara, 'operations chief' of
the BKI in India arrested with two other accused in
the Cinema hall blasts from an industrial area in Narela,
West Delhi. 10.35 kilograms of RDX, pistols, ammunition,
three remote-controlled explosive devices, and hand
grenades were recovered during the arrests.
Several other
arrests have also taken place since in a 'mopping up' exercise
targeting Hawara's associates and the support structure
that facilitated the module's shelter, movement and operations.
This small selection of cells - linked together only by
the accident of the timing of their detection - illustrates
the sheer spread, intensity and relentless character of
the Pakistan-backed enterprise of terror in India. While
terrorist activities and attacks offer the most dramatic
instances of the existing threat, there is a far more insidious
danger that continues to be nurtured in, and exported from,
Pakistan: the continued, vigorous and universal propagation
of the ideology of jihad, of communal polarization
and hatred, the demonization of all other faiths in the
eyes of the Muslims, the continuous recruitment of cadres
and the build-up of widely distributed arms caches for future
use.
This process is not unique to India, and the Islamist extremist
enterprise - both with state support from Pakistan and within
more autonomous non-state groups - is replicating a process
of 'encirclement and penetration' in target communities
across the world. The process often precedes actual terrorist
activity by years, if not decades, and passes through the
following stages:
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A 'hardening'
of Islam through a distortion of the relatively pluralistic
practices of South Asian Muslims - a process of "religious
mobilisation and an extremist Islamist reorientation"
that may extend over decades before it is translated
into violence. This involves a triad of ideological
concepts: the transnational Islamic ummah, khilafat
and jihad. The transfer of populations and
demographic destabilisation - both externally induced
and natural - have been powerful complementarities in
these processes.
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The
second stage of this process is the mobilisation of
motivated Islamist cadres for political action, and
for support activities to existing terrorist operations,
both in present areas of such operation as well as in
all potential areas of expansion. Such potential areas
are conceived, within the pan-Islamist perspective,
to comprehend all concentrations of Muslim populations,
wherever these may be located.
-
The
third stage involves exfiltration and training of such
cadres for terrorist operations - in the past, primarily
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These processes continue
in camps in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).
-
The
fourth stage involves the infiltration of these cadres
back into the target communities, either for immediate
terrorist operation in 'active' theatres, or for the
creation of cells that engage in consolidation activities,
further recruitment, the build-up of arms and ammunition
caches, financial mobilisation, propaganda, the creation
of 'front organisations' that engage in legal and political
activities based on an exploitation of the institutions
and processes of democracy to undermine democracy, or
as 'sleepers', awaiting instructions for deployment
and terrorist action.
The actual
scope of the penetration of these processes comprehends
elements - large or small - within virtually every major
pocket of Muslim populations in South Asia - particularly,
in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. Most of the major
groups involved in Islamist terrorist activities in India
have a transnational presence, with bases, training facilities,
headquarters and supply lines located particularly in Pakistan,
with Bangladesh as a secondary player, and with operational
linkages with the larger pan-Islamist enterprise of terrorism.
More specifically, the major Islamist terrorist actors in
the region are either directly connected, or have had mediated
linkages, with the Al
Qaeda.
There is sufficient evidence of Pakistan's abiding support
to a wide range of jihadi groups in its covert war
against India. The export of terror to J&K, thus continues,
although there has been a secular decline in the number
of incidents and fatalities since 9/11, related essentially
to an erosion of Pakistan's capacities to sustain a high
intensity conflict in this State as a result of increasing
international - and particular US - pressures, as well as
an enormous media focus on Pakistani activities in this
region. Significantly, the trends in fatalities have, since
9/11, shown no correlation between 'peace processes' or
periods of acute belligerence between the two countries.
