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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 30, February 7, 2005
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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The King's Folly
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Nepal's slide into chaos will be enormously accelerated
by King Gyanendra's dismissal of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba's Government on February 1, 2005. The move was justified
on the tenuous grounds of Deuba's failure to secure a dialogue
with the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist
rebels in the country, as well as the Prime Minister's apparent
inability to organize elections - conditionalities that
would have been impossible for any regime to secure under
present circumstances. The fact is, the King simply lost
patience and grasped absolute power in the country on impulse,
with little evidence of a plan.
There has,
of course, been a crescendo of international protests on
the 'stifling of democracy' in Nepal, but the morality or
otherwise of the King's move is not the primary consideration
here. For one thing, democracy in Nepal had been 'stifled'
quite some time ago, and the puppet regimes that have been
charged with running the country since the May 2002 dissolution
of Parliament have had very feeble links with representative
government. For another, even among the King's most voluble
critics most would concede that, eventually, in the realpolitik
of the international order, purely pragmatic considerations
will prevail in dealings with the new dispensation at Kathmandu.
It is, however, on the power and capacities of the new order
that the King has established that the efficacy of his moves
must finally be judged, and it is on this account that the
most significant reservations arise.
Regrettably, far from enhancing the capacities of the state
at this critical juncture, the 'Palace coup' will, in fact,
severely circumscribe the range of policy options available
to the King and will undermine the state's capabilities.
This is despite the temporary illusion of strength created
by the concentration of all executive power in the Palace,
the declaration of an Emergency, the detention - in prison
or under house arrest - of almost the entire top political
leadership of the various Constitutional parties in the
country, total Press censorship and the arrest of some prominent
Press persons who protested the King's move, as well as
some crude intimidatory tactics against the people of Kathmandu
by the Army.
By his precipitate action, the King has lost all constituencies
of support within Nepal, except the Royal Nepalese Army
(RNA), a small band of conservative loyalists and a handful
of opportunists. He has, moreover, at least momentarily
alienated the various countries - most prominently India,
USA and UK - as well as the many international agencies
who had committed extraordinary resources and support to
Nepal over the past traumatic years, and whose continued
support will remain critical, not only in the war against
the Maoists, but to the very survival of the regime at Kathmandu.
At least some of these entities will not find it possible
to reconcile their proclaimed positions and postures with
a resumption of aid to the new regime - and the regime's
conduct may make it particularly difficult for others to
sustain support.
Essentially, it would appear, that the King's strategy over
the coming months will lean inordinately on heavy-handed
repression to 'restore order' in the country. In this, the
risks of failure are extraordinary. For one thing, the armed
Forces available to Kathmandu are far from sufficient to
manage the scale and spread of the insurgency in Nepal,
and these Forces have, in fact, been operationally diminished
as a result of the withdrawal of significant numbers to
Kathmandu for the protection and management of the capital.
The 4,000 troops and 5,100 police personnel permanently
stationed at Kathmandu would certainly be inadequate to
retain a semblance of order in this city of three million
in the present circumstances, and, while specific numbers
are not available, reports suggest that this Force has been
substantially augmented by a withdrawal of troops from other
parts of the country. As troops mass in Kathmandu, the rest
of the country would become the more unstable, the more
vulnerable to Maoist consolidation, and Kathmandu itself
will become the more susceptible to 'encirclement' by the
rebels.
Indeed, Kathmandu's vulnerabilities have been demonstrated
again and again by repeated boycotts and blockades which
have effectively choked its transport lifelines for days
at end. And while the saturation of Forces and the shock
of the Royalist takeover may have resulted in a measure
of immediate disorientation, Kathmandu's susceptibility
to direct militant action is also significant. Indeed, after
the collapse of the ceasefire on August 27, 2003, and till
December 31, 2004, the 'fortified' Kathmandu Valley has
topped the list for incidents of bomb blasts, with at least
68 explosions registered, including 55 in Kathmandu, nine
in Bhaktapur and four in the Lalitpur area. Though total
fatalities in these incidents have been low - the insurgents
have killed 11 Security Force personnel and 8 civilians
- their disruptive and demoralizing impact has been significant.
