SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 29, January 31, 2005

INDIA

Naxalites: What, Me Worry?
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
Saji Cherian,
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

There is a Panglossian obduracy in the refusal to acknowledge and address the realities of the Left Wing extremist threat in India, and the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister, Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy's plaintive insistence that his Government was "open to continuing talks with the Communist Party of India-Maoist and the Janashakti" reflects the political leadership's abject failure to correctly assess the intent and activities of the Maoists. The problem is not confined to the Andhra Pradesh State leadership alone, and the same attitude of complacent myopia was visible in Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee's claim, on January 29, 2005, that "Naxalite activity in Andhra Pradesh and other parts has caused some concerns but it is manageable and there is no need for anyone to panic. The problem is being dealt with."

Also Read Left Wing Extremist Consolidation Undermines Electoral Processes -- Sanjay K. Jha Naxalites: While We Were Sleeping -- Ajai Sahni

The Centre's idea of 'dealing with' the problem was articulated during the meeting of the Coordination Committee on Naxalism in August last, where a 'multi-pronged strategy' exhorted the States "not to be deterred in initiating talks with the Naxal groups due to initial setbacks", since, once a semblance of peace is established, "State Government officials are able to visit the remote corners of the State to undertake developmental works."

But these pat formulations are being repeatedly challenged from within the Government, and even Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has gone on record in a letter to the mediators in December 2004, to state that there had been "a virtual collapse of law and order in view of extortion demands, display of arms, encroachments on public and private property and the militant rhetoric of Naxal leaders at rallies and meetings" in Andhra Pradesh. Earlier, on November 4, 2004, at the Annual Conference of Directors General of Police and heads of Police Organisations at New Delhi, the Prime Minister had warned that the cross-border linkages of the Maoists constituted "an even greater threat to India than militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast." He warned, further, that "Large swathes of tribal territory from Andhra Pradesh in the South to the border of Uttar Pradesh and Bengal in the North and East respectively have become the hunting grounds of Left Wing extremists."

Separately, the then Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (now National Security Advisor) M.K. Narayanan had stated that the Naxalites (Left Wing extremists) had created a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) running from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh. And Jharkhand Home Minister, Brij Mohan Agarwal, complained that the Naxalites had stepped up violence in his State since peace talks began in Andhra Pradesh.

It must be clear, even from these conflicting claims, that current policy on Left Wing extremism is not based on, or consistent with, a coherent assessment of the situation on the ground and is, in fact, more an exercise in political evasiveness and wishful thinking.

A closer scrutiny of the situation in Andhra Pradesh is edifying in this context. Through the 1990s, Naxalite activities had been largely restricted to the Telangana region of North Andhra Pradesh (10 districts), and overwhelmingly to the four 'heartland' districts of Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal and Khammam. Today, all of the State's 23 districts have been covered by the movement, and there is rising evidence of consolidation in the affluent Coastal Andhra region (nine districts) as well as in the southern Rayalseema region (four districts). These trends were already visible by late 2002, when the then DGP, P. Ramulu, had disclosed at the Annual Police Officers' conference at Hyderabad, that coastal Andhra was increasingly being targeted by the Communist Party of India, Marxist Leninist, People's War [CPI-ML-PW, also known as the People's War Group (PWG), which merged with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) in September 2004 to create the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)]. The DGP was speaking in the wake of attacks on the Anakapalli and Chodavaram police stations, both located in urban areas in the region. During the preceding two years, police sources indicated, coastal Andhra had witnessed 12 landmine blasts, 27 killings of police personnel and 124 other crimes related to Left Wing extremism, at a time when a steep decline was registered in similar crimes in the Telangana region.

The shift has become far more pronounced since then, and is visible in the number of explosions [bombs, landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)] carried out by the Naxalites over the past four years (2001-2004).

According to data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, in the year 2001, out of the 46 incidents of explosions across the State, 26 occurred in the Telengana region; 15 in the coastal Andhra region; and five in the Rayalaseema region.