Thus, even as peace talks with India continue to be pursued
as a parallel tactic, 1,810 persons were killed in J&K in
2004 in violence related to Pakistan-backed terrorism; another
915 had lost their lives in 2005, by July 10. Pakistan also
continues to extend support to terrorism by ideologically
incompatible groups such as the Khalistani (Sikh) terrorists
to whom it continues to play host even over twelve years
after the comprehensive defeat of terrorism in the Indian
province of Punjab; and to ethnic insurgencies in India's
Northeast. There is now some evidence of arms and ammunition
supplies to Left Wing extremists active across a widening
swathe of territory along India's eastern board.
Further, across Europe, America, South, South East and Central
Asia, and Africa, evidence of continued subversion and of
the persistence of terrorist training camps and activities
in Pakistan continues to crop up with the arrest and disruption
of a number of Islamist extremist cells. In the US alone,
this has included the arrest of several 'modules', the latest
in Lodi, California, in which one of the accused confessed
that he had attended a jihadi training facility run
by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, as recently as 2003-2004, at,
according to reports, "Tamal in Rawalpindi" (probably Dhamial
in Rawalpindi, where Rehman has run a 'jihad factory'
for many years). While investigations into the London bombings
of July 7, 2005, are yet in the preliminary stages, Pakistani
linkages have repeatedly cropped up in media reports, and
varying estimates of British citizens who have undergone
terrorist training in camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan
have been thrown up in assessments of the future potential
of terrorist activities in the UK. Unless the production
lines of the global jihad are destroyed, more and
more terrorist modules are going to be discovered across
the world - and at least some of these are going to slip
through intelligence filters to execute their missions of
devastation.
The proclivity of states and the international community
to focus only on the most dramatic incidents of terrorist
violence, and on the dubious pronouncements of Pakistan's
military dictator and his proxies in Government, ignores
this gradual and sustained campaign of subversive mobilisation
and capacity building. This, and not the sporadic manifestation
of these capacities in specific acts of terror, comprehends
the real potential that counter-terrorist agencies, operations
and policies are required to confront and neutralize.
Naga Talks: Summer
of Disappointment
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
After a seven-month stay in India, talking peace, the leaders
of the rebel National Socialist Council of Nagaland faction
headed by 'chairman' Isak Chishi Swu and 'general secretary'
Thuingaleng Muivah (NCSN-IM)
returned to their 'shelters' abroad. While Swu had left
sometime back, Muivah took a flight to Amsterdam on July
4, 2005. They had arrived in India to a rousing welcome
by Naga supporters in December 2004, sparking hopes for
a resolution of the nearly six decade-old Naga problem.
If their arrival in New Delhi, and later in Nagaland, appeared
to herald a winter of hope, their departure in mid-summer
has raised doubts on the outcome of the negotiations.
It would be simplistic to conclude that the Naga peace process,
as it stands now, is in the reverse gear. But, the forward
movement that was expected is absent. New Delhi has reason
to be happy that the NSCN-IM has not really pushed its key
demand: that of a sovereign Naga homeland. But, the Government
negotiators could not get the NSCN-IM to budge from the
next best option that the group thinks is actually feasible
- the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast
with the existing State of Nagaland to constitute a single
politico-administrative unit. It is the logjam over integration
demand that stalled the forward movement of the negotiation
process.
The peace process between the NSCN-IM and New Delhi has
been on since 1997, after the two sides entered into a formal
ceasefire agreement. But if the outcome of the past seven
months of negotiations is to be assessed, the NSCN-IM, rather
that the Government, appears to have secured some advantage.
As a top NSCN-IM leader and the group's 'Home Minister,'
R.H. Raising, told this writer on July 9, 2005: "As far
as we are concerned, the current rounds of talks have ended
on a positive note. We have certainly succeeded in making
the Indian Government understand the strength of our arguments
in favour of our demands, and what the Nagas think of it.
We are sincere in our effort at seeking a solution. We hope,
New Delhi too comes to adopt an equally sincere approach
in the days to come."
The Government remains caught in a bind and shied away from
telling the NSCN-IM leadership that their demand for integration
of the Naga-inhabited areas in the region could not be conceded.