The Maoists have also established a 'Special Task Force'
with six to seven 'waves' or groups, each comprising 12
to 24 sharpshooters, to operate in and around the Valley.
The potential for a sustained campaign of harassment and
terror in Kathmandu, consequently, is significant.
With an estimated strength of just 80,000 soldiers in the
RNA, 17,000 personnel in the newly raised Armed Police Force
(APF) and a poorly equipped Police Force comprising 47,000
men, Nepal simply does not have the numbers to contain an
insurgency of the magnitude of the Maoist movement, in a
population of nearly 27 million people, with every one of
its 75 districts currently afflicted. The Maoists have a
current estimated strength of between 8,000 to 10,000 well-armed
and trained 'regulars' and an additional 25,000 (on conservative
estimates) 'militia' armed with relatively primitive weapons,
such as pipe guns and crude bombs. These are backed up by
a substantial number of 'sympathisers' who can, under certain
circumstances, be mobilised - voluntarily or coercively
- for violent action. The current strength of 144,000 men
in all state Forces cannot even provide a fraction of a
minimally acceptable counter-insurgency Force ratio, which
would have to exceed at least 1:10, and arrives at desirable
(though far from optimal) levels at 1:20. Indeed, even such
ratios may not allow the state Forces to dominate the entire
countryside, given the nature of the terrain - which overwhelmingly
favours guerrilla and irregular Forces - in Nepal.
The very inadequacy of Forces implies, essentially, that
a strategy of repression would have to depend overwhelmingly
on relatively indiscriminate violence in 'target areas'
deemed to be 'Maoist infested'. Irrespective of the brutality
of such operations, however, the state's Forces would not
be able to establish a permanent presence or control over
the country's sprawling hinterland - there simply are not
enough 'boots on the ground'. Indeed, the Maoists themselves
would not be particularly averse to such 'state brutality'.
It is useful to recall that it was precisely at the time
of the most brutal phase of its military campaign against
the rebels - after the collapse of the ceasefire in August
2003 - that Kathmandu lost control of its territories at
the most rapid rate. Given this record, the possibility
that the Maoists may, in fact, actively seek to provoke
indiscriminate state violence, cannot be ruled out. This
would feed their ranks and may, eventually, so sicken the
RNA's soldiery that they would begin to ask themselves whether
such a King and such a regime, which commands them to fight
and slaughter their own countrymen, is worth fighting for.
It is this outcome, and not some dramatic military confrontation
at the gates of Kathmandu, that the Maoists will seek to
engineer with a combination of demonstrations, disruptive
activities, blockades and targeted violence. It is useful
to note that the RNA and the APF recruit from the same villages
and communities that have been, and will continue to be,
targeted in the counter-insurgency campaign and, though
no numbers are currently available, there has been a steady
trickle of desertions from these Forces since the Army was
drawn into operations after the Dang attack (in November
2001).
Worse, Gyanendra is a far from popular King, and whatever
the truth may be, the taint of suspicion of his involvement
in the Palace massacre of June 2001 has never been entirely
removed from the collective mind of the people of Nepal.
He has, moreover, a particularly unpopular son in Paras,
and the Prince's misdeeds have filled the capital with sordid
rumours. While Kathmandu is currently being held down with
sheer force, and while the memory of the incompetence of
the fractious democratic parties is presently fresh in the
public mind, it will not take much before people begin speaking
of the 'better times' under the democratic leadership. Indeed,
this is the critical flaw in the King's strategy - he has
removed the buffer between the palace and the people. Henceforth,
while all credit for improbable successes would no doubt
flow directly to him, so, indeed, would all blame for failure
and governmental incapacity in every sphere.
This process has already begun. The Deuba Government was
dismissed for failure to open negotiations with the Maoists,
and the new dispensation immediately declared that, with
the King wielding executive authority "it would be easier
for the rebels to come for peace talks. It is what they
have been wanting." But the rebels have rejected these overtures
outright, stating that "The King has closed the door to
any possibility of talks." The Maoist 'chief', Pushpa Kamal
Dahal @ 'Prachanda', has also called on "all pro-people
forces" to unite against the King's dismissal of the Deuba
Government and the imposition of the Emergency.