In 2002, out of the total 43 incidents of explosions, 21 were registered in the Telengana region; 17 in the Coastal region; and five in the Rayalaseema region.

In 2003, out of the 53 explosions, just 19 occurred in the Telengana region, while there were 17 each in the Coastal and the Rayalaseema region.

In 2004, while the absolute volume of activity declined dramatically as a result of the 'ceasefire', the skew became more pronounced: out of 17 incidents, the Coastal area witnessed eight, Rayalaseema accounted for five, and Telengana had just four.

These trends are backed up by data relating to other offences as well. According to the Andhra Pradesh Police, in 2001, out of a total of 667 offences committed by the PWG across the State, 499 occurred in the Telengana region (74.81 per cent), 113 in the Coastal region (16.94 per cent), and 55 in the Rayalaseema districts (8.24 per cent). By 2003, out of the 716 offences, 410 were in the Telengana region (57.26 per cent), the Coastal region accounted for 214 (29.88 per cent) and there were 92 offenses in the Rayalaseema districts (12.84 per cent).

Further evidence of consolidation outside the 'heartland' during the 'ceasefire' period came in the shape of activities of the revived 'front organisations' of the extremists, the campaign for political mobilisation in rural areas, the building of martyrs' memorials, the imposition of 'revolutionary taxes', and widespread recruitment and training activities. Reports of pervasive extortion in the Coastal region were confirmed when Prakasam District Superintendent of Police (SP), Mahesh Chandra Ladda, disclosed that documents recovered after an encounter in the district on January 8, 2005, contained accounts of extortion from, for instance, a power plant (Rs. 800,000), Linga Reddy, the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) candidate for the Khammam Assembly seat (Rs. 500,000), Manam Venkata Reddy (Rs. 80,000), beedi leaf contractors (Rs. 60,000), the Forest Department (Rs. 50,000), lorry owners of Giddalur (Rs. 20,000) and the Dornala mandal (administrative block) president (Rs. 5,000).

Worse, on December 1, 2004, Police recovered six landmines in the Nakarekallu mandal of the Guntur district in coastal Andhra. The Naxalites had located the mines at a critical point on a route that all police personnel had to take to enter the Guthikonda forest. Again, on December 29, 2004, the police unearthed two dumps with a huge quantity of high-grade explosives in the vicinity of Koondrapalli village in G.K. Veedhi mandal in the Visakhapatnam district in coastal Andhra. According to the District SP, S.K. Jain, the explosive material was adequate to blast 70 to 80 vehicles.

These seizures are no more than the tip of the iceberg, and there is evidence that the Naxalites have used the entire period of the 'ceasefire' to lay out a network of mines and IEDs for future use on all major routes in the State. Indeed, the State's DGP, Swaranjit Sen, on January 20, 2005, disclosed that the Naxalites had prepared mines with an estimated 2,000 kilograms of gelatine, and had planted, or were planning to plant, these at various locations across the State. Confirming reports that the Naxalites had, in fact, mined vast stretches of the State, Chief Minister Reddy had stated on December 17, 2004, that "reports suggest that several roads have been extensively mined."

The impression of peace under the 'ceasefire', moreover, is somewhat misleading. DGP Sen also disclosed that the Naxalites had been involved in as many as 1,405 incidents of violence between May 14 and December 31, 2004. These included four murders, nine attempts to murder and six bomb blasts. Further, during the first 18 days of year 2005, they had engaged in 40 violent incidents, including six murders, seven exchanges of fire, one bomb blast and five incidents of arson.

There is, indeed, reason to believe that the levels of Naxalite violence, not only in Andhra Pradesh, but across the country, are somewhat higher than may be generally reflected in the media. Thus, the earlier SAIR assessment suggesting that total fatalities linked to Left Wing extremism in 2004 across the country had fallen dramatically now appears to have been inaccurate, and it is evident that there was very substantial under-reportage of fatalities, particularly in the States of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. Despite the 'peace' in Andhra Pradesh, total fatalities in the country, in fact, rose marginally from 513 in 2003 to 518 in 2004, according to data released by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) at the end of November 2004.