New Delhi is aware of the mood of both the State Governments
and the people in the States of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal
Pradesh - they have made it clear they will not part with
any stretch of their territory to appease the Nagas. Obviously,
the Government of India cannot attempt to resolve one nagging
problem only to open up several new fronts in the already
turbulent Northeast.
Significant ground was, nevertheless, covered during the
latest rounds of talks in New Delhi:
-
There
were not just official talks, but 'undisclosed official
talks' as well. For example, the NSCN-IM top brass had
met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at least five times
over the past seven months, besides meetings with Home
Minister Shivraj Patil, Congress President Sonia Gandhi,
National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan, official interlocutor
K. Padmanabhiah, and the Group of Ministers. Many of
these sessions were informal talks or dinner meetings.
-
In
a move appreciated by the NSCN-IM, New Delhi has upgraded
the level of talks by appointing a Group of Ministers
headed by Oscar Fernandes, a Minister of State, to represent
the Government of India. That was an acknowledgement
of the fact that the talks have reached a 'political
stage.' In the past, New Delhi was officially represented
by an interlocutor.
-
Despite
the difficulty of conceding the integration demand,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is said to have assured
Muivah that he would not 'waver' from the path of peace.
The Prime Minister is reported to have told Muivah:
"I am sincerely telling you that I am committed to finding
a solution through peaceful means. I will not waver.
I am serious and determined to solve the Naga issue."
The direct
one-on-one meetings between the top NSCN-IM leaders and
the Prime Minister and other Government and political leaders
has certainly helped the two sides understand each other's
position better. That may come in handy when the next rounds
of talks begin, at a location outside India. It was such
direct contacts that prevented the talks from getting derailed.
At one stage, when New Delhi was silent on the NSCN-IM's
integration demand, Muivah and other rebel leaders got impatient
and blamed the Government of trying to buy time by harping
on the need for a 'consensus' on the issue. The angry rebel
bosses were reassured during several informal sessions and
dinner meetings at the initiative of Oscar Fernandes and
National Security Adviser Narayanan.
The turnaround was evident in reassuring comments from the
NSCN-IM camp - Muivah said before leaving that they can
certainly return to India to take the peace process further,
and the rebel group put it on record that it was still positive
about the eventual outcome. Besides the tactful handling
of the situation at the last moment by leaders like Fernandes
and Narayanan, the NSCN-IM leadership may have realized
that, if the talks were snapped off at this stage, their
group, and not New Delhi, would be in a spot. All the top
leaders of the group, Swu, Muivah, Raising, and many others
are ageing, and, therefore, the sooner an acceptable solution
is reached, the better it would be for them. Most importantly,
however, the NSCN-IM leadership is certainly aware of the
fact that it would not be easy to order their young cadres
back to the jungles - despite the threat to do so if the
situation warranted - after they have lived a life of relative
comfort in designated camps and outside, for eight years
at a stretch.
In the coming days, New Delhi will be busy carrying out
the annual formality of extending the prevailing ceasefire
between the two sides for another year, after the current
term expires on July 31, 2005. Then, Government negotiators
would need to build on the latest 'understanding' between
the two sides to try and break the deadlock over the integration
issue. That will be far from easy, and would require the
NSCN-IM to come up with yet another compromise offer, either
on its own, or with prodding from New Delhi. The peace process
has now entered a delicate stage, with options progressively
narrowing, and the rebel cadres and the common Naga people
becoming restive.
Evidence of this impatience was visible in the latest orgy
of violence in the four Naga-dominated districts of Manipur
- Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong and Chandel. In blistering
and coordinated mob violence on July 9, 2005, angry Naga
youth torched at least 25 Government buildings, including
the offices of two district magistrates in these districts.
Significantly, the immediate provocation for the violence
was the death of a Naga youth at the hands of the police,
who were trying to break an ongoing road blockade campaign.