There are also indications that the most of the fractious
Constitutional parties have now been, in some measure, united
against the King. Most of the leadership that is not already
under detention has gone underground, and some are believed
to have crossed over into India. The actual strength and
capacities of this movement will only be discovered over
time, but any such moves can only make the King's situation
more untenable.
External players - particularly India, the US and UK - cannot
be indifferent to these various considerations or to objective
calculations of the probable success or failure of the King's
current enterprise. In this, of course, the King has also
sought to force their hand by playing up traditional geopolitical
rivalries - and there have been rather obvious overtures
in the past few days to both China and (particularly for
India's benefit) Pakistan. But here, the King may well have
overplayed his hand. The delusions of the 'absolute power'
of the monarch notwithstanding, the truth is, Kathmandu
has always been, and remains, a weak and immensely dependent
centre of power. Those who are acquainted with the history
of Nepal's monarchy over the past half century, particularly
in the early 1960s and the late 1980s, will be aware of
how susceptible the King would be to external, especially
Indian, pressure.
There may still be some scope for the international community,
particularly the countries aiding Kathmandu, to try to convince
King Gyanendra that he has made a gross miscalculation,
and that the possibilities of the long-term survival of
Nepal's beleaguered monarchy are greatest under a stable
Constitutional order, which can still be restored through
immediate correctives that would address the consequences
of his present and acute lapse of judgement.
It is, nevertheless, also time, now, for India and the international
community, to begin imagining and assessing the possibilities
and character of the successor state at Kathmandu, and containing
the possibility of Nepal's spiral into chaos in case the
King is led to his own downfall by continued lapses of judgement.
Such a process would require envisaging radical options,
including the reactivation of effective backchannel processes
to work out a stable and comparatively democratic solution
with the Maoists and the Constitutional political parties.
A number of alternative scenarios need to be projected,
and at least some of these may be 'unorthodox' and may involve
support to radical alternative structures of power in the
country.
Naga
Talks: Jeopardizing the Peace
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
After nearly eight years of peace talks, it now appears
to be clear that the faction of the rebel National Socialist
Council of Nagaland headed by chairman Isak Chishi Swu and
general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM)
is ready to give up its demand for a 'sovereign' Naga homeland.
New Delhi is obviously happy, and, consequently, not rejecting
outright the next best option that the NSCN-IM is pushing
for - the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the
Northeast with the existing State of Nagaland to constitute
a single politico-administrative unit.
By failing
to gather the courage to tell the NSCN-IM leadership that
the redrawing of the maps of this volatile region was no
easy task, however, the Government of India will not only
lose the Naga rebel group, sooner rather than later when
this reality has to be faced, but will also create more
enemies within.
This was more than demonstrated in the June 2001 uprising
in Manipur when New Delhi announced the extension of the
ceasefire with the NSCN-IM "without territorial limits",
which was interpreted by the people as a prelude to slicing
off Naga-dominated areas of the State for integration in
a 'Greater Nagaland'. The bloody protests that forced a
reversal of that announcement - eighteen protestors were
killed in police firing in the capital, Imphal, the Manipur
State Assembly Complex and dozens of Government buildings
were set ablaze by angry mobs - are still fresh in the minds
of the people of the region.
It is not the NSCN-IM, but New Delhi that is to blame for
the lack of direction in its handling of the peace negotiations.
The Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
Government had stated in its Common Minimum Programme (CMP)
that "the territorial integrity of existing states will
be maintained" in the Northeast, and that existing geographical
boundaries would not be altered. If that is indeed the position
of the Congress-led coalition in New Delhi, the question
of redrawing the map of the northeastern States should not
arise.
Regrettably, New Delhi has tended to muddy the waters, and
Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil's contradictory statements
over the past week have exposed an insensitivity to both
the sentiments of the NSCN-IM and of the people in the States
of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, whose territory
the Naga rebel group has set its sights on.
On a visit to Assam's capital Guwahati, Patil reminded journalists
about the UPA's stand on not altering existing geographical
boundaries of the States. Once back in Delhi, however, Patil
refused to confirm reports that had quoted him on this,
and his ministry officials said they were not aware of Patil
having given any assurances to anyone in Assam, Manipur
or Arunachal Pradesh that their territories would not be
dismembered.