Divergent Estimates of Fatalities related with Left Wing Extremist Violence in India - 2003-2004
ICM: Institute for Conflict Management, data based on open source (media) monitoring
MHA: Ministry of Home Affairs
DGP: Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh, data till December 31

The sheer scale and spread of Naxalite violence in India (as of the widening spheres of lawlessness due to other factors) is a direct challenge to the country's vaunting pretensions to superpower status, and its ambitious quest for dramatic economic growth and inclusion in the elite club of the world's 'developed countries'. One-sided economic and demographic analyses have painted blissful scenarios of India's future, and all this may well come to pass. It would, however, be foolish to believe that these outcomes are either necessary or imminent. The enveloping lawlessness and growing disorders of virtually the entire eastern board of the country constitute a grave and urgent threat to the nation's stability, integrity and development.

INDIA

J&K: Grassroots Democracy Rebuffs Terror
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

Attempts to strengthen political contestation and civic participation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) received a boost in the first phase of civic polls held on January 29, 2005. Elections to civic bodies have taken place after a gap of 27 years.

Also Read J&K: A Violent Peace -- Kanchan Lakshman Summertime? Reflections on the Peace Process in J&K -- Praveen Swami

In the first of an eight-phase polling process, elections to two municipal councils and eight municipal committees in the Baramulla and Kupwara districts of north Kashmir were held on January 29. Polls will be held for all civic bodies in the State, including the municipal corporations of the two capital cities of Srinagar and Jammu. The electoral process, which began on January 8, is to be completed by February 17. Beginning January 29, civic polls will be held in Srinagar, Baramulla, Budgam, Anantnag, Pulwama and Kupwara to elect a corporation, three councils and 30 committees - with a 33 per cent quota of all posts reserved for women. The summer capital Srinagar, for instance, is to elect its first ever Mayor who will preside over 68 elected councilors, including 23 women.

Preliminary reports indicate that over 60 per cent of the electorate cast their votes in the first phase. The municipal committees in Kupwara witnessed the highest turnout of 86 per cent, while those in Baramulla registered a turnout of 56.5 per cent, according to a Press Trust of India report. The highest voter turnout was recorded in Handwara municipal committee, where nearly 88 per cent of the electorate exercised their franchise. Candidates for Kunzer municipal committee in Baramulla were declared elected unopposed as there were only five nominations for as many seats. While a total of 21 candidates have already been elected unopposed in Baramulla and Kupwara, initial reports indicate that the ruling coalition of the People's Democratic Party (PDP)-Congress has consolidated its position over the opposition National Conference (NC).

Terrorist groups and the overground separatist formations had once again given a call for a boycott of the elections, as they have been doing for over a decade in J&K. Dismissing the polls as a 'useless exercise', and "against the interests" of the people, they called for a boycott 'at every level'. Some efforts were made to enforce the boycott with violence, and terrorists killed two candidates, one each of the NC and Congress, while several others were attacked in the run up to the first phase of polling. At least six political activists were also killed and approximately 64 others were wounded in pre-election violence. Terrorists also targeted the PDP chief, Mehbooba Mufti (January 24), State Finance Minister, Muzaffar Hussain Baig (January 27), and PDP Legislator, Zahoor Ahmad Mir (January 27), in the pre-poll phase.

Targeting the democratic ethos has been integral to the strategic orientation of terrorist groups in J&K. The Al-Mansooran, a front outfit of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), issued threats to all candidates, demanding their withdrawal from the electoral contest. The Congress candidate in Baramulla, Noor-ud-din Sherwani, was shot dead on January 17, while PDP and NC candidates were targeted in the same area, and in Srinagar.