The road blockade stir had been launched in protest against
the Manipur Government's decision to observe June 18 as
'State integration day.' Clearly, the 'greater Nagalim'
idea has enormous potential to spark violence in the region,
and even the smallest symbolic measure by either side -
the Manipuris had resorted to widespread violence after
the ceasefire agreement between the Centre and the NSCN-IM
had been extended 'without territorial limits' on June 18,
2001 - has the capacity to set off the ethnic tinderbox
in wide areas around the present State of Nagaland.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
July
4-10, 2005
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
10
|
7
|
31
|
48
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
13
|
4
|
4
|
21
|
Manipur
|
1
|
3
|
2
|
6
|
Uttar
Pradesh
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
Total (INDIA)
|
25
|
14
|
43
|
82
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
2
|
5
|
9
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
1
|
5
|
8
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Maharashtra Government announces
surrender scheme for Naxalites: On
July 6, 2005, the Maharashtra Government announced an amnesty
scheme for Naxalites (left-wing
extremists). Chief Minister Vilasrao Deshmukh
said after a cabinet meeting in the capital Mumbai that those
surrendering will be given a 'cash prize' immediately and additional
money would be given if they surrender with weapons. Deshmukh
also said that those demanding security cover would be provided
with the same. The State Government would also review cases
filed against the surrendered Naxalites and the ways to withdraw
them. The scheme would be applicable for six months. Times
of India, July 7, 2005.
Six terrorists killed after failed attempt to attack disputed
complex in Ayodhya: Six heavily-armed terrorists, who made
an attempt to storm the makeshift Ram temple at the disputed
Ayodhya complex in Uttar Pradesh, were shot dead by the Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel on July 5, 2005. Four
CRPF personnel and two civilians, including a woman devotee,
were injured in the exchange of gunfire. Uttar Pradesh Police
chief Yashpal Singh said that three AK-47 and one AK-56 rifles,
one carbine, one Chinese revolver and four grenades were recovered
from the slain terrorists. The terrorists, whose identities
are yet to be determined, arrived at the incident site in the
guise of devotees in an explosive-laden jeep, which they rammed
into the security barricade to breach the cordon. While one
terrorist who rammed the jeep was blown to pieces, five others
were killed in the subsequent encounter with the CRPF personnel.
One of the slain terrorists was found with explosives strapped
to his body. The driver of the taxi, Rehan Alam, a resident
of Ayodhya, who also got down along with the terrorists a short
distance away from the barricade, was arrested and is currently
being interrogated. The
Hindu, July 6, 2005.
NEPAL
India resumes
non-lethal military supply, indicates report: According
to The Indian Express, India has supplied the first consignment
of non-lethal military items to Nepal including bullet-proof
jackets, Mahindra jeeps, concertina security wires, bunker protection
devices and mine-proof vehicles through the Raxaul border in
the State of Bihar. According to the report, sources said Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had approved the decision on June
30, 2005 after King Gyanendra gave his assurance that Nepal
would move towards restoring multi-party democracy. However,
the date of delivery was not mentioned. Indian
Express, July 5, 2005.
PAKISTAN
Terrorist training camps resume
functioning, indicates report: Terrorist training camps in
Pakistan have reportedly resumed functioning after a year-long
hiatus and the old and new recruits are flocking to them notwithstanding
the official ban, according to the Karachi-based Herald.
Citing an example of the camps being reopened, the magazine in
its cover story, said one of Pakistan's oldest training camps
at Mansehra in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) is bustling
with activity after a year-long closure, as old and new cadres
converged on it to resume their training. "Our transport fleet
is back, electricity has been restored and communications systems
are in place… Until 2001, thousands of fighters trained here for
operations in Kashmir and Afghanistan," the magazine quoted a
guide who conducted the correspondent around as saying. According
to a top manager of the training camp in Mansehra, all the major
organisations, including Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
Al-Badr
Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
and others, began regrouping in April 2005 by renovating training
facilities that were deserted in 2004. Contrary to official denials,
the magazine said despite the ban, outfits like HM, HuM, Al-Badr
Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
managed to stay in touch with their cadres in 2003-04, which was
considered as their worst year. Herald,
July 11, 2005.
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The South
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
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