On February 3, 2005, moreover, after a meeting with Patil,
NSCN-IM leader Muivah declared that the Home Minister had
made it clear to them that the issue of integration of Naga
areas would definitely constitute part of the negotiations
that would follow between the insurgent outfit and the group
of Union Ministers specially appointed to raise the peace
talks to a political level.
On its part, the NSCN-IM has been consistent on its integration
demand, while it has now chosen silence on its key slogan
of an independent Naga homeland. At the end of the two-day
Naga People's Consultative Meeting that ended on January
21, 2005, at Camp Hebron, the NSCN-IM headquarters near
Nagaland's commercial hub, Dimapur, the rebel group issued
a four-point declaration:
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unification
of all Naga inhabited areas is a legitimate demand of
the Nagas and therefore non-negotiable;
-
support
for an honourable solution to the 'Indo-Naga problem'
should be on the basis of the uniqueness of Naga history
and situation;
-
political
solution should be found through peaceful means;
-
Government
of India and the NSCN-IM should both uphold utmost honesty
and sincerity towards reaching a political solution.
The NSCN-IM
has come to regard the decision arrived at the Consultative
Meeting, attended by up to 10,000 people, as a 'mandate'
from the Nagas for the integration of all areas inhabited
by them. Armed with this 'mandate', Muivah stated in an
interview at New Delhi on February 1, 2005, that any attempt
by the Government of India to resolve the Naga issue by
'appeasing' the Assamese, Meiteis (of Manipur) or the Arunachalese,
would be futile.
Muivah & Co. have certainly hardened their position on the
integration issue, though there is a parallel and clear
realization that pushing for sovereignty was not going to
lead to a solution of the 58-year-long insurrection. The
next best alternative, from their perspective, was clearly
to try and annex parts of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh
to achieve a 'Greater Nagaland.'
New Delhi is certainly aware of the public mood in the three
states bordering Nagaland. Any dismemberment of their geographical
boundaries would certainly lead to mass violence. Nevertheless,
the Centre appears still to be hoping to concede some areas
to the Nagas in the hope of ending the protracted conflict.
In this, the UPA Government at the Centre may be gambling
on the expectation that it may be able to bulldoze the Congress-ruled
states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh into accepting
whatever decision it might eventually take to 'solve' the
Naga problem. This may tempt the Manmohan Singh Government
to push things forward in a hurry, before a non-Congress
Government comes to rule any of these three states. Only
Congress Governments would be prepared to listen to the
'high command', though even that is suspect in the present
case.
A tricky situation confronts the Indian Government negotiators
in the days ahead. If the talks with the NSCN-IM hinge on
signals for the integration of the Naga areas, a sharp polarization
of rebel and mainstream forces is bound to take place in
Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Insurgent groups in
these three states are most likely to close ranks with the
otherwise moderate sub-national forces and pressure groups,
triggering mass uprisings. If New Delhi is then forced to
change its soft approach towards the NSCN-IM on the issue
of integration, the Naga rebel group could be pushed to
the wall, and react by either snapping or threatening to
snap the prevailing truce, to begin with. Either way, Delhi's
ambivalence is progressively trapping it in a Catch 22 situation,
with no solution and no winners in sight.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
January
31-February 6, 2005
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
1
|
0
|
10
|
11
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
5
|
1
|
8
|
14
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
5
|
9
|
7
|
21
|
Manipur
|
0
|
2
|
1
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
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10
|
12
|
17
|
39
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
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PAKISTAN
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
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SRI LANKA
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
SAARC summit postponed indefinitely
after Indian Prime Minister decides to abstain: The South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit, scheduled
for February 6 and 7, 2005, was postponed indefinitely after
India announced on February 2 that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
could not attend the meeting due to poor security conditions
in the Bangladeshi capital, Dhaka, and recent developments in
Nepal. Earlier, the summit, scheduled from January 9 to 11,
was postponed in the wake of the tsunami. Under the SAARC Charter,
a summit cannot be held even if one of the seven heads of Government/state
cannot attend the meeting. The
Hindu, February 3, 2005.