The provision of security for the approximately 350 candidates in Baramulla and Kupwara has been a logistical nightmare, and at least 152 people are reported to have quit the race before Saturday's polls. In Baramulla alone, 83 candidates withdrew after Sherwani's killing, while 23 pulled out in Srinagar city after the grenade attack on an NC rally at Alamgari Bazaar on January 15, in which three political activists were killed. The terror fanned by violence reportedly led to the cancellation of elections at Khrew in Pulwama district, since not a single candidate filed nomination papers.

But the unprecedented participation in the first phase has already transformed elements of the situation on the ground. Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed declared, after the first phase, that, with the increased participation in civic polls, the myth that "everything about Kashmir was being decided in Delhi has also gone." Though it is still too early to judge the overall impact of the current electoral processes, it is certain that municipal structures would provide for a substantive system to address legitimate local grievances. The empowerment of people through their representatives at the lowest and most dispersed levels of Governance is bound to gradually change the micro-politics of terrorist violence.

Since the escalation of terrorism in 1988 and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions, terrorist groups have managed to build pockets of influence across the State and, at one point of time, had even replaced local structures of governance in some areas. The operation of local government institutions is bound to erode the support base of the extremists and, if the initial response generated is a yardstick, these elections could change the ground realities in ways that would consolidate the cumulative impact of the 2004 Parliamentary polls and the 2002 State Assembly elections. Both these earlier electoral exercises saw a significant turn out of voters in defiance of terrorist threats, and extended the spheres of non-violent political activity, even as they helped restore the integrity of civil administrative institutions in wide areas of neglect. Over time, the increasing popularity of electoral processes is also bound to impact on the overground separatist camp, with organisations like the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) being forced to prove their popularity through democratic means.

The small truth of these civic elections is that the youth in the Kashmir Valley, including a large number of women, have been brought to the forefront. Urban Development Minister, G.H. Mir, put the average age of women candidates at 35 and that of men at 30. Opportunities to be part of the developmental process and to secure gainful employment have been critical influencing factors. Sobiya Mushtaq, a candidate in the Sopore town of Baramulla district, a hub of separatist politics, for instance, stated, ''I had no idea what civic polls are all about... But now I am enthusiastic. I will get some monthly salary and then I will also be able to help in the development of our locality.'' The sentiment was echoed by Nazima Rashid, a candidate from Khwaja Bazaar in the capital Srinagar: ''I want to serve people, especially women in my ward… These polls will give us a voice in the government...'' The decision to reserve 33 per cent seats for women has enormous potential for transformation, bringing a much larger proportion of women into the wider political process. Another significant spin-off is that a representative character would give local bodies more powers for decision-making and also augment accountability, factors sorely lacking in the violence-wracked State.

There is, however, one stark blemish on the representative character of the current elections: the names of approximately 200,000 Kashmiri Pandits (descendents of Brahmin priests) were reportedly found to have been deleted from the electoral rolls. According to the Municipal Corporation Act, those who do not live at a particular address for more than three years are automatically deleted from the rolls, which means that virtually the entire population of Kashmiri Pandits, who were forced out of their home in 1989-90, are mechanically disenfranchised. Ghulam Hassan Mir, a leader of the ruling PDP, justifies this on the grounds that, "This is not a question of giving rights to migrants. The municipal elections are about civic amenities. These have to be seen by people where they live." Ajay Chrangoo, Chairman of the Panun Kashmir (a Pandit organisation), however, rejects this position, arguing, "We are not living there, the situation is not conducive, and this blocks our democratic right. How will we tackle this situation?"

Electoral legitimacy, as is the case in other theatres of terrorist violence across the globe may, however, also have a potentially adverse impact if the disconcerted terrorist groups choose to up the ante and provoke a major escalation in violence. Given the track record of Indian security forces, the changing global and regional situation, the increasing difficulty of infiltration across the border, and the progressive disenchantment of the local population with the politics of the gun, however, it will require the most extraordinary effort on the part of the terrorists and their state sponsors to successfully engineer a reversal of the declining trends in violence that have established themselves in the State since 2001.