Ruling BNP and Jamaat activists linked to January 27-grenade
attack: Preliminary investigations by security agencies
have reportedly revealed a section of the ruling Bangladesh
National Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami activists to be the
prime suspects in the January 27-grenade blasts that killed
former Finance Minister, S.A. Kibria, and four others in the
Habiganj district. Police on January 30, 2005, detained two
persons affiliated to the ruling coalition on suspicion of having
links to the incident. "We are considering every possibility
and ruling out nothing. But right now, our analysis shows that
the local BNP leaders are most benefited from Kibria's death,"
said an unnamed official. The
Dailystar, February 1, 2005.
INDIA
Landmine blast
kills seven police personnel in Jharkhand: Seven police personnel
were killed in a landmine blast suspected to have been triggered
by left-wing extremists (also known as Naxalites)
in the Palamau district of Jharkhand on February 3, 2005, the
day of polling for the first phase of Legislative Assembly elections.
The Deputy Election Commissioner, A.N. Jha, stated in New Delhi
that the polling percentage in 24 of the 81 seats for which elections
were held was around 45 per cent. Hindustan
Times, February 3, 2005.
Naga peace talks resume in New Delhi: Talks between the
Union Government and National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM)
leadership began on February 3, 2005, in New Delhi with both sides
reportedly indicating a willingness to work for a mutually acceptable
and honourable solution to the five-decade-old Naga insurgency.
Consequent to an hour-long meeting with the Union Home Minister,
Shivraj Patil, the NSCN-IM general secretary, Thuingaleng Muivah,
said that he looked forward to "an intensification of the negotiations
in coming weeks and months." During the meeting, he is reported
to have reiterated the outfit's demand for the unification of
all Naga-dominated areas in the North-East. The
Hindu, February 4, 2005.
NEPAL
King Gyanendra
dismisses Prime Minister Deuba and imposes emergency: Nepal's
King Gyanendra announced on February 1, 2005-morning that he has
dismissed the Government led by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba.
The King has taken over direct power and imposed an emergency
in the country. "I have decided to dissolve the Government because
it has failed to make necessary arrangements to hold elections
by April and protect democracy, the sovereignty of the people
and life and property," the King said in his announcement. Deuba
had been reappointed Prime Minister during June 2004, two years
after King Gyanendra sacked him for failing to contain the Maoist
insurgency. All international flights to and
from Kathmandu remain suspended since the King's proclamation
and communication facilities, including telephone lines, were
blocked. The King also suspended several provisions of the Constitution,
including the freedoms of press, speech and expression, the freedom
to assemble peacefully, the right to privacy and the right against
preventive detention, according to a statement from the Narayanhiti
Palace. Meanwhile, the King also announced a 10-member Cabinet
on February 2. Indian
Express, February 2, 2005.
PAKISTAN
Bomb blasts
lead to power disruption in the entire Balochistan province:
A series of bomb explosions are reported to have cut electricity
plunging the entire Balochistan province into darkness on February
1-night. A high-tension power supply line was blown up by bomb
attacks in the Mithri Pirak area of Sibi at approximately 9:15
pm (PST). "The electricity tower was blown up in Sibi and power
supply to two-thirds of the province has been cut off," said an
unnamed Balochistan Government official. "This was the last power
supply line after two power transmission lines were blown up earlier
this month [January 29] and now we have no means to supply power.
The repair will take some time," a Water and Power Development
Authority official told AFP. The Balochistan Liberation
Army claimed responsibility for the attacks on the electricity
line. Daily
Times, February 2, 2005.
SRI LANKA
Government help
essential for Tsunami relief, says LTTE leader 'Colonel' Soosai:
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
leader, 'Colonel' Soosai, stated on January 31, 2005, that Government
support was essential for the reconstruction of Tsunami-affected
areas in the North-East of Sri Lanka since the outfit cannot fulfill
this task on its own. In an interview to Daily News from Mullaitivu
town, the Sea Tiger leader said they were planning to begin the
reconstruction process in the district keeping a 300 meter buffer
zone. "Without any assistance from the Government, the LTTE alone
cannot continue this process… There should be government officials
for any committee appointed for the reconstruction of tsunami
hit areas in the North-East representing all ethnic groups in
each district," said Soosai. Daily
News, February 1, 2005.
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